

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

DEVELOPMENT OF 25 APARTMENTS AND 50 HOUSES
FORMER PEACOCK CENTRE AND LAND AT PIPEWELL AVENUE, GORTON

For: Clarion Housing Association
Version B: 5th June 2026
Reference: 2005/0841/CIS/02

designforsecurity

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GREATER MANCHESTER POLICE

Peacock Centre

URN: 2005/0841/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security additions/improvements required.

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

General

- Playground at the Peacock Centre plot should be illuminated to a high standard.
- The play areas adjacent rear/side boundaries of the houses should not allow them to be easily accessed by criminals (i.e. to gain entry to the rear of properties) with the use of dense shrubbery/defensible planting.

Apartments

- Ground floor apartments should be afforded defensible space either with a low boundary or with shrubbery.
- External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.

Houses

- Gates to rear alley should be brough forward to be as close to the front elevation of the houses as possible.
- Gable ends positioned where they directly abut the pavement or open space can generate antisocial behaviour for residents (i.e. loitering and ball games) and can be a target for graffiti. It is highly recommended that gable ends are protected with a low boundary or dense shrubbery.
- Where rear/side boundaries abut the footpath or open space there should be defensible planting installed to the outer face of the garden boundary fence to prevent those criminally, or antisocially minded, from climbing or damaging/defacing the fence.
- Parking spaces at the sides and rears of dwellings should be illuminated to a high standard to reduce the potential for vehicles to be targeted.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.

Matt Granelli

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is split in two by dwelling on Buttress St.


The site is located in the Gorton area of Manchester. The boundaries of the plot to the north of Buttress St are generally formed by metal rails to the north, east and west, which are shared by Burston St, Gorton Ln & Peacock Cl. The southern boundary is formed by a masonry wall which is shared by the rear boundary of dwelling on Buttress St.

The boundaries of the plot to the south of Buttress St are generally formed by the rears of dwellings to the north, east and south.

The site is currently a mixture of vacant land to the north and undeveloped greenspace to the south. The surrounding area is predominantly residential with a care home and industrial units to the north.

The site to the south of Buttress St is unsecured and is subject to act of anti-social behaviour with evidence of fly tipping around the area. The site to the north of Buttress St is secured but fly tipping is prevalent in the enclosed Burston St.

Access to Burston St is prevented by the use concrete blocks in the road.











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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st March 2025 to 28th February 2026 within 500m of the site.

2.1 Local Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
16	9	67	255	40	10	<5	23	10	8

2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the past 12 months has been average for the Manchester division, with less serious wounding, criminal damage and theft having been most reported offences. These offences have occurred all throughout the residential neighbourhoods surrounding the site, particularly to the south at locations along and close to Hyde Road.

2.1.2 Less serious woundings have mostly taken place to the south and east of the proposed site, where assaults, public order and harassment offences have been most reported. These incidents have mainly involved disputes between known associates and neighbours, as well as some cases of domestic violence.

2.1.3 The majority of criminal damage offences have also occurred to the south of the site, whereby offenders have targeted cars parked throughout the residential neighbourhoods by using implements to dent or scratch the bodywork and smash the glazing in the windows. There have also been cases of offenders damaging fences and the external doors and windows of dwellings, which have mainly happened during disputes.

2.1.4 In cases of theft offenders have targeted insecure items, bags or coats on tabletops and benches in public spaces, retail outlets and restaurants, as well as parcels left on doorsteps and in communal areas of apartment buildings. Offenders have also used distraction and pickpocketing techniques to remove items from the person in crowded areas.

2.1.5 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed residential scheme, the more detailed analysis below will focus on local domestic burglary and vehicle crime.

2.2 General Risk Factors

2.2.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds, or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.3 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting residential properties are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

2.3.1 Smashed glazing in windows and doors.

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points.

2.3.2 Using bodily pressure or implements in order to force open secure windows and doors or have been targeted when left insecure by residents.

Possible Solution – All external doors and windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1 & 4.2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and locking, thus reducing the opportunity of them being left insecure.

All individual apartments should also be secured with a robust entrance door set (see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection.

2.3.3 Posing as a legitimate resident and gaining access to communal areas of apartment buildings by tailgating residents and via insecure doors.


Possible Solution – A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to review visitors approaching the building before allowing them access (see Section 4.1). The main communal entrance should be in a highly visible position and well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. Consideration could also be given to 'airlock' lobby system, which features a secondary entrance door that only releases when the external door has closed, reducing the opportunities for tailgating unnoticed.

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
2.4 Local Crime Rate Comparisons

The graphs below compare the local rates of crime (i.e. crimes per 1,000 dwellings) with the average rates for Manchester, Greater Manchester and England & Wales.


Domestic Burglary Crime Rates




Wounding Crime Rates



Criminal Damage Crime Rates



Vehicle Crime Rates



2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **44% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **28% lower** than Greater Manchester and **26% lower** than England & Wales.

2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **17% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **13% higher** than Greater Manchester and **116% higher** than England & Wales.


2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **22% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **59% higher** than Greater Manchester and **94% higher** than England & Wales.

2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **34% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **9% higher** than Greater Manchester and **33% higher** than England & Wales.


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2.5 Local Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis


Local Domestic Burglary – Day Range



Local Domestic Burglary – Time Range



Local Domestic Burglary – Point of Entry



2.5.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of domestic burglary peaks on Tuesday in the morning (01:00-04:00 and 07:00-08:00). Offenders often target dwellings at this time when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving them the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 Point of Entry: In the local area, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:


- In cases where the entry point is recorded as 'unknown' it is likely that the offenders have exploited insecure doors.
- Forcing open secure doors using bodily pressure and implements.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.

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
2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.6.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Thursday just before midnight (23:00-00:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles at this time when they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

3.1.1 Full planning application for the erection of 75 dwellings (Use Class C3), including a 25-unit apartment building and 27 dwellings on the Peacock Centre Site, and 23 dwellings on the Pipewell Avenue Site, with associated access, parking, landscaping, public open space, informal play provision, drainage infrastructure, and enhanced pedestrian and cycle connections.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The proposal will bring additional legitimate activity to a currently vacant site. Redevelopment with housing and repopulation of the site should help to generate a sense of ownership and responsibility and improve informal policing of the area.

3.2.2 The proposed development will bring activity, overlooking and surveillance to the area during the day and night.

3.2.3 Access controls can easily be deployed at the communal entrance doors to the apartment building, in order to restrict access to residents and authorised visitors only.

3.2.4 The principal entrance to the apartment building will be located in a prominent position and will be capable of being clearly seen from the public realm.

3.2.5 The houses will have habitable room windows to their front, maximising surveillance opportunities over the street, parked vehicles and between dwellings.

3.2.6 The footprint of the buildings has been kept simple, with no doors hidden in deep recesses or behind building lines (where they would be vulnerable to attack).

3.2.7 The majority of the proposed houses will be served by in-curtilage parking spaces directly in front of them, allowing residents to secure/overlook their own vehicles and limiting opportunities to criminals.

3.2.8 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the dwellings, avoiding the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the developments are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

<u>General</u>

3.3.1 Playground at the Peacock Centre plot should be illuminated to a high standard.

3.3.2 The play areas adjacent rear/side boundaries of the houses should not allow them to be easily accessed by criminals (i.e. to gain entry to the rear of properties) with the use of dense shrubbery/defensible planting. Boundaries adjacent these spaces should have enhanced security to prevent them from being scaled or damaged.

3.3.3 Footpaths within the site should be wide enough to accommodate pedestrian traveling in both directions. Where possible, footpaths should be as linear as possible to allow for good sightlines. Shrubbery adjacent footpaths should be limited in height to 1000mm, and tree canopies should fall no less than 2000mm. Where footpaths aren't sufficiently ambiently illuminated there should be dedicated lighting sources to deter antisocial/criminal behaviour and allow for safe use at night.

3.3.4 Consideration should be given to a symbolic barrier at the entrances to the development, such as a change of surface texture/colour, or brick pillars, which can convey the impression that the area beyond is private and discouraging anyone without a legitimate reason from entering.

3.3.5 The proposed access roads into the development should be illuminated to adoptable standard, to reduce the potential for crime and fear of crime.

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Apartments

3.3.6 Ground floor apartments should be afforded defensible space either with a low boundary or with shrubbery.

3.3.7 External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock operating with an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.

3.3.8 Access into the building should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.

3.3.9 There should be a secondary access-controlled door into the circulation cores of the building to reduce the potential for tailgating.

3.3.10 The door to the bicycle store should be security-certified and be self-closing and self-locking. It should also operate on an access control system, operated with resident's key card/fob. Bicycle racks should allow both wheels and the frame to be secured.

3.3.11 The door into the building, from the bicycle store, should be access control restricting access into the building. To prevent someone tailgating through the bicycle store to gain access into the building.

3.3.12 A secure mail delivery system should be supplied, to allow delivery without access to the whole building. Given the emerging trend of parcel thefts (particularly at apartment blocks), consideration should also be a secure system for depositing parcels.

3.3.13 The apartment car parking areas should be illuminated to a high standard (i.e. in accordance with BS 3659) and car parking spaces should be well defined to avoid any conflict. Any visitor spaces should be clearly marked.

Houses

3.3.14 Gates to rear alley should be brough forward to be as close to the front elevation of the houses as possible. This occurs between B7 & B4, B4 & B2 on the Peacock centre site and B3 & B1 on the Pipewell Avenue site. A gate should be installed between B8 & B11 on the Pipewell Avenue site.



3.3.15 Gable ends positioned where they directly abut the pavement or open space can generate antisocial behaviour for residents (i.e. loitering and ball games) and can be a target for graffiti. It is highly recommended that gable ends are protected with a low boundary or dense shrubbery.

3.3.16 Where rear/side boundaries abut the footpath or open space there should be defensible planting installed to the outer face of the garden boundary fence to prevent those criminally, or antisocially minded, from climbing or damaging/defacing the fence.

3.3.17 Parking spaces at the sides and rears of dwellings should be illuminated to a high standard to reduce the potential for vehicles to be targeted.

3.3.18 Boundaries should be appropriately high and robust. Rear and side boundaries that are adjacent to public space should have a masonry (or other hardwearing) base, with timber fence above to a total height of

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2100mm. It is recommended that the top 300mm consist of trellis structure. Rear boundaries adjacent secure areas can 1800mm in height. Side and rear gardens adjacent publicly accessible space should be protected with defensible planting to deter climbing and criminal damage.

3.3.19 Where there is a communal gate providing access to multiple gardens it should be of robust construction (i.e. metal railings), self-closing, and be capable of being secured from both sides.

3.3.20 Front gardens should be well defined with a low boundary treatment or low-level planting (i.e. to an approximate height of 1000mm).

3.3.21 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

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4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation in addition to the layout issues highlighted within Section 3.3.

4.1 Doors (Houses)

- ☐ Front and rear doors to dwellings must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222.
- ☐ Any external French/double doors or sliding doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222.
- ☐ Front doors to properties should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key.
- ☐ Front doors should have either fixed sidelights or door viewers.
- ☐ Chain limiters are recommended but not generally essential.
- ☐ Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

4.2 Doors (Apartments)

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification. Access into the build should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.
- ☐ Patio doors to ground floor apartments must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. Apartment entrance doors must have a door viewer.
- ☐ Construction of internal walls surrounding internal apartment entrance doors (600mm either side of the door set) should incorporate a resilient layer to reduce the risk of anyone breaking through the wall to access the locking mechanism. The resilient layer should be timber (minimum thickness of 9mm) or expanded metal.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.3 Windows

- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR A, STS 204, or STS 222.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.4 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

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4.5 Alarms

- [ ] If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either:
  - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
  - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- [ ] If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.
- [ ] If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

4.6 Access Control (Apartments)

- [ ] Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
  - Communal entrances
  - Bicycle stores
  - Circulation cores
  - Staff only areas
  - Parcel rooms

4.7 Boundaries

- [ ] Rear boundaries should generally be 1800mm high and of close boarded timber construction. It is recommended that the top 300mm consist of trellis structure.
- [ ] Rear boundaries that are adjacent to public space should have a masonry (or other hardwearing) base, with timber fence above to a total height of 2100mm. It is recommended that the top 300mm consist of trellis structure.
- [ ] Sub-divisional rear boundaries may be as low as 1500mm.
- [ ] The fronts of properties should be demarcated by low boundaries such as planting and/or railings to an approximate height of 1000mm.
- [ ] Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.
- [ ] Gates into the rear curtilage of dwellings should be in keeping with the height of adjacent boundary treatments and incorporate either:
  - A pad lockable bolt to the midpoint of the internal face, or
  - A key operable deadlock

4.8 Bicycle Stores

- [ ] Doors into the cycle parking area(s) must be certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, with access restricted to registered residents (i.e. genuine bicycle owners).
- [ ] Cycle stands should either be U-profile or Sheffield style stands. If rack storage is used it should be possible for both wheels and the frame to be secured.

4.9 Lighting

- [ ] External lighting must be provided to the front and rear of dwellings and the apartment building, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible).

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- [ ] Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.
- [ ] Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.
- [ ] Parking areas to the rears of houses should be illuminated.

4.10 Car Parking Areas

- [ ] Apartment car parking areas should be illuminated to a high standard.
- [ ] Car parking spaces should be clearly marked, and signage should indicate that these are for residents use only.

4.11 Landscaping

- [ ] In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- [ ] Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

4.12 Other

- [ ] Meter cupboards should be located to the fronts of properties only, not in the private areas.

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4.13 Management & Maintenance

4.13.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter/graffiti removal
- Repair to communal areas (access controls, lighting, signage etc.)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

4.13.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

5 Construction

5.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

5.1.2 Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

6 Useful References

6.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

6.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. Please see Secured by Design - Secured by Design for more information. To apply for the SBD Award for your development in Greater Manchester, please visit Apply for Secured by Design – Design For Security.

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A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
25/02/2026	PRP	CIS Application
26/02/2026	DfS	CIS Fee Proposal
23/03/2026	PRP	CIS Confirmation

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
B100705-AD-01-07-002	Pre-Application Design Report		
DN0385-PRP-B10-00-DR-A-23200 P07	Ground Floor Plan		
DN0385-PRP-B10-01-DR-A-23201 P06	First Floor Plan		
DN0385-PRP-B10-02-DR-A-23202 P07	Second Floor Plan		
DN0385-PRP-B10-ZZ-DR-A-24100 P04	Proposed Elevations		
DN0385-PRP-Z1-00-DR-A-20100 P07	PROPOSED SITE PLAN - PEACOCK CENTRE		
DN0385-PRP-Z1-ZZ-DR-A-24002 P02	CHILTERN BLOCK 02 - GA		
DN0385-PRP-Z1-ZZ-DR-A-24004 P03	RENDLESHAM BLOCK 04 - GA ELEVATIONS		
DN0385-PRP-Z1-ZZ-DR-A-24005 P03	RENDLESHAM & WYCHWOOD BLOCK 04B - GA ELEVATIONS		
DN0385-PRP-Z1-ZZ-DR-A-24006 P03	RENDLESHAM & WYCHWOOD BLOCK 04C - GA ELEVATIONS		
DN0385-PRP-Z2-00-DR-A-20101 P07	PROPOSED SITE PLAN - PIPEWELL AVENUE		
DN0385-PRP-Z2-ZZ-DR-A-24001 P03	CHILTERN BLOCK 01 - GA ELEVATIONS		
DN0385-PRP-Z2-ZZ-DR-A-24003 P03	RENDLESHAM BLOCK 03 - GA ELEVATIONS		
DN0385-PRP-Z2-ZZ-DR-A-24008 P02	H24.3 BLOCK 07 - GA ELEVATIONS		
DN0385-PRP-Z2-ZZ-DR-A-24009 P02	H23.7 BLOCK 08 - GA ELEVATIONS		
DN0385-PRP-Z2-ZZ-DR-A-24010 P02	CHILTERN BLOCK 09 - GA ELEVATIONS		
DN0385-PRP-Z2-ZZ-DR-A-24011 P02	CHILTERN BLOCK 11 - GA ELEVATIONS		
DN0385-PRP-Z2-ZZ-DR-A-24012 P02	WHITELEAF BLOCK 05 - GA ELEVATIONS		
DN0385-PRP-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-24007 P02	BLOCK 05 CORNER TYPE - GA ELEVATIONS		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

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C CIS Version History

Version	Date	Revisions
A	07/04/2026	First Issue
B	05/06/2026	Updated in line with revised drawings

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