

# CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

**Mosley Street, Manchester**

**Hotel (190 No. Bedrooms)**

**FOR: Criterion Capital**

**VERSION D: 11th June 2026**

**REFERENCE: 2017/1035/CIS/01**

GREATER MANCHESTER POLICE

# Mosley Street

# 2017/1035/CIS/01

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Recommendations made

The proposed development has been assessed using the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime, the fear of crime, and anti-social behaviour. The proposed development is generally acceptable; however, hotels can attract criminal and antisocial behaviour. There are a number of recommendations made in section 3.3, including but not limited to:

- There should be a security presence at night to manage any antisocial behaviour around the main entrance.
- Access control into and around the hotel should be carefully controlled.

These measures will improve the security of the buildings, deter criminals, and alert staff to unwanted/suspicious behaviour. These measures, and those detailed in section 3.3 of this report should be implemented where possible.



Patrick Babb

**Consultant**





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# 1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located in the city centre of Manchester, in the Piccadilly Gardens area.

The site is located on the major junction of Market Street and Mosley Street which form the Northern and Eastern boundaries of the site, with the South of the building being defined by a gated passageway between Burger Kind & Primark, and to the West the site is bound by Café Nero.

The site is currently occupied by Royal Buildings, which has a number of ground floor commercial uses. The proposed development will mostly occupy the upper floors of the building other than an entrance which will be taken from Mosley Street.















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# 2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st June 2022 to 31st May 2023.

## 2.1 Crime Summary

| Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Domestic Burglary | Non-Domestic Burglary | Criminal Damage | Less Serious Wounding | Theft | Robbery | Serious Wounding | Theft from Motor Vehicle | Theft of Motor Vehicle | Bicycle Theft |
| 72 | 276 | 459 | 3370 | 1179 | 390 | 83 | 396 | 59 | 162 |

2.1.1 In the local area, the volume of crime is very high, particularly the levels of violence and theft, reflecting the site's location on the edge of the city centre. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of city centres – where there is a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of such crime and disorder issues. The majority of reported crimes have taken around Piccadilly Gardens, The Village and the Northern Quarter areas.

2.1.2 The majority of the violence in the local area has taken place in the evening and during early hours of the morning, with a higher volume of incidents typically experienced between Friday and Sunday – when more people visit the city and attend licensed premises, often for longer periods and consuming more alcohol, leading to conflicts.

2.1.3 Thefts in the local area have mostly been taking place within/around the licenced premises, restaurants and retail premises situated within the Arndale Centre, along Market Street and within Piccadilly Gardens and the Northern Quarter, with offenders primarily targeting mobile phones, wallets/purses and cash. Offenders have mostly used pickpocketing and distraction methods to obtain the personal belongings.

## 2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

### 2.2.1 Offenders Posing as Guests or Legitimate Customers Accessing Staff-Only/Restricted Areas

*Unauthorised individuals may blend in with legitimate guests or visitors, exploiting busy or understaffed moments to access restricted areas such as staff rooms, storage areas, or administrative offices. These areas often contain valuable items, sensitive information, or personal belongings of staff.*

- Reception staff should verify the identity and purpose of all visitors. Use sign-in systems and issue temporary access passes when necessary.
- Use keycard/fob access for staff-only doors, with clear signage indicating staff only areas.
- Provide lockers or secure rooms for staff to store personal items.
- Install CCTV in corridors leading to restricted areas to deter and detect unauthorised access.

### 2.2.2 Offenders Entering Rooms Using Forged or Stolen Electronic Keycards/Fobs or Exploiting Insecure Doors

*Electronic keycards and fobs can be cloned or stolen, especially if guests leave them unattended. Insecure doors may also be manipulated or bypassed, allowing unauthorised access to guest rooms.*

- Use solid core doors (minimum 44mm thick) with reinforced frames..
- Ensure doors are flush fitting with minimal gaps to prevent prying.
- Install auditable access control systems like VingCard/Salto that log each entry attempt, allowing for post-incident review.
- Integrate with hotel management software to deactivate lost/stolen cards immediately.
- Prevent doors from being left ajar by installing closers that ensure full closure after use.


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- Inform guests about the importance of safeguarding their keycards and reporting any loss immediately.

### 2.2.3 Doors Forced Open with Bodily Pressure or Tools/Implements

*Criminals may use brute force or tools to break into rooms, especially if doors are weak or poorly secured. This method is often quick if the door is not built to resist such attacks.*

- Use certified doorsets that meet standards such as PAS 24 or LPS 1175.
- Connect external doors to the intruder alarm system that trigger alerts upon forced entry attempts.
- Conduct routine checks to ensure doors and locks remain in good condition.

## 2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:


- Burglary of hotel rooms
- Robbery to business
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Employee theft
- Violence towards staff
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period


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
## 2.4 Burglary Risk Analysis

*The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against hotels, recorded in the Manchester.*


Manchester Hotel Burglary – Day Range




Manchester Hotel Burglary – Time Range




Manchester Hotel Burglary – Point of Entry




2.4.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of burglary at Manchester hotels fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Tuesday. During the day, the risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning. It is likely that offenders target hotels at these times when guests are likely to be out of their rooms or when staffing levels are likely to be lower – allowing offender's time to attempt to gain unauthorised access without being detected.

2.4.2 Point of Entry: Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:


- Offenders posing as legitimate customers to gain entry before targeting insecure doors/ restricted areas.
- Opening secured doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain access.
- Exploitation of insecure doors to gain entry to hotel room.
- In cases of unknown point of entry offenders have often gained possession of the hotel room key card and accessed the room, removing personal and business property.


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
## 2.5 Theft Risk Analysis

*The data below relates to thefts within/against hotels, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.*

Hotel Theft – Day Range




Hotel Theft – Time Range





2.5.1 Day/ Time Range: The risk of theft at Manchester hotels generally increases over the weekend. It is possible that the risk increases at these times when hotels typically have more guests and the opportunity to carry out such offences is greater. However, offenders do also target hotels between Monday and Friday, when they are typically less busy, and they perceive a lower risk of being caught/challenged. The risk of theft is greatest around lunchtime and in the evening/early hours of the morning. This is when hotel restaurants, bars and gyms are likely to be at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Thefts of personal property (such as mobile phones, bags and purses/wallets) are the most routinely stolen items.


## 2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

*The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.*

Vehicle Crime – Day Range




Vehicle Crime – Time Range




2.6.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime peaks on a Saturday during the afternoon period (12pm – 3:30pm) and evening (6pm – 8pm). Offenders often target vehicles during the afternoon and evening, particularly around the city centre, as vehicles are often left unattended for long periods of time, out of sight of the owner, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.


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# 3 Layout Appraisal

## 3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development is of a 190 no. bedroom hotel at Royal Buildings, Mosley Street. The main entrance will be taken from the front elevation on Mosley Street, with the reception located on the first floor and all bedrooms are located on the first floor and above. The ground floor of the building will remain as existing.

## 3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

*The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.*

3.2.1 The proposed use is appropriate for this city centre location. There are a number of hotels in the local area including a Travelodge and Mecure Hotel in close proximity of the site.

3.2.2 The hotel is well served by public transport and it is unlikely that residents or staff will need to park for long periods of time away from the building, which could leave their vehicles vulnerable to criminals.

3.2.3 The main entrance to the hotel is positioned on the front elevation of the building, on Mosley Street, which can be easily viewed from the public realm.

3.2.4 The local area is very busy during the day and at night, reducing the potential for criminals to target the building without being seen.

3.2.5 All hotel rooms are located at first floor and above, reducing the potential for noise disturbance late at night.

3.2.6 All ground floor uses are self-contained, reducing potential for unauthorised access into the hotel from adjacent properties (or vice versa).

3.2.7 The hotel will have extensive CCTV coverage, which will deter offenders from targeting the building.

3.2.8 There will be a safe at reception for any guests who need to secure belongings.

## 3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

*The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.*

3.3.1 The close proximity of Burger King and other fast food takeaways in the local area could lead to loitering around the main entrance to the hotel, to the detriment of guests returning or leaving the building. It is highly recommended that at night there is a security presence that can manage any unwanted or antisocial behaviour by the main entrance.

3.3.2 Doors into hotel room corridors should only be accessible/operable by guest key card, ensuring that access can only be gained by guests of that specific area of the hotel.

3.3.3 Hotel bedroom doors/frames should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and fitted with auditable access controls (i.e. VingCard or similar).

3.3.4 Access into staff only areas (i.e. housekeeping & stores) should be restricted to staff. Signage should be provided so that it is clear which areas are restricted to staff, to prevent confusion being used a legitimate excuse for accessing staff only areas.

# 4 Physical Security

*The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.*

## 4.1 Doors

☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.


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- [ ] Sliding/revolving doors should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2.
- [ ] Hotel bedroom doors/frames should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and fitted with auditable access controls (i.e. VingCard or similar).
- [ ] External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- [ ] All doors/frames to staff areas/stores/offices should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and fitted with auditable access controls. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

## 4.2 Windows & Building Fabric

- [ ] Ground floor windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- [ ] Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- [ ] Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.

## 4.3 Glazing

- [ ] In double glazed units the inner pane should not be less than 7.5mm laminated glass (2 x 3mm glass plies with an approx. 1.5mm PVB interlayer) and the outer pane should be a minimum of 6mm toughened or 6.8mm laminated glass (2 x 3mm glass plies with an approx. 0.8mm PVB interlayer).

## 4.4 Access Control

- [ ] Access to first floor, and above, should be restricted to hotel residents and staff. Hotel guests should only be able to access the specific floor that they are staying on.
- [ ] Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
  - Main entrances
  - External doors
  - Stairs/lifts
  - Offices
  - Staff only areas

## 4.5 Landscaping

- [ ] In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- [ ] There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

## 4.6 Lighting

- [ ] External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.


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- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

## 4.7 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images, then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be all external spaces, car parking areas, circulation spaces, all access/egress points, all bar/till areas, corridors, and reception areas.

# 5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable, and up to date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures, and it should be made east for people to raise concerns or report observations.

5.1.2 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter/graffiti removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls, CCTV)

5.1.3 An 'operating policy' should be drawn up, which includes:


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- Security (door policy; door staff; staff training; CCTV cameras - monitoring and recording facilities, and their locations; intruder alarm; and cash storage/management).
- Fire safety, including clearing designated escape routes of all obstacles.
- Noise management; and,
- Servicing and waste management (in a secure location) arrangements, avoiding the disposal of glass late at night which might disturb residents at the nearby accommodation.

# 6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

# 7 Useful References

## 7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/


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# A Contact register

| Date | Contact With | Summary of Contact |
|---|---|---|
| 22/05/2023 | Mollie Arif | CIS instruction received |
| 12/03/2025 | Jay Patel | Revised CIS issued |
| 18/05/2026 | Jay Patel | Revised CIS issued |
| 11/06/2026 | Jay Patel | Revised CIS issued |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |

# B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

| Drawing No. | Drawing Title | Date Received | Rev |
|---|---|---|---|
| ROY_MAN-RYD-DR-A-10-0099 | Level B - GA Plan | 01.05.2026 | T3 |
| ROY_MAN-RYD-DR-A-10-0100 | Level 00 - GA Plan | 01.05.2026 | T3 |
| ROY_MAN-RYD-DR-A-10-0101 | Level 01 - GA Plan | 01.05.2026 | T3 |
| ROY_MAN-RYD-DR-A-10-0102 | Level 02 - GA Plan | 01.05.2026 | T3 |
| ROY_MAN-RYD-DR-A-10-0103 | Level 03 - GA Plan | 01.05.2026 | T3 |
| ROY_MAN-RYD-DR-A-10-0104 | Level 04 - GA Plan | 01.05.2026 | T3 |
| ROY_MAN-RYD-DR-A-10-0105 | Level 05 - GA Plan | 01.05.2026 | T3 |
| ROY_MAN-RYD-DR-A-10-0106 | Level R5 - GA Plan | 01.05.2026 | T3 |
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**PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.**

# C CIS Version History

| Version | Revisions Made | Date |
|---|---|---|
| A | | |
| B | Slight amendments | 23/01/2025 |
| C | Revised hotel room number | 18/05/2026 |
| D | Minor amendments | 11/06/2026 |


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