

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Development of two Residential apartment blocks
Ellesmere Street

For: Kirindolam 8 Limited
Version A: 17/04/26
Reference: 2005/0798/CIS/03

designforsecurity

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GREATER MANCHESTER POLICE

Ellesmere Street

URN: 2005/0798/CIS/03

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported - Minor security additions required.

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

From a crime prevention perspective, the positive features of the development include:

- the use within the development will maintain activity and natural surveillance in and around the building throughout the day, including at weekends.
- the proposed, main, entrance doors to the residential use are appropriately located.
- the residential corridors allow the installation of a further means of controlling access to the apartments; and,
- secure refuse and cycle storage has been provided.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Robust control of access in/and around the buildings.
- Managed secure cycle store.
- Ground floor external material protection against graffiti.
- Landscape proposals to eliminate on-site car parking.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition to achieve Secured by Design accreditation is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.

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Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit


The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site lies within the Cornbrook district about 1.5km southwest of central Manchester. It is a former industrial quarter with much of the land further west being derelict/vacant.
More recently, regeneration of Castlefield has spread into the neighbourhood and sites to the east have been redeveloped to contain new apartments and commercial spaces, with more developments planned for the Pomona area.
A small cluster of retail / take away premises is located across Chester Road.

A short section of the northern boundary of the site directly adjoins the towpath of the Bridgewater Canal, between the neighbouring apartment block and the listed railway bridges. A railway embankment forms part of the northwestern boundary, separating the site from a scrapyard.

Cornbrook Metrolink stop is close to the site which generates some demand for on-streetcar parking. The proximity of Old Trafford football stadium also creates demand for parking on nearby streets. Vehicles on quiet roads have been targeted by offenders.

Evidence of disorder in the area includes graffiti, fly-tipping, broken glass on pavements, and installation of security bars / grilles on lower-floor windows of business premises.






1 – View towards the site from Dutton St.


2 – View south towards the nearby AO Arena.


3 – View north along Dutton St.


7 – View west along Park St.


6 – View south along Robert St.


5 – View north along Robert St.


4 – Existing vehicle gates off Dutton St.

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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st April 2025 to 31st March 206 within 500m of the site.

2.1 Local Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
34	15	64	268	73	22	7	52	8	20

2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area is average to low, with the most prevalent types of recorded crime being less serious wounding, vehicle crime and theft. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in, or within, close proximity of city centres where there is a higher concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to larger number of crime and disorder issues.

2.1.2 Less serious woundings have taken place throughout the local area, with a hotspot of offences occurring around Cornbrook tram stop and at locations on/around Ellesmere Street and Chester Road. Assaults and public order offences have been the highest recorded less serious woundings taking place, often occurring late at night/over the weekend with alcohol consumption being a contributing factor.

2.1.3 Theft from motor vehicle has been the most common type of vehicle crime offence, with a large hotspot of offences occurring in the streets and car parks within the Cornbrook district. It is likely that offenders target vehicles here as they tend to be left unattended for long periods of time whilst the owners are working or attending nearby events/attractions. Vehicles parked on streets or within open car parks (particularly when they are not staffed, have poor lighting levels and poor surface/boundary treatments), where they are easily accessible and cannot be easily overlooked by their owners, are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked within secure parking facilities.

2.1.4 Theft offences have also taken place throughout the local area, with a hotspot of offences around/off Ellesmere Street to the east and Chester Road to the south. Theft of parcels/bags left unattended from doorsteps, tables and communal areas of flats have accounted for most of the recorded offences, as well as incidents of personal thefts (with offenders using pickpocketing and distraction techniques to obtain items such as mobile phones or wallets/purses).

2.1.5 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed residential scheme, the more detailed analysis below will focus on local domestic burglary and vehicle crime.

2.2 General Risk Factors

2.2.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds, or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

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- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.3 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.3.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M. O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting residential properties are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

2.3.2 **Communal and apartment entrance doors were targeted when left insecure.**

To minimise the risk of offenders tailgating through communal doors or entering apartments through insecure doors:

- communal entry doors should be self-closing and lock securely upon closure.
- install a secondary set of secure doors (airlock/secure lobby), that are also self-closing and self-locking.
- install lifts that are operated by a fob or card access control system.
- install CCTV cameras in the entrance lobby.
- apartment doors should be self-closing with a thumb-turn lock on the inner side that meets fire regulations, with clear, yet discreet, permanent instructions on the door to inform the resident that the door is not secure until the lock is turned; and,
- employ a concierge to supervise the entrance lobby.

2.3.3 **Doors have been forced open.**

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all external doors and apartment entry doors should be certified to PAS 24 security standard - PAS 24 rated doors are very difficult to force open.
- 'recess-free' entrances should be designed so that doors are readily visible - offenders will be less inclined to target properties where their actions may be witnessed;
- all external doors should be illuminated with dusk-to-dawn lighting. Light suggests a property may be occupied and may deter offenders from targeting a premise. Lighting will also support CCTV systems and highlight the actions of an offender, increasing the chance of a crime being witnessed; and,
- CCTV should be considered, to record activity within circulation spaces within the building and around exterior of the building.

2.3.4 **Ground floor windows were prised open, or the glazing smashed to gain access.**

To minimise the risk of offenders prising open windows or breaking glass to gain entry:

- avoid installing opening windows at street level.
- install window locks and opening restrictors to any windows that are accessible from street level; and,
- install laminate glass on street level windows and doors.

2.3.5 **Vehicles were targeted when parked on driveways, in unsecured car parks or on the 'street'.**

To minimise the risk of vehicle-related crime:

- car parking should be located within the boundaries of the property, within an area that is both very secure and well overlooked by residents or monitored by an effective CCTV system. Consideration should be given to installing automatic vehicle gates and fencing around car parks.

2.3.6 **Offenders have entered communal cycle stores.**

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To minimise the risk of offenders entering cycle stores:

- cycle stores should be secure rooms or stores.
- appropriate CCTV and PIR lighting should be installed within a store; and,
- doors or gates to cycle stores should be fitted with good quality locks (ideally a maglock or similar with a resistance force of around 4500N), be self-closing and lock automatically upon closure.

2.3.7 Offenders have damaged boundary fencing.

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting fencing:

- rear garden boundaries should avoid being exposed to the public realm.
- communal pathways providing access to rear gardens should be secured with self-closing, self-locking gates; and,
- fencing should be especially robust when unavoidably exposed to the public realm.

2.3.8 Theft of plant and machinery, and criminal damage during the construction period.

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting the construction site:

- a secure boundary should be erected around the site.
- access should be restricted to contractors and authorised visitors.
- security staff should patrol during non-working hours.
- lighting and CCTV should be installed to illuminate the site and record activity.
- at the end of the working day, plant and machinery should be arranged to prevent forced access onto the site; and,


plant and machinery should be fitted with a tracking device.

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
2.4 Local Crime Rate Comparisons

The graphs below compare the local rates of crime (i.e. crimes per 1,000 dwellings) with the average rates for Manchester, Greater Manchester and England & Wales.


Domestic Burglary Crime Rates




Wounding Crime Rates



Criminal Damage Crime Rates



Vehicle Crime Rates



2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **71% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **62% lower** than Greater Manchester and **61% lower** than England & Wales.

2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **78% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **70% lower** than Greater Manchester and **43% lower** than England & Wales.


2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **72% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **63% lower** than Greater Manchester and **55% lower** than England & Wales.

2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **71% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **52% lower** than Greater Manchester and **41% lower** than England & Wales.


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2.5 Local Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis


Local Domestic Burglary – Day Range



Local Domestic Burglary – Time Range



Local Domestic Burglary – Point of Entry



2.5.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of domestic burglary is highest on Wednesday and Thursday in the afternoon (14:00-15:00) and evening (21:00-22:00). Offenders tend to target dwellings during the day in the working week when it is likely that the owners are out at work. Offenders also target dwellings in the evening when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving them the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified

2.5.2 Point of Entry: In the local area, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:


- In cases where the entry point is recorded as 'unknown' it is likely that the offenders have exploited insecure doors.
- Forcing open secure doors using bodily pressure and implements.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.

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
2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.6.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime is peaks on Friday in the evening (20:00-21:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles at this time when they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

3.1.1 Full planning application for a residential development comprising 2 buildings, block A 45 storeys and block B 8 storey totalling 593 units with residential parking, secure storage and residential amenity and associated landscaping works.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 Animation of street scene. The buildings will present an active frontage to all the public elevations around the site, which will enliven the street scene and help to provide useful natural surveillance of the adjacent public realm.

3.2.2 Entrances to the buildings will be readily apparent on approaching from the surrounding public realm.

3.2.3 The building is capable of zoning which restricts access within the site and thus if an offender does manage to enter the building, their movement is restricted. All rooms containing facilities for residents should have access controls.

3.2.4 The amenity spaces provide opportunities for residents to meet and foster community relations within the development. Schemes which have good social communities are less likely to tolerate inappropriate behaviour and are more willing to challenge unfamiliar faces in the development.

3.2.5 The layout of upper floor corridors is free of projections or recesses that would impede sight lines and contains no potential areas of concealment within communal areas. Doors within communal corridors should contain a glazed element to improve informal surveillance.

3.2.6 Individual apartment entrance doors are flush with the corridor walls.

3.2.7 Concierge. Provision has been made for a permanent concierge presence on the site, with an office located within the lobby off Ellesmere Street. This should be staffed at all times and should provide clear views of people entering / leaving the buildings. All visitors to apartments should be directed via the concierge.

3.2.8 The building footprint along Ellesmere Street is free of recesses or projections that could provide cover for criminal activity.

3.2.9 Refuse disposal arrangements. Refuse and servicing functions can be carried out without compromising the overall security of the site perimeter. The layout of the residential bin store area allows collection staff to access the bins without needing to enter the internal secure areas.

3.2.10 Cycle storage – Provision for residents is contained within secure enclosures located within the building. Access must be restricted to genuine cyclists only, on application to the managers of the building. Racks within the enclosure should allow cyclists to lock the frame and both wheels. Any short-stay cycle parking intended for visitors / shoppers should be located within sight of entrances and / or overlooked by reception / security staff and CCTV.

3.2.11 Security measure carefully incorporated into the building design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime. The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retrofitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime.

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3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 Level changes / retaining walls. There are some changes in levels around the edge of the site and the developer should be careful not to allow any retaining structures or gate features to facilitate climbing aids that would allow easy access into otherwise secure areas or onto upper floors of the building.

3.3.2 Definition of boundaries to mews properties. The frontage to the mews properties must be well defined to create an obvious area of defensible space outside the properties, and draw people away from private windows, doors. Any landscape features incorporated for this purpose should not create potential hiding areas or climbing aids that may provide a step up to the first-floor balconies to the mews properties.

3.3.3 The overall building footprint must be free of any projections or recesses that could provide concealment for a potential offender.

3.3.4 Post. Postal theft is a significant problem within apartment blocks. If the mailboxes are to be located within the building itself, they should be situated within the entrance lobby area so that postal delivery staff do not have access to the whole of the building. Mailboxes should be easily monitored from the concierge desk and / or covered by CCTV.

3.3.5 The development should take into account the security of residents, guests and staff approaching and leaving the building, particularly at quiet times and late at night. The areas outside the premises should be well-illuminated without creating areas of shadow or pooling. A monitored CCTV system covering all elevations of the premises is also recommended.

3.3.6 Given the development site's location and the current level of illegal 'fly-tipping' and littering around the vicinity it is important that all boundaries are covered under a site wide CCTV system. A management plan should be developed and submitted, incorporating regular removal and cleaning the pavements of litter and graffiti. Removal of litter on a weekly basis will challenge the 'Broken window' theory whereby it becomes the norm & acceptable that litter & graffiti is allowed to happen. Removal of these issue help create a sense of pride and community within the area in-turn helping to create an atmosphere of order and lawfulness, thereby preventing more serious crimes from happening.

3.3.7 Further Recommendations

3.3.8 CCTV cameras should be capable of identifying all vehicle and pedestrian movements into and out of the site. An audible warning system should be employed to alert to intruders that they have been detected, and a response has been generated. To facilitate the CCTV system, dusk until dawn lighting should be provided for the site, particularly around the access doors/gates and loading bays. Signage should be located at the site entrance to inform visitors that their movements will be recorded.

3.3.9 Fixed and permanent boundary control measures should be incorporated into the landscape proposals to remove any opportunity for vehicles to park within the site's public realm space.

3.3.10 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

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4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation in addition to the layout issues highlighted within Section 3.3.

☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to STS202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.

☐ Arrangements for residents to admit visitors. Communal entrance and inner lobby / zone doors should be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on a phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can confirm the identity of visitors before allowing them access themselves.

☐ Where secure lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The post boxes themselves should be of robust construction, with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access-controlled main entrance.

☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights and are provided with door viewers instead.

☐ Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

☐ Doors to storage / meter rooms should have 44mm solid core doors, 3 hinges, with a mortised sash lock to BS3621/8621 to allow the rooms to be secured when not in use.

☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

☐ The doors to the cycle store should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2 or be steel gates within steel frames. These doors/gates should both be self-closing and lock securely upon closure and be accessible by a programmable fob allowing secure entry and exit.

4.1 Windows

☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.

☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.2 Glazing

☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.3 Alarms

☐ If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either:

- BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
- BS 6799 for wireless systems

☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

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4.4 Access Control

☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following doors should operate on access control:

- All external doors where regular staff access is required.
- Doors separating internal zones / lobbies.
- Any internal doors to obvious high risk or controlled areas (e.g., storage / server / locker rooms)
- Cycle stores

4.5 Boundaries

☐ Inward opening automatic gates to provide access to the sports courtyard area must be certified to one of the following standards:

- LPS 1175: Issue 7, SR2
- STS 202: Issue 3, BR2
- Sold Secure Gold
- PAS 68: 2013

☐ Any ground floor townhouse/apartment windows to the Street/courtyard elevations of the podium that will not front onto the front garden spaces described above must be protected by defensive planting beds. The windows themselves should preferably have as high cills as possible and be non-opening. If not, they should have only small opening lights fitted with opening restrictors to avoid providing opportunities to criminals.

☐ Boundary treatments to front gardens should be designed to discourage comfortably sitting on or leaning against them, which could potentially cause nuisance and intimidation to residents.

☐ The ground floor townhouses and apartments which front onto the public realm and the landscaped courtyard, must be protected by some defensible space, defined by dense low-level planting, creating front gardens areas in ownership/control of the residents themselves.

4.6 Landscaping

☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.

☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by

4.7 Lighting

☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.

☐ Dusk ‘til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors (manual override is also permissible).

☐ Fittings should produce ‘white’ light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

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4.8 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images, then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: Entrances to site, external areas all around the new building and ancillary facilities, external doors including emergency egresses / hatches, access-controlled doors & cycle parking areas

4.9 Other

- ☐ Meter cupboards to apartments should be located to the fronts of properties only or within a secure cupboard / room inside the block but not inside individual apartments. Smart meters are acceptable.
- ☐ Partition walls between flats and corridors should be of masonry construction or include reinforcement such as a layer of expanded metal mesh.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction, and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the buildings. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.

5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

- ☐ Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings…

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6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. Please see Secured by Design - Secured by Design for more information. To apply for the SBD Award for your development in Greater Manchester, please visit Apply for Secured by Design – Design For Security.

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A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
05/03/26	Allied London	CIS instruction received
02/04/26	Allied London	Instruction confirmed
16/04/26	DfS	Site visit
XX/XX/26	Applicant	CIS payment received
18/04/26	DfS	CIS complete
06/07/26	DfS	CIS issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	6595_No.1 Castlefield_Tower Presentation_20260220_DRAFT_reduced	5/3/26	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Date	Revisions
A	18/04/2026	

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D Glossary

Physical Security Standards

PAS 24

Enhanced security performance requirements for doorsets and windows in the UK. Doorsets and windows intended to offer a level of security suitable for dwellings and other buildings exposed to comparable risk. It is designed to mimic an attack by an opportunist burglar, using tools which are easy to conceal.

STS 201

Enhanced security to satisfy the requirements for certification of doorsets, equivalent to test standard to PAS 24.

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors, roller shutters, fences and barriers. Products are rated via the term Burglary Resistance (BR) and range from BR1 (lower security rating) to BR6 (higher security rating).

LPS 1175

Physical security for products manufactured for perimeter, façade, internal spaces and entrapment protection. The higher the security rating, the more formidable the security product.

Developed following extensive consultation with stakeholders, the most recent issue sees the previous single digit performance classifications (i.e. Security Ratings 1 to 8) extended to one formed of two elements that illustrate performance in terms of:

- *Threat level (first element) – Letter (A to H) corresponding with the tool kit used to evaluate the product's intruder resistance and number of attackers involved.*
- *Delay (second element) – Numeric value (1, 3, 5, 10, 15 or 20) corresponding with the minimum delay (in minutes) provided by the product when placed in a locked condition.*

BS EN 1627

European standard for the burglary resistance of pedestrian doorsets, windows, curtain walling, grilles and shutters. It defines six resistance classes, from RC1 to RC6, with RC1 being the lowest level of resistance and RC6 the highest. These classes indicate the level of resistance to forced entry, with higher classes requiring more time and specialized tools to breach.

BS EN 356

European standard that specifies the resistance of laminated glazing (i.e. two or more layers of glass bonded together with a plastic interlayer) to manual attacks, such as might occur during forced entry or vandalism. It classifies laminated glass into different resistance levels, ranging from P1A to P8B, with P1A being the lowest and P8B the highest.

Useful Websites

Design For Security – Designing Out Crime *– apply for Crime Impact Statements or the Secured by Design Award from Greater Manchester Police*

Secured by Design - Secured by Design *– SBD Award Scheme, Design Guides and Member Companies*

ParkMark - Home *– Park Mark Safer Parking Award Scheme*

NBS Source *– find, select and specify building products (including security-certified products)*

RedBook Live - LPCB Red Book *– search for LPS 1175 certified products*

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