

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

20 x COMMERCIAL UNITS

LAND OFF SHERBORNE ST CHEETHAM HILL MANCHESTER M8 8LR

For: WMR LTD
Version A: 15th October 2025
Reference: 2025/0338/CIS/01

designforsecurity

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GREATER MANCHESTER POLICE

Land off Sherborne Street Cheetham Hill Manchester

URN: 2025/0338/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security additions/improvements required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed.

- Consideration should be given to securing the rear of the units, to prevent offenders from loitering to the rear of the properties if they gain access to the site.
- A comprehensive survey of the existing perimeter fencing is highly recommended to address any weaknesses.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.

Matt Granelli

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit


The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located in Cheetham Hill, in the north of an existing industrial area.


To the north the site is bound by an unfinished construction site with the boundary being defined by a mound of rubble, to the south and east the site is bound by an active commercial area and is formed from timber fencing. The west is bounded by Sherborne St, this boundary has the vehicle access which is to be retained and is formed from weld mesh fencing.

The site is currently vacant. Traffic along Sherborne St was minimal at the time of the site visit.

The local area is a mixture of retail and commercial properties, with the Manchester City Centre to the south in close proximity.













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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Local Crime Summary

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st October 2024 to 30th September.

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
20	27	50	197	37	11	8	47	18	<5

2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the past 12 months has been below average for the Manchester division, with less serious wounding and domestic burglary having been the most reported offences taking place.

2.1.2 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed commercial development, the more detailed analysis below will look at use-specific burglary and theft and local vehicle crime.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 Forcing open shutters using bodily pressure and implements/ tools to gain access.

Possible Solution – A security-certified shutter (see Section 4.1) should be installed. If external shutters are used, the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering or attack. Avoid locating openings in concealed areas where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed.

2.2.2 Opening secure doors using bodily force and implements/tools to gain entry to property.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1). External doors should be illuminated and be covered with CCTV to deter offenders.

2.2.3 Theft of staff property or unattended / insecure items of personal property.

Possible Solution - There should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that visitors to the building are vetted and / or met and escorted before being allowed further access to all areas.

2.2.4 Damaging fencing and gates using tools in order to access the industrial unit

Possible Solution – A robust boundary treatment should be used to define the site perimeter. The boundary treatment should be capable of withstanding opportunistic attacks with hand tools. Boundary treatments should be installed on hardstanding so that offenders cannot crawl under and of a height sufficient to deter climbing.

Gates should be of robust material and to the same height as surrounding boundaries. The gap between the gate and the ground should be minimised to reduce the potential of an offender crawling under. The design of the gate should not include any horizontal bars or exposed hinges that could assist climbing.

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2.3 Risk Factors


The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Theft of fuel, company stock, tools and IT equipment
- Theft of employee personal belongings
- Criminal damage the buildings and vehicles
- Arson
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Bicycle and motorcycle theft
- Theft of plant and machinery and criminal damage during the construction period


2.4 Non-Industrial/Storage Units Burglary Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against industrial units, recorded in the Manchester area.


Burglary Other – Day Range



Burglary Other – Time Range



Burglary Other – Point of Entry



2.4.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of burglary at industrial units in the Manchester area peaks on a Monday and Sunday during the evening and into the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target industrial

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properties in the evening and early hours of the morning when it is dark and there is less foot fall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.


2.4.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure shutters using bodily pressure and implements (mostly metal bars and vehicles) in order to gain access to doors and windows located beneath.
- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Posing as a legitimate customer/ visitor and accessing restricted areas.
- Forcing open perimeter fencing and gates using tools and vehicles.
- Climbing onto the roof of the building and using tools in order to remove tiles and enter the property.
- Removing bricks from the wall using tools in order to gain access.


2.5 Industrial/Storage Units Theft Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against industrial units, recorded in the Manchester area.

Misc Theft – Day Range



Misc Theft – Time Range




2.5.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of theft from industrial units in the Manchester area peaks on a Saturday during the morning and into the afternoon (9am – 4pm). There are two common occurrences of theft – the theft of personal property from within buildings (e.g. cash, bags, wallets/purses etc.) and the theft of tools, materials and plant stolen from service yards.


2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



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2.6.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Wednesday in the evening (18:00-19:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles at this time when they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

3.1.1 The proposed is a commercial development for 20 no. storage units with associated parking for 10 no. cars. The 20 no. units will be across 3 buildings; each unit is 2 stories high.

3.1.2 The site will be accessed from Sherborne Street and be secured by a gate.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The proposed footprint will be simple, with no recesses that could provide cover for covert criminal activity. The buildings will also be sufficiently tall enough to make unauthorised access to the roof difficult.

3.2.2 There is a small car parking area which will allow users to park on the site within the compound, rather than in the local area.

3.2.3 The activity the units will generate will potentially deter antisocial and criminal behaviour from occurring in the area such as flytipping and congregation.

3.2.4 The entrances of the storage units will overlook the car park.

3.2.5 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the dwellings, avoiding the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the developments are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 Consideration should be given to securing the rear of the units, to prevent offenders from loitering to the rear of the properties if they gain access to the site.

3.3.2 A comprehensive survey of the existing perimeter fencing is highly recommended to address any weaknesses.

3.3.3 The gates into the site should be secured with a padlock certified to Sold Secure Gold, to prevent the site from being accessed if the padlock is broken by a determined offender.

3.3.4 The roller shutters should be secured to a burglary resistant standard (see section 4 below) to prevent the shutters from being forced open easily by an offender to gain entry (which is a common MO in the local area).

3.3.5 The entrances to the buildings and car park should be illuminated to deter offenders from targeting the buildings at night.

3.3.6 There should be a secure bicycle store located with the site. The bicycle parking should be visible from the proposed units.

3.3.7 There should be the appropriate infrastructure for tenants/owners to easily fit an alarm, CCTV, and access control.

3.3.8 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

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4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation in addition to the layout issues highlighted within Section 3.3.

4.1 Doors

☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222.

☐ Garage or sectional overhead doors must be tested and certified to RC2, LPS 1175 SR2 or STS202.

☐ Solid block walls should be provided behind any lightweight cladding to a height of 2400mm to prevent attacks to the cladding to gain access to buildings.

4.2 Windows & Cladding

☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.

☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

☐ Solid block walls, or a similar resilient layer, should be provided behind any **lightweight cladding** to a height of 2400mm to prevent attacks to the cladding to gain access to buildings.

4.3 Glazing

☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms, Access Control & CCTV

☐ Consideration should be given to installing a modest CCTV system. Cameras should be placed where they are able to monitor:

- Car park
- Cycle store
- Vehicle entrance

☐ There should be the infrastructure provided so that tenants/owners can easily install an intruder alarm, CCTV system, and access control to there unit.

4.5 Boundaries

☐ Secure boundary treatments (including service yard boundaries) should generally be 2400mm high and of welded wire mesh construction. It is recommended that a 358-type fence panel is used in higher risk situations.

☐ Any new site boundaries should be a minimum of 2400mm high and of welded wire mesh construction. It is recommended that a 358-type fence panel is used in higher risk situations.

☐ There should be minimal ground clearance beneath the fence, to reduce the potential for crawling into secure areas.

☐ The site boundary treatment should be positioned on hard standing ground. Where this is not possible, the ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary.

☐ Gates should be in keeping with the height of adjacent boundary treatments and incorporate either:

- A pad lockable bolt to the midpoint of the internal face, or

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- A key operable deadlock

☐ Double gates should have lockable (or externally inaccessible) drop bolts to each leaf.

4.6 Lighting

☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes and car parking areas within the site in accordance with BS 5489.

☐ Dusk ‘til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external fixtures.

☐ Fittings should produce ‘white’ light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.7 Landscaping

☐ In vulnerable locations such as around entrances and parking areas, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow unimpeded surveillance and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.

4.8 Other

☐ Any rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.

☐ Any cycle stores should be secure, lockable enclosures. For further information refer to our cycle storage guidance document: http://www.designforsecurity.org/uploads/files/DFS_Cycles.pdf

☐ Any bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire-resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

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5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the commercial units must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the units. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:

- Opening and closing of premises, including staff arrival and departure;
- Details of staff security training;
- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras etc;
- Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
- Refuse collection arrangements.
- Litter removal

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. Please see Secured by Design - Secured by Design for more information. To apply for the SBD Award for your development in Greater Manchester, please visit Apply for Secured by Design – Design For Security.

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A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
01/09/25	Atelier Two	CIS Application
02/09/25	DfS	CIS Fee Proposal
23/09/25	Atelier Two	CIS Confirmation
30/09/25	DfS	Site Visit

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
2444 PL200 D	Proposed Site Layout		
2444 PL202 D	Proposed First Floor		
2444 PL301 A	Proposed Elevations 02		
2444 PL300 A	Proposed Elevations 01		
2444 PL201 D	Proposed Ground Floor		
T0879	- Topographical Survey		
2444 RP100 A			

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Date	Revisions
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