CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

A DEVELOPMENT OF 10 APARTMENTS AND 41 HOUSES

AT **188 WILMSLOW ROAD, FALLOWFIELD, MANCHESTER**

FOR: **VIEWS LTD**

VERSION A: **29.07.26**

2025/0431/CIS/01

designforsecurity

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GREATER MANCHESTER POLICE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported

We welcome the continuing investment in central Fallowfield and support redevelopment of this site for residential purposes.

From a crime prevention perspective, the positive features of the development include: the scheme design is of a high quality; there will be an appropriate balance in the mix of housing and the orientation of accommodation, focusing activity on appropriate areas of the site and surroundings; and, off-road, car and cycle parking facilities have been included.

Advice is included in the report, which we consider will enhance security of the development and this set out in sections 3.3 and 4. The principal recommendations relate to securing the buildings appropriately, limiting access points into the development to *bona fide* visitors, encouraging high quality in the private and semi-private realm to stimulate activity and supervision of the spaces around the development, and enhancing the security of the site's northern, eastern and southern boundaries.

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will support the application and make representations to Manchester Planning to require the inclusion of a condition requiring the completed development to achieve Secured by Design, SBD, accreditation. Should the recommendations included in this report be adopted, I have every confidence that the scheme will achieve the award, and the condition met.

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1 The Site and Surroundings

The photographs and plan below show the development site and its surroundings. The site, edged in red on the plan, is located on the western side of Wilmslow Road, Fallowfield in south Manchester. Wilmslow Road is very heavily trafficked, particularly with buses, and connects the student dominated suburbs south of the city with universities and the city centre. Just south of the site, the western side of Wilmslow Road includes Hilltop Court, a small complex of apartments, as well as a range of food and beverage outlets, retailers and property letting agencies. Adjoining the eastern boundary of the site, on Wilmslow Road, there is a concentration of bus stops, which predominantly serve the very large student population living in this part of Fallowfield. The University of Manchester's Fallowfield Campus is situated opposite the site on the eastern side of Wilmslow Road. The Campus halls of residence and support services cater for over 2000 students. South of the site, there is a cluster of streets lined with terraced houses, many of which are rented by students. Langley Road is one of these streets and has houses directly facing the site. Platt Fields Park adjoins the site's northern and western boundaries. The park is extensive and includes, *inter alia*: a boating lake, BMX track, children's playground, showgrounds and recreational pathways. Many of the facilities are concentrated centrally within the park to the west of the site. There is pedestrian entrance to the park on Wilmslow Road just north of the site, and a pedestrian and vehicle entrance on Mabfield Road, a short distance south-west of the site.




Looking toward the site from Wilmslow Road



Oakley Villa and the 1930's building from Langley Road



The main entrance to Oakley Villa is on the southern elevation facing Platt Fields Park





Well maintained grounds of the site with Oakley Villa and the 1930's building in the background



The Langley Road vehicle entrance and car park at the western end of the site



A view east along Langley Road with the site on the left and terraced housing on the right

The development site itself comprises three linked, but distinct, buildings: Oakley Villa - a 2-storey building dating from 1840 situated at the eastern end of the complex of buildings; a 3-storey office building, built in 1937 and sits at the southern edge of the site, adjacent to Langley Road; and, a 2-3 storey office building, constructed sometime in the 1970's and situated at the western part of the site. Some of the windows on the ground floor of this block have the additional security of steel bars. The buildings were formerly occupied by the trade union, USDAW. Car parking is located at the western edge of the site and includes a number of bays within the undercroft of the 1970's building. Access into this car park is gained from Langley Road via entrance that can be secured with an automated, sliding gate. There are two further vehicle entrances one on Wilmslow Road and a second on Langley Road towards Wilmslow Road, both of which provide access to a small unused area of parking in front of Oakley Villa. There is a pedestrian gate on Langley Road close to the entrance to the 1937 building. The grounds are landscaped and well-maintained. The site perimeter is defined with walls and railings of varying heights.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

The data below relates to crimes committed with 500m of the site between 1st January 2025 and 31st December 2025.

2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood around the site

All crime

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Use, or threat, of violence	Theft including shoplifting	Robbery	Drug offences	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
16	7	23	210	81	10	55	34	11	38

2.1.1 There were 485 recorded crimes in the neighbourhood around the development site during the period analysed. This number is a little above the average for a typical neighbourhood within Manchester. The neighbourhood does include a high number of bars, takeaways, retail outlets and student accommodation, all of which tend to be crime attractors or crime generators.

2.1.2 The most commonly crimes recorded were:

- Crimes involving the use, or threat, of violence - 43%
- Theft (including bicycle theft, robbery, and shoplifting) - 25%
- Drug offences – 11%
- Vehicle crimes – 9%
- Burglary – 5%.

2.1.3 The percentage of crimes involving the use or threat of violence is a noticeably lower than a typical suburban neighbourhood with the City off Manchester, however, crimes involving theft, the supply/possession of drugs and vehicle crime are appreciably higher. Hotspots for theft include a local supermarket, bars and cafes, a gym and student accommodation; bicycle theft is a particular issue at student accommodation and a nearby gym. Drug offences are most commonly recorded at Platt Fields Park and Wilmslow Road. Vehicle crime is more common in the terraced streets adjacent to the site and a similar cluster of terraced streets south-east of the site at Ladybarn.


2.1.4 There streets experiencing the most crimes were:

- Wilmslow Road (168 offences)
- Moseley Road (34)
- Wilbraham Road (40)
- Old Hall Lane Road (29)


Domestic burglary

2.1.5 The number of burglary offences is usually very high in this neighbourhood but, in the period analysed, it appears to have fallen dramatically when compared to previous years; that said 10 of the 14 burglaries in this neighbourhood were committed in the terraced streets immediately south of the site.

Domestic Burglary – Day Range



Local Domestic Burglary – Time Range




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
2.1.6 Burglary tended to be committed evenly across the week with the exception of Monday. Midnight was the most common time for an offence to be committed. Offenders forced open doors on six occasions, entered via an unlocked door three times, smashed a window once as a means to gain entry. There were two incidents where the means of entry was unknown (suggesting a door or window was not locked) and two occasions where a garden shed was targeted.

Vehicle crime

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range




2.1.7 There were 45 vehicle-related crimes (theft of a vehicle and theft from a vehicle). Cars parked on Carill Drive, a short distance south-east of the site, and on Wilmslow Road were most frequently targeted. Offences were more common on Monday, Friday and Saturday and in the early evening and around mid-night.

2.2 Crime rate comparison

Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester, Greater Manchester, and England & Wales *England & Wales data is from January – December 2021.*

Domestic Burglary Crime Rates




Wounding Crime Rates




2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **23% lower** than the rate for Manchester, **1% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **1% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.2.2 The rate of wounding per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **36% lower** than the rate for Manchester, **14% lower** than the Greater Manchester rate and **65% higher** than the rate across England & Wales.

Criminal Damage Crime Rates



Vehicle Crime Rates



2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **43% lower** than the Manchester rate, **25% lower** than the Greater Manchester rate and **9% lower** than the rate across England & Wales.

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2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **16% higher** than the Manchester rate, **92% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **133% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.3 Typical modus operandi used in committing burglary, theft, criminal damage and vehicle-related crimes in Manchester, & measures to reduce vulnerabilities

2.3.1 Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools to drill locks

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all external doors should be certified to PAS 24 security standard - PAS 24 rated doors are very difficult to force open;
- entrance doors should be visible to neighbouring properties and from the 'street' rather than set within recesses or on more secluded elevations. Offenders will be less inclined to target properties where their actions may be witnessed;
- private gardens should be enclosed with appropriately high fencing and locking gates so that rear doors are only accessible to residents; and,
- secluded passageways to the sides and rear of properties should be avoided wherever possible as such routes can facilitate offender access to secluded areas of a site, as well as attract anti-social behaviours such as graffiti, fly-tipping or damage to fencing.

2.3.2 Doors have been targeted when left insecure

To minimise the risk of 'walk-in' burglaries:

- entrance doors should be fitted with a fixed handle or a 'split spindle', so that the only way in is with a key;
- communal entrance doors should be self-closing and lock automatically upon closing;
- defensible space should be provided between dwellings and the 'street', i.e. a small front garden enclosed with a 1000mm high fence. A degree of separation between public and private space can act as a psychological barrier to some offenders, who are then less willing to cross from public to clearly defined private space. Such boundary definition can also reduce the risk of criminal damage to property; and,
- dusk-to-dawn lighting should be fitted to all external doors. Light suggests a dwelling is occupied and highlights the actions of intruders.

2.3.3 Windows have been prised open by offenders

To minimise the risk of prising windows open:

- all ground floor windows should be certified to PAS 24 security standard - PAS 24 rated windows are very difficult to force open;
- all ground floor windows should include key-operated locks and opening restrictors; and,
- access to the rear should be controlled by the erection of robust boundaries and locking gates. Pedestrian routes alongside the rear boundaries should be avoided. As a means to break and enter, offenders are more likely to target windows on secluded side or rear elevations.

2.3.4 Glazing in rear doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry

To minimise the risk of offender smashing glazing in doors and windows:

- laminate glass should be fitted to all external doors and to all windows on the ground floor of the development.

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2.3.5 **Bikes were stolen from cycle stores at halls of residence, apartments and at a local gym**

To minimise the risk of bicycle theft:

- provide cycle parking in a convenient, secure store within the building, or in a store which has self-closing, self-locking doors or gates, and is only accessible to residents in possession of a programmable, key-fob.

2.3.6 **Offenders have damaged boundary fencing**

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting fencing:

- communal pathways should be secured with self-closing gates; and,
- fencing should be robust where exposed to the public realm.

2.3.7 **Theft of plant and machinery, and criminal damage during the construction period.**

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting the construction site:

- a secure boundary should be erected around the site;
- access should be restricted to contractors and authorised visitors;
- security staff should patrol during non-working hours;
- lighting and CCTV should be installed to illuminate the site and record activity;
- at the end of the working day, plant and machinery should be arranged to prevent forced access onto the site; and,
- plant and machinery should be fitted with a tracking device.

2.4 Environmental features of the site and surroundings that may influence crime patterns

2.4.1 Features of the physical environment can influence patterns criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether or not to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?
- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

2.4.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder at the site currently and in the future are as follows:

- the perimeter of the site is very well defined with boundary walls, railings and hedges;
- the presence of residents in the apartments and houses on the southern side of Langley Road, facing the site, offer a reasonable prospect of passive surveillance;
- the site is very well-maintained - offenders tend to target properties where there are signs of neglect or a lack of attention;
- CCTV and lighting of the buildings on the site may help to deter offenders; and,
- street-based CCTV on Wilmslow Road may help to detect offenders operating in the neighbourhood.

2.4.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder and the fear of crime and these include:

- In recent years, the level of crime, particularly burglary, theft, drug offences vehicle crime and robbery in the immediate vicinity of the site have been a concern. Though crime levels have

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fallen in the past 12 months, a development in this location is likely to attract the interest of opportunist as well as professional criminals. Burglary, criminal damage to buildings, theft and vehicle crime are all likely to affect a development on this site. Anti-social behaviour is also likely to occur;

- the site lies adjacent to Platt Fields Park with its recreational pathways. Such pathways can facilitate criminal activity as they provide a secluded, largely unsupervised, conduit for criminals used to access or escape from a target person or property;
- the lack of off-street parking in the immediate vicinity of the site and restrictions to parking on the north side of Langley Road results in on-street parking, which is being targeted by offenders. Further development in the area may lead to increase pressure for parking on the surrounding streets to the south of the site, which may lead to an increase vehicle-related crime in the neighbourhood;
- the buildings on the site have in some places been adapted to reduce the risk of being targeted by criminals. Adaptations include the addition of roller shutters and grilles/bars to windows. Such features suggest a property has been targeted in the past and can generate feelings of insecurity amongst local residents as well as being an unsightly addition to a site or building; and,
- the proximity of several food and beverage outlets attracts people to the area late at night and also attracts offenders who target customers or premises in the neighbourhood.

3 Development Appraisal

3.1 The proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development scheme will involve:

- demolition of the 1930's and 1970's buildings;
- retention, extension and refurbishment of Oakley Villa;
- construction of 41 houses;
- creation of landscaped, amenity spaces with pathways linking the development to Langley Road and Wilmslow Road; and,
- car and cycle parking.

3.2 Positive aspects of the proposals

3.2.1 Whilst not obvious from visiting the site or analysing crime data, vacant sites often attract anti-social behaviour in the form of theft, fly-tipping, fire raising or graffiti. The redevelopment of the site will restrict the ability for such activities to take place.

3.2.2 The proposed development will result in the re-purposing of a vacant site at the heart of Fallowfield.

3.2.3 A mixed-residential development is an appropriate use for the site in the context of the surrounding land uses.

3.2.4 The refurbished/extended Villa and proposed houses are of a good design quality and will positively contribute to the environmental quality of Fallowfield. Well-designed developments tend to experience much less crime or anti-social issues than those which are ill-considered or poorly designed.

3.2.5 The main entrances to the houses and apartment building will be readily visible to residents and visitors.

3.2.6 Controls can be installed at internal and external doors of the Villa to restrict access to residents and bona fide visitors.

3.2.7 The house and apartment buildings are orientated and designed in such a way that windows will provide excellent opportunities for passive surveillance of the private and public realm.

3.2.8 The provision of convenient, off-street parking reduces the risk of vehicles being targeted by offenders. The number of spaces seems adequate.

3.2.9 Private gardens and outdoor amenity spaces are included within the development. Communal spaces, in particular, can help build relationships between residents of the development and develop 'social

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capital'. Socially cohesive developments tend to be less attractive to offenders as residents are more likely to challenge strangers or intervene where inappropriate behaviour is witnessed.

3.2.10 The landscaping of the gardens and the grounds will support the quality of the local environment. Well-maintained verdant environments tend to attract less crime and anti-social behaviour.

3.2.11 There will be a reasonable number of apartments within the Villa, which increases the likelihood of some of the residents being present throughout the day. The presence of residents or even just visible signs of people being present - cars in the car park, lights on in apartments, bright lighting at the entrance doors, for example - will help to deter offenders.

3.2.12 'Defensible space' is included to the front, sides and rear of each house and the Villa.

3.2.13 Refuse and cycle storage will be provided.

3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the scheme

The site

3.3.1 To distinguish between public and private space, and to help preserve residents' privacy as well as reducing the risk of crime and anti-social behaviour affecting the development, the edges of the site should be defined with appropriately-styled hedging, gates and fencing, signage, and surface treatment to the access road and car parking. We recommend the following:

- to limit the use of the grounds as a shortcut and by offenders who otherwise may legitimately walk through the development between Langley Road and Wilmslow Road and vice versa, the Wilmslow Road entrance gate should be 1800mm high steel rail gate fitted with an electronic lock. The operation of the gate should be triggered by presenting a residents' security fob to a reader to both enter the site and leave. Visitors should be directed to the Langley Road entrances to the development;
- the pedestrian gate connecting the apartments to Langley Road should be a 1500mm high, steel-rail, self-closing gate.
- signs indicating the name of the apartment building should be mounted at each street entrance;
- signs indicating the private nature of the car parks should be mounted at the development entrances;
- the small car park serving the eastern part of the development should be secured with a 1500mm high, automated gate (operated by residents' security fob);
- the pathway that provides access to the rear of the terrace of three houses at the eastern edge of the site should be reconsidered/redesigned/deleted;
- car parking bays should be surfaced in a distinctive material that differs from the adjacent carriageway;
- the initial length of the access road and associated footpaths should be surfaced with a coloured or textured material that distinguishes it from the public highway;
- symbolic entrance features, such as gate posts but not necessarily gates, should be installed at the vehicle and pedestrian entrances to the development to communicate to drivers, pedestrians and passers-by the private nature of the development;
- high fencing/walls/railings/hedges and gates should enclose private and communal gardens, and low fencing/walls/railings/hedges should define front gardens. Prickly, densely planted shrubs should be introduced to add security to the northern eastern and western boundaries of the development;
- low-intensity, dusk-to-dawn, lighting should illuminate all external doors of the houses and apartments, footpaths and car parking; and,
- PIR activated lighting should illuminate bin store and bike stores.

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Houses

Front gardens

3.3.2 Front gardens facing Langley Road should be defined with 900mm high hedges, railings, or dwarf wall with railing infill.

Rear garden fencing and gates

3.3.3 Rear garden gates should include a lock that can be operated from either side of the gate to allow, for example, drivers and cyclists to enter and leave without compromising the security of the property. Ideally, the gates should be self-closing and self-locking.

3.3.4 Rear gardens should be secured with 1800-2100mm high fencing.

3.3.5 Fencing between neighbouring houses should include an 1800mm high, close-boarded fencing panel (acting as a privacy screen, generally erected perpendicular to the back of the house, it may then be lowered to 1200mm or 1500mm of close-boarded fencing with 600mm or 300mm sections of trellis to create a secure boundary whilst also allowing neighbours to interact.

House security

3.3.6 Each house should be fitted with a security-rated entrance door, with number, door viewer and opening limiter. Multi-fold or patio doors should also be security-rated.

3.3.7 The ground floor windows of each house should be security-rated, fitted with key-operable locks, and have opening restrictors fitted. Glazing in all external doors and all accessible windows should include laminate glass.

3.3.8 Fit an intruder alarm, or a fuse spur to allow residents to install an alarm system.

3.3.9 Install a dusk-to-dawn light at the front and rear doors.

Cycle stores

3.3.10 A cycle storage sheds/box should be installed in the rear garden of each house. The shed/box should be fitted with a Sold Secure™, ground anchor, a Sold Secure™ hasp and staple, and a Sold Secure™ padlock.

Apartments

Communal entrance doors

3.3.11 The communal entrance doors and means of escape doors should be security-rated, self-closing and lock upon closure. The main entrance doors will need to be fitted with an audio/visual unit that allows visitors to communicate with residents prior to entry. Residents should be able to release the lock on the entrance doors from within their apartment to allow *bona fide* visitors entry.

Apartment security

3.3.12 Each apartment should be fitted with a security-rated entrance door with door viewer and opening limiter.

3.3.13 Windows at ground level should be security-rated, fitted with key-operable locks, and have opening restrictors fitted. Glazing in all external doors and all accessible windows should include laminate glass.

Mail delivery

3.3.14 Ideally, to reduce the need for regular access by delivery staff, mail should be delivered ‘through the external wall’ into boxes in the lobby or into robust boxes secured to the wall adjacent to communal entrance doors. A secure, parcel storage system should also be installed in the front lobby.

Cycle storage

3.3.15 A secure, weatherproof, cycle store should be provided. The entrance doors/gates to the cycle store should be fitted with a fob-activated, electronic lock (or good quality digital lock) and be self-closing/locking.

Intruder alarm and CCTV

3.3.16 Consider installing an intruder alarm to each apartment, particularly those on the ground floor.

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3.3.17 Consider installing a modest CCTV system, with cameras capable of monitoring the communal entrance doors and entrance lobbies, bike store, refuse store, external doors and the car parking. Images should be recorded and securely stored and thereafter retained for 30 days for review and for use as evidence in any prosecutions arising.

4 Physical Security

4.1 Doors

Houses

- ☐ All external doors must all be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS 202 BR2, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ The front doors should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key when closed.
- ☐ The front entrance doors should have fixed, clear-glazed sidelights or a door viewer, as well as an opening limiter fitted, so that residents can identify visitors prior to opening the door fully.
- ☐ Letter plates should meet the Door Hardware Federation's Technical Standard 008 (TS 008), be fitted with deflector plate, and be located a minimum of 400mm away from the internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Each house should be clearly numbered with the number visible from the 'street'.

Apartments

- ☐ The communal entrance doors should be:
    - compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2;
    - include a multi-point electronic lock, (which is an integral part of the certification), capable of being operated via an electronic access control system; and,
    - self-closing and lock automatically on closure.
- ☐ An audio-visual, unit should be located at the communal entrance doors to allow visitors to communicate with residents.
- ☐ Residents of apartments should have a handset in their apartment to speak to (and view) visitors.
- ☐ Residents of the apartments should be able to operate the communal entry door locking mechanism remotely from within their apartment to allow *bona fide* visitors entry.
- ☐ Individual apartment entrance doors must be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must include a door viewer and apartment number.
- ☐ Chain limiters to apartment entrance doors are recommended.

4.2 Window frames

- ☐ Ground floor windows of the houses and apartments should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, be fitted with key-operated locks, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limiting opening to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing within, and surrounding, all external doors and all ground floor windows of the houses, apartments and garages should incorporate at least one pane of glass rated compliant with BS EN356 P1A.

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4.4 Intruder alarm

- [ ] It is good practice to fit an alarm to each house and apartment. Alarms should be linked to contacts on all external doors, with PIR detectors covering all ground floor rooms that have windows. In the absence of an alarm a 13amp fuse spur should be provided to allow future residents to fit their own alarm.

4.5 Boundary fencing and gates

- [ ] Where appropriate, front gardens should be defined with 900mm high hedges, railings, or dwarf wall with railing infill.
- [ ] Rear garden gates should be a minimum of 1800mm high and include a lock that can be operated from either side of the gate. The gates should be self-closing and self-locking.
- [ ] Fencing between neighbouring houses should include an 1800mm high, close-boarded, privacy panel. Fencing may then be lowered to include panels of 1200mm or 1500mm high, close-boarded fencing, finished with 600mm or 300mm sections of trellis.

4.6 Lighting

- [ ] Dusk-to-dawn, LED lighting must be provided to illuminate the rear garden gates of the houses.
- [ ] Dusk-to-dawn lighting must be provided to all external front and rear doors of all houses.
- [ ] Dusk-to-dawn lighting must be provided to the apartment building communal entrance and means of escape doors.
- [ ] Lighting must be provided to the cycle store entrance doors and within the store.
- [ ] Lamps should produce a ‘white’ light and be operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor.
- [ ] PIR lighting is only suitable for the apartment residents’ cycle and bin stores.

4.7 Meter cupboards

- [ ] Unless smart meters are installed, meters should be located in ground level boxes to the front of each house, not with the secure area at the side or rear.

4.8 Downpipes

- [ ] Wherever possible, downpipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the brickwork to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.

5 Management & Maintenance

- [ ] A plan should be drawn up to address maintenance issues associated the communal areas of the apartment building and landscaped fringes of the site.

6 Construction

- [ ] The developer should take appropriate measures to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in and out.
- [ ] Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved.

7 Secured by Design (SBD)

- [ ] Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout, and construction stages of homes and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

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A Contact Register

Date	Contact	Summary of Contact
11.11.26	Patrick Sheridan	Request for Crime Impact Statement
28.01.26		Site visit
29.07.26	Patrick Sheridan	Report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following plans and drawings:

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
AL(02)001 D1	Existing block plan		
AL(02)002 D1	Existing location plan		
SK058 D3	Proposed site plan – ground floor		

In the event of any subsequent changes to the scheme, it may be necessary for to review the recommendations within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Date	Revisions
A	29.07.26	

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D Glossary

Physical Security Standards

PAS 24

Enhanced security performance requirements for doorsets and windows in the UK. Doorsets and windows intended to offer a level of security suitable for dwellings and other buildings exposed to comparable risk. It is designed to mimic an attack by an opportunist burglar, using tools which are easy to conceal.

STS 201

Enhanced security to satisfy the requirements for certification of doorsets, equivalent to test standard to PAS 24.

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors, roller shutters, fences and barriers. Products are rated via the term Burglary Resistance (BR) and range from BR1 (lower security rating) to BR6 (higher security rating).

LPS 1175

Physical security for products manufactured for perimeter, façade, internal spaces and entrapment protection. The higher the security rating, the more formidable the security product.

Developed following extensive consultation with stakeholders, the most recent issue sees the previous single digit performance classifications (i.e. Security Ratings 1 to 8) extended to one formed of two elements that illustrate performance in terms of:

- *Threat level (first element) – Letter (A to H) corresponding with the tool kit used to evaluate the product's intruder resistance and number of attackers involved.*
- *Delay (second element) – Numeric value (1, 3, 5, 10, 15 or 20) corresponding with the minimum delay (in minutes) provided by the product when placed in a locked condition.*

BS EN 1627

European standard for the burglary resistance of pedestrian doorsets, windows, curtain walling, grilles and shutters. It defines six resistance classes, from RC1 to RC6, with RC1 being the lowest level of resistance and RC6 the highest. These classes indicate the level of resistance to forced entry, with higher classes requiring more time and specialized tools to breach.

BS EN 356

European standard that specifies the resistance of laminated glazing (i.e. two or more layers of glass bonded together with a plastic interlayer) to manual attacks, such as might occur during forced entry or vandalism. It classifies laminated glass into different resistance levels, ranging from P1A to P8B, with P1A being the lowest and P8B the highest.

Useful Websites

Design For Security – Designing Out Crime *– apply for Crime Impact Statements or the Secured by Design Award from Greater Manchester Police*

Secured by Design - Secured by Design *– SBD Award Scheme, Design Guides and Member Companies*

ParkMark - Home *– Park Mark Safer Parking Award Scheme*

NBS Source *– find, select and specify building products (including security-certified products)*

RedBook Live - LPCB Red Book *– search for LPS 1175 certified products*

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