CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Corner of Old Mill Street and Upper Kirby Street/Lampwick Lane

41 No. Apartments

FOR: ZENTRA GROUP Plc

VERSION B: 24th August 2026

REFERENCE: 2016/0054/CIS/04

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

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Corner of Old Mill Street and Upper Kirby Street/Lampwick Lane

2016/0054/CIS/04

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recommendations made

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The following areas have been identified as a concern and should be addressed (see section 3.3 for more details).

- Consider measures to improve security and privacy of exposed ground floor apartment windows.
- Access control and physical security of the buildings should be carefully considered.

Additionally, there are a number of recommendations made in section 3.3 of this report which would enhance the security of the development, and it is highly recommended that these are considered. It is also recommended that the development is built to Secured by Design standards.



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
1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located on the periphery of Manchester city centre, within the area of Ancoats.

The site is roughly square, and the boundaries are defined by a vehicular access route to a carp parking area to the front of Fanatics to the North-East, to the South-East the site is bound by an unnamed road, to the South-West the site is bound by Upper Kirby Street/Lampwick Lane, and to the North-West the site is bound by Old Mill Street.

The local area is typically residential with both a large number of apartments in the local area, but also a high number of both older housing stock and relatively newly built houses. Old Mill Street is a busy route through the area, connecting areas of East Manchester with Manchester city centre.













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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st August 2025 to 31st July 2026.

Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
25	28	72	242	61	31	9	90	14	23

2.1.1 The overall rate of crime is above average for the Manchester division, with less serious wounding, vehicle crime and criminal damage being the highest recorded offence types. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres where there is often a higher concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to an increase of crime and disorder issues.

2.1.2 Less serious woundings have occurred throughout the local area, with a hotspot of offences to the southwest of the proposed site at the junction of Pollard Street and Great Ancoats Street. Assaults, harassment, and public order offences have been the most common less serious woundings taking place, with incidents between known associates and domestic disputes most commonly reported.

2.1.3 The site's close proximity to the city centre means there is a higher volume of vehicles due to the large number of commuters that pass through and use parking facilities within the local area. Theft from motor vehicle has been the most common vehicle crime offence, with offenders having smashed the glazing in the windows or used implements to lockpick the doors before removing items from within.

2.1.4 Criminal damage to vehicles has accounted for the majority of criminal damage offences taking place in the local area, with offenders having targeted vehicles parked on the streets and in car parks by using bodily pressure or objects to smash the glazing in windows and damage the bodywork of cars, vans, and buses.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 Forcing open secure doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to apartments

Possible Solution - All apartment entrance doorsets should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (i.e. BS PAS 24).

2.2.2 Entering apartment buildings by means of insecure doors/ tailgating residents and gaining access to communal areas.

Possible Solution - There should be access controlled secure doorsets restricting access to the circulation core of the building to reduce the possibility of would-be offenders from tailgating residents and visitors into the building.

2.2.3 Posing as a legitimate customer and gaining access to staff only areas by means of tailgating staff and exploitation of insecure doors.

Possible Solution – Any staff-only areas should operate on an access control system with access restricted to authorised personnel.

2.2.4 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors to gain access into communal areas and apartments.

Possible Solution – All ground floor communal doors should be fitted with door closers and lock automatically, to prevent these doors from being left open and insecure. Any publicly accessible apartment entrance doors should be fitted with a split-spindle, or fixed external handle, to prevent them from being opened from the outside when unlocked. Anny accessible windows should be restricted in opening to prevent them from being fully opened if left insecure.

2.2.5 Theft of parcels left by couriers in communal and insecure areas.

A secure parcel room should be provided for the delivery of parcels, which can operate on an access control system and be covered by CCTV. Alternatively, a delivery locker system can be used.

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2.3 Risk Factors - Residential

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:


- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

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
2.4 Crime Rate Comparison

The rates below relate to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.


Comparison of Burglary Dwelling Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester




Comparison of Wounding Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester



2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **78% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **72% lower** than Greater Manchester and **71% lower** than England & Wales.

2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **80% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **73% lower** than Greater Manchester and **48% lower** than England & Wales.

2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **68% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **58% lower** than Greater Manchester and **48% lower** than England & Wales.


2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **46% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **11% lower** than Greater Manchester and **8% higher** than England & Wales.

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
2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.


Burglary dwelling – Day Range



Burglary dwelling – Time Range



Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry



2.5.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of domestic burglary peaks on Wednesday in the afternoon (14:00-15:00). Offenders often target dwellings in the afternoon when they are often left empty for long periods of time whilst the owners are at work, giving them the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:


- In cases where the entry point has been recorded as "unknown", it is likely that the offender has exploited insecure windows or doors.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.
- Forcing open secure windows and doors using implements and bodily pressure.

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
2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.6.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Saturday and Sunday in the evening (20:00-00:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles late at night when they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 Erection of a residential apartment building comprising 41no. dwellings (Use Class C3), together with landscaping and associated works.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 There will be defensible space to the ground-floor apartments fronting Old Mill Street and Lampwick Lane, helping to reduce the potential for antisocial behaviour.

3.2.2 Old Mill Street is a busy thoroughfare providing access to and from the city centre, as well as the inner ring road. The volume of both vehicular and pedestrian traffic will provide good levels of passive surveillance.

3.2.3 The main entrance to the building, together with other external entrance doors serving the apartments, will be accessed from Old Mill Street and Lampwick Lane, where they will be highly visible from the public highway.

3.2.4 The main building entrance is designed with a splayed frontage, allowing good visibility of the entrance and helping to deter loitering.

3.2.5 The proposed development will bring the existing vacant plot into active use. The site is currently hoarded along parts of its boundary and appears to be used as a surface car park.

3.2.6 A secure cycle store will be provided, allowing residents to safely and securely store bicycles within the building.

3.2.7 A dedicated parcel store will be incorporated within the building, enabling parcels to be stored securely where direct delivery to residents is not possible.

3.2.8 Post boxes will be installed within the entrance lobby, allowing mail to be delivered without providing unauthorised access to the remainder of the building.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 To the rear of the building, two bedroom windows will directly abut the pavement, which could leave them vulnerable to antisocial behaviour, criminality and reduced privacy. It is recommended that appropriate security and privacy measures are considered for these windows. Such measures could include ornamental railings or bell bars, windowsill planters and, to enhance privacy, obscure glazing film applied to the lower half of the glazing.

3.3.2 The communal entrance doors should be certified to BS PAS 24 (or an equivalent standard), be self-closing and fitted with a multi-point electronic locking system. The doors should also be capable of operating as part of an electronic access control system, with all such features falling within the scope of the relevant certification.

3.3.3 Access into the building should be controlled by a video entry phone system, with the image displayed on the handset itself rather than via a television set, enabling residents to vet visitors before granting access. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.

3.3.4 To prevent tailgating, a second secure, access-controlled door set should be provided between the entrance lobby and the building's circulation areas.

3.3.5 Access to the proposed cycle store should be restricted to residents via an access-controlled door certified to a recognised burglary-resistant standard, such as BS PAS 24. A vision panel should be incorporated into the door to enable users to assess any potential threats before entering or exiting the facility. Access from the cycle store into the main building should also be controlled through the access control system.

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3.3.6 The external entrance to the cycle store should be illuminated to a high standard to facilitate safe use during hours of darkness and to enhance opportunities for natural surveillance.

3.3.7 The external door to the bin store should be certified to a recognised burglary-resistant standard. Alternatively, where this is not achievable, the internal door between the bin store and the building should be similarly certified to prevent unauthorised onward access into the building.

3.3.8 Consider treating the rear and side blank elevations of the building with an anti-graffiti coating to a height of 2.0 metres, allowing any graffiti to be removed more easily and reducing long-term maintenance requirements.

3.3.9 Access to the parcel store should be controlled through an access control system, limiting entry to authorised persons undertaking legitimate deliveries or collections. Ideally, the parcel store should also be covered by CCTV to deter theft and provide footage for review in the event of an incident.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification. Access into the build should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.

☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.

☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. Apartment entrance doors must have a door viewer.

☐ Construction of internal walls surrounding internal apartment entrance doors (600mm either side of the door set) should incorporate a resilient layer to reduce the risk of anyone breaking through the wall to access the locking mechanism. The resilient layer should be timber (minimum thickness of 9mm) or expanded metal.

☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.1 Windows

☐ Ground floor and easily accessible windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR A, STS 204, or STS 222.

☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.2 Glazing & Building Fabric

☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.

☐ There should be a block work wall or material of similar strength (e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind or within any new cladding/insulated panels to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack.

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4.3 Alarms

☐ If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either:

- BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
- BS 6799 for wireless systems

☐ If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

4.4 Access Control

☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:

- Communal entrances
- Parcel store
- Cycle store

4.5 Bicycle Parking

☐ Doors into internal cycle parking area(s) must be certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, with access restricted to registered residents (i.e. genuine bicycle owners).

☐ Cycle stands should either be U-profile or Sheffield style stands. If rack storage is used it should be possible for both wheels and the frame to be secured.

4.6 Lighting

☐ Fittings should produce ‘white’ light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.

☐ Dusk ‘til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

☐ Elevations of the building should be illuminated.

5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

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6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

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A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
30/10/2023	Amy Brontë Littlejohns	CIS application received
20/11/2023	Amy Brontë Littlejohns	Progress update
03/08/2026	Kat McMaster	Revised scheme
07/08/2026	Aisha SIllah	Project update
18/08/2026	Aisha Sillah	Updated drawings
18/08/2026	Aisha Sillah	Updated drawings

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
OLDMS-BUT-01-00-DR-A-94000	Ground Floor GA Plan - Planning	15/09/2026	P04
OLDMS-BUT-01-01-DR-A-94001	First Floor GA Plan - Planning	11/09/2026	P04
OLDMS-BUT-01-ZZ-DR-A-94002	Typical Floor GA Plan - Planning	03/09/2026	P03
OLDMS-BUT-01-05-DR-A-94005	Fifth Floor GA Plan - Planning	03/09/2026	P03
OLDMS-BUT-01-R5-DR-A-94006	Roof GA Plan - Planning	03/09/2026	P03
OLDMS-BUT-01-ZZ-DR-A-92001	Existing GA Elevations - South	03/09/2026	P02
OLDMS-BUT-01-ZZ-DR-A-92002	Existing GA Elevations - North	03/09/2026	P02
OLDMS-BUT-01-ZZ-DR-A-95001	Planning GA Elevations - South	03/09/2026	P03
OLDMS-BUT-01-ZZ-DR-A-95002	Planning GA Elevations - North	03/09/2026	P03
OLDMS-BUT-01-ZZ-DR-A-96001	Planning GA Longnitudinal Sections	11/09/2026	P04
OLDMS-BUT-01-ZZ-DR-A-96002	Planning GA Cross Sections	11/09/2026	P04
OLDMS-BUT-ZZ-00-DR-A-90010	Site location plan	03/09/2026	P01
OLDMS-BUT-ZZ-00-DR-A-90100	Existing Site Plan - Planning	03/09/2026	P02
OLDMS-BUT-ZZ-00-DR-A-90400	Proposed Site Plan - Planning	03/09/2026	P02
OLDMS-BUT-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-96500	Planning Bay Study and Section	03/09/2026	P02
OLDMS-BUT-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-96600	Planning Window Study and Section	03/09/2026	P02

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Revised scheme	24/08/2026

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