



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Erection of 81 no. residential apartments (Use Class C3a) with a mixed-use ground floor comprising workplace and retail uses (Use Class E), associated landscaping, servicing, car and cycle parking and other associated works following demolition of the existing buildings

At **Birtles House, Unit 1 Market Place, Civic Centre, Wythenshawe, Manchester**

For: Muse Places and Wythenshawe Community Housing Group

Version A: 28.11.25

2025/0324/CIS/01

design**for**security

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported

We welcome the continuing investment in central Wythenshawe and support redevelopment of this site for residential-led purposes.

From a crime prevention perspective, the positive features of the development include: the scheme design is of a high quality; the proposed scheme will result in the redevelopment of a vacant building; the new building will be more animated with the windows and shopfronts; there will be an appropriate number of apartments; and, the development will partly focus activity at appropriate areas, whilst also facilitating passive surveillance of the surrounding street.

Advice is included in the report, which we consider will enhance security of the development and this set out in sections 3.3 and 4. The principal recommendations relate to securing the building appropriately and encouraging high quality in the public realm to stimulate activity and supervision of the spaces around the development.

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will support the application and make representations to Manchester Planning to require the inclusion of a condition requiring the completed development to achieve Secured by Design, SBD, accreditation. Should the recommendations included in this report be adopted, I have every confidence that the scheme will achieve the award, and the condition met.

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Consultant

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1 The Site and Surroundings

The photographs and plan, below, show the development site and its surroundings. The site measures approximately 0.3ha and is located at the northern end of The Birtles, one of the two, principal shopping streets in the town centre. To the north is a somewhat bleak, hard-surfaced, open market area at Etrop Way. A very tall, steel-palisade fence defines the edge of the town centre/market ground, beyond which is a footpath and the Manchester-to-Manchester Airport Metrolink line, then Poundswick Lane. North-west of the market ground is a modern development comprising retail space and office space. The Birtles is a wide, pedestrianised, shopping street lined with a large number of small and medium sized retailers, including several kiosks at the northern end adjacent to the application site. Wythenshawe Interchange is situated to the south-west of the site and comprises a modern bus station alongside Wythenshawe Town Centre Metrolink station. CCTV monitors all parts of the town centre and Interchange

The north façade of the retail and office building that stands on the development site



The site on the right and neighbouring large and small retailers, including market stalls/kiosks



Looking south along The Birtles with the corner of the application site on the right



The western edge of the site and gated access to the rear, service yard



The service yard at the rear of the application site



Wythenshawe Interchange is situated immediately to the south-west of the site



The site itself is occupied by Birtles House, a vacant part two-, part three-storey, flat roofed, L-shaped building. It has a series of medium and small retail units on the ground floor with office space and storage uses above. All shopfronts are protected with roller shutters whilst a line of bollards provide additional protection from ram raiding. There is a service yard to the rear, which is accessed from Ainley Road, off Poundswick Lane. The service yard is enclosed by very tall, steel-palisade fencing and matching vehicle gates that include an arm barrier. The yard is monitored by CCTV.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood around the site

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st October 2024 to 30th September 2025.

All crime within 500m of the site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Use, or threat, of violence	Theft including shoplifting	Robbery	Drug offences	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
11	17	80	512	161	26	50	13	10	6

2.1.1 There were 907 recorded crimes in the neighbourhood around the development site during the period analysed.

2.1.2 The most common crimes recorded were:


- Crimes involving the use, or threat, of violence - 56%
- Theft (including bicycle theft, robbery, and shoplifting) - 18%
- Criminal damage - 9%
- Drug offences – 6%
- Vehicle crime - 3%
- Burglary of dwellings and other property - 3%

2.1.3 This number of offences is more than twice that recorded in a typical neighbourhood within Manchester. This is not unusual where there is a concentration of retail and leisure uses, take-away premises, transport hub and car parks, all frequented by a high volume of people.


2.1.4 The town centre's commercial premises, often the larger retail stores, the Interchange and Forum were hotspots of crime. Violent incidents, criminal damage and shoplifting were most common, not unusual in a busy town centre.

Domestic Burglary

There were just 11 incidents of domestic burglary; Rowlandsway was a slight hotspot for burglary.





2.1.5 The risk of domestic burglary is greatest on Wednesday and Friday in the early hours of the morning.





- 2.1.6 Where the means of entry was known, doors were usually targeted, with offenders kicking the door open or smashing the glass in glazed panels before reaching in and releasing the lock. Garden sheds were targeted twice.

Vehicle crime



- 2.1.7 There were 26 incidents of vehicle-related crime. This is a very low number given the town centre location and the presence of several large car parks. The rate is significantly lower than elsewhere in the City. Offences were more commonly committed in the evening



2.1 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester, Greater Manchester and England & Wales



- 2.1.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **61% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **50% lower** than Greater Manchester and **49% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.1.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **24% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **68% higher** than Greater Manchester and **221% higher** than England & Wales.



- 2.1.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **40% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **83% higher** than Greater Manchester and **123% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.1.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **51% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **19% lower** than Greater Manchester and **1% lower** than England & Wales.

2.2 Typical modus operandi used in committing burglary, theft, criminal damage, and vehicle related crimes in Manchester, & measures to reduce vulnerabilities

2.2.1 Doors have been targeted when left insecure

To minimise the risk of 'walk-in' burglaries:

- front doors to houses should be fitted with a fixed handle or a 'split spindle', so that the only way in is with a key;
- communal entrance doors to apartments should be self-closing and lock automatically upon closing;
- where this can be balanced with the design of a development and its ability to fit the context of the local area, defensible space should be provided between dwellings and the 'street', i.e., a small front garden enclosed with a suitably high fence. Separation of the passing public from a property can also help to reduce the risk of criminal damage; and,
- dusk-to-dawn lighting should be fitted to all external doors.

2.2.2 Doors have been forced open with tools and bodily pressure

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all external doors should be certified to PAS 24 security standard;
- front doors should be visible to neighbouring properties and from the 'street' rather than set within recesses or on more secluded elevations;
- side or rear gardens should be enclosed with appropriately high fencing and locking gates so that rear doors are only accessible to residents; and,
- secluded passageways to the sides and rear of properties should be avoided wherever possible as such routes can facilitate offender access to rear gardens, as well as attract anti-social behaviours such as graffiti, fly-tipping, and damage to fencing.

2.2.3 Glazing in doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry or commit criminal damage

To minimise the risk of offender smashing glazing in doors and windows:

- laminate glass should be fitted to all external doors and to all windows on the ground floor of the development;
- windows should be fitted with locks and opening restrictors; and,
- access to gardens and private amenity space should be restricted by installing high fencing and locking gates.

2.2.4 Vehicles were targeted when parked on driveways, in unsecured car parks or on the 'street'

To minimise the risk of vehicle-related crime:

- car parking should be located within the boundaries of the property, within an area that is both very secure and well overlooked by residents or monitored by an effective CCTV system. Consideration should be given to installing automatic vehicle gates and fencing around car parks.

2.2.5 Offenders have stolen bicycles

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting bicycles:

- cycle stores should be provided within a secure part of the site;
- rear garden gates should be robust, tall, self-closing and self-locking;
- CCTV should monitor activity in and around communal cycle stores; and,
- PIR lighting should be installed to illuminate the cycle stores.

2.2.6 Offenders have damaged boundary fencing

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting fencing:

- rear garden boundaries should avoid being exposed to the public realm;
- communal pathways providing access to rear gardens should be secured with self-closing, self-locking gates; and,
- fencing should be especially robust when unavoidably exposed to the public realm.

2.2.7 Theft of plant and machinery, and criminal damage during the construction period.

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting the construction site:

- a secure hoarding should be erected around the site with access restricted to contractors and authorised visitors;
- security staff should patrol the site or visit during non-working hours;
- lighting and CCTV should be installed to illuminate the site and record activity; and,
- plant and machinery should be fitted with tracking devices, and, at the end of the working day, it should be arranged to prevent forced access onto the site and to minimise the risk of theft.

2.3 Environmental features of the site and surroundings that may influence crime patterns

2.3.1 Features of the physical environment can influence patterns criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect a potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether or not to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?
- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

2.3.2 Features of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder at the site are as follows:

- public sector bodies and businesses/landlords are increasingly more pro-active in the management and maintenance of the town centre;
- the town centre has a broad and complementary range of retail, commercial, cultural, civic and leisure uses, which attracts a diverse range of people at all times of the day;
- there are plans to a grow the number of residential properties in the town centre;
- the rate of burglary is much lower than it is elsewhere in Manchester;
- the neighbourhood is improving – environmental standards are also improving. Places where there are clear signs of physical deterioration and neglect tends to increase an offenders' perception that areas are vulnerable to crime and their actions will go unchallenged;
- the site's position is reasonably prominent and benefits from casual supervision passing shoppers and staff at nearby shops and kiosks;
- the shopping centre has a 24-hour security team and extensive CCTV, both of which will deter offenders;
- roller shutters secure the front and rear entrance doors to the retail units as well as the shopfronts; and,
- the existing, fencing and gates securing the service yard is effective if unsightly.

2.3.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder, and these include:

- the site is located in a neighbourhood with a high volume of crime;
- offenders, particularly those engaged in theft, robbery, criminal damage, and violent crimes are active in this neighbourhood;
- the town centre pedestrian routes experience high footfall during the day, less so at night. Such routes often can act as conduits for crime, with criminals identifying opportunities for crime and committing crime opportunities as they travel along them;
- the current absence of any significant residential development in the town centre leaves premises isolated in the evening and at night when activities and informal surveillance relating to office and retail uses subside; and,
- the nearby shops, takeaways and transport interchange attract offenders and generate crime. People and property on streets approaching crime hotspots are sometimes targeted by offenders coming and going from such places.

3 Development Appraisal

3.1 The proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development includes:

- the demolition of the existing retail and office building;
- provision of a landscape buffer between the site and the nearby Metrolink line;
- construction of a six-storey building containing of 81no. one- and two-bedroom apartments as well as three workplace/retail units (floorspace - 1 x 92m², and 2 x 88m²);

3.2 Positive aspects of the proposals

- 3.2.1 Wythenshawe Masterplan/Development Framework has been produced and used to guide the development of the wider town centre.
- 3.2.2 Wythenshawe Community Housing Group, WCHG, and Muse Places have a vested interest in raising the quality of development in the town centre.
- 3.2.3 A residential led development seems appropriate development is an appropriate use for the site given the surrounding land use.
- 3.2.4 Introducing residential uses into the town centre will bring additional activity and passive surveillance to town centre during the day and long into the evening.
- 3.2.5 Whilst limited car parking is available within the development, public transport and taxi ranks are located close-by.
- 3.2.6 The proposals result in the redevelopment of a site which, if it remains vacant, is very likely to attract anti-social behaviour, which may affect the quality of life of nearby residents and businesses, the security of their homes/premises and the appearance of the town centre.
- 3.2.7 The scheme design is of a very high quality, both visually and from a crime prevention perspective.
- 3.2.8 There are a significant number and mix of apartments within the development, which increases the likelihood of residents being from a broader age range. Such a mix increases the likelihood of some of the residents being present throughout the day. The presence of residents or even just visible signs of people present – cars in the car park, lights on in the apartments, external lighting on at entrance doors, for example - will help to deter offenders.
- 3.2.9 The proposed location of the principal, communal entrance door is appropriate, and secure lobbies can be created with the installation of access controls to the internal doors and/or lifts.
- 3.2.10 The elevated position of the apartments will result in a greater degree of privacy and security to residents without unduly compromising natural surveillance of the public realm.

3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the scheme

Public realm

- 3.3.1 The application of a high-quality treatment to the market ground and footpaths around the building are encouraged

Control entry into the building

- 3.3.2 The communal entrances and means of escape doors must be both security-rated and self-closing and lock upon closure. The communal entrance doors should be secured with an electrically operated, multi-point lock, activated with a programmable fob.
- 3.3.3 An audio-visual unit with a link to each apartment should be fitted at each of the front, communal, entrance doors, so that residents can vet callers prior to allowing access to *bona fide* visitors only.
- 3.3.4 To minimise the risk of offenders 'tail-gating' legitimate residents/visitors via the entrance doors, internal lobby doors should be installed and be fitted with fob-operated electronic locks. Alternatively, all lifts and stair core access doors should be fitted with access controls.
- 3.3.5 The communal entrance doors and means of escape doors should be particularly well lit.

3.3.6 Mail delivery

- 3.3.7 Secured by design accredited postal boxes should be located in the post room. The post room access doors should be FD-30 rated and fitted with Secured by Design approved access controls. The door should be self-closing and self-locking.

Apartment security

- 3.3.8 Each apartment should be fitted with a security-rated entrance door with door viewer and opening limiter.

Scooter and cycle stores

- 3.3.9 External cycle store entrance doors should be security-rated and fitted with fob-activated, electronic locks to both enter and exit. Internal doors should be FD30-rated and fitted with fob-activated, electronic locks to both enter and exit.
- 3.3.10 Sheffield stands should be securely anchored to the floor of the store to allow cyclists to secure the frame and wheels of their bikes.

Bin store

- 3.3.11 The external, bin store doors should be security-rated and fitted with fob-activated, electronic locks to both enter and exit. Internal doors should be FD30-rated and fitted with fob-activated, electronic locks to both enter and exit.

Signage

- 3.3.12 Signage on and around the buildings should display the development name and appropriate entrances for residents, visitors, and delivery staff.

Commercial units

- 3.3.13 For crime and security and residential amenity reasons, I would not support the introduction of late-night, commercial uses, such as take-aways or other licensed premises, into the ground floor commercial units.
- 3.3.14 Shopfronts should be fitted with laminate glazing and security-certified door sets. If roller shutters are fitted, they too should be security-rated.
- 3.3.15 External service or escape doors should be security-rated.
- 3.3.16 All commercial units should include provision for a CCTV system and an intruder alarm.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ The communal entrance doors should be:
 - compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2;
 - include a multi-point electronic lock, (which is an integral part of the certification), capable of being operated via an electronic access control system; and,
 - self-closing and lock automatically on closure.
 - ☐ An audio, and ideally visual, unit should be located at the main, communal, entrance door to allow visitors to communicate with residents. The secondary entrance door should be for the use of residents only.
 - ☐ Residents should have a handset in their apartment to speak to (and view) visitors arriving at the front entrance door.
 - ☐ Residents should be able to remotely operate the front, communal entry door's locking mechanism from within their apartments to allow bona fide visitors entry.
 - ☐ External doors to the cycle stores, bin stores, plant rooms, the means of escape, car park access, all apartment entrance doors must also be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2:
 - ☐ Apartment entrance doors must include a door viewer and chain, or similar opening limiter.
 - ☐ Each apartment should be clearly numbered.
- Commercial
- ☐ Entrance doors and service/escape doors should be compliant with, and certified to, LPS 1175 SR2.

4.2 Window frames and glazing

- ☐ Any opening, ground floor windows must be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, be fitted with key-operated locks, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limiting opening to 100mm.
- ☐ Glazing within ground floor windows/curtain walling, shopfronts and entrance doors must incorporate at least one pane of glass that complies with BS EN 356 P1A (laminated glass). The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.3 Intruder alarm

- ☐ It is good practice to fit an alarm to each apartment.
- ☐ Commercial units must be fitted with an intruder alarm, although it is understood that this is likely to be a tenant item and not necessarily installed upon completion of the building.

4.4 Landscaping

- ☐ The streetscape immediately adjacent to the development must be of a suitably high environmental quality to reflect the changing nature of the use of the site. A new design, which raises the quality of the streetscape at the market ground would be welcomed for the space would be welcomed.
- ☐ Measures to prevent unauthorised parking on the pavement or other spaces around the building should be installed.
- ☐ Signage on and around the building should display the development name and appropriate entrances for residents, visitors, and delivery staff.

4.5 Lighting

- ☐ External, dusk-to-dawn lighting must be provided all external doors.
- ☐ Lights should be operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor. Bollard and PIR security lighting are not recommended.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives.

5 Management & Maintenance

- ☐ A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address maintenance of the development.

6 Construction

- ☐ The developer should take appropriate measures to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in and out. The contractor on this scheme should be a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme and site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved.

7 Secured by Design (SBD)

- ☐ Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout, and construction stages of homes and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

8 Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
27.08.25	Will McCullough, Asteer Planning	Request for Crime Impact Statement
04.11.25		Site visit
28.11.25	Alysia Rigg, Shift PM	Report issued

A CIS Version History

Version	Date	Revisions
A	28.11.25	

B Glossary

Physical Security Standards

PAS 24

Enhanced security performance requirements for doorsets and windows in the UK. Doorsets and windows intended to offer a level of security suitable for dwellings and other buildings exposed to comparable risk. It is designed to mimic an attack by an opportunist burglar, using tools which are easy to conceal.

STS 201

Enhanced security to satisfy the requirements for certification of doorsets, equivalent to test standard to PAS 24.

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors, roller shutters, fences and barriers. Products are rated via the term Burglary Resistance (BR) and range from BR1 (lower security rating) to BR6 (higher security rating).

LPS 1175

Physical security for products manufactured for perimeter, façade, internal spaces and entrapment protection. The higher the security rating, the more formidable the security product.

Developed following extensive consultation with stakeholders, the most recent issue sees the previous single digit performance classifications (i.e. Security Ratings 1 to 8) extended to one formed of two elements that illustrate performance in terms of:

- Threat level (first element) – Letter (A to H) corresponding with the tool kit used to evaluate the product's intruder resistance and number of attackers involved.
- Delay (second element) – Numeric value (1, 3, 5, 10, 15 or 20) corresponding with the minimum delay (in minutes) provided by the product when placed in a locked condition.

BS EN 1627

European standard for the burglary resistance of pedestrian doorsets, windows, curtain walling, grilles and shutters. It defines six resistance classes, from RC1 to RC6, with RC1 being the lowest level of resistance and RC6 the highest. These classes indicate the level of resistance to forced entry, with higher classes requiring more time and specialized tools to breach.

BS EN 356

European standard that specifies the resistance of laminated glazing (i.e. two or more layers of glass bonded together with a plastic interlayer) to manual attacks, such as might occur during forced entry or vandalism. It classifies laminated glass into different resistance levels, ranging from P1A to P8B, with P1A being the lowest and P8B the highest.

Useful Websites

[Design For Security – Designing Out Crime](#) – apply for Crime Impact Statements or the Secured by Design Award from Greater Manchester Police

[Secured by Design - Secured by Design](#) – SBD Award Scheme, Design Guides and Member Companies

[ParkMark - Home](#) – Park Mark Safer Parking Award Scheme

[NBS Source](#) – find, select and specify building products (including security-certified products)

[RedBook Live - LPCB Red Book](#) – search for LPS 1175 certified products