

# CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

**Development of 126 apartments and 25 houses former Buzz Bingo, Hyde Road. Mcr.**

For: Kellen Homes and Jigsaw Homes North
Version B: 27/04/2026
Reference: 2024/0104/CIS/03

designforsecurity

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GREATER MANCHESTER POLICE

# Former Buzz Bingo, Hyde Road

# URN: 2024/0104/CIS/03

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Development Supported

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

We consider the residential scheme, public realm and community uses appropriate and are happy to support the proposals.

From a crime prevention perspective, the positive features of the development include:

- An appropriate number of dwellings on the site.
- The orientation of the houses and apartments will focus activity in appropriate areas whilst also facilitating passive surveillance of the public realm.
- The proposals aim to establish strong residential communities through the design and orientation of the built environment.
- Off street car parking has been included in the scheme.

Advice is included in the report, which we consider will enhance security of the development and this set out in sections 3.3 and 4. The principal recommendations are:

- install doors, locks, windows, glazing, and, ideally, intruder alarms that meet a recognised security standard.
- provide secure cycle parking to all dwellings; and,
- install dusk to dawn lighting to all external doors of the houses and apartments.
- Post & delivery arrangements for the apartment blocks.
- Defensible space around ground floor windows
- Robust landscaping furniture

If these points can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, Design for Security would be happy to support the development.

**Please note:** Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added requiring the development to achieve Secured by Design accreditation as included within the Physical Security specification listed in Section 4 of this report.

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# Contents


1 Visual Audit ..... 4

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis ..... 5

2.1 Local Crime Summary

2.2 General Risk Factors

2.3 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.4 Local Crime Rate Comparisons

2.5 Local Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

3 Layout Appraisal ..... 10

3.1 Proposed Development

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

3.3 Recommendations to support security & safety.

3.4 Points for Further Consideration

4 Physical Security ..... 14

4.1 Doors (Houses)

4.2 Doors (Apartments)

4.3 Windows

4.4 Glazing

4.5 Alarms

4.6 Access Control

4.7 Boundaries

4.8 Landscaping

4.9 Lighting

4.10 Other

5 Management & Maintenance ..... 16

6 Construction ..... 16

7 Useful References ..... 16

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)


# Appendix


A Contact Register ..... 17

B Associated Documents ..... 17

C CIS Version History ..... 17

D Glossary ..... 18




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# 1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The Site is 1.37 hectares in size and is located within the administrative boundary of Manchester City Council ("MCC"). It is bounded by Hyde Road to the north, and the Kirkmanshulme Lane to the south. An existing hotel and wedding venue are located to the east and Co-op Academy Belle Vue to the west. Manchester City Council also own a car park to the south of the site which is earmarked for future development.

Hyde Road itself is a wide, busy primary route linking the M60/M67 to Manchester city centre – meaning the site benefits from good levels of passive surveillance.

There is an existing brick wall along part of the boundary between the site Hyde Road taking into account the minor level change.


The existing residential houses on the opposite side of Hyde Road (to the north-west) provide limited overlooking over the site itself.

The site contains the former Buzz Bingo Hall, currently unused. The southern boundary of the site has been fenced off with temporary herras fencing and the car park blocked secure.

To the west of the site is a new secondary school building.

Pedestrian footfall around the site is limited with most of the movement via car transport.

A large new housing estate has been developed in recent years to the south of Kirkmanshulme Lane. Houses facing Kirkmanshulme Lane provide some natural surveillance of the car park and vehicle entrance to the site.






1 – Main vehicle entrance from Kirkmanshulme Lane.


2 – View towards site from Hyde Road.


3 – Existing main entrance.


4 – Evidence of fly-tipping, graffiti & drug paraphernalia on site.


5 – Existing building & external store on site heavily vandalised.


6 – View towards residential house on Kirkmanshulme Lane


7 – Footpath from Hyde Road into the site.

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# 2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

*The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st March 2025 to 28th February 2026 within 500m of the site.*

## 2.1 Local Crime Summary

| Recorded Crime within 500m of Site | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Domestic Burglary | Non-Domestic Burglary | Criminal Damage | Less Serious Wounding | Theft | Robbery | Serious Wounding | Theft from Motor Vehicle | Theft of Motor Vehicle | Bicycle Theft |
| 14 | 10 | 50 | 188 | 20 | 12 | <5 | 17 | <5 | <5 |

2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the local area over the past 12 months is average for the Manchester division, with less serious wounding, criminal damage and theft having been most commonly reported. These offences have taken place all throughout the local area, particularly at locations to the east of the site around Thornbury Way and along Hyde Road.

2.1.2 Less serious woundings have taken place all throughout the local area, particularly at locations mentioned above. Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been most reported, with the majority of incidents involving disputes been known offenders and neighbours, as well as some cases of domestic violence.

2.1.3 Criminal damage against vehicles and properties have accounted for the majority of criminal damage offences taking place. Offenders have targeted vehicles parked in the streets throughout the local area by using objects to smash the glazing and damage the bodywork of cars. Offenders have also targeted dwellings by using objects to smash windows and damage external doors.

2.1.4 Theft offences have also taken place all throughout the local area, whereby offenders have used pickpocketing and distraction methods in order to remove items from the person such as wallets and mobile phones and have also targeted insecure parcels on doorsteps and items, bags or coats left on tabletops and benches.

## 2.2 General Risk Factors

2.2.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds, or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems


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## 2.3 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.3.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting residential properties, local vehicles are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

2.3.2 **Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access.**

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see section 4.1 & 5.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors into apartment blocks before allowing them access to the building (also see section 4.1). The main communal entrances should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access.

2.3.3 **Gaining access to secure apartment complexes by means of tailgating residents and insecure doors, gaining access to resident only areas (mail rooms, bicycle storage and apartment doors).**

Possible Solution - All individual apartments should be secured with a security-certified entrance door set (see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.), cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection. A staffed 24/7 concierge desk will support the management and security of the entrance lobby.

2.3.4 **Breaking of glazing in windows and doors using implements.**

Possible Solution - An appropriate glazing specification should be used to adequately secure the building. All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. In vulnerable locations, shutters or perforated protective panels may be necessary to provide extra protection. However, the layout of the building and position of windows should be designed to avoid vulnerabilities as much as possible. Any damage arising from vandalism should be repaired quickly in order to maintain a culture of care and respect, as a lack of maintenance can often attract further abuse.

2.3.5 **Forcing open secure shutters using implements and tools (mostly metal bars) in order to gain access to the windows and doors located below.**

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 5.2) has an independently proven level of resistance and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, ideally the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack.

2.3.6 **Prising open of windows, including windows on balconies and on the ground floor, using implements most likely screwdrivers, crowbars or similar at residential properties.**


Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 5.4), with key operated locks and opening restrictors. All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 5.4). Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points.


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
## 2.4 Local Crime Rate Comparisons

*The graphs below compare the local rates of crime (i.e. crimes per 1,000 dwellings) with the average rates for Manchester, Greater Manchester and England & Wales.*


Domestic Burglary Crime Rates





Wounding Crime Rates




Criminal Damage Crime Rates




Vehicle Crime Rates




2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **45% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **29% lower** than Greater Manchester and **27% lower** than England & Wales.

2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **32% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **7% lower** than Greater Manchester and **77% higher** than England & Wales.


2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **2% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **34% higher** than Greater Manchester and **63% higher** than England & Wales.

2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **55% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **26% lower** than Greater Manchester and **11% lower** than England & Wales.



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## 2.5 Local Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis


Local Domestic Burglary – Day Range




Local Domestic Burglary – Time Range




Local Domestic Burglary – Point of Entry




2.5.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of domestic burglary is highest on Tuesday in the afternoon (13:00-14:00). Offenders tend to target dwellings at this time when they are left empty for long periods of time whilst the owners are at work, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 Point of Entry: In the local area, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:


- In cases where the entry point is recorded as 'unknown' it is likely that the offenders have exploited insecure doors.
- Forcing open secure doors using bodily pressure and implements.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.


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
## 2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

*The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.*

Vehicle Crime – Day Range




Vehicle Crime – Time Range




2.6.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime peaks on Monday in the evening (21:00-22:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles at this time when they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.


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# 3 Layout Appraisal

## 3.1 Proposed Development

3.1.1 Erection of a residential development comprising 152 dwellings (Use Class C3a) together with landscaping, sustainable drainage features, pedestrian footways and highways, parking provision and other associated works.

## 3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

*The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.*

3.2.1 When left vacant, sites such as this, often attract anti-social behaviour in the form of criminal damage, fly-tipping, fire raising or graffiti, however there seemed to be little evidence of ASB on or around the site. The redevelopment of the site will restrict the ability for such activities to take place.

3.2.2 The proposed residential development is an appropriate use for the site given the surrounding land uses.

3.2.3 There are a significant number and mix of houses and apartments within the development, which increases the likelihood of residents being from a broader age range, including young singles, older residents and families with children. Such a mix increases the likelihood of some of the residents of the houses and apartments being present throughout the day. The presence of residents or even just visible signs of people present - cars on driveways/the car park, lights on in dwellings, external lighting on at entrance doors, for example - will help to deter offenders.

3.2.4 The apartment buildings are suitably located and include off-street parking and communal gardens.

3.2.5 Front doors and principal room windows of the houses and windows of apartments face the streets, which helps to promote street activity and supports natural surveillance. The existing houses opposite the site, will benefit from mutual supervision from the proposed houses and apartments.

3.2.6 'Defensible space', defined with a wall and railings is provided to the front of the houses and apartments.

3.2.7 Private amenity space is provided within rear gardens of the houses, which will be appropriately secured with suitably high, boundary fencing and gates.

3.2.8 The landscaping of the modest front gardens of the houses, will support the quality of the local environment. Well-maintained verdant environments tend to attract less crime and anti-social behaviour.

3.2.9 Where ground floor amenity spaces have been located, consideration appears to have been taken using external facing materials of the properties; glazing, providing good levels of activity and natural surveillance.

3.2.10 Apartment main entry doors and internal doors to the stairs from the lobby should require access-controlled-operation. All visitors to the residents of the apartments will be required to enter via the lobby area. Mailboxes for residents should be located within the lobby area so that regular delivery personnel do not need to be given access to the residential parts of the building.

3.2.11 The proposed building plots provide further ground floor activity in the form of residential uses and new public realm leading to dedicated resident entrance front doors and apartment reception spaces. In-turn these uses offer good levels of activity and natural surveillance of the adjacent streets. Resident cycle storage areas are located in prominent locations.

3.2.12 The proposed mix of in-curtilage parking arrangements for the houses, and the off-street, car park courtyard for residents, will facilitate the security of vehicles. Car parking provision that is separated from the passing public, especially where vehicles can be readily supervised by residents, are less likely to be targeted by offenders than cars parked on the street or within ill-defined, unsecured, communal, car parks.

3.2.13 Refuse provision has been considered for each property.


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3.2.14 The public realm and landscaping will be well-overlooked by the proposed buildings and should benefit from legitimate activity and passive surveillance at all times of the day and night, promoting a greater sense of safety in the public realm.

3.2.15 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retrofitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.


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## 3.3 Recommendations to support security & safety.

*The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.*

### Houses and apartments

3.3.1 Security-certified, external, front and rear doors, and ground/lower ground floor window frames should be installed at each property. Laminate glass should be fitted to ground floor external doors. Fitting an intruder alarm to each property is recommended, particularly the houses and ground floor apartments.

### Courtyard car parking

3.3.2 In order to emphasise ownership and suggest that a threshold has been crossed into a space that is more private, where one's actions may be under greater scrutiny, the application of a high-quality surfacing of the access road and the car park is recommended.

3.3.3 Where necessary, car park should be illuminated with low intensity lighting working with the ecological aspect of the site.

3.3.4 Measures should be installed to prevent damage to boundary fencing around the fringe of the car park as a result of vehicles manoeuvring.

3.3.5 Install planters, bollards or knee-rails to prevent any vehicles parking in undesignated areas, particularly on the pathways and greenspaces.

3.3.6 Install signs to indicate the private nature of the car park and sanctions for misuse.

### Cycle parking.

3.3.7 Cycle parking should be provided for apartment residents in a secure part of the site. Provision should include a secure, weatherproof shelter with Sheffield stands set in concrete. A mesh enclosure or wooden enclosure with a steel rail gate would be appropriate. The door/gate should be self-closing and lock upon closure.

3.3.8 Cycle parking should also be provided for residents of the houses in the rear gardens. The doors to the storage sheds in the rear gardens should be secured with a Sold Secure™, padlock and hasp and staple, and fitted with a Sold Secure™, ground anchor.

### Boundary fencing

3.3.9 Definition of front gardens. Definition of frontage. Front and side garden boundaries should be well-defined to indicate ownership, using low walls, railings, planting and / or surface materials, and discourage intruders from approaching the dwellings and parked vehicles, or taking short cuts.

3.3.10 900mm high railings defining adjoining garden boundaries at the front of the houses are ideal.

3.3.11 The proposed fences defining rear garden boundaries of the houses are also ideal.

3.3.12 Rear garden gates to the townhouses should be 1800mm high. The locking mechanism should be capable of being operated from either side of the gate so that, for example, cyclists can enter or leave the garden easily. Ideally, the gates should be self-closing and self-locking.

3.3.1 Communal pathways (excluding the gate(s) to the Communal Green), between the terraces should be secured with a locking gate located at the front building line. Again, the locking mechanism should be capable of being operated from either side of the gate.

### Grass verges in the car park

3.3.2 Verges should be protected to prevent vehicles parking on the grass or damaging trees.

### Public realm and Landscaping

3.3.3 Street furniture and landscape features should be used to prevent unwanted parking or access onto pedestrian only surfaces. It should be very clear in which spaces, or on which streets, vehicle parking is authorised.

3.3.4 It is important to formalise the proposed road and pedestrian links across the new development.

3.3.5 As the proposed public spaces and plots are developed consideration needs to be given towards external lighting. The proposals are to incorporate a lighting scheme that will distribute illumination


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evenly around the space without areas of shadowing or pooling and work coherently with the wider security requirements of the site such as any CCTV for apartment entrances, car parking courts.

3.3.6 Consideration for safe bicycle storage should be embedded within the landscape design. Short-stay cycle parking stands should be located where they can be readily observed. The location of cycle stores within proposed buildings should consider the position, inherent physical security and safety of cyclists using the facility.

3.3.7 Poor design, management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour. Any landscape features (hard or soft) should not impede natural surveillance of/from the buildings or reduce the effectiveness of lighting or any CCTV system. The design of any hard landscaping features or street furniture, in particular any steps, ramps or benches, should be designed to withstand and discourage the potential for mistreatment and damage (e.g. from vandalism, skateboarding, rough sleeping etc.). Bollards or similar hard/soft landscaping features should also be incorporated to prevent unauthorised vehicles from accessing the courtyard.

## 3.4 Points for Further Consideration

3.4.1 Graffiti on surfaces. Expanses of blank wall exposed to public areas should be formed of a graffiti-resistant surface or have a resistant coating applied to enable easy removal of any unauthorised markings.

3.4.2 Vegetation Management. The proximity of bushes and trees to the fence line can undermine the security of the boundary by creating cover for an intruder or providing potential climbing aids. Overhanging branches and dense vegetation should be removed where it could be exploited in this way. Care must be taken to ensure the proposed landscaping to the perimeter of the site is maintained at an appropriate height (see Section 4.8), in order to prevent it impeding views to and from the site and avoid the creation of hiding places that could be exploited by offenders.

3.4.3 Residential post/parcel/grocery room. Arrangements for the delivery of post should not allow postal or grocery delivery staff to have access to internal areas of the residential block beyond the GF reception space. Postal workers should not be given unfettered access to the entire building as this could potentially leave apartments and residents vulnerable. (see Section 4.1 for more information)

3.4.4 Communal facilities and amenity space. The robust management of such areas is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour.

3.4.5 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.


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# 4 Physical Security

*The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation in addition to the layout issues highlighted within Section 3.3.*

## 4.1 Doors (Houses)

- ☐ Front and rear doors to dwellings must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ French/double doors or sliding patio doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Front doors to properties should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key.
- ☐ Front doors should have either fixed sidelights or door viewers.
- ☐ Chain limiters are recommended but not generally essential.
- ☐ Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

## 4.2 Doors (Apartments)

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to STS202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system - these features should be permitted under the scope of the security certification.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to STS202 BR2, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24:2012, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights and are provided with door viewers instead.
- ☐ Communal doors located within the corridors should include glazed elements to assist sight lines.
- ☐ Ground floor external French/double doors or sliding patio doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24:2012.
- ☐ Chain limiters to apartment entrance doors are recommended but not generally essential.
- ☐ Any external escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24:2012, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ The main entrance door and doors off the lobby area should be controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set), so that residents can vet callers to the building before allowing them access

## 4.3 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

## 4.4 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.


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## 4.5 Alarms

- [ ] If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either:
  - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
  - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- [ ] If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

## 4.6 Access Control

- [ ] Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following doors should operate on access control:
  - All external doors where regular staff access is required.
  - Doors separating internal zones / lobbies.
  - Any internal doors to obvious high risk or controlled areas (e.g. storage / server / locker rooms)
  - Cycle stores.

## 4.7 Boundaries

- [ ] Any ground floor windows to the Street/courtyard elevations that will not front onto the front garden spaces described above must be protected by defensive planting beds. The windows themselves should preferably have as high cills as possible and be non-opening. If not, they should have only small opening lights fitted with opening restrictors to avoid providing opportunities to criminals.
- [ ] Boundary treatments to front gardens should be designed to discourage comfortably sitting on or leaning against them, which could potentially cause nuisance and intimidation to residents.

## 4.8 Landscaping

- [ ] In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- [ ] Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- [ ] Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by

## 4.9 Lighting

- [ ] External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- [ ] Dusk ‘til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors (manual override is also permissible).
- [ ] Fittings should produce ‘white’ light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.

## 4.10 Other

- [ ] Meter cupboards to apartments should be located to the fronts of properties only or within a secure cupboard / room inside the block but not inside individual apartments. Smart meters are acceptable.


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☐ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the buildings. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.

# 5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter removal.
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

# 6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

# 7 Useful References

## 7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. Please see Secured by Design - Secured by Design for more information. To apply for the SBD Award for your development in Greater Manchester, please visit Apply for Secured by Design – Design For Security.


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# A Contact Register

| Date | Contact With | Summary of Contact |
|---|---|---|
| 11/03/26 | Kellen Homes | CIS instructed |
| 11/03/26 | Kellen Homes | CIS confirmed |
| 11/03/26 | GMP | Invoice issued |
| 17/03/26 | DfS | Site visit |
| 09/04/26 | Kellen Homes | Invoice paid |
| 09/04/26 | DfS | CIS issued |
| 27/04/26 | DfS | CIS revised & reissued |

# B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

| Drawing No. | Drawing Title | Date | Rev |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Buzz Bingo- Layout (Rev R) | 18/02/26 | |
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**PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.**

# C CIS Version History

| Version | Date | Revisions |
|---|---|---|
| A | 30/03/2026 | |
| B | 27/04/2026 | Client text updates incorporated |


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# D Glossary

## Physical Security Standards

### PAS 24

*Enhanced security performance requirements for doorsets and windows in the UK. Doorsets and windows intended to offer a level of security suitable for dwellings and other buildings exposed to comparable risk. It is designed to mimic an attack by an opportunist burglar, using tools which are easy to conceal.*

### STS 201

*Enhanced security to satisfy the requirements for certification of doorsets, equivalent to test standard to PAS 24.*

### STS 202

*Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors, roller shutters, fences and barriers. Products are rated via the term Burglary Resistance (BR) and range from BR1 (lower security rating) to BR6 (higher security rating).*

### LPS 1175

*Physical security for products manufactured for perimeter, façade, internal spaces and entrapment protection. The higher the security rating, the more formidable the security product.*

*Developed following extensive consultation with stakeholders, the most recent issue sees the previous single digit performance classifications (i.e. Security Ratings 1 to 8) extended to one formed of two elements that illustrate performance in terms of:*

- *Threat level (first element) – Letter (A to H) corresponding with the tool kit used to evaluate the product's intruder resistance and number of attackers involved.*
- *Delay (second element) – Numeric value (1, 3, 5, 10, 15 or 20) corresponding with the minimum delay (in minutes) provided by the product when placed in a locked condition.*

### BS EN 1627

*European standard for the burglary resistance of pedestrian doorsets, windows, curtain walling, grilles and shutters. It defines six resistance classes, from RC1 to RC6, with RC1 being the lowest level of resistance and RC6 the highest. These classes indicate the level of resistance to forced entry, with higher classes requiring more time and specialized tools to breach.*

### BS EN 356

*European standard that specifies the resistance of laminated glazing (i.e. two or more layers of glass bonded together with a plastic interlayer) to manual attacks, such as might occur during forced entry or vandalism. It classifies laminated glass into different resistance levels, ranging from P1A to P8B, with P1A being the lowest and P8B the highest.*

## Useful Websites

**Design For Security – Designing Out Crime** *– apply for Crime Impact Statements or the Secured by Design Award from Greater Manchester Police*

**Secured by Design - Secured by Design** *– SBD Award Scheme, Design Guides and Member Companies*

**ParkMark - Home** *– Park Mark Safer Parking Award Scheme*

**NBS Source** *– find, select and specify building products (including security-certified products)*

**RedBook Live - LPCB Red Book** *– search for LPS 1175 certified products*


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