

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

185 NO. APARTMENTS & 4 NO. HOUSES
DUTTON STREET, MANCHESTER

For: Rani Developments
Version A: 17th March 2026
Reference: 2024/0072/CIS/02

designforsecurity

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GREATER MANCHESTER POLICE

Dutton Street

URN: 2024/0072/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recommendations made

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed residential development is acceptable in general; however there are a number of points that should be considered to increase the security of the building and reduce the vulnerability of criminal and antisocial behaviour:

- Front public realm offers potential for positive use, but without effective management it may be subject to misuse. Landscaped areas must maintain clear sightlines, avoiding concealed spaces and reducing opportunities for criminal or antisocial behaviour, and adequate lighting should ensure safe use after dark.
- External seating areas should be placed in locations visible from inside the building to deter misuse, supported by CCTV coverage of external spaces.
- Roof terraces require access control to limit use to authorised individuals and provide an audit trail in the event of an incident.

More details can be found in section 3.3 where there are there are a number of recommendations made which would enhance the security of the development and it is highly recommended that these are considered. It is also recommended that the development is built to Secured by Design standards.



Patrick Babb

Consultant

e: patrick.babb@designforsecurity.org

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1 Visual Audit


The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located in the Cheetham Hill area of Manchester, on the periphery of the Manchester city centre area.

The site boundaries are defined by Robert Street to the East and Dutton Street to the South-West. The other site boundaries are defined by neighbouring properties.

The site is currently developed with a large steel portal framed building with a small car parking area, the building is currently being used as a padel tennis facility.. The car parking area is defined with a steel palisade boundary. On the day of visiting the site there were no obvious signs of criminal or antisocial behaviour, but this building and other in the area have had retrospective security measure installed such as metal bars, roller shutters, and barbwire.

The local area is a mix of commercial and residential uses, and the site is in close proximity to HMP Manchester. Opposite the site on Dutton Street there is a large, recently completed apartment development (Waterhouse Gardens).













2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st March 2025 to 28th February 2026 within 500m of the site.

2.1 Local Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
11	24	99	374	135	18	37	153	20	5

2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area is high and this is likely due to the close proximity of the city centre and prolific venues such as Victoria Station, Manchester Arena, and also HMP Manchester. There are also a high number of surface, and temporary, car parks which are used for commuters, shoppers, and events.

2.1.2 The most frequently occurring crimes in the area are criminal damage to both vehicles and property, less serious violent crime, theft of personal property, and theft from vehicles, these crime types are often associated with city centre areas and the night-time economy. When the location of the crimes are examined, the vast majority are to the South of the site, occurring on the periphery of the city centre.

2.2 General Risk Factors

2.2.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds, or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.3 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.3.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting residential properties are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain entry to the property.

  Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see section 4.1 & 5.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements

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- Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.

  Possible Solution - Any ground floor opening lights should be restricted in opening to 100mm to prevent them being left vulnerable if unlocked. All external doors should be self-closing to prevent them being left in an insecure position and any external apartment doors should have a split-spindle or fixed handle to prevent these doors from being left insecure.

- Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.

  Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see section 4.2 & 5.2). Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points.

- Posing as a legitimate resident and gaining access to communal areas of apartment building via insecure doors and tailgating.

  Possible Solution – All ground floor communal doors should be fitted with door closers and lock automatically, to prevent these doors from being left open and insecure. Any publicly accessible apartment entrance doors should be fitted with a split-spindle, or fixed external handle, to prevent them from being opened from the outside when unlocked. Any accessible windows should be restricted in opening to prevent them from being fully opened if left insecure.


- Theft of parcels from communal areas

  Possible Solution – There should be a secure parcel store provided for residents. The parcel store should be covered with a CCTV camera.


2.4 Local Crime Rate Comparisons

The graphs below compare the local rates of crime (i.e. crimes per 1,000 dwellings) with the average rates for Manchester, Greater Manchester and England & Wales.


Domestic Burglary Crime Rates




Wounding Crime Rates



Criminal Damage Crime Rates



Vehicle Crime Rates



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2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **87% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **84% lower** than Greater Manchester and **83% lower** than England & Wales.

2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **56% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **40% lower** than Greater Manchester and **14% higher** than England & Wales.


2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **41% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **22% lower** than Greater Manchester and **6% lower** than England & Wales.

2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **14% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **87% higher** than Greater Manchester and **127% higher** than England & Wales.


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2.5 Local Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis


Local Domestic Burglary – Day Range



Local Domestic Burglary – Time Range



Local Domestic Burglary – Point of Entry



2.5.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of domestic burglary peaks on Thursday in the afternoon (15:00-16:00). Offenders often target dwellings at this time during the week when it is likely that the owners are out at work, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 Point of Entry: In the local area, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:


- In cases where the entry point is recorded as 'unknown' it is likely that the offenders have exploited insecure doors.
- Forcing open secure doors using bodily pressure and implements.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.

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
2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.6.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime peaks on Friday to Sunday in the evening (21:00-22:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles at this time when they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

3.1.1 Demolition of existing structures and erection of a part 10, part 11, part 14 and part 20 storey residential building comprising 189 units with associated residents' amenity space, servicing and public realm.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The building footprint is relatively simple and does not feature any recesses or similar features that could generate antisocial or criminal behaviour.

3.2.2 The site is located in a prominent location on Dutton Street and Robert Street Way where it will be subject to high levels of natural surveillance from those passing by. The main entrance to the building is positioned in highly visible location on the junction of Dutton Street and Robert Street.

3.2.3 The site is overlooked by a large apartment development on Dutton Street (Waterhouse Gardens) and is located in an area of increasingly high residential density. High levels of legitimate activity can be an effective deterrent against criminals who do not want to be easily seen or identified.

3.2.4 There will be duplex apartments/townhouses positioned on Robert Street, these dwellings will create an active frontage to Robert Street allowing for high levels of natural surveillance of the surrounding area.

3.2.5 The residents lounge will overlook the landscaped area to the front of the building and create an active frontage to Dutton Street.

3.2.6 The landscaped area, kiosk, formal and informal seating areas to the front of the building will foster legitimate activity in the area which can deter offenders from operating.

3.2.7 There will be two large cycle stores within the building, allowing residents to secure their bicycles within the building rather than in their apartment, communal areas, or in the public realm.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 The public realm to the front of the building has the potential to foster legitimate activity to the benefit of the development and surrounding area, but if not managed/controlled carefully it could potentially be misused to the detriment of residents (i.e. loitering, vagrancy, drug/alcohol consumption).

3.3.2 The landscaped areas should be designed to maintain clear sightlines and avoid the creation of concealed spaces that could encourage criminality, antisocial behaviour, or misuse, to the detriment of residents and pedestrians. Tree canopies should be maintained at a minimum height of 2000 mm, and low-level planting in close proximity to pedestrian routes should not exceed 1000 mm. Appropriate illumination should be incorporated to ensure safe use after dark, for example bollard lighting supplemented by ambient street lighting.

3.3.3 Any seating within the landscaped areas should be positioned so that it can be clearly observed from within the building, discouraging misuse. Provision should also be made for CCTV coverage of the external areas.

3.3.4 Roof terraces on the upper floors of the building must operate on an access control system to restrict access to genuine users and to provide an audit trail in the event of any incident (i.e. damage, defacement, or other misuse/criminal activity.

3.3.5 External communal access doors must comply with, and be certified to, BS PAS 24, STS 202, or LPS 1175 SR2. These doors must be equipped with locks capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. Communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock, and all such features should fall within the scope of the relevant certification. To prevent tailgating, a secure entrance lobby should be provided, requiring residents and visitors to pass through a second security-rated, access-controlled door before entering the stair or lift core.

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3.3.6 Access into the building should be controlled through a video entry system that allows residents to verify visitors before granting access. No unrestricted trade access should be permitted.

3.3.7 Postal workers should not be granted unrestricted access throughout the development. They should be permitted access only to designated post rooms, or mail and parcels should be delivered directly to the concierge.

3.3.8 Access to the parcel store should be restricted to residents through an auditable access control system. The parcel room should have monitored CCTV coverage to deter theft and to enable footage review should items be reported missing.

3.3.9 Cycle store doors should incorporate a glazed viewing panel to allow users to assess potential risks before entering or exiting the store.It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

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4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation in addition to the layout issues highlighted within Section 3.3.

4.1 Doors

☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification. Access into the build should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.

☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.

☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. Apartment entrance doors must have a door viewer.

☐ Construction of internal walls surrounding internal apartment entrance doors (600mm either side of the door set) should incorporate a resilient layer to reduce the risk of anyone breaking through the wall to access the locking mechanism. The resilient layer should be timber (minimum thickness of 9mm) or expanded metal.

☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Windows

☐ Ground floor and easily accessible windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR A, STS 204, or STS 222.

☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.

☐ There should be a block work wall or material of similar strength (e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind or within any new cladding/insulated panels to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack.

4.4 Alarms

☐ If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either:

- BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
- BS 6799 for wireless systems

☐ If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

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4.5 Access Control

☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:

- Communal entrances
- Communal areas
- Bicycle stores
- Circulation cores
- Staff only areas
- Parcel rooms

4.6 Bicycle Stores

☐ Doors into the cycle parking area(s) must be certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, with access restricted to registered residents (i.e. genuine bicycle owners).

☐ Cycle stands should either be U-profile or Sheffield style stands. If rack storage is used it should be possible for both wheels and the frame to be secured.

4.7 Landscaping

☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.

☐ Loose surface materials in public areas should be avoided, as small fragments can be used as projectiles to harm people, damage property, or smash glazing to gain entry.

4.8 Lighting

☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the development in accordance with BS 5489. Lighting should be taken from a variety of sources and levels (i.e. columns, up lighting) to provide a greater level of coverage and avoid shadows/pooling.

☐ Dusk ‘til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

☐ Elevations of the buildings should be illuminated to deter loitering.

4.9 CCTV

☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

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- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images, then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals.
- ☐ Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

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5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter/graffiti removal
- Repair to communal areas (access controls, lighting, signage etc.)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. Please see Secured by Design - Secured by Design for more information. To apply for the SBD Award for your development in Greater Manchester, please visit Apply for Secured by Design – Design For Security.

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A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
26/02/2026	Kate Salter	CIS instruction received

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
1181-TGA-XX-00-	Level 00	25.02.26	P08
1181-TGA-XX-01-	Level 01	25.02.26	P08
1181-TGA-XX-ZZ-	Level 02-06	25.02.26	P08
1181-TGA-XX-ZZ-	Level07-09	25.02.26	P03
1181-TGA-XX-10-	Level 10	25.02.26	P08
1181-TGA-XX-11-	Level 11	25.02.26	P08
1181-TGA-XX-ZZ-	Level12-13	25.02.26	P02
1181-TGA-XX-ZZ-	Level14-19	25.02.26	P07
1181-TGA-XX-RF-	Roof Level	25.02.26	P03
1181-TGA-XX-XX-	Site Plan	26.02.26	P05
1181-TGA-XX-XX-	Existing Site Plan	26.02.26	P02
1181-TGA-XX-ZZ-	Section AA	25.02.26	P05
1181-TGA-XX-ZZ-	Section BB	25.02.26	P05
1181-TGA-XX-ZZ-	Elevation South	26.02.26	P06
1181-TGA-XX-ZZ-	Elevation West	25.02.26	P05
1181-TGA-XX-ZZ-	Elevation East	25.02.26	P05
1181-TGA-XX-ZZ-	Elevation North	25.02.26	P05
1181-TGA-XX-ZZ-	Context Elevation South	26.02.26	P02
1181-TGA-XX-ZZ-	Context Elevation East	25.02.26	P01

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Date	Revisions
A	16/03/2026	

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D Glossary

Physical Security Standards

PAS 24

Enhanced security performance requirements for doorsets and windows in the UK. Doorsets and windows intended to offer a level of security suitable for dwellings and other buildings exposed to comparable risk. It is designed to mimic an attack by an opportunist burglar, using tools which are easy to conceal.

STS 201

Enhanced security to satisfy the requirements for certification of doorsets, equivalent to test standard to PAS 24.

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors, roller shutters, fences and barriers. Products are rated via the term Burglary Resistance (BR) and range from BR1 (lower security rating) to BR6 (higher security rating).

LPS 1175

Physical security for products manufactured for perimeter, façade, internal spaces and entrapment protection. The higher the security rating, the more formidable the security product.

Developed following extensive consultation with stakeholders, the most recent issue sees the previous single digit performance classifications (i.e. Security Ratings 1 to 8) extended to one formed of two elements that illustrate performance in terms of:

- *Threat level (first element) – Letter (A to H) corresponding with the tool kit used to evaluate the product's intruder resistance and number of attackers involved.*
- *Delay (second element) – Numeric value (1, 3, 5, 10, 15 or 20) corresponding with the minimum delay (in minutes) provided by the product when placed in a locked condition.*

BS EN 1627

European standard for the burglary resistance of pedestrian doorsets, windows, curtain walling, grilles and shutters. It defines six resistance classes, from RC1 to RC6, with RC1 being the lowest level of resistance and RC6 the highest. These classes indicate the level of resistance to forced entry, with higher classes requiring more time and specialized tools to breach.

BS EN 356

European standard that specifies the resistance of laminated glazing (i.e. two or more layers of glass bonded together with a plastic interlayer) to manual attacks, such as might occur during forced entry or vandalism. It classifies laminated glass into different resistance levels, ranging from P1A to P8B, with P1A being the lowest and P8B the highest.

Useful Websites

Design For Security – Designing Out Crime *– apply for Crime Impact Statements or the Secured by Design Award from Greater Manchester Police*

Secured by Design - Secured by Design *– SBD Award Scheme, Design Guides and Member Companies*

ParkMark - Home *– Park Mark Safer Parking Award Scheme*

NBS Source *– find, select and specify building products (including security-certified products)*

RedBook Live - LPCB Red Book *– search for LPS 1175 certified products*

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