

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Development of 88 apartments
Palatine Road

For: Marco Living 3 Ltd
Version A: 13/05/2026
Reference: 2024/0369/CIS/02

designforsecurity

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GREATER MANCHESTER POLICE

Palatine Road

URN: 2024/0369/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported – Minor security additions required.

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

We consider the residential scheme appropriate and are happy to support the proposals.

From a crime prevention perspective, the positive features of the development include; an appropriate number of dwellings on the site; the orientation of the apartments will focus activity in appropriate areas whilst also facilitating passive surveillance of the public realm; off-street, car parking has been included in the scheme.

Advice is included in the report, which we consider will enhance security of the development and this set out in sections 3.3 and 4. The principal recommendations are:

- *install doors, locks, windows, glazing, and, ideally, intruder alarms that meet a recognised security standard.*
- *to emphasise the private nature of the apartment residents' car park and access road, we recommend enhancing the quality of the surfacing of both and including signs to clarify terms of use.*
- *install dusk to dawn lighting to all external doors of the houses and Main reception of the apartment blocks, and to the apartment car park and access road.*
- *Post & delivery arrangements for the apartment blocks.*
- *Defensible space around ground floor windows.*
- *Robust landscaping furniture.*

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition to meet Secure by Design accreditation is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.

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Contents

1 Visual Audit 4

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis 5

2.1 Local Crime Summary

2.2 General Risk Factors

2.3 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.4 Local Crime Rate Comparisons

2.5 Local Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

3 Layout Appraisal 10

3.1 Proposed Development

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

3.4 Points for Further Consideration

4 Physical Security 13

4.1 Doors

4.2 Windows

4.3 Glazing

4.4 Alarms

4.5 Access Control

4.6 Boundaries

4.7 Landscaping

4.8 Lighting

4.9 Other

5 Management & Maintenance 15

6 Construction 15

7 Useful References 15

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

Appendix

A Contact Register 16

B Associated Documents 16

C CIS Version History 16

D Glossary 17

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site is situated towards the southern edge on Palatine Rd, West Didsbury.

This section of Palatine Road in West Didsbury is a busy stretch of road network connecting Didsbury to Northenden and the motorway network.

Pedestrian footfall along this section of Palatine Rd is low. The main flow is vehicle traffic.

To the rear of the site is a large surface grade car park for the neighbouring Britania Hotel.


Northenden has good vehicle & public transport links to nearby popular destinations such as Sale and Didsbury. The M60 motorway provides excellent links to M/cr Airport and the wider Greater M/cr district.

The proposed site currently contains three separate residential Victorian blocks, sub-divided into apartments with surface grade car parking at the front & rear.

The rear of the site is open access car parking with no access control or parking restrictions.

The parking area to the hotel is of poor quality with dense and overgrown landscaping towards the majority of the boundaries.

The main area to the rear of the existing blocks has been cleared. The site is relatively level, however there are some level changes between the hotel car park and the proposed site, approx. 1.5m/2m drop to the car park.




1 – Proposed site off Palatine Road.


2 – Neighbouring Britania Hotel.


3 –View towards neighbouring site.


4 – Access road car park within the Britania Hotel.to


5 – Entrance off Palatine Rd to the site.


6 – Brick structure within the site.


7 – View south along Palatine Road.

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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st April 2025 to 31st March 2026 within 500m of the site.

2.1 Local Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 1000m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
17	6	47	186	30	7	<5	25	13	8

2.1.1 The overall rate of crime over the past 12 months in the local area has been slightly lower than average for the Manchester division, with less serious wounding, theft and criminal damage being the most commonly reported offences. The majority of these incidents have occurred around nearby residential areas around the Princess Road and Northenden districts.

2.1.2 Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the highest recorded less serious wounding offences taking place, with incidents between known associates most commonly reported, as well as some cases of domestic violence. Criminal damage against properties has accounted for the majority of criminal damage offences taking place in the local area. Offenders have primarily smashed windows and damaged the external doors of both residential dwellings and business/retail premises.

2.1.3 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed residential development, the more detailed analysis below will focus on local residential burglary and vehicle crime.

2.2 General Risk Factors

2.2.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds, or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.3 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.3.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent MOs (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting residential properties and parked vehicles are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Doors have been targeted most frequently, particularly front doors (a common M.O. when apartments or terraced properties are targeted), and have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure.

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Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1 for more information), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.

A robust audio-visual access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to any apartment block before allowing them access. The main communal entrance to the block should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. Consideration could also be given to 'airlock' lobby system, which features a secondary entrance door that only releases when the external door has closed, reducing the opportunities for tailgating unnoticed. All individual internal apartment entrance doors should be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (see above), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection.

The locks to the front entrance doors of houses should be fitted with split-spindles or fixed external handles, essentially meaning they are key only entry and are secure from the exterior of the dwelling when shut. This will ensure that they cannot be left open and accessible.

- Offenders have gained access to rear gardens and targeted sheds.

  Possible Solution – All private spaces to the sides/rears of the dwellings should be robustly enclosed, particularly where adjacent to publicly accessible space, to deter unauthorised access (see Section 4.5). Open pedestrian routes/accessible land to the rear of the properties should be avoided. Lighting to the front and rear of dwellings can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime.

  Any sheds should be of robust construction (i.e. minimum 38x50mm planed timber frame; floor and roof constructed from minimum 11mm boards; and minimum 11x125mm tongue & grooved board walls and door), with coach-bolted hinges, two hasp and stables to meet 'Sold Secure' Silver and two padlocks to meet 'Solid Secure' Silver or LPS 1654 SR1.

- Vehicles have been targeted when parked on the street or within publicly accessible communal parking areas


  Possible Solution - It is essential that the development is designed so that resident's vehicles are secured and overlooked. It is preferable that all houses either have the provision to garage vehicles or have in-curtilage car parking arrangements, well-overlooked from habitable room windows. Ideally, any surface communal parking areas serving apartment buildings or groups of houses should be located directly in front of the dwellings they serve, clearly separated from the streets or any areas of adjacent open space/pedestrian routes. Any side, rear, undercroft or basement communal parking areas must be secured to prevent unauthorised access to where hidden doors, windows and parked vehicles could be attacked unseen.

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
2.4 Local Crime Rate Comparisons

The graphs below compare the local rates of crime (i.e. crimes per 1,000 dwellings) with the average rates for Manchester, Greater Manchester and England & Wales.


Domestic Burglary Crime Rates




Wounding Crime Rates



Criminal Damage Crime Rates



Vehicle Crime Rates



2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **78% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **72% lower** than Greater Manchester and **71% lower** than England & Wales.

2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **78% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **70% lower** than Greater Manchester and **42% lower** than England & Wales.


2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **69% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **59% lower** than Greater Manchester and **50% lower** than England & Wales.

2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **73% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **55% lower** than Greater Manchester and **45% lower** than England & Wales.


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2.5 Local Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis


Local Domestic Burglary – Day Range



Local Domestic Burglary – Time Range



Local Domestic Burglary – Point of Entry



2.5.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of domestic burglary peaks on Thursday around midday (12:00-13:00). Offenders often target dwellings at this time during the working week when they are likely to be left empty whilst the owners are at work, giving them the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 Point of Entry: In the local area, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:


- In cases where the entry point is recorded as 'unknown' it is likely that the offenders have exploited insecure doors.
- Forcing open secure doors using bodily pressure and implements.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.

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
2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.6.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Saturday in the morning (06:00-07:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles at this time when they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

3.1.1 Demolition of 3 existing detached buildings and creation of a new build 5 storey apartment block fronting Palatine Rd.

3.1.2 Creation of under croft parking to the rear, with 2 deck access apartment blocks with associated amenity space. A total of 88 units, comprising of 83 x 2 Bed & 5 x 4 bed.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The proposed residential development is an appropriate use for the site given the surrounding land uses.

3.2.2 When left vacant, sites such as this, often attract anti-social behaviour in the form of criminal damage, fly-tipping, fire raising or graffiti. The redevelopment of the site will restrict the ability for such activities to take place.

3.2.3 There are a significant number of apartments within the development, which increases the likelihood of residents being from a broader age range, including young singles, older residents and families with children. Such a mix increases the likelihood of some of the residents being present throughout the day. The presence of residents or even just visible signs of people present - cars on driveways/the car park, lights on in dwellings, external lighting on at entrance doors, for example - will help to deter offenders.

3.2.4 The apartment buildings are suitably located and include off-street parking and a communal garden.

3.2.5 Front doors and principal room windows of the apartments face the communal landscaped amenity space and parking area at the front and sides, which helps to promote natural surveillance.

3.2.6 ‘Defensible space’, defined with a wall and railings is provided to the front of the blocks.

3.2.7 Resident private amenity space is provided with a shared garden space, which will be appropriately secured with suitably high, boundary fencing and gates.

3.2.8 The landscaping of the garden area, will support the quality of the local environment. Well-maintained verdant environments tend to attract less crime and anti-social behaviour.

3.2.9 Where ground floor amenity spaces have been located, consideration appears to have been taken using external facing materials; glazing, providing good levels of activity.

3.2.10 Apartment main entry doors and internal doors to the stairs from the lobby should require access-controlled-operation. All visitors to the residents of the apartments will be required to enter via the lobby area. Mailboxes for residents should be located within the lobby area so that regular delivery personnel do not need to be given access to the residential parts of the building.

3.2.11 The proposed building plots provide further ground floor activity in the form of residential uses and new public realm leading to dedicated resident entrance front doors and apartment reception spaces. In-turn these uses offer good levels of activity and natural surveillance of the adjacent streets. Resident cycle storage areas are located in prominent locations.

3.2.12 The proposed mix of frontage ground floor parking arrangements for the blocks facing palatine Road, and the below deck, car park courtyard for residents, will facilitate the security of vehicles. Controlled car parking provision that is separated from the passing public, are less likely to be targeted by offenders than cars parked on the street or within ill-defined, unsecured, communal, car parks.

3.2.13 Refuse provision has been considered for each property.

3.2.14 The central landscaped courtyard deck will be well-overlooked by the proposed buildings and should benefit from legitimate activity and passive surveillance at all times of the day and night, promoting a greater sense of safety in the public realm.

3.2.15 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retrofitted security measures that can

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increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 There should be a symbolic barrier at the main entrance off Palatine Road to the front communal parking area serving the first main blocks, formed by brick pillars and a change of road surface texture/colour etc, to encourage a feeling of territoriality among the residents - psychologically giving the impression that the area beyond is private and discouraging anyone without a purpose from entering. The communal cycle and bin stores within the parking area should also be securely enclosed to prevent theft or misuse.

Apartments

3.3.2 Security-certified, external, front and rear doors, and ground/lower ground floor window frames should be installed at each property. Laminate glass should be fitted to ground/lower ground floor windows and all external doors.

3.3.3 Given the semi-isolated location of the site, it is recommended that fitting an intruder alarm to each property is recommended, particularly the houses and ground floor apartments.

Below deck car parking

3.3.4 The car park should be illuminated with low intensity, LED lighting from dusk to dawn.

3.3.5 Measures should be installed to prevent damage to boundary fencing around the fringe of the car park as a result of vehicles manoeuvring.

3.3.6 Install planters, bollards or knee-rails to prevent any vehicles parking in undesignated areas, particularly on the pathways and greenspaces.

3.3.7 Install signs to indicate the private nature of the car park and sanctions for misuse.

Cycle parking.

3.3.8 Cycle parking should be provided for apartment residents in a secure part of the site. Provision should include a secure, weatherproof shelter with Sheffield stands set in concrete. The door/gate should be self-closing and lock upon closure. Access controls/fob access should be provided to the cycle store door(s). Residents should apply to the management company for access to residents to only store bikes

Boundary fencing

3.3.9 Definition of frontage. Front boundaries should be well-defined to indicate ownership, using low walls, railings, planting and / or surface materials, and discourage intruders from approaching the dwellings.

3.3.10 900mm high railings defining adjoining garden boundaries at the front of the houses are ideal.

3.3.11 It is recommended that the western, northern and southern boundaries are 2100mm high timber fences, which incorporate a trellis topping of 300mm.

Public realm and Landscaping

3.3.12 Any resident amenity furniture and landscape features should be used to prevent unwanted parking or access onto pedestrian only surfaces. It should be very clear in which spaces, or on which streets, vehicle parking is authorised.

3.3.13 It is important to formalise the proposed road and pedestrian links across the new development.

3.3.14 The proposals are to incorporate a lighting scheme that will distribute illumination evenly around the space without areas of shadowing or pooling and work coherently with the wider security requirements of the site such as any CCTV for apartment entrances, car parking courts and the landscape courtyard.

3.3.15 Consideration for safe bicycle storage should be embedded within the landscape design. Short-stay cycle parking stands should be located where they can be readily observed. The location of cycle stores within proposed buildings should consider the position, inherent physical security and safety of cyclists using the facility.

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3.3.16 Poor design, management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour. Any landscape features (hard or soft) should not impede natural surveillance of/from the buildings or reduce the effectiveness of lighting or any CCTV system. The design of any hard landscaping features or street furniture, in particular any steps, ramps or benches, should be designed to withstand and discourage the potential for mistreatment and damage (e.g. from vandalism, skateboarding, rough sleeping etc.). Bollards or similar hard/soft landscaping features should also be incorporated to prevent unauthorised vehicles from accessing the courtyard.

3.4 Points for Further Consideration

3.4.1 Vegetation Management. The proximity of bushes and trees to the fence line can undermine the security of the boundary by creating cover for an intruder or providing potential climbing aids. Overhanging branches and dense vegetation should be removed where it could be exploited in this way. Care must be taken to ensure the proposed landscaping to the perimeter of the site is maintained at an appropriate height (see Section 4.6), in order to prevent it impeding views to and from the site and avoid the creation of hiding places that could be exploited by offenders.

3.4.2 Residential post/parcel/grocery room. Arrangements for the delivery of post should not allow postal or grocery delivery staff to have access to internal areas of the residential block beyond the GF reception space. Postal workers should not be given unfettered access to the entire building as this could potentially leave apartments and residents vulnerable. (see Section 4.1 for more information)

3.4.3 Communal facilities and amenity space. The robust management of such areas is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour.

3.4.4 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

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4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation in addition to the layout issues highlighted within Section 3.3.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to STS202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system - these features should be permitted under the scope of the security certification.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to STS202 BR2, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24:2012, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights and are provided with door viewers instead.
- ☐ Communal doors located within the corridors should include glazed elements to assist sight lines.
- ☐ Ground floor external French/double doors or sliding patio doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24:2012.
- ☐ Chain limiters to apartment entrance doors are recommended but not generally essential.
- ☐ Any external escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24:2012, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ The main entrance door and doors off the lobby area should be controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set), so that residents can vet callers to the building before allowing them access.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either:
  - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
  - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- ☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following doors should operate on access control:

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- All external doors where regular staff access is required.
- Doors separating internal zones / lobbies.
- Any internal doors to obvious high risk or controlled areas (e.g. storage / server / locker rooms)
- Cycle stores.

4.6 Boundaries

☐ Inward opening automatic gates to provide access to the courtyard area must be certified to one of the following standards:

- LPS 1175: Issue 7, SR2
- STS 202: Issue 3, BR2
- Sold Secure Gold
- PAS 68: 2013

☐ Any ground floor apartment windows to the Street/courtyard elevations of the podium that will not front onto the front garden spaces described above must be protected by defensive planting beds. The windows themselves should preferably have as high cills as possible and be non-opening. If not, they should have only small opening lights fitted with opening restrictors to avoid providing opportunities to criminals.

☐ Boundary treatments to front gardens should be designed to discourage comfortably sitting on or leaning against them, which could potentially cause nuisance and intimidation to residents.

☐ The ground floor apartments which front onto the public realm and the landscaped courtyard, must be protected by some defensible space, defined by dense low-level planting, creating front gardens areas in ownership/control of the residents themselves.

4.7 Landscaping

☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.

☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by

4.8 Lighting

☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.

☐ Dusk ‘til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors (manual override is also permissible).

☐ Fittings should produce ‘white’ light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.

4.9 Other

☐ Meter cupboards to apartments should be located to the fronts of properties only or within a secure cupboard / room inside the block but not inside individual apartments. Smart meters are acceptable.

☐ Partition walls between flats and corridors should be of masonry construction or include reinforcement such as a layer of expanded metal mesh.

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☐ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the buildings. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.

5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter removal.
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. Please see Secured by Design - Secured by Design for more information. To apply for the SBD Award for your development in Greater Manchester, please visit Apply for Secured by Design – Design For Security.

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A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
22/04/26	Client	Development presentation
22/04/26	Client	CIS application submitted
22/04/26	Client	Client confirmation
13/05/26	DfS	Site visit
15/05/26	DfS	CIS completed

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	L0100-EXISTING SITE PLAN	12/05/2026	
	L1001-MASTERPLAN - LEVEL 00	12/05/2026	
	L1002-MASTERPLAN - LEVEL 01	12/05/2026	
	L1003-MASTERPLAN - LEVEL 02 & 03	12/05/2026	
	L1004-MASTERPLAN - LEVEL 04	12/05/2026	
	L1005-MASTERPLAN - ROOF PLAN	12/05/2026	
	L1601-PROPOSED SITE ELEVATION - EAST	12/05/2026	
	L1602-PROPOSED SITE ELEVATION - SOUTH	12/05/2026	
	L1603-PROPOSED SITE ELEVATION - WEST	12/05/2026	
	L1600-PROPOSED SITE ELEVATION - NORTH	12/05/2026	
	L1500-PROPOSED SITE SECTION AA	12/05/2026	
	L1501-PROPOSED SITE SECTION BB	12/05/2026	
	L1502-PROPOSED SITE SECTION CC	12/05/2026	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Date	Revisions
A	15/05/2026	

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D Glossary

Physical Security Standards

PAS 24

Enhanced security performance requirements for doorsets and windows in the UK. Doorsets and windows intended to offer a level of security suitable for dwellings and other buildings exposed to comparable risk. It is designed to mimic an attack by an opportunist burglar, using tools which are easy to conceal.

STS 201

Enhanced security to satisfy the requirements for certification of doorsets, equivalent to test standard to PAS 24.

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors, roller shutters, fences and barriers. Products are rated via the term Burglary Resistance (BR) and range from BR1 (lower security rating) to BR6 (higher security rating).

LPS 1175

Physical security for products manufactured for perimeter, façade, internal spaces and entrapment protection. The higher the security rating, the more formidable the security product.

Developed following extensive consultation with stakeholders, the most recent issue sees the previous single digit performance classifications (i.e. Security Ratings 1 to 8) extended to one formed of two elements that illustrate performance in terms of:

- *Threat level (first element) – Letter (A to H) corresponding with the tool kit used to evaluate the product's intruder resistance and number of attackers involved.*
- *Delay (second element) – Numeric value (1, 3, 5, 10, 15 or 20) corresponding with the minimum delay (in minutes) provided by the product when placed in a locked condition.*

BS EN 1627

European standard for the burglary resistance of pedestrian doorsets, windows, curtain walling, grilles and shutters. It defines six resistance classes, from RC1 to RC6, with RC1 being the lowest level of resistance and RC6 the highest. These classes indicate the level of resistance to forced entry, with higher classes requiring more time and specialized tools to breach.

BS EN 356

European standard that specifies the resistance of laminated glazing (i.e. two or more layers of glass bonded together with a plastic interlayer) to manual attacks, such as might occur during forced entry or vandalism. It classifies laminated glass into different resistance levels, ranging from P1A to P8B, with P1A being the lowest and P8B the highest.

Useful Websites

Design For Security – Designing Out Crime *– apply for Crime Impact Statements or the Secured by Design Award from Greater Manchester Police*

Secured by Design - Secured by Design *– SBD Award Scheme, Design Guides and Member Companies*

ParkMark - Home *– Park Mark Safer Parking Award Scheme*

NBS Source *– find, select and specify building products (including security-certified products)*

RedBook Live - LPCB Red Book *– search for LPS 1175 certified products*

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