# CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

**Proposed development of up to 4 industrial units, with combined floorspace of 3,189m$^2$**

**at Briscoe Lane, Newton Heath, Manchester**

FOR: **Mr J Greenberg**

VERSION A: **14.11.19**

**2019/0539/CIS/01**

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

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# Briscoe Lane, Newton Heath, Manchester

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## Development Supported

The relative isolation of many of the commercial premises in this area leaves businesses vulnerable to criminal acts. A number of businesses in the area trade from premises that lack well-designed, integrated security measures, and have often resorted to crude additions to buildings in order to frustrate criminals but such measures are unsightly and compound the sense that security is a significant issue. Whilst the number of recorded crimes in this neighbourhood is very low, business premises are being targeted, which warrants the development being built to a very secure standard, with security an integral element of the design. The design team appear cognisant of this and, from a crime prevention perspective, have produced a well-considered scheme

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police will support the application and request that condition be included requiring the development to be constructed in accordance with the recommendations and physical security standards set out in this report.

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Consultant

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# Contents


1 Visual Audit ..... 4

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis ..... 5

2.1 Crime Summary

2.2 Modus Operandi used in crimes against industrial premises in Manchester and measures to reduce risk

2.3 Risk Factors

2.4 Burglary at industrial premises in North Manchester: Risk Analysis

2.5 Theft at industrial premises in North Manchester: Risk Analysis

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

3 Layout Appraisal ..... 7

3.1 Proposed Development

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

3.3 Recommendations to Improve Security

4 Physical Security ..... 10

4.1 Building Structure

4.2 Doors

4.3 Windows & Shutters

4.4 Glazing

4.5 Staff Lockers

4.6 Intruder Alarm

4.7 Boundaries

4.8 Lighting

4.9 CCTV

4.10 Car Parking

5 Management & Maintenance ..... 12

6 Construction ..... 12

7 Secured by Design (SBD) ..... 12


# Appendix


A Contact register ..... 12

B Associated Documents ..... 12

C CIS Version History ..... 12

D Glossary ..... 13





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# 1 Visual Audit

The development site and its surroundings are shown on the plan and photographs below. This site, edged in red on the plan, is located on the north side of Briscoe Lane in a predominantly industrial area. There are industrial premises adjoining the site to the north, east and west. Philips Park Cemetery lies opposite the site on the south side of Briscoe Lane. The site itself, Unit 230 Briscoe Lane comprises the remains of a fire damaged industrial building, an area where the damaged building has been demolished and the associated yard, where piles of demolition spoil are being stored. The sides of the site are secured with tall, steel palisade fencing and vehicle gates. The southern elevation of what remains of the fire damaged building and a low retaining wall define the Briscoe Lane boundary. At the rear of the site, the presence of a large industrial building on land to the south serves to secure the site's northern boundary. The remains of the building that still stands on the site and several of the neighbouring premises have a number of crude security features such as: steel doors and gates - to add protection to vulnerable doors; roller shutters and grilles - to protect door and window openings; and, razor wire – to deter intruders climbing over fences and gates. The application of such measures suggests that crime is an issue in the area. Outside of business hours, there is little vehicle and pedestrian traffic is this part of Briscoe Lane, coupled with the absence premises that open active throughout the day and at weekends of  there is very little passive surveillance from passers-by on foot or in vehicles

Looking towards the site from Riverpark Road

The fire damaged building at the southern and western edges of the site

Looking across the site from east to west where the fire damaged building has been partially demolished

The vehicle access to the site off Briscoe Lane

The eastern edge of the site where steel palisade fencing and gates define the site boundary

Industrial premises immediately north of the site

There have been 71 recorded crimes in the neighbourhood around the development site in the past 12 months. The focal points for crime were businesses on Briscoe Lane and Riverpark Road. Over one third of the crimes were recorded at industrial or warehouse premises and 25 offences took place on the street or in premises on Briscoe Lane. The crimes recorded at industrial/warehouse premises in this neighbourhood were principally burglary and vehicle related crimes (theft and criminal damage).  In the neighbourhood generally crimes involving theft of, theft from or damage to vehicles are most commonly recorded, followed by burglary at business premises.  Many of the industrial and warehouse premises within the area analysed are isolated, with little activity outside of business hours, which makes them vulnerable to criminal activity. The range of security measures installed at business premises, predominantly anti-ram features, palisade fencing, barbed and razor wire, intruder alarms and the use of CCTV, suggests that local businesses are cognisant of the risk of crime. The proposed development should include a range of security measures which are effective without being overly visually intrusive.

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# 2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

*All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st June 2018 and 31st May 2019.*

## 2.1 Crime Summary

| Recorded Crime within 500m of Site | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Domestic Burglary | Non-Domestic Burglary | Criminal Damage | Less Serious Wounding | Theft | Robbery | Serious Wounding | Theft from Motor Vehicle | Theft of Motor Vehicle | Bicycle Theft |
| <5 | 12 | 9 | 12 | 5 | <5 | <5 | 9 | 7 | <5 |

2.1.1 The volume of crime recorded in the area is very low when compared with other inner city neighbourhoods in Manchester. Burglary at commercial premises at industrial sites along Briscoe Lane is an issue, as are vehicle related crime and arsonists targeting business premises.

## 2.2 Modus Operandi used in crimes against industrial premises in Manchester and measures to reduce risk

### 2.2.1 Doors have been forced open

*To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:*

- all external doors should be certified to PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 sr2 standard – security rated doors are very difficult to force open;
- external doors should be placed where they can be readily observed by staff or monitored readily by CCTV and fitted with intruder alarm contacts; and,
- the deployment of visible security patrols, appropriately high boundary fencing to control access to a site, CCTV and lighting can also deter offenders.

### 2.2.2 Shutters have been forced upwards by offenders

*To minimise the risk of offenders forcing shutters:*

- security-certified roller shutters (to LPS 1175) should be used wherever possible;
- where size limits the availability of certified shutters, intruder alarms, CCTV and lighting should be deployed to increase the security of these larger openings; and,
- anti-ram bollards or barriers should be deployed to help secure the most vulnerable shutters.

### 2.2.3 Theft of employee/trainees property

*To minimise the risk of offenders stealing personal property from the industrial premises:*

- access control systems should be employed to prevent unauthorised personnel from entering buildings - especially offices and staff rooms, where sensitive information, expensive equipment, or staff belongings may be stored;
- overt signage should be used to warn against casual entry, referring visitors to appropriately located, visible reception areas; and,
- include space for employees to store personal/valuable items securely e.g. lockers or lockable drawers.

### 2.2.4 Using a vehicle to force open gates, walls and shutters

*To minimise the risk of offenders forcing gates, walls and shutters:*

- security-certified roller shutters and fencing/gates (to LPS 1175) should be used wherever possible;
- sliding gates tend to be more secure than hinged gates;


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- steel frame buildings clad in profiled metal sheet should include a 2000mm high brick or blockwork base or a suitably robust inner layer of attack resistant material, e.g. expanded metal panels; and,
- anti-ram bollards or vehicle barriers (ideally that meet the PAS 68 standard) should be installed in front of gates to prevent access into a site.

2.2.5 **Glazing in windows and doors has been smashed**

*To minimise the risk of breaking and entering via glazed doors or windows:*

- windows should be avoided on secluded elevations;
- windows and glazed doors should be fitted with laminate glass; and,
- security shutters or grilles, certified to the LPS 1175 sr2 standard, should be fitted to all windows and glazed doors.

## 2.3 Risk Factors

2.3.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Theft of fuel, company stock, tools and IT equipment
- Theft of employee personal belongings
- Criminal damage the buildings and vehicles
- Arson
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Bicycle and motorcycle theft
- Theft of plant and machinery and criminal damage during the construction period.

## 2.4 Burglary at industrial premises in North Manchester: Risk Analysis

*The data below relates to burglary offences carried out at industrial premises in North Manchester*

Burglary – Day Range




Industrial Burglary – Time Range




2.4.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of burglary is greatest on a Friday and a Monday, and during the late evening. Offenders often target properties at night, when it is dark, streets are quiet and they perceive a lower risk of being witnessed or apprehended.

Burglary – Point of Entry





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2.4.2 Point of Entry: A little less than half of the burglaries carried out at industrial premises in North Manchester have involved forcing roller shutters; offenders also forced open doors using bodily pressure or hand tools. On fewer occasions, offenders gained entry by smashing glazing in doors and windows and, in fewer still instances, offenders simply forced their way through the walls or roof of a building, or removed external cladding.

## 2.5 Theft at industrial premises in North Manchester: Risk Analysis

*The data below relates to theft carried out at industrial premises in North Manchester.*

Theft – Day Range




Theft – Time Range




2.5.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of theft is appreciably greater on Wednesday, Thursday and Friday, and in the afternoon and into the evening. There are two common occurrences of theft – the theft of personal property from within buildings (e.g. cash, bags, wallets/purses etc.) and the theft of tools, materials and plant stolen from service yards.

## 2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

*The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.*

Vehicle Crime – Day Range




Vehicle Crime – Time Range




2.6.1 Day/Time Range: The risk is greatest on a Tuesday and Wednesday, and during the evening. Offenders often target vehicles in the evening, when it is dark and there is less street activity, reducing the risk for the offender of being apprehended. Vehicles targeted have mostly been parked on streets. Given the proximity of the Etihad Stadium, some of these offences may be linked to supporters seeking out free parking on match days.

# 3 Layout Appraisal

## 3.1 Proposed Development

3.1.1 The proposed development involves the clearance of all existing structures on the site and the erection of a partly two-storey, L-shaped, industrial building, with a total floorspace of 3,189m$^2$. The building has been designed in such a way as to provide flexible accommodations for between one and four businesses.

3.1.2 The building will be multifaceted, with brick walls up to 2700mm and an outer skin of profiled composite sheeting above. The roof will also be profiled composite sheeting with translucent man-safe roof lights.


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Windows to the proposed office space at ground and first floor levels will be metal framed and double glazed. Doors will be metal faced timber doors. The entrance to unit 1, facing Briscoe Lane, will be an aluminium-framed, glazed door with glazed side panels.

3.1.3 Each unit will have a full height workshop and a small office space, staff facilities, a pedestrian entrance door, escape door, and a full height service shutter. The office space within unit 1 will be larger and set out over two floors, and will include a meeting room and executive office. Should the development be taken over by a single business it is likely to become the focal point of the business.

3.1.4 The site's perimeter will be secured with high security fencing of between 2000-2500mm in height.

3.1.5 Parking spaces are spread around the site but generally close to the pedestrian and service entrances.

## 3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

*The following proposed features make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.*

3.2.1 We strongly support the demolition of the remains of the existing fire damaged building, which has attracted crime and trespass.

3.2.2 The new development will improve the appearance of the area and will include built-in, security measures.

3.2.3 The principal elevation of the building is orientated towards Briscoe Lane with office windows offering opportunities for staff to monitor activity of the street.

3.2.4 There is the opportunity for some surveillance over the site and main site access, with the building entrances and some windows offering views of vehicles and visitors approaching.

3.2.5 The building has solid walls is suitably tall to prevent access to the roof; both of which will deter breaking and entering.

3.2.6 Shutters will be integrated into the design of the building to secure windows and entrance doors.

3.2.7 Though limited in numbers, the proposed car parking is well located, close to the building in view of staff in the coming and going.

3.2.8 Suitably high and secure fencing and gates will be erected around the site.

## 3.3 Recommendations to Improve Security

### 3.3.1 Development management

- The development should, ideally, be managed by a single management company, with a single security contractor.

### 3.3.2 The site boundary

- Care should be taken to ensure ground level changes at do not inadvertently facilitate climbing over the proposed fence or leave space underneath that could allow intruders a way into the development.

### 3.3.3 The building fabric

- The building should be constructed using doors, shutters, window frames and glazing that meet the Secured by Design standards. Because of the risk of criminal damage to glazing, automated security shutters should be fitted to all windows.

### 3.3.4 Access controls to the site and the building

- The site entrance gates should include access controls – either automated gates or a vehicle arm barrier. Staff in each unit should be able to vet visitors at the gates prior to allowing entry to the site using an audio-visual intercom and remote gate release.
- To prevent casual access at times when staffing levels are low, access controls should be used on the external personnel doors and service shutters.
- Staff in the offices of each unit should be able to vet visitors at the entrance prior to allowing entry to the building using an audio-visual intercom and remote door lock release. This is particularly important in the early morning and late evening when staff may be working alone.


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### 3.3.5 Internal fit-out of building

- Offices should contain a safe for cash and valuable documents. The doors to safe rooms should be self-closing and self-locking and certified to BS PAS 24 or be a 44mm solid core door with at least one key operated lock, preferably two, certified to BS 3621 or 8621.
- The walls and ceiling to the room containing the safe should be solid.
- Small lockers should be provided in an appropriately secure location to allow staff to securely store personal belongings.

### 3.3.6 Monitored intruder alarm and CCTV

- A monitored, intruder alarm and CCTV system should be installed.
- The CCTV system should include cameras capable of identifying all vehicle and pedestrian movements along the service road, within the car parking areas and service yards, and around each unit. Cameras should also be capable of monitor all building entrance doors, entrance lobby and service shutters.
- The alarm and CCTV systems should be monitored by an appropriate security company and, ideally, include a public address system, allowing monitoring staff to issue an audible warning to alert to intruders that they have been detected and a response generated.

### 3.3.7 Externally stored fuel, plant and machinery, and vehicles may be vulnerable

- If required, a fuel management system that allows only authorised users to dispense fuel, as well as only allowing authorised vehicles to be refueled, should be installed.
- Materials stored externally within the service yards should not be visible from the site boundaries and, ideally, stored within appropriate, secure, containers.
- Plant, machinery and vehicles should be arranged in such a way as to minimise the risk of theft, and all fitted with tracking devices.
- A smart management system should be used for the storage and management of keys, such as Traka or similar.

### 3.3.8 Parking and service areas

- Consideration should be given to creating a greater number of parking spaces within the site.
- Armco$_{TM}$ barriers, or similar, should be installed around the perimeter of servicing and parking areas, and against the buildings, to reduce the risk of vehicle movements damaging perimeter fencing, parked vehicles or the buildings themselves.
- Parking bays should be clearly marked.
- The provision of secure refuse stores should be considered.
- The position of any ancillary structures within the service areas should be carefully considered in relation to the following:
    - Creating blind spots reducing the effectiveness of supervision of the site by staff
    - Creating areas which CCTV cameras cannot monitor
    - Reducing the efficiency and effectiveness of site lighting
    - Creating climbing aids that would assist trespassers.

### 3.3.9 Lighting

- For pedestrian and vehicle safety, and to support the CCTV system, dusk-to-dawn lighting should be provided along the service road, around the development, site entrance gates, the car and cycle parking, and the buildings - particularly around the entrance and escape doors, and the service shutters.

### 3.3.10 Signage

- To aid visitors and deter criminals, a map, directional signs and warning signs should be erected at the site entrances to direct visitors to the appropriate building within the development. Warning signs should include, for example:
    - CCTV in operation


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- Security patrols in operation
- Plant is security marked and fitted with tracking devices
- A fuel tank management system has been installed

### 3.3.11 Cycle parking

- Cycle parking should be located well inside the site boundary and, ideally, out of the gaze of the passing public. Cycle parking in very visible locations close to the perimeter is more likely to be targeted by offenders. Shelters should be provided which protect bikes from the weather and, ideally, be lockable enclosures - fitted with a self-closing and self-locking door/gate. Cyclists should be able to secure both wheels and the frame to a stand - Sheffield' stands are recommended.

# 4 Physical Security

*The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.*

## 4.1 Building Structure

☐ The external walls and sub-diving walls between units should be constructed using block or brickwork wall up to a height of 2700mm from ground level.

## 4.2 Doors

☐ Building entrance and escape doors should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202 or LPS 1175 SR2.

☐ All external doors should be self-closing and, ideally, self-locking.

☐ There should be no external ironmongery on escape doors.

☐ Cash/document storage offices should have solid masonry walls, no adjacent false/suspended ceilings and a security-certified door-set (see above). A time-delay safe, certified to LPS 1183, is advised.

## 4.3 Windows & Shutters

☐ Where feasible, window frames should meet the PAS 24 or LPS 1175 standard.

☐ Any opening windows be fitted with key operated locks, and fixed opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limiting opening to 100mm.

☐ Where size allows, service shutters tested, and certified, to LPS 1175 SR2.

☐ Similarly security rated shutters should be installed to enhance security of windows or any glazed doors.

## 4.4 Glazing

☐ Glazing to all external doors or windows should incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

## 4.5 Staff Lockers

☐ Each unit should include be a secure space with lockers to allow staff to store their belongings while at work.

## 4.6 Intruder Alarm

☐ An intruder alarm should be installed to each unit, with contacts on all external doors and shutters.


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☐ The alarm systems should be monitored, with a response facility (be that an alert to the key holder, or to a security team).

## 4.7 Boundaries

☐ Boundary fencing should meet the LPS1175 standard for paladin fencing.

☐ The vehicle gates should 2500mm high and automated.

☐ The gates should be designed such that there must be no parts of the gate that provide footholds to any would-be intruder intent on entering the site and there should be minimal ground clearance beneath gates to reduce the potential for crawling into the site.

## 4.8 Lighting

☐ Lighting to parking and service areas, and to pedestrian and vehicle routes within the site should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%.

☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light.

☐ Dusk-to-dawn lights should be installed to all external doors and shutters.

☐ Lighting fixtures should not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary fencing.

## 4.9 CCTV

☐ The design team should consider the following points when planning the CCTV strategy:

- With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- Procedures for recovery of recordings should be established to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
    - **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
    - **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

☐ CCTV monitoring and recording equipment should be securely housed and located in a secure room with access limited to appropriate staff. Alternatively, images can be monitored and stored off site by a suitable monitoring/management company.

☐ Suitable locations for cameras would be: all entry doors and service shutters; escape doors; the site entrances; all building elevations; and, all areas of car and cycle parking.

☐ A public address system should be installed to complement the cameras so that camera and alarm monitoring staff can warn intruders off.

## 4.10 Car Parking

☐ Bays and directional markings should be clearly lined, with visitor and disabled bays indicated.


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# 5 Management & Maintenance

☐ A management and maintenance plan should be prepared, which addresses, inter alia, upkeep of CCTV and alarm systems, lighting, signage, perimeter fencing, access controls, and maintenance of any peripheral landscaping.

# 6 Construction

☐ The developer should take appropriate measures to secure the site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular movements in and out.

☐ The contractor employed should be a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme'.

☐ Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

# 7 Secured by Design (SBD)

☐ Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

# A Contact register

| Date | Contact With | Summary of Contact |
|---|---|---|
| 01.07.19 | MR STEWART PEARL, SPA | REQUEST FOR CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT |
| 22.07.19 | | SITE VISITED |
| 14.11.19 | MR STEWART PEARL, SPA | REPORT ISSUED |

# B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings:

| Drawing No. | Drawing Title | Date | Rev |
|---|---|---|---|
| PRE/B/001 | SITE / LOCATION PLAN | Mar 19 | |
| PRE/B/002 | EXISTING INFORMATION | Mar 19 | |
| PRE/B/003 | PROPOSED INFORMATION | Mar 19 | |
| PRE/B/004 | EXISTING ELEVATIONS | Mar 19 | |
| PRE/B/005 | PROPOSED ELEVATIONS | Mar 19 | |
| PRE/B/006 | PROPOSED LAYOUT PLAN | Mar 19 | |
| PRE/B/007 | ESTATE DIVISION | Mar 19 | |
| PRE/B/008 | EXTERNALS and FENCING | Mar 19 | |
| PRE/B/009 | ISO/PHOTO/OVERLAY | Mar 19 | |

**PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent changes to the scheme, it may be necessary for Design for Security to review recommendations made within this report.**

# C CIS Version History

| Version | Revisions Made | Date |
|---|---|---|
| A | | |
| | | |


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# D Glossary

### Burglary Resistance Standards

#### BS 7950, 1997

***Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.***

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

#### BS PAS 23-1, 1999

***General performance requirements for door assemblies.***

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

#### BS PAS 24-1, 2012

***General security performance requirements for door assemblies.***

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

#### ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

***Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification***

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

#### LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

***Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components***

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

#### STS01 Issue 4: 2012

***Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24***

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

#### STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS202 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

#### EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

***Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.***

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

### Commonly Used Acronyms

#### CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

#### CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at ***www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted***)

#### CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

#### INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

#### PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

#### LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

#### UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

### Useful Websites

***Design for Security***
***www.designforsecurity.org***
***Secured by Design***
***www.securedbydesign.com***
***RIBA Product Selector***
***www.ribaproductselector.com***
***LPCB – Red Book Live***
***www.redbooklive.com***
***Crime Reduction (Home Office)***
***www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk***
***DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre***
***www.designagainstcrime.org***
***Building for Life***
***www.buildingforlife.org***
***CLG (Communities and Local Government)***
***www.communities.gov.uk***


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