

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

LATE NIGHT HOSPITALITY VENUE
200 DEANSGATE, MANCHESTER

For: The Little Door & Co
Version A: 08/05/2026
Reference: 2019/0579/CIS/01

designforsecurity

GREATER MANCHESTER POLICE

200 Deansgate

URN: 2019/0579/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Design changes not required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed change of use to a late night hospitality venue is suitable for this area and does not conflict with surrounding uses - which are a similar nature. The venue is located in a prominent location on Deansgate where it is well overlooked and subject to high levels of passive surveillance; additionally, the rear of the building is well overlooked by Sunlight House – which will make it difficult for offenders to target the building without being seen.

It is highly recommended that further consideration should be given to the following points to enhance the security of the scheme:

- Consideration should be given to securing the recessed entrance when the venue is closed, to reduce the potential for misuse.
- Access to back-of-house areas should be restricted to staff.
- The premises should have a comprehensive CCTV/VSS system.
- There should be a monitored intruder alarm.

Additionally, there are a number of recommendations made in section 3.3 of this report which would enhance the security of the development and it is highly recommended that these are considered for the proposed units and the wider outline proposals.

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
1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located within the city centre of Manchester.

The site forms part of 196 Deansgate, a grade II listed Edwardian building which first opened in 1908 as the Royal London Friendly Society. The building is bound by Atkinson Street to the North, Deansgate to the East (front), to the South by Quay Street, and Little Quay Street to the East (rear).

The ground floor of the building is occupied by a number of restaurant/café uses including Federal Café, Flat Iron, Pieminister. The upper floors of the building have been refurbished and are in use as offices. The rear of the building is generally used for servicing/bin collection and is well overlooked by Sunlight House – which has also been recently refurbished.

The proposed site is positioned on the ground floor/basement, on the unit positioned between Flat Iron and Pieminister, which previously formed part of the outdoor retail store Blacks.











2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Local Crime Summary

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st May 2025 to 30th April 2026.

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
8	114	151	1,408	469	80	36	167	39	39

2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area is …

2.1.2 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed commercial development, the more detailed analysis below will look at use-specific burglary and theft and local vehicle crime.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting restaurants/cafes/drinking establishments are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

2.2.2 Customers posing as legitimate customers, gaining access to staff only areas

Possible Solution - There should be a secure area for staff to leave their belongings while at work and access to all staff areas should be restricted with auditable access controls.

2.2.3 Theft of personal property from tabletops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables



Possible Solution - A particular issue in drinking establishments within the Manchester city centre area is the theft of personal effects; handbag and mobile phone theft is a particular issue. Consideration should be given to fixing 'Chelsea Clips' (see image) or simple hooks to the underside of tables to allow customers to secure bags or jackets to the table while keeping it in view; a more secure option than, for example, tabletops or back of chairs, where belongings can be liable to theft.

The internal layout of the premises can also help deter theft by promoting surveillance and creating an uncluttered, environment, avoiding pinch points or areas of concealment. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.

2.2.4 Doors have been forced open with tools and bodily pressure

Possible Solution – All external doors should be certified to the relevant security standards (see section 4).

2.2.5 Glazing in windows has been smashed

Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see section 4 for more details).

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2.3 General Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:


- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict
- Miscellaneous theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery / wounding of patrons leaving premises
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

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
2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary (Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against licenced premises, recorded in the Manchester area.


Licensed Premises Burglary – Day Range



Licensed Premises Burglary – Time Range



Licensed Premises Burglary – Point of Entry



2.4.1 Day / Time Range: In Manchester, the risk of burglary at licensed premises between Monday and Wednesday and is lowest on Friday. The risk of burglary is highest in the early hours of the morning. Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed and the areas/streets where they are typical found are quieter than during the day – meaning offenders perceive the risk of being detected or identified as low.

2.4.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:


- Forcing open secure doors and windows – mostly fire doors located to the side and rear of the property are targeted – using bodily pressure and implements to gain access.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and exploiting insecure doors/ tailgating staff into restricted areas, taking property belonging to employees and the business.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily pressure and implements to access the doors and windows located below.
- Broken glazing to windows and doors – located mostly to the front of the property, with glass in doors highly targeted- using bricks or implements located around the scene.

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
2.5 Theft (Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against licenced premises, recorded in the Manchester area.

Licensed Premises Theft – Day Range



Licensed Premises Theft – Time Range




2.5.1 Day / Time Range: During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester licensed premises peaks over the weekend. On these days, many premises within the city centre area experience higher levels of attendance than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunity for offenders to commit theft is greater. The risk of theft peaks late at night and into the early morning. This reflects the times when licensed premises are at their busiest and therefore the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses / wallets, cash and phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items - usually stolen from table tops, from bags hung on chairs/stored under tables or via pickpocketing and distraction methods. Theft of property belonging to staff is also common, with offenders posing as legitimate customers to gain access to unauthorised areas.


2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.6.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime is high throughout the week, and peaks in the afternoon/evening (17:00-20:00). Offenders often target vehicles at this time when they are often left parked on streets for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

3.1.1 The proposed development is the change of use and fit out of the unit as a late night hospitality venue at ground floor and basement level.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The site is located on Deansgate which is one of the main routes through the city centre, and near the major junction with Quay Street. The volume of pedestrian and vehicular traffic will subject the site to high levels of pedestrian traffic.

3.2.2 The main entrance is positioned where it can easily be seen from the public highway/footway.

3.2.3 The bar/service areas at both ground floor, and basement level, both the entrance, allowing staff to vet those entering the venue.

3.2.4 The bar/service areas overlook the seating areas well, allowing staff to have good views across the venue.

3.2.5 The rear of the building is well overlooked by Sunlight House which fronts Little Quay Street

3.2.6 The proposed late night hospitality use is in keeping with other uses in the local area and suitable for this city centre location.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 The proposed recessed entrance doors could potentially generate loitering, vagrancy, or drug/alcohol consumption when the venue is closed. Restricting access to the recessed area when the building is closed will reduce the potential for misuse. Possible solutions could include:

- A: The use of heavy planters to block the space, which could be positioned either side of the entrance when not in use.
- B: The installation of ornate wrought iron style gate, or similar,(in keeping with the style of the building), which could be locked when the venue is closed, to restrict access to the recessed area.





3.3.2 Licensed premises are frequently the scenes of assaults both between patrons, and additionally, staff have been targeted by patrons. It is highly recommended that the premises is covered by a comprehensive CCTV system to deter unwanted behaviour and that any incidents are recorded and used as evidence.

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3.3.3 It is recommended that 'Chelsea Clips' or simple hooks are fitted to the underside of tables to allow customers to secure bags or jackets to the table.

3.3.4 Access to staff/storage areas should be restricted to staff. It is recommended that doors into areas restricted to staff operate on an access control system (i.e. fob or swipe card) or that they are lockable by key, a door closer should be installed to ensure the door locks as staff enter/leave this area. Signage should indicate which areas are only for members of staff.

3.3.5 The proposed public house should have a monitored intruder alarm with a security of keyholder response.

3.3.6 Casual access to the rear of the bars/service counters should be restricted (e.g. with a lockable hatch that cannot be easily scaled) to prevent unauthorised access.

3.3.7 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any till/bar area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.

3.3.8 The volume of cash left on site overnight should be minimised as far as possible with regular banking/cash collections. Any cash left in the building overnight should be stored in an insurance rated safe within a secure room.

3.3.9 Any alterations to the building should be in accordance with Secured by Design standards were possible (see below).

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation in addition to the layout issues highlighted within Section 3.3. The listed status of the building might prove restrictive and in that case mitigating security measures might be required.

4.1 Doors

☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222.

☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Windows, Curtain Walling, Cladding & Shutters

☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified BS PAS 24, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR A, STS 204, or STS 222.

☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover each building, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

4.5 Access Control

☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:

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☐ Main entrances

☐ External doors

☐ Staff areas

4.6 VSS

☐ The proposed development should be covered by a comprehensive VSS system (Video Surveillance System / CCTV) see section 5 for more details.

5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the commercial units must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the units. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:

- Opening and closing of premises, including staff arrival and departure;
- Cash management within the premises - consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods;
- Cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices (which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe to meet insurance needs);
- Management of stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
- Details of staff security training;
- Location and management of any smoking areas;
- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, VSS cameras etc;
- Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
- Refuse collection arrangements.

5.1.2 The opening hours should be consistent with other such premises in the locale and should not unduly conflict with other nearby uses. Sufficient levels of service staff should be provided at busy periods to reduce waiting times and the potential for frustration, aggression and conflict.

5.1.3 Any high value equipment (e.g. computers/TVs, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

5.1.4 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the site and each of the premises, but also to deter unauthorised access to resident or staff-only areas.

5.1.5 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left accessible for extended periods. Servicing activities should also not require any service doors to remain open and unattended for prolonged periods.

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

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6.1.2 Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. Please see Secured by Design - Secured by Design for more information. To apply for the SBD Award for your development in Greater Manchester, please visit Apply for Secured by Design – Design For Security.

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A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Date	Revisions
A	??/??/????	

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D Glossary

Physical Security Standards

PAS 24

Enhanced security performance requirements for doorsets and windows in the UK. Doorsets and windows intended to offer a level of security suitable for dwellings and other buildings exposed to comparable risk. It is designed to mimic an attack by an opportunist burglar, using tools which are easy to conceal.

STS 201

Enhanced security to satisfy the requirements for certification of doorsets, equivalent to test standard to PAS 24.

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors, roller shutters, fences and barriers. Products are rated via the term Burglary Resistance (BR) and range from BR1 (lower security rating) to BR6 (higher security rating).

LPS 1175

Physical security for products manufactured for perimeter, façade, internal spaces and entrapment protection. The higher the security rating, the more formidable the security product.

Developed following extensive consultation with stakeholders, the most recent issue sees the previous single digit performance classifications (i.e. Security Ratings 1 to 8) extended to one formed of two elements that illustrate performance in terms of:

- *Threat level (first element) – Letter (A to H) corresponding with the tool kit used to evaluate the product's intruder resistance and number of attackers involved.*
- *Delay (second element) – Numeric value (1, 3, 5, 10, 15 or 20) corresponding with the minimum delay (in minutes) provided by the product when placed in a locked condition.*

BS EN 1627

European standard for the burglary resistance of pedestrian doorsets, windows, curtain walling, grilles and shutters. It defines six resistance classes, from RC1 to RC6, with RC1 being the lowest level of resistance and RC6 the highest. These classes indicate the level of resistance to forced entry, with higher classes requiring more time and specialized tools to breach.

BS EN 356

European standard that specifies the resistance of laminated glazing (i.e. two or more layers of glass bonded together with a plastic interlayer) to manual attacks, such as might occur during forced entry or vandalism. It classifies laminated glass into different resistance levels, ranging from P1A to P8B, with P1A being the lowest and P8B the highest.

Useful Websites

Design For Security – Designing Out Crime *– apply for Crime Impact Statements or the Secured by Design Award from Greater Manchester Police*

Secured by Design - Secured by Design *– SBD Award Scheme, Design Guides and Member Companies*

ParkMark - Home *– Park Mark Safer Parking Award Scheme*

NBS Source *– find, select and specify building products (including security-certified products)*

RedBook Live - LPCB Red Book *– search for LPS 1175 certified products*

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E Commercial Internal Layout Guidance

The internal layout of any commercial units should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. Design for Security understands that the designers and client may not always know who will be occupying their units once complete, and therefore, the end-users requirements. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

Restaurants/Cafes/Licensed Premises

Restaurants/cafes/licensed premises can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:

- Opportunities - Large numbers of people congregating in restaurants/licensed premises generates opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons are stationary for long periods of time, making them easier to target.
- Lack of attention - The movement of people, noise, social interaction and other factors mean patrons can be easily distracted.
- Cohesion – Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent restaurants/licensed premises means that such a venue would lack 'community territoriality' (i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them). This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur.
- Customer turnover – High turnover with high levels of customer movement within an establishment, are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
- Valuable goods – Often available and possibly on show, a particular problem in external seating areas. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – such as mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys etc.
- Stealth - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.

In order to minimise these issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:

The main entrances to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising.

Customers entering/leaving the premises through the main entrances should be easily observed by staff. Staff should also have clear views of any W/Cs to monitor their use.

The internal layout of premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.

Consideration should be given to high/wide bars/service counters, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of any bars/service counters should be prevented (e.g. with lockable hatches that cannot be easily scaled).

Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.

All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible (see Section 6.4) and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.

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It is highly recommended that any customer tables are fitted with Chelsea Clips, to reduce the opportunities for theft (see below).



Public toilets can give rise to problems and the following issues should be considered:

- Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work etc. should be used.
- Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
- Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening as this will aid gaining access in an emergency. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 200mm from the floor and to reduce the top height.
- Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
- Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
- Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.

F VSS Guidance

Resolution, Identification & Retention

☐ Select camera resolution based on identification requirements and field of view. More megapixels provide higher detail but also increase bandwidth and storage requirements.

☐ Recommended resolution levels:
- 1080p (2MP): General indoor and corridor surveillance.
- 4MP–8MP (4K): Entrances, exits, and high-security areas for facial or number plate recognition.
- >8MP: Large-area coverage or post-event digital zooming.

☐ The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

Image Quality

☐ High-quality imaging is the foundation of effective VSS. Selecting cameras with the right sensor size, lens aperture, and image processing capabilities ensures accurate visual data capture across lighting conditions.

☐ Key considerations:

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- Larger sensors and low f-number lenses capture more light and deliver better contrast.
- Use Wide Dynamic Range (WDR) cameras for scenes with bright and dark areas.
- Apply Day/Night and IR-capable cameras for low-light performance.
- Frame rates between 25–30 fps are recommended for motion clarity.

Camera Placement and Coverage

☐ Camera placement directly affects image usability. Ensure coverage overlap and proper mounting height to minimise blind spots.

☐ Placement principles:

- Mount indoor cameras to prevent tampering while retaining facial detail.
- Outdoor cameras should be positioned to avoid glare and direct sunlight.
- Slight overlap of camera fields ensures seamless coverage.
- Combine wide-angle lenses for area coverage and narrow lenses for detail zones.

Environmental and Housing Considerations

☐ Outdoor and exposed cameras must withstand environmental and mechanical impacts. Select housings rated for weather and vandal resistance.

- Minimum IP65/66 for outdoor use.
- IK10 or equivalent vandal-resistant enclosures.
- Integrated IR or OptimizedIR functions for low-light areas.
- Avoid steep downward angles; maintain clear facial perspective.

Network and System Design

☐ Design the video system architecture around IP-based network cameras for scalability, reliability, and flexibility. Core design elements to consider:

- Use Power over Ethernet (PoE) to simplify installation.
- Calculate bandwidth and storage based on resolution, frame rate, and retention time.
- Apply compression standards (H.264/H.265) to optimise storage.
- Ensure strong cybersecurity: password protection, encryption, network segmentation.

Maintenance and Quality Assurance

☐ Routine inspection and maintenance are critical to sustaining image quality and reliability.

- Perform day/night checks post-installation.
- Clean lenses regularly and inspect mounting fixtures.
- Review recorded footage to confirm identification quality.
- Update firmware and review network security periodically.

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