

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

PADEL COURTS & WELLNESS FACILITY
LAND BOUNDED BY CHAPELTOWN STREET, BAIRD STREET AND CONGOU STREET

For: Padel 16 Limited
Version A: 4th August 2026
Reference: 2026/0244/CIS/01

designforsecurity

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GREATER MANCHESTER POLICE

Land bounded by Chapeltown Street, Baird Street and Congou Street

URN: 2026/0244/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recommendations made

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed padel courts and wellness facility is suitable for this city centre area. Further consideration should be given to the following points:

- Securing the rear of the site to prevent unauthorised access (see sections 3.3.1 & 3.3.2).

Additionally, there are a number of recommendations made in section 3.3 of this report which would enhance the security of the development and it is highly recommended that these are considered for the proposed units and the wider outline proposals.

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
1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located in the city centre of Manchester, close to Piccadilly Station, the Northern Quarter, and positioned close to the outer ring road (Great Ancoats Street).

The site is roughly rectangular and it is bound by Chapletown Street to the North, Congou Street to the East, Baird Street to the South, and to the West by an adjacent car park.

The site is currently used as a surface car park, accessed from Congou Street. The site boundaries are roughly defined by a low knee rail and walls. Level changes on the site create a barrier to entering the site towards the West of the site.

There is a mix of uses in the areas surrounding the site with the North and East of the site to be typically residential, the area to the South and West of the site is dominated by Piccadilly train station.











2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Local Crime Summary

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2025 to 30th June 2026.

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
22	34	99	457	176	58	9	171	20	27

2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area is high and this is typical of city centre areas which have large volumes of crimes attributed to the nighttime economy and theft/shoplifting.

2.2 General Risk Factors

2.2.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Theft of user / staff belongings
- Other theft from premises
- Theft of / from parked cars
- Uncontrolled access
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Arson
- Violence towards staff and other users
- Cycle security
- Cash robbery / attacks on vending machines
- Anti-social behaviour
- Loitering groups

2.3 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.3.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting similar premises are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Doors and windows have been forced open by offenders using bodily pressure and implements.

  Possible Solution – Any external doorsets and windows should be certified to recognised security standards (e.g. BS PAS 24), Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by staff, security personnel or passers-by. Consideration should also be given to security-certified shutters to protect particularly vulnerable/hidden doors or windows.
- The glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.

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Possible Solution - Any ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. In vulnerable locations, shutters or perforated protective panels may be necessary to provide extra protection.

- Where the point of entry is 'legitimate' or 'unknown', this is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers to gain access to premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors, tailgating or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas without being noticed.


  Possible Solution – Typically thefts occur at sports facilities when customers leave property unattended in communal areas, in changing rooms or in unsecured lockers whilst taking part in activities, returning to find property missing. Consideration should be given to providing lockers to visitors to allow them to secure their property.

  There should also be secure lockers for the use of staff while at work and all staff-only areas should be fitted with self-closing, solid-core doors fitted with auditable access controls, in order to prevent unauthorised access.


2.4 Leisure Facilities: Burglary Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area.


Leisure Facilities Burglary – Day Range



Leisure Facilities Burglary – Time Range



Leisure Facilities Burglary – Point of Entry



2.4.1 Day/ Time Range: During the week, the risk of burglary at Greater Manchester leisure facilities peaks on Thursday/Friday and is slightly lower on Saturday. During the day, the risk of burglary peaks during the late afternoon/early evening and during the early hours of the morning. During the late afternoon/early evening, leisure facilities are often at their busiest, meaning offenders can take advantage of busy staff and anonymity among higher numbers of legitimate customers. Offenders often target commercial properties at night, when they are often closed (or operate with a reduced number of on-site staff), it is

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dark and the streets/areas in which they are typically located are quieter than during the day – meaning offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.


2.4.2 Point of Entry: The following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently by offenders targeting Greater Manchester leisure facilities:

- Doors and windows have been forced open by offenders using bodily pressure and implements.
- The glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.
- Where the point of entry is 'legitimate' or 'unknown', this is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers to gain access to premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors, tailgating or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas without being noticed.


2.5 Theft Risk Analysis: Leisure Facilities

The data below relates to thefts within/against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area.

Leisure Facilities Theft – Day Range



Leisure Facilities Theft – Time Range




2.5.1 Day/ Time Range: During the week, the risk of theft at Greater Manchester leisure facilities peaks on Tuesday, but remains consistently high throughout the week. During the day, the risk of theft rises in the afternoon and peaks in the evening. This is when leisure facilities are typically at their busiest and the opportunities to offend are greater. Personal property belonging to staff and customers, such as mobile phones and cash, are the most routinely targeted items – taking place most often in changing/locker rooms and staff-only areas.


2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



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2.6.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime peaks on Sunday in the evening (21:00-22:00). Offenders often target vehicles at this time when they tend to be left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

3.1.1 Full planning application on a temporary basis of 3 years for the redevelopment of the existing car park into a padel and wellbeing facility with both indoor (Class E(d)) and outdoor (Class F2(d)) sports facilities. Proposals include 6 no. car parking spaces and 20 no. bicycle spaces.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The local crime data does not suggest that the proposed development is particularly vulnerable to being targeted by criminals; additionally, there seems to be little evidence that padel courts/club houses are frequently targeted by offenders.

3.2.2 The main entrance into the building is positioned on Congou Street where it can easily be seen from the public highway.

3.2.3 On the day of my site visit the local streets were relatively busy with pedestrian and vehicular activity, allowing for good levels of passive surveillance.

3.2.4 Visitors will have to pass the reception/shop area before accessing the padel courts, allowing staff to vet those entering the building.


3.2.5 There will be parking spaces and cycle parking for staff/customers. There are on street parking in the area, and nearby public car parks that can be used.

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
3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 The outdoor courts will be relatively easy to access from Baird Street, either by scaling the brick wall or accessing it from a lower level closer to Congou Street. Access to these courts could generate antisocial behaviour such as trespassing, public urination, littering, graffiti, alcohol/drug consumption and could leave the courts vulnerable to criminal damage. To restrict access to the rear of the facility it is recommended that an additional section of fencing is installed to the top of the walls (see below) and returned to the building (with a pedestrian gate if required) to reduce the potential for an offender to gain access.



3.3.2 Access into the sauna/Pilates area could also be vulnerable with the current boundary treatments, particularly as the space within cannot be viewed from the public highway. It is recommended that fence panels, or similar, are installed in the areas indicated below in red, to restrict access to this area.



3.3.3

3.3.4 Theft of personal property is one of the most frequently occurring crimes in the city centre. It is highly recommended that lockers are provided for customers, so that they have the option to securely store their property when using the facilitate and reduce the potential for theft. Similar, a secure space for staff to store belongings should be provided.

3.3.5 The development should have a comprehensive CCTV system, covering the main entrance, car/bicycle parking areas, the reception/shop/café, the wellness facility, and the padel courts.

3.3.6 The building should be covered with a monitored intruder alarm (with a response facility).

3.3.7 External doors and shutters/sectional overhead doors should be certified to a burglary resistant standard such as BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2.

3.3.8 Lighting should be provided to all external doors and the car parking area, to allow for good levels of safety and to maximise surveillance opportunities at night.

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4 Management & Maintenance

4.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the commercial units must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the units. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:

- Opening and closing of premises, including staff arrival and departure;
- Cash management within the premises - consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods;
- Cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices (which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe to meet insurance needs);
- Management of stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
- Details of staff security training;
- Location and management of any smoking areas;
- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras etc;
- Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
- Refuse collection arrangements.

4.1.2 Any high value equipment (e.g. computers/TVs, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

4.1.3 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left accessible for extended periods. Servicing activities should also not require any service doors to remain open and unattended for prolonged periods.

5 Construction

5.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

5.1.2 Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

6 Useful References

6.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

6.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. Please see Secured by Design - Secured by Design for more information. To apply for the SBD Award for your development in Greater Manchester, please visit Apply for Secured by Design – Design For Security.

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A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
10/07/2026	Nathan Todd-Smith	CIS application confirmed

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
PL-01	Proposed Ground Floor Plan	June 26	
PL-02	Proposed Roof Plan	June 26	
PL-03	Proposed Elevations	June 26	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Date	Revisions
A	04/08/2026	

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D Glossary

Physical Security Standards

PAS 24

Enhanced security performance requirements for doorsets and windows in the UK. Doorsets and windows intended to offer a level of security suitable for dwellings and other buildings exposed to comparable risk. It is designed to mimic an attack by an opportunist burglar, using tools which are easy to conceal.

STS 201

Enhanced security to satisfy the requirements for certification of doorsets, equivalent to test standard to PAS 24.

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors, roller shutters, fences and barriers. Products are rated via the term Burglary Resistance (BR) and range from BR1 (lower security rating) to BR6 (higher security rating).

LPS 1175

Physical security for products manufactured for perimeter, façade, internal spaces and entrapment protection. The higher the security rating, the more formidable the security product.

Developed following extensive consultation with stakeholders, the most recent issue sees the previous single digit performance classifications (i.e. Security Ratings 1 to 8) extended to one formed of two elements that illustrate performance in terms of:

- *Threat level (first element) – Letter (A to H) corresponding with the tool kit used to evaluate the product's intruder resistance and number of attackers involved.*
- *Delay (second element) – Numeric value (1, 3, 5, 10, 15 or 20) corresponding with the minimum delay (in minutes) provided by the product when placed in a locked condition.*

BS EN 1627

European standard for the burglary resistance of pedestrian doorsets, windows, curtain walling, grilles and shutters. It defines six resistance classes, from RC1 to RC6, with RC1 being the lowest level of resistance and RC6 the highest. These classes indicate the level of resistance to forced entry, with higher classes requiring more time and specialized tools to breach.

BS EN 356

European standard that specifies the resistance of laminated glazing (i.e. two or more layers of glass bonded together with a plastic interlayer) to manual attacks, such as might occur during forced entry or vandalism. It classifies laminated glass into different resistance levels, ranging from P1A to P8B, with P1A being the lowest and P8B the highest.

Useful Websites

Design For Security – Designing Out Crime *– apply for Crime Impact Statements or the Secured by Design Award from Greater Manchester Police*

Secured by Design - Secured by Design *– SBD Award Scheme, Design Guides and Member Companies*

ParkMark - Home *– Park Mark Safer Parking Award Scheme*

NBS Source *– find, select and specify building products (including security-certified products)*

RedBook Live - LPCB Red Book *– search for LPS 1175 certified products*

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