

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Development of Key Worker Accommodation, PBSA apartments and retained Healthcare Uses
Octagon House

For: Octagon Project
Version A: 19/05/2026
Reference: 2017/0630/CIS/02

designforsecurity

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GREATER MANCHESTER POLICE

Octagon House

URN: 2017/0630/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported with minor security additions required.

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Robust control of access to back-of-house areas.
- Access controls through the building.
- install security certified doors, glazing and windows.
- Secure car park access & cycle stores.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will make representations to Manchester Planning to require the inclusion of a condition requiring the completed development to achieve Secured by Design (SBD), accreditation. Should the recommendations as listed within Section 4 of this report be adopted, I have every confidence that the scheme will achieve the award and the condition met.

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site is located in an established area of student accommodation, residential, commercial premises and buildings of historic interest located on the approx. 1 mile from the City centre of Manchester.


The perimeter of the immediate surrounding is defined with unmanaged dense landscape planting to the western boundary, screening the rear site and the neighbouring buildings to the west. The secure fence line is contained behind this planted area.

The red line development area shown on the adjacent site plan provides an existing car park for the octagon commercial office building.

Neighbouring buildings to the west are are a mix of retail units and car mechanics. Parking within the area is limited due to the locality of St. Mary's Hospital resulting in a high concentration of on-street parking confined to specific locations.

The main site entrance currently benefits from a gate which appeared closed across the working day. The proposed area for redevelopment is currently a concrete service yard and parking area.

The site has good links to the nearby road networks. Local public transport bus services are approx. 300m west on Upper Brook St.





1 – Existing site from Hathersage Rd.


2 – View along Hathersage Rd


3 – Existing pedestrian entrance to the NHS Octagon office building.


7 Controlled car parking to rear of the Octagon building.


6 – Existing car parking off Hathersage Road.


5 – Existing boundary treatments


4 – View along Carmoor Road

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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Local Crime Summary

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st April 2025 to 31st March 2026 within 500m of the site.

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
26	9	42	222	35	11	6	38	9	16

2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the past 12 months is high for the Manchester division, with particularly levels of violence, domestic burglary, vehicle crime and theft - reflecting the site's location on the edge of the city centre, close to University and Hospital campuses and the high concentration of student accommodation in the surrounding area. Students tend to be more vulnerable to crime due to a number of factors including their age, lifestyle, income, tenure, employment status, occupancy and accommodation type. The majority of crime is concentrated towards the east of the proposed site, where the majority of privately rented student accommodation is located. A hotspot of offences has also occurred to the west where the hospital is located.

2.1.2 Less serious woundings have occurred all throughout the residential neighbourhoods surrounding the site and at the hotspot areas mentioned above. Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the most reported less serious woundings, the majority of which have involved disputes between known associates, as well as some cases of domestic violence.

2.1.3 Criminal damage to vehicles has been the highest recorded criminal damage taking place within the local area, whereby offenders have smashed the glazing in windows and used objects to damage the body work of cars. There have also been cases of damage being dealt to the external doors of both retail properties and dwellings, as well as smashing the glazing in front windows.

2.1.4 In instances of theft, offenders have primarily used pickpocketing and distraction techniques in order to remove items from the person such as credit cards, mobile phones and wallets. Offenders have also targeted insecure items left unattended on tabletops and benches in public spaces and restaurants.

2.1.5 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed mixed-use development, the more detailed analysis below will look at use-specific burglary, theft and vehicle crime.

2.2 Risk Factors - Residential

2.2.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds, or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

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2.3 Risk Factors - Healthcare

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Safety of medical records and drugs
- Theft of personal belongings (patients and staff)
- Criminal damage to property
- Unauthorised access to private space/restricted areas
- Robbery and attacks on staff, patients and members of the public
- Arson
- Bicycle theft
- Loitering groups
- Theft of/from parked cars
- Acts of criminal damage during the construction period

2.4 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.4.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting PBSA residential properties, local vehicles are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

2.4.1 Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools to drill locks

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all external doors should be certified to PAS 24 security standard - PAS 24 rated doors are very difficult to force open;
- entrance doors should be visible to neighbouring properties and from the 'street' rather than set within recesses or on more secluded elevations. Offenders will be less inclined to target properties where their actions may be witnessed;
- private gardens should be enclosed with appropriately high fencing and locking gates so that rear doors are only accessible to residents; and,
- secluded passageways to the sides and rear of properties should be avoided wherever possible as such routes can facilitate offender access to secluded areas of a site, as well as attract anti-social behaviours such as graffiti, fly-tipping or damage to fencing.

2.4.2 Doors have been targeted when left insecure

To minimise the risk of 'walk-in' burglaries:

- entrance doors should be fitted with a fixed handle or a 'split spindle', so that the only way in is with a key;
- communal entrance doors should be self-closing and lock automatically upon closing;
- defensible space should be provided between dwellings and the 'street', i.e. a small front garden enclosed with a 1000mm high fence. A degree of separation between public and private space can act as a psychological barrier to some offenders, who are then less willing to cross from public to clearly defined private space. Such boundary definition can also reduce the risk of criminal damage to property; and,
- dusk-to-dawn lighting should be fitted to all external doors. Light suggests a dwelling is occupied and highlights the actions of intruders.

2.4.3 Windows have been prised open by offenders

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To minimise the risk of prising windows open:

- all ground floor windows should be certified to PAS 24 security standard - PAS 24 rated windows are very difficult to force open;
- all ground floor windows should include key-operated locks and opening restrictors; and,
- access to the rear should be controlled by the erection of robust boundaries and locking gates. Pedestrian routes alongside the rear boundaries should be avoided. As a means to break and enter, offenders are more likely to target windows on secluded side or rear elevations.

2.4.4 Glazing in rear doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry

To minimise the risk of offender smashing glazing in doors and windows:

- laminate glass should be fitted to all external doors and to all windows on the ground floor of the development.

2.4.5 Bikes were stolen from cycle stores at halls of residence, apartments and a gym

To minimise the risk of bicycle theft:

- provide cycle parking in a convenient, secure store within the building, or in a store which has self-closing, self-locking doors or gates, and is only accessible to residents in possession of a programmable, key-fob.

2.4.6 Offenders have damaged boundary fencing

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting fencing:

- communal pathways should be secured with self-closing gates; and,
- fencing should be robust where exposed to the public realm.

2.4.7 Theft of plant and machinery, and criminal damage during the construction period.

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting the construction site:


- a secure boundary should be erected around the site;
- access should be restricted to contractors and authorised visitors;
- security staff should patrol during non-working hours;
- lighting and CCTV should be installed to illuminate the site and record activity;
- at the end of the working day, plant and machinery should be arranged to prevent forced access onto the site; and, plant and machinery should be fitted with a tracking device.

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
2.5 Local Crime Rate Comparisons

The graphs below compare the local rates of crime (i.e. crimes per 1,000 dwellings) with the average rates for Manchester, Greater Manchester and England & Wales.


Domestic Burglary Crime Rates




Wounding Crime Rates



Criminal Damage Crime Rates



Vehicle Crime Rates



2.5.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **43% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **27% lower** than Greater Manchester and **25% lower** than England & Wales.

2.5.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **55% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **38% lower** than Greater Manchester and **18% higher** than England & Wales.


2.5.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **53% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **38% lower** than Greater Manchester and **25% lower** than England & Wales.

2.5.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **45% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **9% lower** than Greater Manchester and **10% higher** than England & Wales.


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2.6 Local Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis


Local Domestic Burglary – Day Range



Local Domestic Burglary – Time Range



Local Domestic Burglary – Point of Entry



2.6.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of domestic burglary is highest on Saturday at various times in the afternoon, evening and particularly in the early morning. Offenders often target dwellings at these times when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving them the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.6.2 Point of Entry: In the local area, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:


- In cases where the entry point is recorded as 'unknown' it is likely that the offenders have exploited insecure doors.
- Forcing open secure doors using bodily pressure and implements.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.

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
2.7 Non-Domestic Burglary (GM Healthcare Facilities): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against health facilities, recorded in the Greater Manchester area.

GM Healthcare Facilities – Day Range




GM Healthcare Facilities – Time Range



2.7.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of burglary at Greater Manchester healthcare facilities is greatest on Friday/Saturday.

2.7.2 Time Range: During the day, the risk of burglary fluctuates but peaks mid-morning, in the afternoon and late at night/during the early hours of the morning. Offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed/detected at these times and often pose as legitimate visitors to enter healthcare facilities, in an attempt to gain unauthorised access to restricted areas/rooms to steal property unnoticed.

GM Healthcare Facilities – Point of Entry



2.7.3 Point of Entry: At Greater Manchester healthcare facilities, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:


- In the majority of cases, the means of entry is unknown/legitimate. This is likely to be where offenders have gained access posing as legitimate patients/visitors, before targeting insecure doors or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas without being noticed.
- Offenders have targeted doors and windows to gain unauthorised access – either by smashing glazing, prising them open with bodily pressure/implements or targeting them when left insecure.

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
2.8 Theft (GM Healthcare Facilities): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against healthcare facilities, recorded in the Greater Manchester area.

GM Healthcare Facilities Theft – Day Range



GM Healthcare Facilities Theft – Time Range




2.8.1 Day Range: The risk of theft at Greater Manchester healthcare facilities remains relatively consistent across the week, peaking slightly on Tuesday and Thursday.

Time Range: During the day, the risk of theft peaks during the afternoon and into the early evening. It is during these hours that healthcare premises tend to be at their busiest and so the opportunities to offend are greater. Hospital visiting times also tend to be around these times, when would-be offenders can access wards and other areas without raising suspicion or drawing attention. The most commonly stolen items are cash, wallets/purses and mobile phones belong to both patients and staff


2.9 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.9.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Tuesday in the evening (20:00-22:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles at this time when they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

3.1.1 Full planning permission for mixed use scheme comprising key worker accommodation, PBSA and retained healthcare uses (see design document attached).

3.1.2 Redevelopment of existing blocks to include remodelling of the existing building to provide a mix of residential accommodation, including associated ancillary internal and external amenity space, hard and soft landscaping and associated highway works.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The building plots provides ground floor activity in the form of student amenity spaces, meeting rooms and reception space uses. In-turn these uses offer good levels of activity and natural surveillance of the adjacent streets, hotel car park and public realm.

3.2.2 Given the proximity of the hospital, universities and other student accommodation, the proposed development seems an appropriate.

3.2.3 The main entrance and secondary entrance doors to the buildings will be suitably located in the direction of Hathersage Road and Carmoor Road.

3.2.4 Secure lobbies will be provided.

3.2.5 The existing perimeter walls, railings and hedges will be retained, clearly defining the edge of the development and helping to distinguish public space from semi-private space.

3.2.6 Along with the boundary treatments, there will be a degree of separation between the perimeter of the site and the proposed building, providing an area of defensible space between passing public and the building.

3.2.7 Surveillance across the site from Hathersage Road and Carmoor Road will be enhanced by the well-considered location of facilities within the building and the location of entrance doors.

3.2.8 Lighting from the development will contribute to public lighting around the site. Good public, and building, lighting can significantly reduce the public's fear of crime.

3.2.9 The footprint of the building facing onto the public realm is relatively simple and free from deeply recessed concealed areas. Where ground floor amenity spaces have been located, consideration appears to have been taken through the use of external facing materials; glazing, providing good levels of activity.

3.2.10 Student amenity spaces provide opportunities for residents to meet and foster community relations within the development. Schemes which have good social communities are less likely to tolerate inappropriate behaviour and are more willing to challenge unfamiliar faces in the development.

3.2.11 The main entrance will be accessed via an electronic access control fob system for residents and staff. The arrangement of the lobby space is greeted and controlled via a concierge.

3.2.12 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the dwellings, avoiding the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the developments are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

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3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 Ideally, to enhance security at the site, the existing vehicle barrier should be replaced with an automated, vehicle gate, and a powered, pedestrian gate to the side of it to provide a secure accessible route into the development. The pedestrian/cyclist gate should be secured with an electronic lock with the lock and gate opening activated by a fob presented to a reader. Both vehicle and pedestrian/cyclist gates should close automatically and be secure upon closure.

3.3.2 A self-closing manual gate should be installed to define the boundary of Carmoor Road and the pathway to the entrance to the new building. Railings, around 1200mm high, should guide pedestrians to the entrance door and prevent access along the front of the building from the pathway.

3.3.3 Any existing boundary walls/railings to be retained should be repaired and extended as necessary to ensure the boundary is secure. Beech or laurel hedge should be encouraged around the edges of the communal garden to enhance security and privacy.

3.3.4 Pathways within the site, and the entrance doors and gates entrance gates should be illuminated from dusk to dawn.

3.3.5 CCTV cameras capable of monitoring activity at the entrance gates, the car park, cycle parking, along pathways, at entrance doors and in the entrance-lobby should be installed.

3.3.6 Access into the buildings should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set), so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the reception area only prior to providing access further into the building.

3.3.7 Residential post/parcel room. Arrangements for the delivery of post should not allow postal delivery staff access to internal areas of the residential areas beyond the reception space. Mailboxes for residents should be located either within a secure lobby area or use a 'through-the-wall' post box arrangement. Due to the significant increase in on-line postal ordering, considerations should be given to appropriate post room area; avoiding parcels/post being left in an unsecure location. Further design details of these ancillary spaces are to be developed.

3.3.8 Because of the volume of cycle theft in this neighbourhood, a secure cycle store(s) should be provided. Because of the limited space available, a 'bike share' scheme may be suitable for this development. The store should be located in a position where it will benefit from passive surveillance by staff and residents but not easily visible from the public realm so that it is out of view or the sphere of awareness of the passing public.

3.3.9 Each entrance door should be security-rated, with entry restricted to residents or staff holding an appropriate fob. The doors should be self-closing and lock securely upon closure.

3.3.10 An audio-visual unit should be installed at each entrance door to relay images (one way) and audio (two ways) from each cluster flat and/or reception staff in order to allow residents/staff to vet visitors prior to allowing entry, via a remote lock release.

3.3.11 All mail should be directed to the designated reception.

3.3.12 All glazing within external doors and the ground floor windows should include laminate glass.

3.3.13 The cluster flat entrance doors should be security-rated, include an electronic lock that forms part of the security certification, and a door viewer. These doors should also be self-closing and self-locking.

3.3.14 Study bedroom doors should include an electronic lock and a fixed outer handle, so that entry is only possible with an appropriately programmed fob. These doors should also be self-closing.

3.3.15 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

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4 Physical Security (Residential)

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation in addition to the layout issues highlighted within Section 3.3.

4.1 Doors

☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to STS202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.

☐ Arrangements for residents to admit visitors. Communal entrance and inner lobby / zone doors should be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on a phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can confirm the identity of visitors before allowing them access themselves, visitors to be greeted in reception by the resident.

☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to STS202 BR2, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.

☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS01, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead.

☐ Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

☐ Doors to storage / meter rooms should have 44mm solid core doors, 3 hinges, with a mortised sash lock to BS3621/8621 to allow the rooms to be secured when not in use.

☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Windows

☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.

Ground floor and easily-accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P2A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

☐ If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:

- BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
- BS 6799 for wireless systems

☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

4.5 Access Control

☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:

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- Main Entrance doors
- Secondary entrance doors off internal lobbies
- Bin stores
- Cycle stores
- Staff-only areas
- Cluster apartment access
- Level only access from lift and stair lobbies

4.6 Landscaping

☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

4.7 Lighting

☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.

☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors (manual override is also permissible).

☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.8 CCTV

☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: Main entrances, foyer, stairs, lift lobbies, landings, cycle stores, bin store entrances.

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4.9 Other

- ☐ Meter cupboards to apartments should be located to the fronts of properties only or within a secure cupboard / room inside the block but not inside individual apartments. Smart meters are acceptable.
- ☐ Any externally-mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- ☐ Partition walls between flats and corridors should be of masonry construction or include reinforcement such as a layer of expanded metal mesh.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction, and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the buildings. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.

5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

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7 Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
14/04/2026	Turley	CIS application
28/04/2026	Turley	CIS instruction received
12/05/2026	DfS	Site visit
13/04/2026	Turley	Drawings received
28/04/2026	DfS	Invoice issued
19/05/2026	DfS	CIS completed
19/05/2026	DfS	CIS issued

A Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	0670_Octagon House - Pre App 2.0	13/04/26	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

B CIS Version History

Version	Date	Revisions
A	19/05/2026	

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C Glossary

Physical Security Standards

PAS 24

Enhanced security performance requirements for doorsets and windows in the UK. Doorsets and windows intended to offer a level of security suitable for dwellings and other buildings exposed to comparable risk. It is designed to mimic an attack by an opportunist burglar, using tools which are easy to conceal.

STS 201

Enhanced security to satisfy the requirements for certification of doorsets, equivalent to test standard to PAS 24.

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors, roller shutters, fences and barriers. Products are rated via the term Burglary Resistance (BR) and range from BR1 (lower security rating) to BR6 (higher security rating).

LPS 1175

Physical security for products manufactured for perimeter, façade, internal spaces and entrapment protection. The higher the security rating, the more formidable the security product.

Developed following extensive consultation with stakeholders, the most recent issue sees the previous single digit performance classifications (i.e. Security Ratings 1 to 8) extended to one formed of two elements that illustrate performance in terms of:

- *Threat level (first element) – Letter (A to H) corresponding with the tool kit used to evaluate the product's intruder resistance and number of attackers involved.*
- *Delay (second element) – Numeric value (1, 3, 5, 10, 15 or 20) corresponding with the minimum delay (in minutes) provided by the product when placed in a locked condition.*

BS EN 1627

European standard for the burglary resistance of pedestrian doorsets, windows, curtain walling, grilles and shutters. It defines six resistance classes, from RC1 to RC6, with RC1 being the lowest level of resistance and RC6 the highest. These classes indicate the level of resistance to forced entry, with higher classes requiring more time and specialized tools to breach.

BS EN 356

European standard that specifies the resistance of laminated glazing (i.e. two or more layers of glass bonded together with a plastic interlayer) to manual attacks, such as might occur during forced entry or vandalism. It classifies laminated glass into different resistance levels, ranging from P1A to P8B, with P1A being the lowest and P8B the highest.

Useful Websites

Design For Security – Designing Out Crime *– apply for Crime Impact Statements or the Secured by Design Award from Greater Manchester Police*

Secured by Design - Secured by Design *– SBD Award Scheme, Design Guides and Member Companies*

ParkMark - Home *– Park Mark Safer Parking Award Scheme*

NBS Source *– find, select and specify building products (including security-certified products)*

RedBook Live - LPCB Red Book *– search for LPS 1175 certified products*

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