

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Unit 12-18, Piccadilly Trading Estate

Commercial (4107.5m^2)

for: ESN (Scotland) Ltd (SPPS)

version A: 1st May 2020

URN: 2020/0199/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

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Unit 12-18, Piccadilly Trading Estate, Manchester 2020/0199/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Conditional Support for the Proposed Development

This development has been assessed using the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. At this time our support for this scheme is dependent on the issues raised within sections 3.3, 4 and 5 being incorporated into any future operations on the site.



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Consultant

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Contents

1 Visual Audit 4

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis 5

2.1 Crime Summary

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.3 Risk Factors

2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis

2.5 Theft Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

3 Layout Appraisal 9

3.1 Proposed development

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

3.3 Further Recommendations to improve security of the development

4 Physical Security 10

4.1 Doors and Shutters

4.2 Shutters

4.3 Windows

4.4 Glazing

4.5 Boundaries

4.6 Lighting

4.7 Car parking

4.8 CCTV

4.9 Other

4.10 Fit Out

5 Management & Maintenance 13

6 Construction 13

7 Useful References 13

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

Appendix

A Contact register 14

B Associated Documents 14

C CIS Version History 14

D Glossary 15

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1 Visual Audit

The site is located at the south eastern edge of Manchester city centre, close to Piccadilly railway station & the Mayfield regeneration area. The neighbourhood is predominantly commercial and industrial in character but with nearby plots in process of regeneration into residential, leisure and commercial uses.

Legitimate activity in the area is highest during the working day. Generally the area is very quiet at night with little passing traffic.

There are some areas of unmanaged open space and vacant plots in the vicinity. Vacant and neglected plots provide opportunities for antisocial behaviour which often escalates into criminal behaviour. Construction operations on some nearby sites generates further criminal activity, with building materials and equipment being targeted by offenders, who feel they operate relatively anonymously within the transient community of employees.

Commuter car parking. The proximity of the city centre and Piccadilly railway stations means that quiet neighbouring streets and local car parks are frequently used for long-term commuter car parking, an attractive target for criminals.



In light of current restrictions on non-essential travel, DfS staff have not been able to visit the proposed development site, and this report has been prepared and issued without inclusion of site photographs.

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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 to 30th June 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
<5	27	53	97	39	28	<5	278	43	17

2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is somewhat average for Manchester, with exception to vehicle crime which is high. The proposed site is located within close proximity to Manchester City Centre where there is a high volume of retail outlets and licenced premises which often increases the amount of crime and disorder within an area. Less serious woundings, theft and vehicle crime have been the highest recorded offences taking place.

2.1.2 Less serious woundings have mostly taken place to the north of the proposed site, around Great Ancoats Street and New Islington Metrolink stop. Assaults and public order offences have been the highest recorded less serious woundings in the local area. Offences have often involved unknown associates targeting members of the public, often vulnerable victims. Offences involving domestic incidents and incidents between known associates are also common in the local area.

2.1.3 Offences of theft have occurred throughout the local area, with a particular hotspot occurring around the proposed site area and along Fairfield Street. The majority of thefts have involved the removal of mobile phones, either when left insecure on a table or from a bag by means of pick pocketing. Offenders have also targeted businesses within the area, either removing items from the yard outside and making off, or entering the business, posing as a customer and removing items from within. Thefts from hotel rooms have also been common within the area.

2.1.4 Vehicle crime is high within the local area; however there are a large number of car parking facilities and on street parking facilities. Vehicle crime offences have mostly occurred to the south and west of the proposed site. Theft from motor vehicle and criminal damage to vehicles has been the highest recorded vehicle crime offences taking place. Offenders are breaking glazing within windows using implements in order to remove times from within the vehicle as well as cause damage. Offenders are also removing vehicle registration plates and vehicle parts as well as causing damage to the vehicle by means of scratching paint work and damaging bodywork.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 Shutters have been targeted most frequently, with offenders often using implements and power tools to force them open

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Sections 4.1/4.2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack. Avoid locating shutters in concealed areas where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed. Ensure that parked vehicles and stored materials do not obscure sight lines.

2.2.2 Doors have also be commonly targeted, either by being forced open, targeted when left insecure by staff or the glazing within them has been smashed to gain entry

Possible Solution - Although the location of doors should be considered (ideally placed where they can be readily observed, so that potential criminals would be more easily detected), it is inevitable that some will be located where they will benefit from lower levels of natural surveillance. All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to

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suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV (see Sections 4.5, 4.6 & 4.7) can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.

2.2.3 Where the point of entry is 'unknown', this is likely to be where offenders have posed as legitimate customers, visitors or employees have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas to steal property

Possible Solution – There should be a robust access control system in place to ensure that callers to the units are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed access into them (see Section 4.1). All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be secure areas for staff to store their belongings while at work. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour.

2.2.4 Theft of externally stored materials, tools and plant equipment

Possible Solution - The integrity of the boundary treatments should be evaluated and regularly checked for defects. Inappropriately parked vehicles/trailers and other externally stored items can obscure the spread of lighting and CCTV coverage, creating potential areas of intense shadowing and blind spots. It is recommended that this is considered in the external arrangement, and 'no store/park' areas specifically identified to avoid inadvertently blocking surveillance. Storage/parking areas close to boundaries should also be avoided as they may mask any damage to perimeter fencing.

2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:


- Commercial burglary
- Cash robbery
- Unauthorised access to private spaces/Tailgating
- Shoplifting
- Employee theft
- Theft of customer / staff property
- Criminal damage to property

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
2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.


Retail Burglary – Day Range



Retail Burglary – Time Range



Retail Burglary – Point of Entry



2.4.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Wednesday. During the day the risk of burglary at retail premises increases in the early hours of the morning (12am – 6am). Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed and the streets are quiet. Offenders perceive the risk of being witnessed or apprehended at its lowest.

2.4.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been the occurred most frequently:


- Smashed glazing in windows and doors to gain entry to premises.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and tailgating / exploitation insecure doors to gain access to staff only areas.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily force and implements to gain entry.
- Opening secure doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain entry.

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
2.5 Theft Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.

Retail Theft – Day Range



Retail Theft – Time Range




2.5.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of theft from retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Friday and Saturday. During the day the risk of theft at retail premises peaks in the late morning and into the evening (10:30am – 8pm). Small, personal items are being targeted, mostly mobile phones, purses and bags.


2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.6.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Thursday and Saturday during the morning and into the evening, with an increase of offences occurring during the afternoon (12pm – 3pm). Offenders often target vehicles within the City Centre as they are left unattended for long periods of time, reducing the likelihood that the offender will be caught or identified.

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development comprises a change of use to change of use of the existing building to provide industrial, office, storage or distribution use, with minimal alterations to the existing structures.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The exterior of the buildings have a relatively simple footprint containing few recesses that could be exploited by potential offenders. Most doors are positioned flush with the outer elevations, reducing the scope for concealment / abuse, particularly on the less-well-used elevations.

3.2.2

3.3 Further Recommendations to improve security of the development

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 Evaluation of the security capability of the existing construction should be undertaken, to ensure that any potential weakness in the building fabric is identified and appropriately addressed. External doors and shutters may not now form a reliably-secure perimeter to the site, and in such circumstances it may be necessary to provide some additional reinforcement to ensure that they are effective at preventing unauthorised entry to the building.

3.3.2 Evaluation of boundaries, including vegetation. The condition of the boundary fencing should be reviewed to ensure that it can provide a consistent level of security to the site. Any sections of deficient fencing should be replaced with a robust fencing system. Any new boundary fencing should be 2.4m high minimum. The proximity of bushes and trees to the fence line can undermine the security of the boundary by creating cover for an intruder, or providing potential climbing aids. Overhanging branches and dense vegetation should be removed where it could be exploited in this way. Care must be taken to ensure that any proposed landscape planting to the perimeter of the site is maintained at an appropriate height, in order to prevent it impeding views to and from the site, and avoid the creation of hiding places that could be exploited by offenders.

3.3.3 Zoning / Subdivision. Internally, the building should be capable of zoning so that entry to parts of the premises can be effectively controlled. Movements in and out of the buildings should be confined to specific areas and access controls used to ensure only authorised staff can enter controlled areas. Subdivision to create smaller individual units should use robust construction (see section 4.9). There should be no shared facilities that could compromise security, and emergency egress routes that involve access to shared stairwells or corridors should be alarmed and covered by monitored CCTV.

3.3.4 Parking controls. Demand for car parking in the vicinity is very high, and the open frontage of the site allows scope for fly parking. Access to car parking areas should be capable of being controlled and barriered off when not in use to discourage abuse and unauthorised activity at off-peak times.

3.3.5 Cycle parking. Cycle & bin stores located within publicly-accessible space are frequent targets for theft, criminal damage and can provide cover for other criminal and antisocial behaviour. It is advised that they are located behind a secure fence line. Any cycle parking provision intended for staff should be accommodated in a secure enclosure accessible to cyclists only, or located in part of the site with restricted access. This area should be specifically covered by any site CCTV system and have controlled entry. Any provision for visitors should be located where it can be easily observed from within the building and also covered by CCTV.

3.3.6 Refuse. Arrangements for storage and disposal of refuse should not compromise the security of the development. Entry to refuse stores should be strictly controlled. Collection of waste should not require or allow external operatives to enter restricted areas within the site. Waste bins must not be stored on the streets.

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3.3.7 CCTV and lighting. A comprehensive lighting and CCTV system should be installed to cover communal areas of the site. CCTV cameras should be capable of identifying all vehicle and pedestrian movements into and out of the site as well as the building entrances, elevations and boundary fencing behind it. To facilitate the CCTV system, dusk until dawn lighting should be provided, particularly around the access doors / gates and any loading bays. Signage should be located at the site entrance to inform visitors that their movements will be monitored and recorded.

3.3.8 Doors providing emergency egress. These doors should not be used for regular entry or exit. The doors should be fitted with an alarm which, when opened, sounds and alerts the building managers. Doors should include panic hardware on the inner side, with the outer side being free of any handles or other means of opening.

3.3.9 The existing vegetation around the site has provided cover for antisocial behaviour, affects the spread of street lighting and can obscure sight lines around the boundary. Where existing vegetation is to be retained, this must be subject to regular maintenance, including a routine pruning programme for larger bushes / shrubs.

3.3.10 The position of ancillary structures, parked trailers and any external storage areas should be carefully considered in relation to the following:-

- Their potential to block sight lines and create hiding places.
- Their potential to obscure CCTV and lighting.
- Their potential to create climbing aids that would assist unauthorised exit or entry over boundary fencing.
- Their potential to obscure damage to fence lines.

4 Physical Security

The proposed development involves conversion of an existing building, and thus the potential to make alterations and upgrade its physical security is to some extent constrained by its structure. However, the following standards should be the minimum applicable to all new-build elements of the scheme. If the identified security risks cannot be addressed by design solutions, the protection of the buildings and their occupants will be more dependent on effective supervision and management.

4.1 Doors and Shutters

- All external doors (single and double leaf) must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- The doors / frames to internal offices / rooms etc. should be robust / solid-core (minimum 44mm thick) and capable of being secured when unoccupied. Staff should be able to store their belongings in a secure area while at work.
- Garage or sectional overhead doors must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2.

4.2 Shutters

- Where grilles or shutters are required for additional protection the minimum certification required is:
  - LPS 1175: Issue 7 Security Rating 1
  - STS 202: Issue 3, Burglary Rating 1

4.3 Windows

- All windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs / dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions.

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- Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed / lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.4 Glazing

- Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.5 Boundaries

- Secure parts of the site should be enclosed with rigid-panel welded-wire mesh fencing (with no mid-rails that would aid climbing) and gates, minimum height of 2.4m. Care should be taken to ensure that panels are fixed securely to the posts and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels / gates. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures / locking points to gates should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding / protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. The fencing / gates should also be located away from any other climbing aids, such as lighting columns, trees, junction boxes etc.



- The site boundary treatments should be positioned on hard standing ground. Where this is not possible, the ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary.

4.6 Lighting

- External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- Fittings should produce ‘white’ light, as opposed to yellow / orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- Dusk ‘til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell / daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.7 Car parking

- Lighting to car parks should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout / lux plan.
- Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated, with pedestrian routes / directions clearly signed.

4.8 CCTV

- Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to complement the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

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- With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: Entrances to site, external areas all around the buildings and ancillary facilities, external doors including emergency egresses / hatches, access-controlled doors & cycle parking areas.

4.9 Other

- Staff lockers should be provided, and in a location where there is a high level of activity and surveillance, so that staff can safely store personal items during the working day.
- If cash is to be stored overnight on the premises, a safe should be provided adequate capacity, with a deposit facility, certified to LPS 1183. The correct size and category of safe should be determined by an assessment of prospective takings and to meet insurance needs.
- Property marking. All high value equipment (e.g. computers) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage / theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- Graffiti on surfaces. This kind of abuse is particularly prevalent in the vicinity of the site. Expanses of blank wall exposed to public areas should be formed of a graffiti-resistant surface or have a resistant coating applied at the outset to enable easy removal of any unauthorised markings.
- Alarms - A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover all buildings on the site, linked to contacts on all external doors / shutters and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.
- Wall construction should be of a robust nature enough to withstand physical attack through the material. Where a lightweight wall construction is being considered a reinforced lining such as welded steel mesh will need to be incorporated.

4.10 Fit Out

- Design for Security understands that the designers and client may not always know who will be occupying their buildings once complete, and therefore the end-users requirements. Typical components which are subject to fit-out are:
  - Internal access control
  - Internal doors in to premises
  - Alarm systems
- These features can be critical to a secure environment, and we would urge the client to provide would-be tenants with the contact details for Design for Security, who will provide free advice on internal security matters so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

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5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 There should be a comprehensive security regime in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews / exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.

5.1.2 Any high value equipment (e.g. computers, tools, plant/equipment etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage / theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

5.1.3 Effective signage within the site will help to orientate people who are unfamiliar with it (e.g. visitors and delivery staff) and can direct them away from sensitive / restricted areas, making it obvious where they should and shouldn't be.

5.1.4 Active continuous management and maintenance of the premises can reduce the likelihood of crime and disorder occurring. A security management plan should be created to promote good administration of the premises, this plan should include the following:

- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras, lighting, access controls, signage.
- Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti;
- Cash management within the premises
- Cash-in-transit collections / deliveries and banking practices
- Regular vegetation management to maintain sight lines and lighting / CCTV coverage
- Management of stock deliveries.
- Opening and closing the premises

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

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Appendix

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
12/03/2020	CBRE Ltd	CIS instruction received
25/03/2020	CBRE Ltd	Commission confirmed / fee agreed

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
310861-U12-18-0G	Internal Area Plan	25/04/19	A
310861-U12-18-01	Internal Area Plan	25/04/19	A

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999
General performance requirements for door / window assemblies.

A performance standard for door-sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door-set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012
General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door-sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French / double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)
Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)
Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012
Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011
Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT
Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS
Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT
Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB / PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)
A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)
A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)
The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security
www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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