

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

DRAFT B. 03/08/26

Piccadilly Gardens redevelopment

For: Manchester City Council
Version B: 10/08/2026
Reference: 2019/0596/CIS/01

designforsecurity

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GREATER MANCHESTER POLICE

Piccadilly Gardens

URN: 2019/0596/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported with minor design & management recommendations.

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The scheme has been very well designed from a crime prevention perspective. The proposed uses are appropriate and will make a positive contribution to the redevelopment of the area. The redesign of the space has the potential to create a very vibrant location. Developments where there is an active use mix tend be better managed and less prone to crime and disorder issues. Clearly, with a development of this nature, there needs to be a balance between creating a safe area without detracting from the ambience of the place.

The area will greatly benefit from the proposed investment, bringing a change in public perception and a much-needed uplift in environmental quality.

Positive aspects of the scheme include:

- High quality public spaces to complement planned developments
- Public space located in activity nodes promote passive surveillance
- Greater legibility to the street pattern
- High quality street surfacing
- Improved street lighting & CCTV
- High quality landscape architecture proposals

A number of recommendations to improve security within the scheme are included in section 3.3 of the report. The principal recommendations are summarised as follows:

- Replace legacy street furniture, signage and information points.
- Robust approach to building fabric, landscaping materials & furniture
- Lighting & CCTV to be incorporated at access points.
- prepare and execute a strong & committed management and maintenance plan for the repair and upkeep of the site, spaces and facilities within it.

The success of this proposal will largely be dependent on implementation of efficient management and maintenance procedures, together with other crime-prevention initiatives over the long term.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police support the application and where feasible, the development is built in accordance with the security recommendations and physical security specifications set out in sections 3.3 and 4 of this report.

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1 Visual Audit

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The development site is indicated by the red outline, and is supported with existing context photographs around the site.

The site is located at a central location within the city and incorporate a number of functions including recreation & play, meeting place, waiting (for transport), eating & drinking, attending events and attractions (sometimes involving temporary structures erected within the gardens), shopping (market stalls and shops around the fringes), and just passing through the space. The relative importance of these functions is weather-dependent, with certain features such as the play area and fountain being very popular attractions on sunny days.

The area to the south of the gardens accommodates busy tram and bus stops, with some services operating 24/7, drawing large numbers of people to the gardens at all times of day and night, especially at weekends when a full night bus service is in operation.

There are many licensed premises in the Piccadilly area which generate alcohol-related disorder incidents, often late into the evening. Late-night revellers leaving licensed premises and gathering on the nearby streets and spaces can cause nuisance and generate significant disorder/abuse. This is a particular issue around the bus and tram stops and Market St and the 24hr food outlet.

A wide range of street furniture has been installed in the gardens which includes benches, raised planting beds, historic statues and more recent sculpture, lamp columns, signage, litterbins, and video display / advertising units. There are also some utility structures of various types.

Concrete walls of the existing pavilion dominate the southern side of the gardens. They block sight lines, inhibit the spread of lighting and provide cover and shelter for antisocial activity. Litter collection does take place on a regular basis, but it is unusual to visit the gardens and not see broken bottles and other detritus under benches, in flower beds and in the gullies around the fountains. A large section of the site has been hoarded in readiness for construction.




1 – View south towards the site.


2 – Existing food markets.


3 – View into the site through the secure gate.



4 – Existing monument behind hoarding.


5 – Existing raised planters to boundary of the site.


6 – View west into the site. Array of mixed street furniture.

7 – View towards No.1 Piccadilly.



8 – F+B units fronting onto the Gardens.



1 – Existing service structure & children's play space.



2 – Pedestrian path across the garden from No.1 Piccadilly.




3 – Existing F+B units facing the Gardens.



4 – Rear of existing concrete wall F+B unit.




5 – Pedestrian route between tram stop & Piccadilly No.1.






6 – Existing concrete wall, trees & cycle parking.




7 – View across the Gardens.



8 – Pedestrian crossing to transport interchange



13 – View towards retail units, street furniture & food markets.



12 – Existing substation structure.



11 – Hidden corning between hoarding & market structure.



10 – Existing junction boxes.



9 – View towards existing trees.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Local Crime Summary

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2025 to 30th June 2026.

Recorded Crime within 50m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
<5	7	54	665	178	89	23	<5	<5	15

2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the area is very high, due to its location within the city centre. The volumes of violent crimes, theft, robbery and vehicle crime are exceptionally high and the rate of burglary at commercial premises is much greater than is experienced across Manchester as a whole

2.1.2 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed public realm redevelopment, the more detailed analysis below will look at use-specific criminal damage and theft and within parks & public realm spaces.

2.1.3 The overall crime rate in the local area is high for central Manchester, with less serious wounding, theft and robbery crime having been the highest recorded crimes taking place. Offences have taken place throughout the area and surrounding the site, with a trend of more offences occurring in areas with limited natural surveillance.

2.1.4 Less serious woundings offences have taken place throughout the local area, with the volume of offences increasing towards the periphery of the gardens. Public order offences have been the most common offence, with assaults and harassment also occurring. Most violent offences have been carried out during disputes between unknown associates.

2.1.5 Thefts in the local area have mostly been taking place within/around the licenced premises, restaurants and retail premises situated within the Gardens, tram & bus stops, with a hotspot of offences taking place at locations to the north and south of the site. Offenders have primarily targeted mobile phones, wallets/purses and cash by using pickpocketing and distraction methods to obtain the personal belongings, as well as targeting parcels and bags left unattended.

2.2 General Risk Factors

2.2.1 The typical issues in the public realm in the city centre:

- Personal robbery
- Theft of personal belongings
- Criminal damage to adjoining properties
- Arson
- Violence towards the public and staff
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private spaces
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Antisocial behaviour
- Loitering groups
- Alcohol and drug misuse
- Alcohol related disorder
- Rough sleeping

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2.3 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.3.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting Public realm and food & beverage uses are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Individuals were pickpocketed using distraction techniques to steal mobile phones, cash and wallets / purses.
- Offenders have frequently used or threatened violence (without weapons) in cases of personal robbery to obtain mobile phones, cash and credit cards.
- Bikes were targeted when locked in bike ricks, with offenders using tools or other implements to cut padlocks.

Features that affect patterns of disorder in the vicinity of Piccadilly Gradens include: -


- City Centre location. The city centre has well above average rates of crime due to the high levels of activity and large numbers of people living, working and visiting central Manchester.
- Licensed premises. There are many licensed premises in the area which generate alcohol-related disorder incidents, often late into the evening. Late-night revellers leaving licensed premises and gathering on the nearby streets and spaces can cause nuisance and generate significant disorder / abuse.
- The network of streets, passageways and concealed spaces in the vicinity provides some potential access / escape routes and hiding places for offenders. Recessed doorways are regularly subject to unpleasant abuse. The demand for public toilets in the vicinity, particularly from late-night travellers waiting for trams or busses, has not been well catered-for.
- Transport Interchange. Piccadilly Gardens Bus and Tram stop brings people to the area at all hours-of-service operation. It is particularly busy during the morning and evening peaks but also generates heavy usage from people attending a variety of event venues within the city centre.
- Piccadilly Gardens is and has been frequently used for major events and gets particularly busy during the seasonal markets around Christmas. Over the last 5 to 6 years, during the redevelopment of Albert Square, the site has been generally the focus for any political demonstrations held in Manchester. Large concentrations of people attract the attention of offenders.
- Empty / vacant buildings in the vicinity can generate disorder. Lack of repair of damaged and vandalised structures creates a negative impact, and gives the impression that disorder is tolerated which can lead to an escalation of abuse.

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
2.4 Criminal Damage (Parks): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to criminal damage offences within / against parks, recorded in the Manchester area.


Burglary Other – Day Range



Burglary Other – Time Range



Burglary Other – Point of Entry



2.4.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of criminal damage peaks on a Saturday and Sunday during the afternoon and into the evening, peaking between 8pm – 9:30pm. Offenders often carry out criminal damage in the evening when there is less footfall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be identified. Offenders also use the cover of darkness in order to enter the area and exit the area unseen.

2.4.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:


- Graffiti on park statues and walls.
- Using implements in order to set fire to bins in public spaces.
- Damaging out houses by means of bodily pressure and implements, damaging doors/walls.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.
- Using bodily pressure and implements in order to damage fencing / netting surrounding the park.
- Using off road vehicles or cars to cause damage to grass fields within the park.

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
2.5 Theft (Parks): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within / against parks, recorded in the Manchester area.

Misc Theft – Day Range



Misc Theft – Time Range




2.5.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of theft at parks in Manchester peak on a Saturday and Sunday during the afternoon and into the evening. Offenders have targeted properties located within the park, climbing on roofs and removing lead from the building. Offenders have also targeted insecure bikes, scooters, phones and bags, grabbing the property and making off out of the area:


2.6 Bike Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 50m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.6.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of bike crime high on Monday, Tuesday and Thursday, and peaks in the afternoon (15:00-18:00). This is likely due to the higher footfall at this time when people have finished work and are visiting shops/restaurants on the way home, increasing the number of potential targets for offenders.

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

3.1.1 Redevelopment and reconfiguration of Piccadilly Gardens comprising works to the public realm including public open space and use of space for events, together with decommissioning and removal of the existing fountain; creation of play space, lawn area, hard and soft landscaping; lighting; and drainage and other associated infrastructure; and a severable plot for a future ancillary structure with associated interim landscaping.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The proposals are likely to transform the perception of the area from one to possible avoid, to one that is welcoming to pedestrians and represents a safe civic space.

3.2.2 The proposed layout includes a high-quality landscape treatment which is designed to create an attractive space that would draw in more legitimate activity.

3.2.3 The layout is generally free of obstacles to vision allowing people to see and be seen within the area and maintains sight lines across the site.

3.2.4 Most areas of the open space are well-overlooked from adjacent premises.

3.2.5 The play space has been increased in size, and the location is better suited for this use. Natural surveillance of the space is provided by the adjacent restaurants and commercial uses, whilst the play space is screened from the tram stop by the existing concrete pavilion. Soft landscaping in and around the play zone works with the CCTV strategy.

3.2.6 The main circulation routes are obvious, leading people directly to where they need to go. The proposals are intended to integrate with surrounding circulation routes.

3.2.7 The redevelopment of the site will provide an interesting and diverse use, offering opportunity for relaxation and enjoyment, employment, an interesting and safer public realm and a chance to create an exciting destination.

3.2.8 The proposed development will result in an increase in footfall in the area, improving vitality across the wider area, providing additional natural surveillance, which can help promote a greater sense of safety on within the gardens and play space.

3.2.9 The myriad of hostile security features and furniture will be gradually removed from the street scene and, where appropriate, will be redistributed to support the reduction in street furniture clutter. In turn this will drive a considered approach to the thoughtful design blanket to the entire area.

3.2.10 The proposals have addressed concerns regarding the legibility of the street network by creating a series of pedestrian routes through and around the site, which links with the principal areas of the neighbouring street pattern.

3.2.11 The recognised approach to creating a safer public realm, play space and enhance natural surveillance supports an environment in which people want to dwell, work and visit.

3.2.12 Planting and street furniture has been designed to avoid creating potential hiding places and avoids blocking sight lines. Existing vegetation will be retained wherever possible, with targeted thinning or removal in limited areas to ensure sightlines are maintained and integrated with the proposed planting strategy. The choice of trees and other plant species will support greater visible permeability through the canopies and foliage.

3.2.13 Areas of external seating for the existing café / restaurant premises will not be affected by the proposals. They will be capable of being monitored by staff from within the premises. Customers should be prevented from moving furniture / drink outside the designated operational areas.

3.2.14 Lighting & CCTV. The proposals include a lighting scheme that will distribute illumination evenly around the space without areas of shadowing or pooling. Lighting columns within the Gardens will incorporate a CCTV strategy that has been coordinated with the lighting layout and will provide coverage across the public realm around the gardens and play space.

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3.2.15 The public realm of the proposal is permeable, allowing pedestrian movement to be concentrated on the newly created boulevards and spaces between green spaces.

3.2.16 Security measure carefully incorporated into the environment and building design can ensure that buildings and the environment is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime. The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retrofitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime.

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3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

Public realm

3.3.1 The layout appears generally free of obstacles to vision allowing people to see and be seen within the area and maintains sight lines across the site. Planting and street furniture has been aligned to avoid creating potential hiding places and avoids blocking sight lines. However, the choice of trees and other plant species should allow some visible permeability through the canopies and foliage so that people cannot be concealed within the public spaces. The planting strategy incorporates more substantial tree specimens capable of providing significant canopy cover, but with appropriate clear stem heights and spacing between trunks to maintain visibility beneath and through the canopy

3.3.2 The principal routes should be located in prominent positions, which are readily apparent from the street. Approaches to the buildings for pedestrians are along routes that have good sightlines.

3.3.3 When considering the positions and density of tree planting the design team should be cognisant of the need to allow casual supervision of space from the adjacent premises and improve the spread of lighting and CCTV coverage.

3.3.4 Consideration should be given to the waste collection, storage and disposal arrangements for litter bins fronting the upgraded public realm. It is not acceptable for bins to be left on the street for extended periods where they can block sight lines, provide potential hiding places and targets for arson or criminal damage.

3.3.5 As the proposed public spaces and plots are developed consideration needs to be given towards external lighting. The proposals are to incorporate a lighting scheme that will distribute illumination evenly around the space(s) without areas of shadowing or pooling and work coherently with the wider security requirements of the site such as CCTV.

3.3.6 Consideration for safe bicycle storage should be embedded within the landscape design. Short-stay cycle parking stands should be located where they can be readily observed and, ideally, monitored by CCTV. The location of cycle stores within proposed buildings should consider the position, inherent physical security and safety of cyclists using the facility.

3.3.7 Consideration to support the reduction of cycle speeds which can be an issue between pedestrians and cyclists along the pathways. Reduce the opportunity for cyclists and E-bikes to undertake high speeds over long stretches, thus reducing conflict and/or injury between users

3.3.8 Future developments should exploit the public realm, ensuring that there are active edges to the streetscape which can help to increase the accessibility of such spaces to user groups who may feel more vulnerable in such spaces and who are of lower mobility. The greater the use of these spaces the less likely they will be populated by those acting anti-socially.

3.3.9 Consider the creation of a *'Friends of'* and *'Local business'* groups, to support the management and maintenance of the public realm.

3.3.10 The development of this public realm space will encourage further significant pedestrian footfall in the area, with people spending longer in the area, rather than it simply passing through as part of a journey from A to B. The aspirations of the plans also seek to extend the use of this space beyond traditional Commercial/retail business hours. It is therefore recommended that planners, developers, and design teams concerned with this development consult with Counter Terrorism Security Advisors throughout the planning and implementation of this development with a view to ensure protection from VAW attacks is as comprehensive as realistically possible. This engagement will also afford the opportunity to consider other attack methodologies and potential mitigations against them.

3.3.11 Security measure carefully incorporated into the environment and building design can ensure that buildings and the environment is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime or safety. The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retrofitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime.

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4 Physical Security (Public realm)

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation in addition to the layout issues highlighted within Section 3.3.

4.1 Landscaping

- ☐ Street furniture should be designed to withstand casual acts of vandalism. When selecting or designing street furniture, consider how easily and quickly items can be repaired or replaced following damage. When commissioning bespoke street furniture and public artworks it is also important to be mindful of the potential for attack and ease of repair. These features are best positioned where there is plenty of formal and informal surveillance, so any criminal acts are more likely to be witnessed.
- ☐ Use of loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Public open space areas should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.
- ☐ Consideration to support the reduction of cycle speeds which can be an issue between pedestrians and cyclists along the path. Reduce the opportunity for cyclists and E-bikes to undertake high speeds over long stretches, thus reducing conflict and/or injury between users.
- ☐ Ease of repair. It is likely that furniture will be subject to criminal damage. The design should be sufficiently robust to withstand this kind of attack but also should be capable of rapid repair. Use of bespoke components may create delays in obtaining replacements.

4.2 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting should be provided in accordance with local ecology requirements. The spread of lighting should be evenly distributed with no areas of shadowing or pooling. Levels should be sufficient to support the ecology within the area. The position of light sources must not create glare or be dazzling at eye level.

4.3 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The

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remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: Main circulation routes / landscaped sheltered area to the paly space / main gathering spaces.

4.4 Other

☐ Signage should be provided advising people of what to do if they get into difficulties or simply to report faults or offensive graffiti.

☐ Signage should be consistent throughout the area. It should help direct users to the safest/most convenient routes to and from key areas of the site, for example, bus stops and nearest points of interest where further assistance may be found.

☐ Surfaces that could be vulnerable to graffiti should be formed of a resistant material or have a resistant coating applied at the outset in order to facilitate rapid removal, e.g. 'easy-on' (see www.urbanhygiene.com for details).

5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within the area. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter and graffiti removal to ensure that the site remains in good repair.
- Regular inspection, service and repair to communal security features (lighting, signage, fencing & gates)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees to ensure that sight lines are maintained, and coverage of lighting is not impaired.

5.1.2 Ensure that the site management of the structure and landscape can cope with the proposals remains in place.

5.1.3 Information regarding security features (such as specifications of materials and structures and systems performance) should be conveyed to the ultimate owners or managers of the site to ensure that any future replacements continue to provide the same level of security and maintain any security accreditation for the development.

5.1.4 As the facility is in a very busy location, it will inevitably attract the attention of potential offenders, regular maintenance should be considered during the initial period, which can be reviewed and adapted as experience of site develops. The developer should liaise with the local policing team, and the site should be included in the patrols of the neighbourhood officers.

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

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7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. Please see Secured by Design - Secured by Design for more information. To apply for the SBD Award for your development in Greater Manchester, please visit Apply for Secured by Design – Design For Security.

7.2 Counter Terrorism Security Advice

7.2.1 Given the location/nature of the proposed scheme, the local Counter Terrorism Security Advisor (CTSA) has highlighted that the development may be at an increased risk. Please contact ctpnw.protect@gmp.pnn.police.uk for more information and advice.

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A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
30/06/26	Enabl	CIS application submitted
08/07/26	Enabl	Client confirmation
10/07/26	IFDO & Enabl	Design team presentation
15/07/26	Design Team & GMP	Design team presentation
14/07/26	DfS	Site visit
21/07/26	DfS	DRAFT CIS completed
03/08/26	DfS	DRAFT A CIS completed & issued
10/08/26	DfS	DRAFT B CIS completed & issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	4004-ID-004-07-Piccadilly-Gardens-Planning-Strategy	10/07/26	
	4004-PLA-XX-XX-DR-L-0001-General Arrangement	10/07/26	
	4004-PLA-XX-XX-DR-L-0001-General Arrangement[27]	08/07/26	
	260702_MPGP-Workbook 09	08/07/26	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Date	Revisions
-	16/07/2026	DRAFT
A	03/08/2026	DRAFT A
B	10/08/2026	DRAFT B

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D Glossary

Physical Security Standards

PAS 24

Enhanced security performance requirements for doorsets and windows in the UK. Doorsets and windows intended to offer a level of security suitable for dwellings and other buildings exposed to comparable risk. It is designed to mimic an attack by an opportunist burglar, using tools which are easy to conceal.

STS 201

Enhanced security to satisfy the requirements for certification of doorsets, equivalent to test standard to PAS 24.

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors, roller shutters, fences and barriers. Products are rated via the term Burglary Resistance (BR) and range from BR1 (lower security rating) to BR6 (higher security rating).

LPS 1175

Physical security for products manufactured for perimeter, façade, internal spaces and entrapment protection. The higher the security rating, the more formidable the security product.

Developed following extensive consultation with stakeholders, the most recent issue sees the previous single digit performance classifications (i.e. Security Ratings 1 to 8) extended to one formed of two elements that illustrate performance in terms of:

- *Threat level (first element) – Letter (A to H) corresponding with the tool kit used to evaluate the product's intruder resistance and number of attackers involved.*
- *Delay (second element) – Numeric value (1, 3, 5, 10, 15 or 20) corresponding with the minimum delay (in minutes) provided by the product when placed in a locked condition.*

BS EN 1627

European standard for the burglary resistance of pedestrian doorsets, windows, curtain walling, grilles and shutters. It defines six resistance classes, from RC1 to RC6, with RC1 being the lowest level of resistance and RC6 the highest. These classes indicate the level of resistance to forced entry, with higher classes requiring more time and specialized tools to breach.

BS EN 356

European standard that specifies the resistance of laminated glazing (i.e. two or more layers of glass bonded together with a plastic interlayer) to manual attacks, such as might occur during forced entry or vandalism. It classifies laminated glass into different resistance levels, ranging from P1A to P8B, with P1A being the lowest and P8B the highest.

Useful Websites

Design For Security – Designing Out Crime – *apply for Crime Impact Statements or the Secured by Design Award from Greater Manchester Police*

Secured by Design - Secured by Design – *SBD Award Scheme, Design Guides and Member Companies*

ParkMark - Home – *Park Mark Safer Parking Award Scheme*

NBS Source – *find, select and specify building products (including security-certified products)*

RedBook Live - LPCB Red Book – *search for LPS 1175 certified products*

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