CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Development of Adult Gaming Centre
60 Portland Street

For: RR Planning Ltd
Version B: 21/10/25
Reference: 2009/0439/CIS/01

designforsecurity

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GREATER MANCHESTER POLICE

60 Portland Street

URN: 2009/0439/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The development is modest in size and the re-use of vacant premises is welcomed.

There are no significant issues to address from a crime prevention perspective but, to improve the overall security of the premises, a number of recommendations are included, the main ones are summarised as follows:

- consider replacing the shop entrance door and means of escape doors with security-rated doors
- consider the installation of access controls (for night-time use) at the shop entrance door to allow staff to vet customers prior to releasing the door and allowing *bona fide* entry
- access controls should be employed to prevent entry to the staff area
- appropriate CCTV and alarm systems should be installed
- an operating policy should be developed

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police will support the application and are likely to recommend that a condition requiring the change of use to be implemented in accordance with the recommendations set out within this report be imposed.

David Maher *Dip Arch*
Consultant
[redacted]

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site is located on the corner of Portland St, Nicholas St and Rayner St to the rear. The premises are accessed from, Portland Street via an aluminium-framed glazed doors.

The premises are now vacant having previously been a NatWest bank.

There are three windows on the front elevation, two to the side elevation and none on the rear.

There is a door located on Nicholas St, providing access to the upper floor(s).

Portland St is a busy central road, both for vehicle and pedestrian traffic.

The site is located between two busy central districts, Chinatown to the northwest and the Gay Village to the southeast. Both neighbourhoods are popular desinations across the day and nighttime.

Rayner St to the rear is a single direction service road, a narrow dark street with no natural surveillance, large refuse bin and graffiti. This street has potential to instil a fear of crime.




1 – The site & existing building on Portland St.

2 – View south west along Portland St.

3 – View along Nicholas St.


4 – Existing building from Nicholas St.


5 – View north along Rayner St.

6 – View north along Rayner St.

7 – View north along Rayner St

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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Local Crime Summary

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st September 2024 to 31st August 2025.

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
32	165	306	2,634	894	285	59	149	25	71

2.1.1 The overall rate of crime over the past 12 months has been high for the Manchester division, which is to be expected given that the site is located within Manchester city centre where there is a high concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, as well as a large footfall which creates more opportunities for offenders.

2.1.2 Less serious wounding, theft and criminal damage have been the most recorded crime types taking place, and these offences have occurred all throughout the area surrounding the stie.

2.1.3 Less serious woundings offences have taken place throughout the local area, where assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the most recorded less serious woundings. The majority of incidents have occurred in the early hours of the morning and have involved disputes between both known and unknown associates with alcohol consumption often being a factor.

2.1.4 Whilst theft offences have also occurred throughout the local area, there has been a few large hotspots that have taken place at Piccadilly Gardens and Whitworth Street. Offenders have primarily targeted insecure items left on or under tables in bars and restaurants or benches in public spaces. Offenders have also used pickpocketing and distraction techniques in crowded areas to obtain items stored on the person such as mobile phones, purses and wallets.

2.1.5 In cases of criminal damage, offenders have targeted commercial properties by using bodily pressure and objects to damage the external doors and smash windows, which have mainly occurred during disputes. Offenders have also targeted vehicles on streets and within parking facilities by using implements to dent or scratch the bodywork and smash glazing.

2.2 General Risk Factors

2.2.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Robbery
- Theft of staff personal belongings
- Theft by employees
- Theft from customers
- Criminal damage to property
- Violence towards staff and customers
- Safety of children

2.3 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.3.1 **Offenders posing as legitimate customers gaining access to staff only areas in order to steal property**

To minimise the risk of offenders gaining access to staff only areas:

- access control systems should be considered to secure sensitive areas of the premises – e.g. staff rest rooms, management office and store rooms;
- staff should be required to wear an appropriate form of clearly visible ID and/or a company uniform;

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- all doors separating public areas, from staff only areas should be monitored by CCTV; and,
- small lockers should be provided for staff to secure their personal effects within a secure staff room.

2.3.2 Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- where possible external doors should be certified to PAS 24 or LPS 1175sr2 security standard or doors to have a solid core and fitted with British Standard marked locks;
- all external doors should be illuminated with dusk–to-dawn light. Light suggests a property may be occupied and may deter offenders from targeting a premise. Lighting will also support CCTV systems and highlight the actions of an offender, increasing the chance of a crime being witnessed; and,
- CCTV should be installed to record activity within and around exterior of the premises, particularly the entrance and escape doors.

2.3.3 Glazing in windows and doors has been smashed

To minimise the risk of breaking and entering via windows or to reduce the risk of criminal damage to glazing:

- glazing to doors and windows should include laminate glass, which is extremely difficult to break and penetrate sufficiently to reach in and unlock doors or windows or to create a hole large enough to climb through; and,
- window frames should be certified to the PAS 24 standard, fitted with key operated locks and opening restrictors, and shutters fixed to protect vulnerable areas of glazing.

2.3.4 Theft of personal property e.g. bags hung on chairs or stored under chairs

To minimise the risk of personal property theft:

- provide Chelsea clips or hooks under tables to allow customers to secure bags; and, use rounded backed chairs, which make it difficult on which to hang bags or jackets

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2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary (Leisure Facilities): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres, and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area.

GM Leisure Facilities Burglary – Day Range



GM Leisure Facilities Burglary – Time Range

GM Leisure Facilities Burglary – Point of Entry



2.4.1 Day/Time Range: During the week, the risk of burglary at leisure facilities in the Greater Manchester area peaks on Thursday/Friday and is slightly lower on Saturday. During the day, the risk of burglary peaks during the late afternoon/early evening and during the early hours of the morning. During the late afternoon/early evening, leisure facilities are often at their busiest, meaning offenders can take advantage of busy staff and anonymity among higher numbers of legitimate customers. Offenders often target commercial properties at night, when they are often closed (or operate with a reduced number of on-site staff), it is dark and the streets/areas in which they are typically located are quieter than during the day – meaning offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.

2.4.2 Point of Entry: The following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently by offenders targeting leisure facilities:

- Doors and windows have been forced open by offenders using bodily pressure and implements.
- The glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.
- Where the point of entry is 'legitimate' or 'unknown', this is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers to gain access to premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors, tailgating, or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas without being noticed.

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2.5 Theft (Leisure Facilities): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres, and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area.

GM Leisure Facilities Theft – Day Range



GM Leisure Facilities Theft – Time Range



2.5.1 Day/Time Range: During the week, the risk of theft at leisure facilities within the Greater Manchester area peaks on Tuesday but remains consistently high throughout the week. During the day, the risk of theft rises in the afternoon and peaks in the evening. This is when leisure facilities are typically at their busiest and the opportunities to offend are greater. Personal property belonging to staff and customers, such as mobile phones and cash, are the most routinely targeted items – taking place most often in changing/locker rooms and staff-only areas.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.6.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Saturday around midday (12:00-13:00) and just after midnight (00:00-01:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles at these times when they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, either whilst they are attending the city centre during the day, or at night when the owners are asleep, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

3.1.1 The development involves a change of use of the premises to an adult amusement centre. Games offered in the premises include slots and bingo.

3.1.2 The entrance on Portland Street will continue to be used. The means of servicing/escape door at the rear will also remain and be used as necessary.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The re-use of the property is welcomed. Properties that remain vacant for some months are often targeted by thieves and vandals. The resulting visible signs of decay can attract further abuse, which is then likely to affect the neighbouring and nearby properties.

3.2.2 The proposed use is in keeping with the uses in the town centre area.

3.2.3 The main entrance to the building is positioned on Portland Street where it is well overlooked.

3.2.4 Front-of-house customer areas and back-of-house staff-only area are well-defined.

3.2.5 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the dwellings, avoiding the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the developments are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

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3.3 Recommendations to improve security and safety at the premises

Doors

3.3.1 The external, timber, entrance/exit doors should have at least two-point locking to each door leaf.

3.3.2 Consideration should be given to upgrading the shop entrance door to one which complies with the LPS 1175sr 2 or PAS 24 security standards.

3.3.3 If the existing shop entrance door is retained, the glazing within the door frame should be laminated and there should be two locks fitted to the door, one of which may be a magnetic lock.

3.3.4 An intercom should be fitted at the shop entrance door so that staff can regulate customer entry should the need arise, for example late at night.

3.3.5 Consideration should be given to upgrading the means of escape doors to doors that are complaint with the LPS 1175sr 2 security standard.

3.3.6 Escape doors must not be used by staff or customers to leave the premises. Signage should warn customers not to approach the escape door other than in an n emergency. An alarm should sound if escape doors are opened.

Windows

3.3.7 If the glazing in the windows is to be replaced, consider installing laminate glass.

Staff area

3.3.8 The staff area door should be particularly secure as the safe, CCTV monitoring equipment, and staff personal belongings are likely to be in this room. Ideally, the door should be security-rated, or be a 44mm, solid-core door, fitted with three/four hinges with hinge bolts, a viewer and at least one key operated BS 3621 or BS 8621 lock, preferably two locks. The door should be self-closing and lock upon closure.

3.3.9 In terms of cash storage, consideration should be given to utilise a system of day safe, time lock safe and deposit safe to reduce the risk of cash loss in the event of a robbery or burglary.

3.3.10 Space should be available in the staff area for members of staff to store their belongings securely.

CCTV system

3.3.11 A comprehensive CCTV system should be installed, with cameras located appropriately throughout the premises capable of monitoring activity at all external doors, the entrance lobby, the gaming floor and the staff area. Cameras should be actively monitored at an appropriate monitoring centre.

Alarm systems

3.3.12 A monitored intruder alarm should be installed.

3.3.13 A monitored and reactive, lone worker alarm system should be installed.

Cash-in-transit service

3.3.14 The operator should have a contracted cash-in-transit service for cash collection and coin delivery.

Means of escape

3.3.15 The means of escape route from the rear of the premises must be kept clear to ensure that the escape door can open freely and to avoid obstructing pedestrians making their escape.

Security of customer belongings

3.3.16 To reduce the risk of theft of customer belongings, 'Chelsea Clips', Grippa™ clips, or simple hooks should be fitted to the underside of stools or to the side of machines to allow customers to secure bags or jackets while keeping close-by and in view.

Operating policy

3.3.17 An 'operating policy' should be drawn up, which includes measures for the premises not being open 24/7. The policy should include:

- A procedure for making the premises secure after customers have left so that counting and securing the takings can be carried out in a secure environment.

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- A procedure for safe transfer of cash by cash-in-transit contactors.
- A procedure for staff leaving and securing the premises, so that staff safety is not compromised.
- Staff security training
- A procedure for CCTV cameras - monitoring and recording facilities, and their locations.
- Fire safety, including clearing designated escape routes, clear of all obstacles.
- Designating and managing a smoking area.
- Noise management; and,
- Servicing and waste management (in a secure location) arrangements.

3.4 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.4.1 Premises in the town centre area are frequently the scenes of assaults both between patrons, and additionally, staff have been targeted by patrons. It is highly recommended that the premises is covered by a comprehensive CCTV system which covers the internal areas of the development in addition to any external cameras proposed, to deter unwanted behaviour and that any incidents are recorded and used as evidence. CCTV recording equipment should be located in the staff room.

3.4.2 Access to staff areas should be restricted to staff. It is recommended that doors into areas restricted to staff operate on an access control system (i.e. fob or swipe card) or that they are lockable by key, a door closer should be installed to ensure the door locks as staff enter/leave this area. Signage should indicate which areas are only for members of staff.

3.4.3 Lockers should be provided for staff to securely store their property whilst at work.

3.4.4 Any cash offices/key stores should have solid masonry walls, no adjacent false/suspended ceilings and a security-certified doorset (see above). The doors/frames to all other internal areas, offices, meeting rooms, general stores etc. should be robust/solid-core (minimum 44mm thick) and capable of being secured when unoccupied. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

3.4.5 A panic alarm should be installed. Panic buttons should be fitted under the till points and in the management office so that staff can alert other staff members that assistance is required.

3.4.6 Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

3.4.7 All high value equipment within communal areas (e.g. computers, televisions, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

3.4.8 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left in the street for extended periods/overnight. Servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods.

3.4.9 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

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4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation in addition to the layout issues highlighted within Section 3.3.

4.1 Doors and shutters

- ☐ If the shop's internal entrance door or the escape doors are replaced, the new doors should be certified to LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ The external, timber doors should have at least two-point locking to each door leaf.
- ☐ If roller shutters are fitted to secure external openings at the rear of the premises, or to secure internal doors, they should meet the LPS 1175 sr2 standard.

4.2 Glazing

- ☐ Any new glazing within the shop's internal entrance door, or within the windows on the Portland Street elevation, should incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356.

4.3 Access control

- ☐ An access control system should be installed at the internal entrance door to allow staff to vet customers prior to allowing entry into the centre.

4.4 Lighting and CCTV

- ☐ Dusk-to-dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to the rear escape doors. Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ The CCTV system should include cameras capable of producing clear, evidential quality images of: individuals as they enter the premises; all areas of the shop floor; and, the front and rear doors.

4.5 Intruder alarm

- ☐ The intruder alarm should be installed with contacts on all external doors and any shutters, and with PIR detectors covering the shop floor. It is recommended that the alarm system is monitored, with a response facility.

4.6 Lone worker alarm

- ☐ The lone worker alarm system should be installed. The system should be capable of allowing the alarm receiving centre to intervene via live CCTV footage and two-way audio communication with staff and customers on the shop floor. Staff should carry a portable alarm activator, and the staff area should have a static, alarm activator installed.

5 Management & Maintenance

- ☐ A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
  - Graffiti and litter removal from the immediate environment around the premises.
  - Repair to alarms, lighting, signage, access controls and CCTV.

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6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. Please see Secured by Design - Secured by Design for more information. To apply for the SBD Award for your development in Greater Manchester, please visit Apply for Secured by Design – Design For Security.

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A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
04/07/25	RR Planning Ltd	CIS Application
28/08/25	RR Planning Ltd	CIS Confirmation
09/10/25	DfS	Site Visit
29/08/25	Client	Invoice paid
06/10/25	DfS	CIS Rev A Issued
21/10/25	DfS	CIS Rev B Issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	Location Plan (1-500 @ A3)	22/08/25	
	Manchester, Portland St - Site Plan (1-1250 @ A3)	22/08/25	
	Manchester, 60 Portland St (New) - Proposed Ground GA	22/08/25	
	Manchester, 60 Portland St (New) - Elevation - rev D (A1)	28/08/25	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Date	Revisions
A	14/09/2025	
B	21/10/25	Minor text amendment to item 3.4.1

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D Glossary

Physical Security Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999
General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012
General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)
Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)
Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012
Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011
Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT
Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS
Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT
Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB / PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)
A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)
A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)
The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security
www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org
CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk

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