

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Purpose Built Student accommodation, providing 818 student beds in a mixture of formats

10-12 Whitworth Street, Manchester.

For: ATRI 7 6 LIMITED
Version C: 21/04/26
Ref: 2015/0162/CIS/02

designforsecurity

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GREATER MANCHESTER POLICE

10-12 Whitworth Street Manchester

URN: 2015/0162/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported with minor security additions required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Robust control of access to back-of-house areas.
- Access controls through the building
- install security certified doors, glazing and windows
- Secure lockers for staff

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will make representations to Manchester Planning to require the inclusion of a condition requiring the completed development to achieve Secured by Design (SBD), accreditation. Should the recommendations as listed within Section 4 of this report be adopted, I have every confidence that the scheme will achieve the award and the condition met.

David Maher *Dip Arch*
Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site lies to the south of M/cr Central Convention Centre, and is bound by Whitworth St West to the north, Cameron St to the west, the City Road Inn pub to the east and a Network Railway line / archways to the south.

The existing site was cleared a few years ago of the existing building. The site has been fenced off with railings and turfed.

Whitworth St West (Deansgate Locks), a popular nighttime economy destination in the area.

The site is located south of M/cr Central Convention Centre, an area where the night-time economy is popular and centred on Peter Street.

The site has excellent transport links, with Deansgate Metrolink and train station within 100m. There are bus stops in close proximity.

Across the typical working day footfall past the site is generally high.

The area has high levels of pedestrian activity given its location to Deansgate station and Metrolink stop and surrounding residential, and business uses. There are 4 pedestrian entry points to the tram stop: 3 from Whitworth St West & 1 from Great Bridgewater St.


The rear of the existing buildings and archways are hidden and poorly lit spaces. Overtime this situation has given rise to ASB; Graffiti, street toilets & drug taking.




1 – View towards site & along Whitworth Street West.



2 – View towards Deansgate Locks.


3 – View south along Cameron St.


7 – Service access to the rear of the pub.


6 – View east along Little Peter St..


5 – Cameron St


4 –Pedestrian rstepped access Deansgate tram stop.

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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2024 to 30th June 2025.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
9	27	88	423	127	20	8	171	17	19

2.1.1 The overall rate of crime over the past 12 months has been high for the Manchester division, which is to be expected given that the site is located close to the city centre. Less serious wounding, criminal damage and theft have been the most recorded offences taking place. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity to district, town or city centres where there is a higher concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a higher number of crime and disorder issues. Whilst the offences occur throughout the city centre there is a higher concentration occurring around Whitworth Street West between the Deansgate tram and train stations.

2.1.2 Less serious wounding offences have taken place throughout the local area, particularly at the locations mentioned above. Assaults and public order offences have been the most reported less serious woundings, with incidents involving disputes between both known and unknown associates within public spaces and retail outlets, often between staff and customers.

2.1.3 Theft from motor vehicle has been the most reported vehicle crime taking place, whereby offenders have targeted vehicles parked on the streets and within parking facilities throughout the local area. Offenders mainly used implements in order to smash the windows before removing items from within, as well used tools to remove vehicle parts and registration plates.

2.1.4 In cases of theft offenders have targeted insecure items, bags or coats on tabletops and benches in public spaces, retail outlets and restaurants, as well as parcels left on doorsteps and in communal areas of apartment buildings. Offenders have also used distraction and pickpocketing techniques to remove items from the person in crowded areas.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 **Smashed glazing in windows and doors.**

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points.

2.2.2 **Using bodily pressure or implements in order to force open secure windows and doors or have been targeted when left insecure by residents.**

Possible Solution – All external doors and windows should be certified to recognised security standards, which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and locking, thus reducing the opportunity of them being left insecure.

All individual apartments should also be secured with a robust entrance doorset, to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection.

2.2.3 **Posing as a legitimate resident and gaining access to communal areas of apartment buildings by tailgating residents and via insecure doors.**

Possible Solution – A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to the building before allowing them access. The main communal entrance should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access.

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Consideration could also be given to 'airlock' lobby system, which features a secondary entrance door that only releases when the external door has closed, reducing the opportunities for tailgating unnoticed.

2.2.1 Offenders gaining access through communal entrances to target rooms

To minimise the risk of offenders gaining unauthorised entry through communal entrances to target resident's rooms:

- communal entrances should be located on the most prominent elevations and be illuminated through the hours of darkness.
- communal entry doors should be self-closing and automatically lock upon closure.
- employ a concierge to supervise entry to the building.
- inner lobby doors and/or the lifts should include access controls to prevent intruders gaining access beyond the lobby.
- install CCTV cameras in the lobby; and apartment, cluster-flat and study bedroom doors should be self-closing and self-locking.

2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:


- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

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
2.4 Crime Rate Comparison

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.


Comparison of Domestic Burglary Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester




Comparison of Wounding Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester



2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **95% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **94% lower** than Greater Manchester and **93% lower** than England & Wales.

2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **78% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **70% lower** than Greater Manchester and **43% lower** than England & Wales.

2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **75% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **67% lower** than Greater Manchester and **60% lower** than England & Wales.


2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **42% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **4% lower** than Greater Manchester and **16% higher** than England & Wales.

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
2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.


Burglary Dwelling – Day Range



Burglary Dwelling – Time Range



Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry



2.5.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of domestic burglary is highest on Sunday and Tuesday, at various times throughout the morning (05:00-06:00 and 9:00-11:00). Offenders often target dwellings in the morning when it tends to be darker and there is less footfall in the area, giving them the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:


- In cases where the entry point has been recorded as 'unknown' it is likely that the offenders has exploited insecure windows and doors.
- Doors and windows have been forced open by offenders using bodily pressure and implements.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.

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
2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.6.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Sunday in the evening (22:00-23:00), Offenders often target vehicles at this time when they tend to be left unattended and out of sight of the owner for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

3.1.1 The proposed development will provide a purpose-built student accommodation scheme at the site providing approximately 818 student beds in a mixture of formats.

3.1.2 Large areas of amenity space are incorporated in the proposals, equating to 0.97 sqm / bedroom as well as providing an active ground floor frontage onto Whitworth Street West.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The proposed development will bring vitality to a site which has remained disused for a number of years. The building will present an active frontage to the public elevations around the site, which will help to improve natural surveillance of the surrounding public realm and animate the street scene. Occupation of the ground floor reception spaces is essential to provide the much-needed natural surveillance at street level and enliven the surrounding public realm as intended, which will help to discourage antisocial activity and more serious disorder around the development.

3.2.2 The footprint of the building facing onto the public realm is relatively simple and free from deeply recessed concealed areas. Where ground floor amenity spaces have been located, consideration appears to have been taken through the use of external facing materials; glazing, providing good levels of activity.

3.2.3 Student amenity spaces provide opportunities for residents to meet and foster community relations within the development. Schemes which have good social communities are less likely to tolerate inappropriate behaviour and are more willing to challenge unfamiliar faces in the development.

3.2.4 The main entrance will be accessed via an electronic access control fob system for residents and staff. The building will have a comprehensive on-site management team.

3.2.5 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the dwellings, avoiding the need for obtrusive retrofitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the developments are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

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3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

Management

3.3.1 Students should be issued with an information pack containing, *inter alia*:

- crime prevention/awareness - particularly keeping safe at night when returning to the accommodation.
- deterred from car ownership whilst resident due to the lack of available parking.
- respecting the amenity of other residents in the neighbourhood when returning to the accommodation late at night.
- being vigilant in allowing others access to the building; and
- using the main entrance door only doors to enter and leave the building.

Main entrance and reception area

3.3.2 All residents and visitors should access the building via the main entrance door.

3.3.3 The entrance door should be security-rated, fitted with an electronic locking system and automated, and capable of restricting access to residents or staff holding an appropriate fob or pass card.

3.3.4 An audio unit should relay audio (two ways) from the entrance door to staff at the reception desk to allow for vetting visitors prior to allowing entry via a remote lock release.

3.3.5 To minimise the risk of 'tailgating' legitimate residents/visitors, all doors that connect the entrance lobby to the core, all residents' facilities at ground floor level and the cycle store lift should be fitted with electronic locks capable of restricting access to residents or staff holding an appropriate fob or pass card.

3.3.6 Visitors to the building should be required to report to reception, whereupon staff should alert the student; schemes where students admit visitors remotely by way of electronic, door lock release from inside their apartment or cluster is considered less secure.

3.3.7 The reception desk should be staffed throughout the day and, ideally at night.

3.3.8 All external doors should be security rated.

3.3.9 Internal doors to refuse store and the cycle store may be secured with FD-30 rate doors fitted with a fob-operated electronic or mechanical lock.

Apartments

3.3.10 The studio entrance doors should be security-rated and include an electronic lock, which forms part of the security certification.

Cycle store

3.3.11 The door connecting the stores to the circulation corridor should be FD-30 rated and secured with a fob/card-activated, electronic lock. A card/fob should be used to enter and leave the store. The door should be self-closing and self-locking.

3.3.12 Cycle stands/racks should allow the cyclist to secure the wheels and frame to the stand/rack.

CCTV and lighting

3.3.13 A CCTV system should be installed capable of monitoring all building elevations and external doors, the lobby and reception area, and the cycle store.

3.3.14 All external doors should be illuminated from dusk to dawn

3.3.15 Access into the building, an intercom will be provided from the entrance door to the resident. Visitors need to wait / sign in at reception from where residents will collect them.

3.3.16 Residential post/parcel room. Arrangements for the delivery of post should not allow postal delivery staff access to internal areas of the residential areas beyond the reception space. Mailboxes for residents should be located either within a secure lobby area or use a 'through-the-wall' post box arrangement.

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Due to the significant increase in on-line postal ordering, considerations should be given to appropriate post room area, avoiding parcels/post being left in an unsecure location. Further design details of these ancillary spaces are to be developed.

3.3.17 Given the prolific high levels of graffiti within and around the site, it is important that external cladding materials at ground floor are sealed, protected and supports the removal of graffiti.

3.3.18 All elevations of the new building should be monitored by CCTV with a complementary lighting system to illuminate it throughout the hours of darkness.

3.3.19 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

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4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation in addition to the layout issues highlighted within Section 3.3.

4.1 Doors

☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to STS202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.

☐ Arrangements for residents to admit visitors. Communal entrance and inner lobby / zone doors should be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on a phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can confirm the identity of visitors before allowing them access themselves, visitors to be greeted in reception by the resident.

☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to STS202 BR2, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.

☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS01, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead.

☐ Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

☐ Doors to storage / meter rooms should have 44mm solid core doors, 3 hinges, with a mortised sash lock to BS3621/8621 to allow the rooms to be secured when not in use.

☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Windows

☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.

Ground floor and easily-accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P2A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

☐ If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:

- BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
- BS 6799 for wireless systems

☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

4.5 Access Control

☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:

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- Main Entrance doors
- Secondary entrance doors off internal lobbies
- Bin stores
- Cycle stores
- Staff-only areas
- Cluster apartment access
- Level only access from lift and stair lobbies

4.6 Landscaping

☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

4.7 Lighting

☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.

☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors (manual override is also permissible).

☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.8 CCTV

☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: Main entrances, foyer, stairs, lift lobbies, landings, cycle stores, bin store entrances.

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4.9 Other

- ☐ Meter cupboards to apartments should be located to the fronts of properties only or within a secure cupboard / room inside the block but not inside individual apartments. Smart meters are acceptable.
- ☐ Any externally mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the buildings. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.

5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. Please see Secured by Design - Secured by Design for more information. To apply for the SBD Award for your development in Greater Manchester, please visit Apply for Secured by Design – Design For Security.

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A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
20/01/2025	Rhomco Consulting Ltd	CIS appllication
15/09/2025	Rhomco Consulting Ltd	CIS instruction received
22/10/2025	DfS	Site visit
09/10/2025	Rhomco Consulting Ltd	Drawings received
15/09/2025	DfS	Invoice issued
21/11/2025	DfS	CIS completed
10/04/2026	DfS	CIS updated and issued
21/04/2026	DfS	CIS updated and issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
22987-2001-00-	Proposed Ground Floor Plan	09/10/2025	
22987-2002-01-	Proposed 1st Floor Plan	09/10/2025	
22987-2004-06-37-	Proposed Typical Floor Plan	09/10/2025	
22987-2005-16-	Proposed 16th Floor Plan	09/10/2025	
22987-2006-38-	Proposed Top Floor Plan	09/10/2025	
22987-2007-34	-Proposed Terrace Floor Plan	09/10/2025	
22987-2151-00-	Proposed North Elevation	09/10/2025	
22987-2152-00-	Proposed South Elevation	09/10/2025	
22987-2153-00-	Proposed East Elevation	09/10/2025	
22987-2154-00-	Proposed West Elevation	09/10/2025	
20241205-20231-	GIA Boundary Report-(10-12 Whitworth St)	09/10/2025	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Date	Revisions
A	21/11/2025	
B	10/04/2026	Minor text updates to the document
C	21/04/2026	Minor text updates to the document

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D Glossary

Physical Security Standards

PAS 24

Enhanced security performance requirements for doorsets and windows in the UK. Doorsets and windows intended to offer a level of security suitable for dwellings and other buildings exposed to comparable risk. It is designed to mimic an attack by an opportunist burglar, using tools which are easy to conceal.

STS 201

Enhanced security to satisfy the requirements for certification of doorsets, equivalent to test standard to PAS 24.

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors, roller shutters, fences and barriers. Products are rated via the term Burglary Resistance (BR) and range from BR1 (lower security rating) to BR6 (higher security rating).

LPS 1175

Physical security for products manufactured for perimeter, façade, internal spaces and entrapment protection. The higher the security rating, the more formidable the security product.

Developed following extensive consultation with stakeholders, the most recent issue sees the previous single digit performance classifications (i.e. Security Ratings 1 to 8) extended to one formed of two elements that illustrate performance in terms of:

- *Threat level (first element) – Letter (A to H) corresponding with the tool kit used to evaluate the product's intruder resistance and number of attackers involved.*
- *Delay (second element) – Numeric value (1, 3, 5, 10, 15 or 20) corresponding with the minimum delay (in minutes) provided by the product when placed in a locked condition.*

BS EN 1627

European standard for the burglary resistance of pedestrian doorsets, windows, curtain walling, grilles and shutters. It defines six resistance classes, from RC1 to RC6, with RC1 being the lowest level of resistance and RC6 the highest. These classes indicate the level of resistance to forced entry, with higher classes requiring more time and specialized tools to breach.

BS EN 356

European standard that specifies the resistance of laminated glazing (i.e. two or more layers of glass bonded together with a plastic interlayer) to manual attacks, such as might occur during forced entry or vandalism. It classifies laminated glass into different resistance levels, ranging from P1A to P8B, with P1A being the lowest and P8B the highest.

Useful Websites

Design For Security – Designing Out Crime *– apply for Crime Impact Statements or the Secured by Design Award from Greater Manchester Police*

Secured by Design - Secured by Design *– SBD Award Scheme, Design Guides and Member Companies*

ParkMark - Home *– Park Mark Safer Parking Award Scheme*

NBS Source *– find, select and specify building products (including security-certified products)*

RedBook Live - LPCB Red Book *– search for LPS 1175 certified products*

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