

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Purpose built student accommodation and flexible commercial/ community floor space

Multi storey car park Plot H, Charles Street, Manchester.

For: RGRE Ltd, ID Manchester Ltd and The University of Manchester
Version B: 09/01/26
Reference: 2025/0328/CIS/01

designforsecurity

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GREATER MANCHESTER POLICE

Multi Storey car park, Plot H, Charles Street

URN: 2025/0328/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported with minor security additions required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The scheme has been well considered from a crime prevention perspective, and it will make a positive contribution to the redevelopment of the neighbourhood into a vibrant, mixed-use area. Design for Security are happy to support the proposals.

We welcome the continuing investment in this part of central Manchester and support redevelopment of this site for residential purposes.

Positive aspects of the scheme include:

- staff will be present throughout the day.
- the density of development will generate significant level of street activity as residents and visitors come and go.
- the orientation of the building and uses within will promote activity and surveillance in the most appropriate areas.
- the location of the residents' entrance is appropriately located on the Altrincham Street elevation.
- the location of the reception desk is suitable to allow staff to monitor activity at the entrance.
- suitable spaces have been identified for safe storage of parcels and mail.
- a range of residents' amenity spaces and facilities are proposed; and,
- a secure cycle hub will be provided.
- The public realm proposals have been very well considered.
- The development of the public realm encourages the future redevelopment of the adjacent railway arches, in turn providing further animation and activity of the streetscape.

To improve the scheme from a crime prevention perspective, include:

- a crime awareness/prevention information pack for residents.
- appropriate access controls at relevant doors and the cycle lift to control access into and through the building.
- use of security certified doors and glazing throughout.
- ensuring the cycle hub and access to it is very secure
- a good quality CCTV system and complementary lighting.

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Please note: At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will make representations to Manchester Planning to require the inclusion of a condition requiring the completed development to achieve Secured by Design (SBD), accreditation. Should the recommendations as listed within Section 4 of this report be adopted, I have every confidence that the scheme will achieve the award, and the condition met.

David Maher *Dip Arch*
Consultant
[redacted]

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Contents

1 Visual Audit 6

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis 7

2.1 Local Crime Summary

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.3 Local Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

2.4 Local Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

2.5 Local Crime Rate Comparisons

2.6 Non-Burglary Risk Analysis – Retail Premises

2.7 Theft Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis

2.8 General Risk Factors

2.9 Risk Factors - Retail

3 Layout Appraisal 15

3.1 Proposed Development

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

4 Physical Security (Residential) 19

4.1 Doors

4.2 Windows

4.3 Glazing

4.4 Alarms

4.5 Access Control

4.6 Boundaries

4.7 Landscaping

4.8 Lighting

4.9 Other

5 Physical Security (Non-residential) 22

5.1 Shutters

5.2 Windows

5.3 Glazing

5.4 Alarms

5.5 Access Control

5.6 Lighting

5.7 CCTV

6 Public Realm influences over crime patterns 24

7 Management & Maintenance 26

8 Commercial Internal Layout Guidance 27

8.1 Restaurants/Cafes/Licensed Premises

8.2 Retail Units

9 Management & Maintenance 29

10 Construction 30

11 Useful References 30

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11.1 Secured by Design (SBD)
12 Counter Terrorism Security Advice 30

Appendix

A Contact Register 31
B Associated Documents 31
C CIS Version History 31
D Glossary 32

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

This study area contains an existing but redundant Multistorey Car Park and sits adjacent to the landmark feature of the Deansgate to Castlefield Viaduct, all nestled within the surrounding University of Manchester city centre campus.


The development site is located to the west of Piccadilly train station. The area in and around the site is synonymous as part of the wider University of Manchester campus and historic transport infrastructure.

The railway viaduct creates a dominant structure cutting through the area. The arches are all gated off from Altrincham St. However, access through the palisade fencing has been forced and visual evidence could be seen of rough sleeping and drug taking.

Princess St & Sackville St provide the main vehicle & pedestrian access to the east & west of the site, with Charles St to the immediate southern boundary.

The site is within a short distance to the city centre and further public transport routes are provided on the local road networks within 100m of the site; bus, tram and train networks.

Graffiti is a prominent feature to the abandoned MSCP along with signs of rough sleeping to the green space this area could be perceived to enhance the fear of crime.




1 – View of the MSCP looking east along Charles St.


2 – View east along Altrincham St.


3 – Rough sleeping, graffiti & outdoor toilet uses to the green space.


4 – Damaged fencing to the existing railway arches.


5 – Poor quality public realm.


6 – Damaged fencing to Altrincham St & evidence of fly-tipping


7 – Redundant commercial & leisure uses at the site.

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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st September 2024 to 31st August 2025 within 500m of the site.

2.1 Local Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
37	85	176	1,401	581	115	27	181	24	70

2.1.1 The overall rate of crime over the past 12 months has been high for the Manchester division, with less serious wounding, theft, and criminal damage having been the most recorded offences taking place. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres where there is often a higher concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a higher number of crime and disorder issues.

2.1.2 Less serious wounding offences have occurred throughout the local area, whereby assaults, public order and harassment offences have been most reported. These incidents have involved disputes between both known and unknown associates within public spaces, retail outlets, restaurants and bars, with alcohol consumption often being a factor.

2.1.3 In cases of thefts, offenders have used pickpocketing and distraction techniques in areas with high footfall to remove items such as mobile phones or wallets form the person without them noticing until a later time. Offenders have also targeted insecure items (particularly mobile phones) left on or under tables in bars and restaurants.

2.1.4 Criminal damage offences have also taken place throughout the local area, whereby offenders have targeted vehicles parked on the streets or within parking facilities by using objects and implements to smash the windows and dent/scratch the bodywork. Offenders have also damaged the doors and windows of properties, which have mainly occurred during disputes.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 **Existing crime patterns:** In and around the site, the levels of the following crime types are average rates for Greater Manchester. Below are associated crime types within and around the site boundary with further detailed examples of common M.O's:

- Miscellaneous theft (frequently occurring in shops or in cafes / bars where customers leave property unattended).
- Less serious wounding (much of this kind of disorder is alcohol-related).
- Theft of pedal cycles (most of these crimes occur where bikes have been left in public areas, either locked to fencing or cycle stands).
- Criminal damage (the principle targets have been parked vehicles).
- Personal robbery (a large proportion of victims have lost mobile phones, purses, handbags and electronic devices).

2.2.2 **General: Offenders posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas to steal property.**

Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Section 4.4).

2.2.3 **General: Shutters have been prised open to target doors/windows behind them.**

Possible Solution - To minimise the risk of offenders forcing shutters:

- security-certified roller shutters (to LPS 1175) should be used wherever possible;

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- where the size limits the availability of certified shutters, CCTV and lighting should be deployed to increase the security of these larger openings.

2.2.4 **General: Broken glazing in windows and doors.**

Possible Solution – All new ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. In vulnerable locations, shutters, grilles or perforated protective panels may be necessary to provide extra protection.

2.2.5 **General: Exploitation of insecure windows and doors**.

Possible Solution - Front doors should include a split spindle mechanism which locks on closure and can only be opened from outside with a key.

2.2.6 **General: Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain entry to the property**.

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 5.4), with key operated locks and opening restrictors. All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 5.4). Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points.

2.2.7 **General: Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements**.

Possible Solution – All ground floor / accessible glazing should include a laminated pane which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Ensure that rubbish and loose material is removed from the areas around the site. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within or directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

2.2.8 **Commercial/Retail: Posing as a legitimate customer and entering restricted areas by means of insecure doors and tailgating employees**.

Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Section 5.1).

2.2.9 **Café/Restaurant: Theft of personal property from tabletops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables**.

Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats. The internal layout of the premises can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment.


2.2.10 **Office: Organised burglars targeting expensive I.T. equipment**.

2.2.11 Possible Solution - Secure storerooms, where such items can be kept, should be incorporated into the design of the building or fit-out. These rooms should have solid blockwork walls or be reinforced with expanded metal mesh and certified door sets (to BS PAS 24). Valuable items should not be easy to remove and should be uniquely identified using an appropriate property marking system. Portable equipment should not be positioned in communal areas where there may be regular visitor access. Effective access controls within the building should assist in restricting entry of visitors and potential intruders.


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2.3 Local Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis


Local Domestic Burglary – Day Range



Local Domestic Burglary – Time Range



Local Domestic Burglary – Point of Entry



2.3.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of domestic burglary is highest on Thursday in the afternoon (13:00-14:00). Offenders tend to target dwellings at this time during the working week when they are often left empty whilst the owners are out at work, giving them the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.


2.3.2 Point of Entry: In the local area, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:

- In cases where the entry point is recorded as 'unknown' it is likely that the offenders have exploited insecure doors.
- Forcing open secure doors using bodily pressure and implements.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.


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2.4 Local Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

Local Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Local Vehicle Crime – Time Range




2.4.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Saturday and Sunday in the evening (19:00-23:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles at this time over when it is likely that they are left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

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
2.5 Local Crime Rate Comparisons

The graphs below compare the local rates of crime (i.e. crimes per 1,000 dwellings) with the average rates for Manchester, Greater Manchester and England & Wales.


Domestic Burglary Crime Rates




Wounding Crime Rates



Criminal Damage Crime Rates



Vehicle Crime Rates



2.5.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **77% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **71% lower** than Greater Manchester and **70% lower** than England & Wales.

2.5.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **21% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **7% higher** than Greater Manchester and **104% higher** than England & Wales.

2.5.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **42% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **24% lower** than Greater Manchester and **8% lower** than England & Wales.


2.5.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **2% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **68% higher** than Greater Manchester and **104% higher** than England & Wales.

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
2.6 Non-Burglary Risk Analysis – Retail Premises

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.


Retail Burglary – Day Range



Retail Burglary – Time Range



Retail Burglary – Point of Entry



2.6.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Wednesday. During the day the risk of burglary at retail premises increases in the early hours of the morning (12am – 6am). Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed, and the streets are quiet. Offenders perceive the risk of being witnessed or apprehended at its lowest.

2.6.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been the occurred most frequently:


- Smashed glazing in windows and doors to gain entry to premises.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and tailgating / exploitation insecure doors to gain access to staff only areas.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily force and implements to gain entry.
- Opening secure doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain entry.

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
2.7 Theft Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.

Retail Theft – Day Range



Retail Theft – Time Range



2.7.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of theft from retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Friday and Saturday. During the day the risk of theft at retail premises peaks in the late morning and into the evening (10:30am – 8pm). Small, personal items are being targeted, mostly mobile phones, purses, and bags

2.8 General Risk Factors

2.8.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.9 Risk Factors - Retail

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Commercial burglary
- Cash robbery
- Unauthorised access to private spaces/Tailgating
- Shoplifting
- Employee theft

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- Theft of customer / staff property
- Criminal damage to property

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

3.1.1 Demolition of existing multi storey car park and erection of a new PBSA development of 1,051 rooms with 659sqm GEA ground floor flexible commercial floorspace, across three buildings of 8, 10 and 38 storeys, connected by a five-storey podium.

3.1.2 Additionally, the proposals will involve the extensive redevelopment of the surrounding public realm to Altrincham St and Charles St. The proposals will stronger pedestrian routes connecting Circle Square, Princess St, Sackville St and the proposed redevelopment works at the 'Sister' development site, and on to London Road and Mayfield Park.

3.1.3 The development of the Altrincham St public realm provides the opportunity for the existing railway arches to be developed and work with the public realm and the PBSR development.

3.1.4 The proposal will provide student apartments across a mix of types and bedroom numbers.

3.1.5 Amenity spaces for residents will provide secure cycle parking, residents lobby space and extensive public realm spaces.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The building will present an active frontage to all public elevations around the site, which will help to improve natural surveillance of the surrounding public realm and animate the street scene. Occupation of the ground floor reception spaces is essential to provide the much-needed natural surveillance at street level and enliven the surrounding public realm as intended, which will help to discourage antisocial activity and more serious disorder around the development.

3.2.2 The building plots provide ground floor activity in the form of student amenity spaces and reception space uses. In addition to the student uses the building at ground floor will also operate commercial facilities to the wider community. There are opportunities for retail use facing onto the public realm, In-turn these uses offer good levels of activity and natural surveillance of the adjacent streets and public realm.

3.2.3 The resident entrance foyer is overlooked by the ground floor reception and resident amenity uses. All of which provide good levels of natural surveillance for the foyer and external public realm spaces.

3.2.4 The public realm of the proposal is permeable, allowing pedestrian movement to be concentrated on the newly created boulevards (Altrincham St) and spaces between development blocks. Building use activities are strategically placed to animate new streetscapes and open public spaces. Communal public realm and commercial facilities are also well located helping to promote activity and surveillance across new vistas.

3.2.5 The development will also create an enhancement of Charles Street. Currently the pedestrian routes are poor quality and only one pathway currently exists on the southern side of Charles St. Ground floor building uses will increase pedestrian activity along Charles St, in turn providing greater levels of natural surveillance.

3.2.6 The proposed building plots clearly defines the different uses of the building, and all entrances can be easily located and navigated.

3.2.7 The foyer/reception zone provides the opportunity for good levels of security at a central control point for the residential space.

3.2.8 The footprint of the buildings facing onto the public realm is relatively simple and free from deeply recessed concealed areas. Where ground floor amenity spaces have been located, consideration appears to have been taken through the use of external facing materials; glazing, providing good levels of activity.

3.2.9 Student amenity spaces provide opportunities for residents to meet and foster community relations within the development. Schemes which have good social communities are less likely to tolerate inappropriate behaviour and are more willing to challenge unfamiliar faces in the development.

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3.2.10 The main entrance will be accessed via an electronic access control fob system for residents and staff. The arrangement of the lobby space is greeted and controlled via a concierge.

3.2.11 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the dwellings, avoiding the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the developments are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

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3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 External lighting and CCTV should be incorporated into the design of the new public realm. A considered lighting scheme will create the sense of a safe space which the public will be encouraged to use throughout the day and evening. A retrospective inclusion of CCTV within the public realm can create the appearance that people are entering through a possible crime hotspot.

3.3.2 Given the levels of theft of cycles in the local area, access to the proposed cycle parking areas must be robustly secured, controlled and maintained, in order to prevent unauthorised access. The location of the doors should not create a publicly accessible sheltered recess within the building line that may foster loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour etc. The pedestrian doors into the foyer should be self-closing and should also be fob-in and fob-out, for the use of residents and staff only. The cycle store and refuse stores should also be enclosed and fitted with security-certified, fob-controlled doors to prevent unauthorised access/theft.

3.3.3 Zoning. The building should be capable of zoning which would restrict access within the site and thus if an intruder does manage to enter, their movements are restricted. All rooms containing facilities for residents should have access controls managed by the building operators. The scale of the proposed development requires subdivision so that residents only have access to the zone where they live and do not have unrestricted entry to all residential floors.

3.3.4 Residential post/parcel/grocery room(s). Arrangements for the delivery of post should not allow postal or grocery delivery staff to have access to internal areas of the residential block beyond the GF reception space. Postal workers should not be given unfettered access to the entire building as this could potentially leave apartments and residents vulnerable.

3.3.5 Residential post/parcel room. Mailboxes for residents should be located either within a secure lobby area or use a 'through-the-wall' post box arrangement. Due to the significant increase in on-line postal ordering, considerations should be given to appropriate post room area, avoiding parcels/post being left in an unsecure location. Further design details of these ancillary spaces are to be developed.

3.3.6 The residential stair and lift cores in the block will require access control allowing only building staff and residents' access beyond the reception space to upper floors, in order to create a secure lobby area.

3.3.7 Access into the building will be managed and controlled by a concierge at reception. An intercom will be provided from the entrance door to the reception desk. Visitors need to sign in at reception from where residents will collect them.

3.3.8 Given the prolific high levels of graffiti within and around the site, it is important that external cladding materials at ground floor are sealed, protected and supports the removal of graffiti.

3.3.9 All elevations of the new building should be monitored by CCTV with a complementary lighting system to illuminate it throughout the hours of darkness.

3.3.10 Consideration to be given to the location of external visitor cycle hoops. Bicycles left at the hoop location for long periods of time will become targets for theft and/or damage. Therefore, Cycle hoops should be located in a position where they can be viewed by users and/or staff. Safe cycle storage will encourage and promote greener transport methods to the development and help to reduce crime levels.

3.3.11 Communal / amenity space. The robust management of such spaces is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour.

3.3.12 It is highly recommended that vehicles access through the colonnade is prevented. Whilst the main pedestrian routes along Altrincham St have incorporated measures to mitigate vehicle access (unless access is controlled & required for maintenance etc.), please ensure that alternative routes cannot be accessed through the colonnade.

3.3.13 The proposed soft landscaping areas around the building and the main entrance should not restrict views and natural surveillance. The landscaping should be carefully designed so that low planting is used that does not inhibit views of the building.

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3.3.14 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

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4 Physical Security (Residential)

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation in addition to the layout issues highlighted within Section 3.3.

4.1 Doors

☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to STS202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.

☐ Arrangements for residents to admit visitors. Communal entrance and inner lobby / zone doors should be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on a phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can confirm the identity of visitors before allowing them access themselves.

☐ Where secure lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The post boxes themselves should be of robust construction, with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access-controlled main entrance.

☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights and are provided with door viewers instead.

☐ Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

☐ Doors to storage / meter rooms should have 44mm solid core doors, 3 hinges, with a mortised sash lock to BS3621/8621 to allow the rooms to be secured when not in use.

☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

☐ The doors to the cycle store should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2, or be steel gates within steel frames. These doors/gates should both be self-closing and lock securely upon closure and be accessible by a programmable fob allowing secure entry and exit.

4.2 Windows

☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.

☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

☐ If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either:

- BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
- BS 6799 for wireless systems

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☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

4.5 Access Control

☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following doors should operate on access control:

- All external doors where regular staff access is required.
- Doors separating internal zones / lobbies.
- Any internal doors to obvious high risk or controlled areas (e.g., storage / server / locker rooms)
- Cycle store

4.6 Boundaries

☐ Secure boundaries should be formed at the extent of the new thoroughfare between the proposed external space and the ground floor public landscaped amenity space. Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of walls and railings should have railing panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid.

☐ Inward opening automatic gates to provide access to the courtyard area must be certified to one of the following standards:

- LPS 1175: Issue 7, SR2
- STS 202: Issue 3, BR2
- Sold Secure Gold

☐ PAS 68: 2013

4.7 Landscaping

☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.

☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by

4.8 Lighting

☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.

☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors (manual override is also permissible).

☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.9 Other

☐ Any externally mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.

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- ☐ Partition walls between flats and corridors should include reinforcement such as a layer of expanded metal mesh.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the buildings. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.

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5 Physical Security (Non-residential)

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation in addition to the layout issues highlighted within Section 3.3.

☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS02, or LPS 1175 SR2.

☐ Sliding doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.

☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24:2012, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

☐ Internal doors to storage rooms should be solid core, minimum 44mm thick with a multi-point locking mechanism.

☐ Garage or sectional overhead doors must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2. If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.

5.1 Shutters

☐ Where grilles or shutters are required for additional protection the minimum certification required is:

- LPS 1175: Issue 7 Security Rating 1
- STS 202: Issue 3, Burglary Rating 1

5.2 Windows

☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.

☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

5.3 Glazing

☐ All glazing up to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) should incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

5.4 Alarms

☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover all building on the site, linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

5.5 Access Control

☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following doors should operate on access control:

- All external doors where regular staff access is required.
- Doors separating internal zones / lobbies.
- Any internal doors to obvious high risk or controlled areas (e.g. storage / server / locker rooms)

5.6 Lighting

☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.

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- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.
- ☐ Internal lighting should be operated by detection devices which will automatically switch lights on with movement activity in each room.

5.7 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: Entrances to site, external areas all around the new building and ancillary facilities, external doors including emergency egresses / hatches, access-controlled doors & cycle parking areas.

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6 Public Realm influences over crime patterns

6.1.1 Features of the physical environment can influence patterns criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?
- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

6.1.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder at the site are as follows:

- being located on well-trafficked streets and overlooked by routinely occupied buildings. The site is subject to surveillance by local businesses and residents as well as passers-by on foot and in cars. The casual observations by residents and passers-by may deter some offenders.
- the site is well connected to the core of the city centre. Pedestrian routes are generally busy during the daytime, particularly that they pass along Princess St & Sackville St and Altrincham St through the arches and include university spaces with some 'active' frontages and regular pedestrian flows, especially during the working day.

6.1.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder and the fear of crime, these include:

- A development in this location, is very likely to attract the interest of criminals should they become aware of it whilst going about their everyday activities. Opportunists, criminal damage to buildings, theft and bicycle crime are all likely to affect a development on this site.
- vacant buildings and plots of vacant land in the vicinity of the site sometimes attract those intent on criminal damage (e.g. smashing glazing and graffiti), burglary and theft (particularly metals).
- A site wide management strategy should work in tandem with existing and new retail/bar/restaurant and any leisure uses. Any door staff should be present to monitor queues and keep them flowing when appropriate, as patrons enter and leave the premises.

6.1.4 The design and layout of the public realm surrounding the blocks should be carefully considered. It should not include any hard/soft landscaping features that may impede surveillance opportunities or foster nuisance, anti-social behaviour or misuse. The following issues should be addressed with the public realm/landscaping strategy (also see Section 4.7):

- The proposed public realm features and any changes in ground levels, with step/ramp features to accommodate them. Such features can sometimes impede surveillance opportunities and provide features that can be mis-used. These features, as well as benches and any other hard landscaping features, should be designed to deter and withstand any such treatment and to maximise surveillance opportunities of/from them.
- Public realm furniture items should be robust to sustain constant daily use and form part of the management and maintenance regime. Damaged features which are not tended to over a period can lead to further decline and respect for the area.
- In particular, the potential to foster nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues at night. The central public realm area along Altrincham St and Charles St will benefit from levels of footfall, activity and will rely on passive surveillance from the commercial properties overlooking these areas. The areas must be well-lit and designed to maximise surveillance opportunities and eliminate hiding places. Any windows or doors adjacent to these areas may also need additional protection.

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6.1.5 Any cycle parking areas located throughout the public realm area should be located where they can be overlooked from routinely occupied areas.

6.1.6 The long-term redevelopment of the area should seek to address and remove the concealment and shelter provided by structures and improve visual links between spaces, green spaces, bridges, buildings, and adjacent streets / premises.

6.1.7 The development of this public realm space would encourage further significant pedestrian footfall in the area, with people spending longer in the area, rather than it simply being passed through as part of a journey from A to B. The aspirations of the plans also seek to extend the use of this space beyond event times.

☐ Engagement at the very early RIBA stages has previously proven to afford those involved in the development the opportunity to 'build-in' protective measures, which often results in more aesthetically pleasing, cost-effective measures in the long-run.

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7 Management & Maintenance

7.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

☐ Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

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8 Commercial Internal Layout Guidance

The internal layout of any commercial units should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. Design for Security understands that the designers and client may not always know who will be occupying their units once complete, and therefore, the end-users requirements. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

8.1 Restaurants/Cafes/Licensed Premises

8.1.1 Restaurants/cafes/licensed premises can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:

- Opportunities - Large numbers of people congregating in restaurants/licensed premises generates opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons are stationary for long periods of time, making them easier to target.
- Lack of attention - The movement of people, noise, social interaction and other factors mean patrons can be easily distracted.
- Cohesion – Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent restaurants/licensed premises means that such a venue would lack 'community territoriality' (i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them). This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur.
- Customer turnover – High turnover with high levels of customer movement within an establishment, are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
- Valuable goods – Often available and possibly on show, a particular problem in external seating areas. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – such as mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys etc.
- Stealth - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.

In order to minimise these issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:

8.1.2 The main entrances to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising.

8.1.3 Customers entering/leaving the premises through the main entrances should be easily observed by staff. Staff should also have clear views of any W/Cs to monitor their use.

8.1.4 The internal layout of premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.

8.1.5 Consideration should be given to high/wide bars/service counters, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of any bars/service counters should be prevented (e.g. with lockable hatches that cannot be easily scaled).

8.1.6 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.

8.1.7 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible (see Section 6.4) and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.

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8.1.8 It is highly recommended that any customer tables are fitted with Chelsea Clips, to reduce the opportunities for theft (see below).



8.1.9 Public toilets can give rise to problems and the following issues should be considered:

- Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work etc. should be used.
- Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
- Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening as this will aid gaining access in an emergency. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 200mm from the floor and to reduce the top height.
- Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
- Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
- Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.

8.2 Retail Units

8.2.1 Clear views should also remain from the premises through to the public realm, i.e. large promotional signs should not obstruct views.

8.2.2 Careful consideration should be given to the location of pay points to ensure that staff have full surveillance over the entrance to the unit.

8.2.3 Internal aisles and product displays should be aligned to assist surveillance from pay points and avoid blind-spots. There should be no items of high value displayed close to the entrance of the unit.

8.2.4 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any tills, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.

8.2.5 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible (see Section 6.4) and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.

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9 Management & Maintenance

9.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the commercial units must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the units. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:

- Opening and closing of premises, including staff arrival and departure;
- Cash management within the premises - consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods;
- Cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices (which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe to meet insurance needs);
- Management of stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
- Details of staff security training;
- Location and management of any smoking areas;
- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras etc;
- Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
- Refuse collection arrangements.

9.1.2 The opening hours of any restaurants, licensed premises or retail units should be consistent with other such premises in the locale and should not unduly conflict with other nearby uses. Sufficient levels of service staff should be provided at busy periods to reduce waiting times and the potential for frustration, aggression and conflict.

9.1.3 Any high value equipment (e.g. computers/TVs, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

9.1.4 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the site and each of the premises, but also to deter unauthorised access to resident or staff-only areas.

9.1.5 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left accessible for extended periods. Servicing activities should also not require any service doors to remain open and unattended for prolonged periods.

9.1.6 The upkeep of any residential development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Repairs to communal areas (lighting, access controls, signage etc.)
- Litter/graffiti removal
- Trimming of trees and shrubs

9.1.7 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings. Low-level defensive planting beds can be used to great effect to funnel pedestrians away from vulnerable areas (such as gable walls, boundaries or hidden corners/recesses).

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10 Construction

10.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

10.1.2 Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

11 Useful References

11.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

11.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. Please see Secured by Design - Secured by Design for more information. To apply for the SBD Award for your development in Greater Manchester, please visit Apply for Secured by Design – Design For Security.

12 Counter Terrorism Security Advice

12.1.1 Given the location/nature of the proposed scheme, the local Counter Terrorism Security Advisor (CTSA) has highlighted that the development may be at an increased risk, particularly the public realm. Please contact ctpnw.protect@gmp.pnn.police.uk for more information and advice.

12.1.2 Vehicle access should be considered and designed into the public realm to mitigate unnecessary vehicle access.

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A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
04/09/2025	Deloitte LLP	CIS instruction received
07/10/2025	Design Team	Design presentation
10/10/2025	Deloitte LLP	Fee / authorisation confirmed
11/10/2025	GMP	Invoice issued
22/10/2025	DfS	Site visit
29/10/2025	DfS	CTSA presentation
29/10/2025	GMP	CIS completed

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
0667-HOD-XX-ZZ-DR-A-(--)101	-Location Plan - ID Manchester		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Date	Revisions
A	29/10/2025	
B	09/01/26	Minor text amendments

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D Glossary

Physical Security Standards

PAS 24

Enhanced security performance requirements for doorsets and windows in the UK. Doorsets and windows intended to offer a level of security suitable for dwellings and other buildings exposed to comparable risk. It is designed to mimic an attack by an opportunist burglar, using tools which are easy to conceal.

STS 201

Enhanced security to satisfy the requirements for certification of doorsets, equivalent to test standard to PAS 24.

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors, roller shutters, fences and barriers. Products are rated via the term Burglary Resistance (BR) and range from BR1 (lower security rating) to BR6 (higher security rating).

LPS 1175

Physical security for products manufactured for perimeter, façade, internal spaces and entrapment protection. The higher the security rating, the more formidable the security product.

Developed following extensive consultation with stakeholders, the most recent issue sees the previous single digit performance classifications (i.e. Security Ratings 1 to 8) extended to one formed of two elements that illustrate performance in terms of:

- *Threat level (first element) – Letter (A to H) corresponding with the tool kit used to evaluate the product's intruder resistance and number of attackers involved.*
- *Delay (second element) – Numeric value (1, 3, 5, 10, 15 or 20) corresponding with the minimum delay (in minutes) provided by the product when placed in a locked condition.*

BS EN 1627

European standard for the burglary resistance of pedestrian doorsets, windows, curtain walling, grilles and shutters. It defines six resistance classes, from RC1 to RC6, with RC1 being the lowest level of resistance and RC6 the highest. These classes indicate the level of resistance to forced entry, with higher classes requiring more time and specialized tools to breach.

BS EN 356

European standard that specifies the resistance of laminated glazing (i.e. two or more layers of glass bonded together with a plastic interlayer) to manual attacks, such as might occur during forced entry or vandalism. It classifies laminated glass into different resistance levels, ranging from P1A to P8B, with P1A being the lowest and P8B the highest.

Useful Websites

Design For Security – Designing Out Crime *– apply for Crime Impact Statements or the Secured by Design Award from Greater Manchester Police*

Secured by Design - Secured by Design *– SBD Award Scheme, Design Guides and Member Companies*

ParkMark - Home *– Park Mark Safer Parking Award Scheme*

NBS Source *– find, select and specify building products (including security-certified products)*

RedBook Live - LPCB Red Book *– search for LPS 1175 certified products*

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