CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

MARLSBRO HOUSE, PORT STREET, MANCHESTER

For: Alco Assets MH Ltd
Version A: 20th March 2026
Reference: 2026/0045/CIS/01

designforsecurity

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GREATER MANCHESTER POLICE

Marlsbro House

URN: 2026/0045/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recommendations made

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The development will see the grade II listed Marlsbro House restored after being vacant for a number of years, the refurbishment of the building will improve the security of the building and bring it back into active use. There are a number of recommendations made in the report to enhance the security of the building and deter criminals from operating, including:

- Access control and physical security of the buildings should be carefully considered. A comprehensive access control system should be provided to prevent misuse of the building and to facilitate legitimate use.
- To reduce the potential of theft of personal property, lockers or lockable storage boxes should be provided.

Additionally, there are a number of recommendations made in section 3.3 of this report which would enhance the security of the development, and it is highly recommended that these are considered. It is also recommended that the development is built to Secured by Design standards.



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
1 Visual Audit

2 The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located in the city centre of Manchester, in the Northern Quarter area.

3 The site is roughly rectangular and the boundaries are formed by Faraday Street to the North-East, adjacent properties on Port Street to the South-East, to the South-West by Hilton Stret, and to the North-West by Newton Street.

4 The site is occupied by Marlsbro House which has a small courtyard area to the rear, which is current secured with a palisade fence at Faraday Street and a wooden gate on Hilton Street. Marlsbro House is a grade II listed building and has historically been well known for having music rehearsal/studio spaces such as Sunshine Studios and Manchester Music Box.

5 The building has been extensively defaced with graffiti at ground floor level on all publicly accessible elevations of the building. Ground floor windows are protected with external box roller shutters and basement window lights have been blocked or protected with mesh screens.











2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Local Crime Summary

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st March 2025 and 28th February 2026.

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
36	83	247	1,866	624	240	53	239	24	58

2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area is very high, and this is typical of city centre areas. The site is located within the Northern Quarter, which is one of the main nighttime economy areas – which typically generate high levels of crime. The most commonly occurring crimes in the area are criminal damage, violence, theft, robbery, and vehicle crime. Graffiti is prevalent in this area which the building having been repeatedly targeted - likely because it is vacant.

2.2 Risk Factors - Offices

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft

2.3 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting similar premises are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Opening secure doors (all door types) using bodily pressure and implements to access the premises.

  Possible Solution – All external doors should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (see section 4.1) which are designed to withstand a prolonged attempt to gain entry.

- Breaking glazing in doors and windows, mainly to the front of the premises, using implements to gain access.

  Possible Solution – Any ground floor or easily accessible glazing should contain a pane of laminate glazing, which cannot be easily smashed or shattered to gain entry.

- Entering premises as legitimate customer and tailgating staff/ exploiting insecure doors to access staff only areas.

  Possible Solution – There should be a robust access control system restricting access into and around the building, preventing unauthorised persons accessing spaces restricted to staff, workers, and legitimate visitors.

- Forcing open shutters using implements and bodily force to gain access.


  Possible Solution – Any shutters should be certified to a recognised security standard (i.e. LPS 1175 SR2). Shutters certified to a burglary resistant standard are able to withstand prolonged, opportunist, attacks by criminals.

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
2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary (Offices): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area.

Manchester Office Burglary – Day Range




Manchester Office Burglary – Time Range



2.4.1 Day/Time Range: During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester is greatest on Tuesday, Thursday and Sunday. During the day, the risk of burglary at Manchester office premises rises into the evening/late at night. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.

Manchester Office Burglary – Point of Entry




2.4.2 Point of Entry: The majority of burglaries at offices in Manchester have been committed through doors. Burglaries against office buildings in this area do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing tools with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks. Offenders have also smashed glazed panels in doors and windows to gain entry. A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through 'unknown' and 'legitimate' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.

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
2.5 Theft (Offices): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area.

Manchester Office Theft – Day Range



Manchester Office Theft – Time Range



2.5.1 Day/Time Range: During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester offices is greatest on Monday and Tuesday and is generally lower over the weekend (when many are shut). During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking around midday. During these times, many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

3.1.1 The proposed scheme for Marlsbro House seeks to provide a mix of uses with creative, workspace and hospitality functions. The basement would accommodate a recording studio, sound engineer room and a listening lounge/bar. The ground floor would provide an office and co working lounge supported by a restaurant and kitchen. The first, second and third floors would offer offices, meeting rooms and lounge areas, while the new fourth floor would provide additional office space along with studio space.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The site is located on in a prominent location on the junction of Newton Street and Hilton Street, allowing for high levels of passive surveillance.

3.2.2 The proposed development site will bring the building back into active use, generating activity in the area and an active frontage to Newton Street. The ground floor restaurant and basement bar will generate a mix of activity within the building.

3.2.3 The main entrance will be located on Newton Street where it will be easily seen from the public highway/footway.

3.2.4 The main entrance will be overlooked from within the building from the reception desk which is positioned centrally within the entrance lobby.

3.2.5 The building has been vacant for over five years and has been defaced extensively at ground floor with graffiti. There has also been some criminal damage to the building over the years, such as damage to shutters/glazing.

3.2.6 The appearance of the building and external roller shutters is of poor quality and does not contribute to the urban fabric of the area, which can potentially make people feel unsafe when travelling through the area and make people fearful of criminality. The refurbishment of the building and high quality design will improve the street scene remarkably.

3.2.7 The cycle stores in the secure courtyard will allow workers and those visiting the building to securely park their bicycles. The provision of showers will encourage people to cycle to work.

3.2.8 The courtyard area to the rear of the building will be secured at both sides of the building (Faraday Street & Hilton Street) restricting access to legitimate users.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and should be incorporated where possible. If the security measures cannot be installed due to the listed status of the building, then mitigating security measures may be required.

3.3.1 Any new external fittings (i.e. doors, ground floor/basement windows, and accessible glazing), where possible, should be certified to a recognised burglary resistant standard. Where it is not possible to install security rated products due to the heritage status of the building, a robust alternative should be used with mitigating security measures to reduce the potential for criminality.

3.3.2 Basement lights are particularly vulnerable because of their low level and susceptibility to accidental/malicious damage. The proposed basement light unit should contain at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The outer pane of glass should be a robust pane of toughened glazing which is less susceptible to accidental damage.

3.3.3 Access into/throughout the building should be governed by a robust access control system to restrict access to legitimate persons. The access control system should operate on a fob/key card/app system that permits users to access specific areas as required and not allow them to freely access all aspects of the building.

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3.3.4 If the building is to be accessible before/after the reception is staff during the day, there should be access control on the main entrance doors into the building to restrict access to legitimate persons and prevent misuse.

3.3.5 Meeting rooms, rehearsal spaces, and individual offices, should be bookable with access only permitted to those with legitimate access for those time slots.

3.3.6 Any valuable equipment within the office spaces, multimedia suite, lecture theatre, etc, should be property marked. An asset register of valuable equipment should be regularly maintained.

3.3.7 A comprehensive CCTV system, which can be monitored by reception staff, should provide good coverage of the building including:

- Main entrances
- External doors
- Elevations of the building
- Courtyard and bicycle parking
- Reception space
- Restaurant/bar areas
- Roof terraces

3.3.8 The access control system should be fully auditable, so that access control logs can be interrogated in the event of an incident (i.e. damage to property) or to identify any misuse of the building.

3.3.9 Theft of personal property is one of the most prevalent crimes in office settings, with items left unattended on desks frequently taken. Consideration should be given to providing lockers or small lockable storage boxes that workers can use if they want to leave property secured whilst they leave their desk.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation in addition to the layout issues highlighted within Section 3.3. The listed status of the building might prove restrictive and in that case mitigating security measures might be required.

4.1 Doors

☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222.

☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Windows, Curtain Walling, Cladding & Shutters

☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified BS PAS 24, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR A, STS 204, or STS 222.

☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

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4.4 Alarms

☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover each building, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

4.5 Access Control

☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:

- ☐ Main entrances
- ☐ External doors
- ☐ Elevations of the building
- ☐ Courtyard and bicycle parking
- ☐ Reception space
- ☐ Restaurant/bar areas
- ☐ Roof terraces

4.6 Lighting

☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

4.7 CCTV

☐ The proposed development should be covered by a comprehensive CCTV system (see section 5).

4.8 Other

☐ Staff lockers should be provided so that staff can safely store personal items during the working day.

☐ Any bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

5 CCTV Guidance

5.1 Resolution, Identification & Retention

☐ Select camera resolution based on identification requirements and field of view. More megapixels provide higher detail but also increase bandwidth and storage requirements.

☐ Recommended resolution levels:

- 1080p (2MP): General indoor and corridor surveillance.
- 4MP–8MP (4K): Entrances, exits, and high-security areas for facial or number plate recognition.
- >8MP: Large-area coverage or post-event digital zooming.

☐ The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

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5.2 Image Quality

☐ High-quality imaging is the foundation of effective CCTV. Selecting cameras with the right sensor size, lens aperture, and image processing capabilities ensures accurate visual data capture across lighting conditions.

☐ Key considerations:

- Larger sensors and low f-number lenses capture more light and deliver better contrast.
- Use Wide Dynamic Range (WDR) cameras for scenes with bright and dark areas.
- Apply Day/Night and IR-capable cameras for low-light performance.
- Frame rates between 25–30 fps are recommended for motion clarity.

5.3 Camera Placement and Coverage

☐ Camera placement directly affects image usability. Ensure coverage overlap and proper mounting height to minimise blind spots.

☐ Placement principles:

- Mount indoor cameras between 2.5–3 m to prevent tampering while retaining facial detail.
- Outdoor cameras should be positioned to avoid glare and direct sunlight.
- Slight overlap of camera fields ensures seamless coverage.
- Combine wide-angle lenses for area coverage and narrow lenses for detail zones.

5.4 Environmental and Housing Considerations

☐ Outdoor and exposed cameras must withstand environmental and mechanical impacts. Select housings rated for weather and vandal resistance.

- Minimum IP65/66 for outdoor use.
- IK10 or equivalent vandal-resistant enclosures.
- Integrated IR or OptimizedIR functions for low-light areas.
- Avoid steep downward angles; maintain clear facial perspective.

5.5 Network and System Design

☐ Design the video system architecture around IP-based network cameras for scalability, reliability, and flexibility. Core design elements to consider:

- Use Power over Ethernet (PoE) to simplify installation.
- Calculate bandwidth and storage based on resolution, frame rate, and retention time.
- Apply compression standards (H.264/H.265) to optimise storage.
- Ensure strong cybersecurity: password protection, encryption, network segmentation.

5.6 Maintenance and Quality Assurance

☐ Routine inspection and maintenance are critical to sustaining image quality and reliability.

- Perform day/night checks post-installation.
- Clean lenses regularly and inspect mounting fixtures.
- Review recorded footage to confirm identification quality.
- Update firmware and review network security periodically.

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6 Management & Maintenance

6.1.1 A comprehensive security and maintenance regime for the management of the units must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the building. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up to date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures, and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:

- Opening and closing the units, including staff arrival and departure (including any lone-worker policies).
- Securing the site when not in use.
- Management of deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods).
- Details of staff security training.
- Location and management of any smoking areas.
- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. access control systems, alarm systems, CCTV cameras, lighting etc.
- Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc.
- Regular boundary checks
- Refuse collection arrangements.

6.1.2 All high value equipment within communal areas (e.g. computers, televisions, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

6.1.3 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left in the street for extended periods/overnight. Servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods.

7 Commercial Internal Layout Guidance

The internal layout of any commercial units should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. Design for Security understands that the designers and client may not always know who will be occupying their units once complete, and therefore, the end-users requirements. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

7.1 Restaurants/Cafes/Licensed Premises

7.1.1 Restaurants/cafes/licensed premises can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:

- Opportunities - Large numbers of people congregating in restaurants/licensed premises generates opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons are stationary for long periods of time, making them easier to target.
- Lack of attention - The movement of people, noise, social interaction and other factors mean patrons can be easily distracted.
- Cohesion – Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent restaurants/licensed premises means that such a venue would lack ‘community territoriality’ (i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them). This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur.
- Customer turnover – High turnover with high levels of customer movement within an establishment, are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
- Valuable goods – Often available and possibly on show, a particular problem in external seating areas. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – such as mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys etc.

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- Stealth - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.

In order to minimise these issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:

7.1.2 The main entrances to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising.

7.1.3 Customers entering/leaving the premises through the main entrances should be easily observed by staff. Staff should also have clear views of any W/Cs to monitor their use.

7.1.4 The internal layout of premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.


7.1.5 Consideration should be given to high/wide bars/service counters, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of any bars/service counters should be prevented (e.g. with lockable hatches that cannot be easily scaled).

7.1.6 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.

7.1.7 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible (see Section 6.4) and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.

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7.1.8 It is highly recommended that any customer tables are fitted with Chelsea Clips, to reduce the opportunities for theft (see below).



7.1.9 Public toilets can give rise to problems and the following issues should be considered:

- Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work etc. should be used.
- Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
- Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening as this will aid gaining access in an emergency. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 200mm from the floor and to reduce the top height.
- Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
- Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
- Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.

8 Management & Maintenance

8.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the commercial units must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the units. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:

- Opening and closing of premises, including staff arrival and departure;
- Cash management within the premises - consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods;
- Cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices (which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe to meet insurance needs);
- Management of stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
- Details of staff security training;
- Location and management of any smoking areas;
- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras etc;
- Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
- Refuse collection arrangements.

8.1.2 The opening hours of any restaurants, licensed premises or retail units should be consistent with other such premises in the locale and should not unduly conflict with other nearby uses. Sufficient levels of

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service staff should be provided at busy periods to reduce waiting times and the potential for frustration, aggression and conflict.

8.1.3 Any high value equipment (e.g. computers/TVs, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

8.1.4 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the site and each of the premises, but also to deter unauthorised access to resident or staff-only areas.

8.1.5 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left accessible for extended periods. Servicing activities should also not require any service doors to remain open and unattended for prolonged periods.

9 Construction

9.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

9.1.2 Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

10 Useful References

10.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

10.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. Please see Secured by Design - Secured by Design for more information. To apply for the SBD Award for your development in Greater Manchester, please visit Apply for Secured by Design – Design For Security.

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A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
29/02/2026	Sam Caldwell	CIS instruction confirmed
19/03/2026	Euan Kellie	Progress update

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
EX/097	Existing Site Plan		
EX/098	Existing Site Plan	05.01.26	
GA/099	Proposed Basement Plan		
GA/100	Proposed Ground Floor Plan		
GA/101	Proposed First Floor Plan		
GA/102	Proposed Second Floor Plan		
GA/103	Proposed Third Floor Plan		
GA/104	Proposed Fourth Floor Plan		
GA/105	Proposed Roof Plan		
GA/200	Proposed Elevation Newton Street	04.01.26	P2
GA/201	Proposed Elevation Hilton Street	17.02.26	P2
GA/202	Proposed Elevation Port Street	13.02.26	P2
GA/203	Proposed Elevation Faraday Street	17.02.26	P2

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Date	Revisions
A	20/03/2026	

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D Glossary

Physical Security Standards

PAS 24

Enhanced security performance requirements for doorsets and windows in the UK. Doorsets and windows intended to offer a level of security suitable for dwellings and other buildings exposed to comparable risk. It is designed to mimic an attack by an opportunist burglar, using tools which are easy to conceal.

STS 201

Enhanced security to satisfy the requirements for certification of doorsets, equivalent to test standard to PAS 24.

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors, roller shutters, fences and barriers. Products are rated via the term Burglary Resistance (BR) and range from BR1 (lower security rating) to BR6 (higher security rating).

LPS 1175

Physical security for products manufactured for perimeter, façade, internal spaces and entrapment protection. The higher the security rating, the more formidable the security product.

Developed following extensive consultation with stakeholders, the most recent issue sees the previous single digit performance classifications (i.e. Security Ratings 1 to 8) extended to one formed of two elements that illustrate performance in terms of:

- *Threat level (first element) – Letter (A to H) corresponding with the tool kit used to evaluate the product's intruder resistance and number of attackers involved.*
- *Delay (second element) – Numeric value (1, 3, 5, 10, 15 or 20) corresponding with the minimum delay (in minutes) provided by the product when placed in a locked condition.*

BS EN 1627

European standard for the burglary resistance of pedestrian doorsets, windows, curtain walling, grilles and shutters. It defines six resistance classes, from RC1 to RC6, with RC1 being the lowest level of resistance and RC6 the highest. These classes indicate the level of resistance to forced entry, with higher classes requiring more time and specialized tools to breach.

BS EN 356

European standard that specifies the resistance of laminated glazing (i.e. two or more layers of glass bonded together with a plastic interlayer) to manual attacks, such as might occur during forced entry or vandalism. It classifies laminated glass into different resistance levels, ranging from P1A to P8B, with P1A being the lowest and P8B the highest.

Useful Websites

Design For Security – Designing Out Crime *– apply for Crime Impact Statements or the Secured by Design Award from Greater Manchester Police*

Secured by Design - Secured by Design *– SBD Award Scheme, Design Guides and Member Companies*

ParkMark - Home *– Park Mark Safer Parking Award Scheme*

NBS Source *– find, select and specify building products (including security-certified products)*

RedBook Live - LPCB Red Book *– search for LPS 1175 certified products*

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