



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Erection of extra care apartments (Use Class C2) older living apartments, and dwellinghouses (Use Class C3), car and cycle parking, landscaping and other associated works following demolition of existing buildings

AT **BROTHERTON HOUSE, CORNFIELD DRIVE, WYTHENSHAW, MANCHESTER**

For: ^{1.1.2}Muse Places and Wythenshawe Community Housing Group

Version A: 28.11.25

2009/1233/CIS/01

design**for**security

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported

We welcome the continuing investment in central Wythenshawe and support redevelopment of this site for residential purposes.

From a crime prevention perspective, the positive features of the development include: the scheme design is of a high quality; there will be an appropriate balance in the mix of housing and the orientation of accommodation, focusing activity on appropriate areas of the site and surroundings; and, secure car and cycle parking facilities have been included.

Advice is included in the report, which we consider will enhance security of the development and this set out in sections 3.3 and 4. The principal recommendations relate to securing the buildings appropriately and encouraging high quality in the private and public realm to stimulate activity and supervision of the spaces around the development.

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will support the application and make representations to Manchester Planning to require the inclusion of a condition requiring the completed development to achieve Secured by Design, SBD, accreditation. Should the recommendations included in this report be adopted, I have every confidence that the scheme will achieve the award, and the condition met.

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Contents

1	The Site and Surroundings.....	4
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	5
2.1	Crime in the neighbourhood around the site	
2.2	Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester, Greater Manchester and England & Wales	
2.3	Typical modus operandi used in committing burglary, theft, criminal damage, and vehicle related crimes in Manchester, & measures to reduce vulnerabilities	
2.4	Environmental features of the site and surroundings that may influence crime patterns	
3	Development Appraisal	9
3.1	The proposed development	
3.2	Positive aspects of the proposals	
3.3	Recommendations to improve the security of the scheme	
4	Physical Security	12
4.1	Doors	
4.2	Window frames	
4.3	Glazing	
4.4	Intruder alarm	
4.5	Boundary fencing and gates	
4.6	Lighting	
4.7	Meter cupboards	
4.8	Downpipes	
5	Management & Maintenance	14
6	Construction	14
7	Secured by Design (SBD)	14

Appendix

A	Contact Register	14
B	CIS Version History	14
C	Glossary	15

1 The Site and Surroundings

The photographs and plan, below, show the development site and its surroundings. The 1.7641-hectare site, edged in red on the plan, is located on the north-western side of Cornfield Drive on the western fringe of Wythenshawe Civic Centre. Cornfield Drive is a narrow, local feeder road that connects the modern, Scholars Field housing development, to north of the site, with Poundswick Lane, a well-trafficked street that skirts the northern edge of the town centre, to the south-east. There is a 20mph speed limit on Cornfield Drive and, although there are some parking restrictions at its south-eastern end, the road is congested with parked cars on its north-eastern side; the road is not sufficiently wide to allow parking on both sides of the road and maintain traffic flow. The street-parking is likely to be the cars of staff and customers of town centre businesses/facilities avoiding charges imposed on town centre car parks. On the opposite side of Cornfield Drive from the site there is a small enclave of social housing - a mix of houses, cottage flats and purpose-built, retirement accommodation (Frank Price Court), all set-out within well-maintained, landscaped grounds with a largely, open-plan layout. Manchester Enterprise Academy is situated to the west of the site. It is a large secondary school with extensive grounds that include a floodlit artificial grass pitch located immediately west of the site. Wythenshawe Police Station stands at the junction of Poundswick Lane and Simonsway south of the site.

Looking northwest towards the site from the southern side of Poundswick Lane



The gatehouse and Brotherton House seen from the entrance to the site on Cornfield Drive



Red-brick office and computer buildings and a substantial car park currently occupy the site



The site's southern boundary and Poundswick Lane with the Police Station on the right opposite



Manchester Enterprise Academy lies to the west of the site



Frank Price Court, a sheltered housing scheme, lies opposite the site on eastern side of Cornfield Drive



The pentagonal-shaped application site, known as Brotherton House, is enclosed with wire mesh fencing supplemented by mature, dense hedges, which effectively screen views into the site from the street. There have been several minor breaches of the boundary. On the site, set within generous landscaped grounds, there are a number of buildings associated with its former use as a Lloyds Bank computer centre, these include a four-storey, office building linked to a single-storey, windowless building (the computer centre), what seems to be a caretaker's house that overlooks the site entrance, and a security lodge. There is also a large car park and service yard. Entry to the site is gained from Cornfield Drive where, together with staff in the security lodge tall, steel gates control access in and out. The buildings have become vacant in recent years.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood around the site

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st October 2024 to 30th September 2025.

All crime within 500m of the site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Use, or threat, of violence	Theft including shoplifting	Robbery	Drug offences	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
8	9	79	551	134	23	57	10	8	5

2.1.1 There were 878 recorded crimes in the neighbourhood around the development site during the period analysed.

2.1.2 The most common crimes recorded were:



- Crimes involving the use, or threat, of violence - 62%
- Theft (including bicycle theft, robbery, and shoplifting) - 16%
- Criminal damage - 9%
- Drug offences – 6%
- Robbery – 3%
- Vehicle crime - 2%
- Burglary of dwellings and other property - 2%.

2.1.3 This number of offences is more than twice that recorded in a typical neighbourhood within Manchester. This is not unusual where there is a concentration of retail and leisure uses, public houses, take-away premises, schools, a transport hub and car parks, all frequented by a high volume of people.

2.1.4 The town centre's commercial premises, often the larger retail stores, the Interchange, Police Station, schools and the Forum were hotspots of crime. Violent incidents, criminal damage and shoplifting were most common, not unusual in a busy town centre. There was one incident of burglary at Brotherton House. Offenders entered the site by unknown means and targeted metals, principally copper cable.

Domestic Burglary

2.1.5 There were just 8 incidents of domestic burglary. There were no streets targeted more than once; Rowlandsway was a slight hotspot for burglary.





2.1.6 Though rare, burglaries tended to occur on Thursday and Friday and at night or in the evening.

2.1.7 In six of the eight incidents the means of entry was unknown. In such cases the offender gains entry via an unlocked door or window. A door was forced on one occasion and on another, the offender forced entry into the garden shed.



Vehicle crime

2.1.8 There were 18 incidents of vehicle-related crime. This is a very low number given the edge of town centre location and the presence of several large car parks. The rate is significantly lower than elsewhere in the City. Offences were more commonly committed at the weekend and in the afternoon





- 2.1.9 The risk of vehicle crime peaks on Sunday around in the afternoon (12:00-14:00 and 16:00-17:00). These times coincide with when the owners are likely to be eating lunch or dinner, leaving their vehicles unattended and out of sight, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

2.2 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester, Greater Manchester and England & Wales



- 2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **75% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **68% lower** than Greater Manchester and **67% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.2.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **9% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **49% higher** than Greater Manchester and **185% higher** than England & Wales.



- 2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **14% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **49% higher** than Greater Manchester and **81% higher** than England & Wales.

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- 2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **64% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **41% lower** than Greater Manchester and **29% lower** than England & Wales.

2.3 Typical modus operandi used in committing burglary, theft, criminal damage, and vehicle related crimes in Manchester, & measures to reduce vulnerabilities

2.3.1 Doors have been targeted when left insecure

To minimise the risk of 'walk-in' burglaries:

- front doors to houses should be fitted with a fixed handle or a 'split spindle', so that the only way in is with a key;
- communal entrance doors to apartments should be self-closing and lock automatically upon closing;
- where this can be balanced with the design of a development and its ability to fit the context of the local area, defensible space should be provided between dwellings and the 'street', i.e., a small front garden enclosed with a suitably high fence. Separation of the passing public from a property can also help to reduce the risk of criminal damage; and,
- dusk-to-dawn lighting should be fitted to all external doors.

2.3.2 Doors have been forced open with tools and bodily pressure

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all external doors should be certified to PAS 24 security standard;
- front doors should be visible to neighbouring properties and from the 'street' rather than set within recesses or on more secluded elevations;
- side or rear gardens should be enclosed with appropriately high fencing and locking gates so that rear doors are only accessible to residents; and,
- secluded passageways to the sides and rear of properties should be avoided wherever possible as such routes can facilitate offender access to rear gardens, as well as attract anti-social behaviours such as graffiti, fly-tipping, and damage to fencing.

2.3.3 Glazing in doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry or commit criminal damage

To minimise the risk of offender smashing glazing in doors and windows:

- laminate glass should be fitted to all external doors and to all windows on the ground floor of the development;
- windows should be fitted with locks and opening restrictors; and,
- access to gardens and private amenity space should be restricted by installing high fencing and locking gates.

2.3.4 Vehicles were targeted when parked on driveways, in unsecured car parks or on the 'street'

To minimise the risk of vehicle-related crime:

- car parking should be located within the boundaries of the property, within an area that is both very secure and well overlooked by residents or monitored by an effective CCTV system. Consideration should be given to installing automatic vehicle gates and fencing around car parks.

2.3.5 Offenders have stolen bicycles

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting bicycles:

- cycle stores should be provided within a secure part of the site;
- rear garden gates should be robust, tall, self-closing and self-locking;

- CCTV should monitor activity in and around communal cycle stores; and,
- PIR lighting should be installed to illuminate the cycle stores.

2.3.6 Offenders have damaged boundary fencing

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting fencing:

- rear garden boundaries should avoid being exposed to the public realm;
- communal pathways providing access to rear gardens should be secured with self-closing, self-locking gates; and,
- fencing should be especially robust when unavoidably exposed to the public realm.

2.3.7 Theft of plant and machinery, and criminal damage during the construction period.

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting the construction site:

- a secure hoarding should be erected around the site with access restricted to contractors and authorised visitors;
- security staff should patrol the site or visit during non-working hours;
- lighting and CCTV should be installed to illuminate the site and record activity; and,
- plant and machinery should be fitted with tracking devices, and, at the end of the working day, it should be arranged to prevent forced access onto the site and to minimise the risk of theft.

2.4 Environmental features of the site and surroundings that may influence crime patterns

2.4.1 Features of the physical environment can influence patterns criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect a potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether or not to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?
- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

2.4.2 Features of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder at the site are as follows:

- the rate of burglary is much lower than it is elsewhere in Manchester;
- the neighbourhood is improving – environmental standards are also improving. Places where there are clear signs of physical deterioration and neglect tends to increase an offenders' perception that areas are vulnerable to crime and their actions will go unchallenged;
- the site's Simonsway and Poundswick Lane boundaries are prominent, benefitting from casual supervision by occupants of passing vehicles and passing pedestrians;
- Wythenshawe Police Station is opposite the site, which may deter some offenders from acting;
- windows on the Manchester Enterprise Academy and neighbouring houses as well as activity related to the town centre car parks facilitate surveillance over the site;
- the presence of contractors on the site will deter offenders; and,
- the existing, hedges, gates and fencing around the site provides a secure boundary, particularly the boundary to the school and adjacent housing to the north.

2.4.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder, and these include:

- the site is located in a neighbourhood with a high volume of crime;
- offenders, particularly those engaged in theft, robbery, criminal damage, and violent crimes are active in this neighbourhood;
- the site is located on Simonsway and Poundswick Lane, both well-trafficked routes. Such routes often can act as conduits for crime, with criminals identifying opportunities for crime and committing crime opportunities as they travel along them; and,
- the nearby public house, shops, takeaways and transport interchange attract offenders and generate crime. People and property on streets approaching crime hotspots are sometimes targeted by offenders coming and going from such places.

3 Development Appraisal

3.1 The proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development includes:

- the clearance of the buildings and structures standing on the site;
- retention of selected, peripheral hedges and trees;
- construction of 25no. two- and four-bedroom houses, set out in three terraces occupying the eastern fringe of the site, with two and three storey properties all facing Cornfield Drive and with 100% car parking to the side or rear of the terraces;
- construction of a five-storey, U-shaped, 109-room, dementia/extra care block with to be sited on the southern part of the site, with 35 parking bays to the front ;
- at the northern part of the site, construction of a part four-, part five-storey, residential building containing 82 older-living apartments, with 30 parking bays to the side;
- construction of an access road, a cul-de-sac, off Cornfield Drive in a similar location to the current site access; and,
- landscaping and public realm works – including the provision of securely-gated gardens for the apartment block and extra-care block, as well as a community garden, which will be available to be accessed to all residents.

3.2 Positive aspects of the proposals

- 3.2.1 Whilst not obvious from visiting the site or analysing crime data, vacant sites often attract anti-social behaviour in the form of theft, fly-tipping, fire raising or graffiti. The redevelopment of the site will restrict the ability for such activities to take place.
- 3.2.2 The proposed development will result in the re-purposing of a vacant site at the heart of Wythenshawe.
- 3.2.3 A mixed-residential development is an appropriate use for the site in the context of the surrounding land uses.
- 3.2.4 The proposed buildings are of a good design quality and will positively contribute to the environmental quality of Wythenshawe. Well-designed developments tend to experience much less crime or anti-social issues than those which are ill-considered or poorly designed.
- 3.2.5 Wythenshawe Community Housing Group are experienced in developing and managing good quality, residential schemes and, along with Muse Places, are driving the regeneration of Wythenshawe.
- 3.2.6 The presence of staff in the extra care building will deter offenders as well as providing residents with a convenient contact through which to report any management or maintenance issues.
- 3.2.7 The main entrances to the houses, extra care and apartment buildings will be readily visible to residents and visitors.
- 3.2.8 Controls can be installed at internal and external doors and gates of the extra care building to restrict access to staff, residents and bona fide visitors.
- 3.2.9 The houses, extra care and apartment buildings are orientated and designed in such a way that windows will provide excellent opportunities for passive surveillance of the private and public realm.

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- 3.2.10 The provision of convenient, off-street parking reduces the risk of vehicles being targeted by offenders. The number of spaces seems adequate.
- 3.2.11 Outdoor amenity spaces are included within the development. Communal spaces, in particular, can help build relationships between residents of the development and develop 'social capital'. Socially cohesive developments tend to be less attractive to offenders as residents are more likely to challenge strangers or intervene where inappropriate behaviour is witnessed.
- 3.2.12 The landscaping of the gardens and the grounds will support the quality of the local environment. Well-maintained verdant environments tend to attract less crime and anti-social behaviour.
- 3.2.13 There will be a reasonable number of apartments within that building, which increases the likelihood of some of the residents being present throughout the day. The presence of residents or even just visible signs of people being present - cars in the car park, lights on in apartments, bright lighting at the entrance doors, for example - will help to deter offenders.
- 3.2.14 'Defensible space' is included to the front, sides and rear of each house/building.
- 3.2.15 Secure refuse, cycle and buggy stores will be provided.

3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the scheme

Deterring unwanted visitors

- 3.3.1 To distinguish between public and private space, and to help preserve residents' privacy as well as reducing the risk of crime and anti-social behaviour affecting the development, the edges of the site should be defined with appropriately-styled hedging, fencing, signage, and surface treatment to the access road and car parking. We recommend the following:
- signs indicating the name of the apartment and extra care buildings should be mounted at each communal entrance;
 - signs indicating the private nature of the car parks should be mounted at the development entrance;
 - car parks and the approach to the main entrance doors of the apartments and extra care buildings should be surfaced with a coloured or textured surface that distinguishes it from the public highway and public pathways;
 - a symbolic entrance feature, such as gate posts but not necessarily gates, should be installed at the vehicle entrance to the development to communicate to drivers and passers-by the private nature of the development;
 - high fencing/walls/railings/hedges and gates should enclose private and communal gardens, and low fencing/walls/railings/hedges should define front gardens
 - low-intensity, dusk-to-dawn, lighting should illuminate all external doors and car parking; and,
 - PIR activated lighting should illuminate bin store and bike stores.

Houses

Front gardens

- 3.3.2 Front gardens should be defined with 900mm high hedges, railings, or dwarf wall with railing infill.

Rear garden fencing and gates

- 3.3.3 Rear garden gates should include a lock that can be operated from either side of the gate to allow, for example, drivers and cyclists to enter and leave without compromising the security of the property. Ideally, the gates should be self-closing and self-locking.
- 3.3.4 Rear gardens should be secured with 1800-2100mm high fencing.
- 3.3.5 Fencing between neighbouring houses should include an 1800mm high, close-boarded fencing panel (acting as a privacy screen, generally erected perpendicular to the back of the house, it may then be lowered to 1200mm or 1500mm of close-boarded fencing with 600mm or 300mm sections of trellis to create a secure boundary whilst also allowing neighbours to interact.

House security

- 3.3.6 Each house should be fitted with a security-rated entrance door, with number, door viewer and opening limiter. French doors should also be security-rated.
- 3.3.7 The ground floor windows of each house should be security-rated, fitted with key-operable locks, and have opening restrictors fitted. Glazing in all external doors and all accessible windows should include laminate glass.
- 3.3.8 Fit an intruder alarm, or a fuse spur to allow residents to install an alarm system.
- 3.3.9 Install a dusk-to-dawn light at the front and rear doors.

Cycle stores

- 3.3.10 A cycle storage sheds/box should be installed in the rear garden of each house. The shed/box should be fitted with a Sold Secure™, ground anchor, a Sold Secure™ hasp and staple, and a Sold Secure™ padlock.

Apartments

Communal entrance doors

- 3.3.11 The communal entrance door should be security-rated and fitted with an audio unit that allows visitors to communicate with residents prior to entry. Residents should be able to release the lock on the entrance door from within their apartment to allow *bona fide* visitors entry.

Apartment security

- 3.3.12 Each apartment should be fitted with a security-rated entrance door with door viewer and opening limiter.
- 3.3.13 Windows should be security-rated, fitted with key-operable locks, and have opening restrictors fitted. Glazing in all external doors and all accessible windows should include laminate glass.

Mail delivery

- 3.3.14 Ideally, to reduce the need for regular access by delivery staff, mail should be delivered 'through the external wall' into boxes in the lobby or into robust boxes secured to the wall adjacent to communal entrance doors.

Cycle storage

- 3.3.15 The entrance doors/gates to a cycle store should be fitted with a fob-activated, electronic lock (or good quality digital lock) and be self-closing/locking.

Controlling entry into the building

- 3.3.16 The front and rear, communal entrances, means of escape exit, and the external entrances to the bike store, refuse store and plant room should be fitted with security-certified doors that are self-closing and lock upon closure. The doors should be fitted with an electronic lock that is operated with a programmable fob. In addition, so that residents can identify visitors, the front and rear, entrance doors should be fitted with a clear glass pane or a door viewer.
- 3.3.17 An audio-visual unit should be installed at the main entrance door, with a link to each apartment, so that residents can vet callers prior to allowing entry to bona fide visitors only.
- 3.3.18 All visitors arriving at the rear of the building should be directed to the front entrance.
- 3.3.19 The internal doors to the plant room, bike store, refuse store, and the front and rear lobby, internal doors should be fitted with electronic locks operable by a programmable fob. These doors should all be self-closing and lock securely upon closure.

Intruder alarm and CCTV

- 3.3.20 Consider installing an intruder alarm to each apartment, particularly those on the ground floor.
- 3.3.21 Consider installing a modest CCTV system, with cameras capable of monitoring the communal entrance doors and entrance lobbies, bike/scooter stores, refuse store external doors, means of escape doors and the car park. Images should be recorded and securely stored and thereafter retained for 30 days for review and for use as evidence in any prosecutions arising.

Mail delivery

- 3.3.22 A through-the-wall post system, with mail dropping into secure boxes at the front, communal entrance door, or secure boxes mounted on the wall next to the front entrance door is preferred.
- 3.3.23 A secure, parcel storage system should also be installed in the front lobby.

Extra care

Controlling entry into the building

- 3.3.24 All external doors should be fitted with security-certified doors that are self-closing and lock upon closure. With the exception of the means of escape door, all external doors should be fitted with an electronic lock that is operated with a programmable fob. In addition, so that residents can identify visitors, the front entrance door should be fitted with a clear glass pane or a door viewer.
- 3.3.25 An audio-visual unit should be installed at the front entrance door, with a link to the staff office and to each apartment, so that staff and residents can vet callers prior to allowing entry to bona fide visitors only.
- 3.3.26 The internal doors to the plant room, bin store, and the front lobby internal doors should be fitted with electronic locks operated by a programmable fob. These doors should all be self-closing and lock securely upon closure.

Apartment security

- 3.3.27 Each apartment entrance door should be security-rated, and fitted with an apartment number, a door viewer.
- 3.3.28 All ground floor windows should be security-rated, fitted with a key-operable lock, and have opening restrictors fitted.
- 3.3.29 Laminate glazing should be installed in all ground floor windows and within, or surrounding, entrance and means of escape doors.

CCTV

- 3.3.30 Consider installing a modest CCTV system, with cameras capable of monitoring all external doors, the entrance lobby, and the car park. Images should be recorded and securely stored and retained for 30 days for review and for use as evidence in any prosecutions arising.

Mail delivery

- 3.3.31 Mail should be delivered to a staffed reception.

4 Physical Security

4.1 Doors

Houses

- ☐ All external doors must all be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS 202 BR2, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ The front doors should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key when closed.
- ☐ The front entrance doors should have fixed, clear-glazed sidelights or a door viewer, as well as an opening limiter fitted, so that residents can identify visitors prior to opening the door fully.
- ☐ Letter plates should meet the Door Hardware Federation's Technical Standard 008 (TS 008), be fitted with deflector plate, and be located a minimum of 400mm away from the internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Each house should be clearly numbered with the number visible from the 'street'.

Apartments and extra care

- ☐ The communal entrance doors should be:
 - compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2;

- include a multi-point electronic lock, (which is an integral part of the certification), capable of being operated via an electronic access control system; and,
- self-closing and lock automatically on closure.

- ☐ An audio-visual, unit should be located at the communal entrance doors to allow visitors to communicate with staff or apartment building residents.
- ☐ Residents of apartments should have a handset in their apartment to speak to (and view) visitors.
- ☐ Prior to entry, staff of the extra care should be able to communicate with visitors arriving at the entrance door
- ☐ Staff and residents of the apartments should be able to operate the relevant communal entry door locking mechanism remotely from within their apartment to allow *bona fide* visitors entry.
- ☐ Individual apartment entrance doors must be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must include a door viewer and apartment number.
- ☐ Chain limiters to apartment entrance doors are recommended.

4.2 Window frames

- ☐ Ground floor windows of the houses and apartments should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, be fitted with key-operated locks, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limiting opening to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing within, and surrounding, all external doors and all ground floor windows of the houses, apartments and garages should incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356.

4.4 Intruder alarm

- ☐ It is good practice to fit an alarm to each house and apartment. Alarms should be linked to contacts on all external doors, with PIR detectors covering all ground floor rooms that have windows. In the absence of an alarm a 13amp fuse spur should be provided to allow future residents to fit their own alarm.

4.5 Boundary fencing and gates

- ☐ Where appropriate, front gardens should be defined with 900mm high hedges, railings, or dwarf wall with railing infill.
- ☐ Rear garden gates should be a minimum of 1800mm high and include a lock that can be operated from either side of the gate. The gates should be self-closing and self-locking.
- ☐ Fencing between neighbouring houses should include an 1800mm high, close-boarded, privacy panel. Fencing may then be lowered to include panels of 1200mm or 1500mm high, close-boarded fencing, finished with 600mm or 300mm sections of trellis.

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk-to-dawn, LED lighting must be provided to illuminate the rear garden gates of the houses.
- ☐ Dusk-to-dawn lighting must be provided to all external front and rear doors of all houses.
- ☐ Dusk-to-dawn lighting must be provided to the apartment building communal entrance doors.
- ☐ Lighting must be provided to the cycle store entrance doors and within the store.
- ☐ Lamps should produce a 'white' light and be operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor.
- ☐ PIR lighting is only suitable for the apartment residents' cycle and bin stores.

4.7 Meter cupboards

- ☐ Unless smart meters are installed, meters should be located in ground level boxes to the front of each house, not with the secure area at the side or rear.

4.8 Downpipes

- ☐ Wherever possible, downpipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the brickwork to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.

5 Management & Maintenance

- ☐ A plan should be drawn up to address maintenance issues associated the communal areas of the apartment building and landscaped fringes of the site.

6 Construction

- ☐ The developer should take appropriate measures to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in and out.
- ☐ Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved.

7 Secured by Design (SBD)

- ☐ Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout, and construction stages of homes and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact	Summary of Contact
29.08.25	Will McCullough, Asteer Planning	Request for Crime Impact Statement
04.11.25		Site visit
28.11.25	Alysia Rigg, Shift PM	Report issued

B CIS Version History

Version	Date	Revisions
A	28.11.25	

C Glossary

Physical Security Standards

PAS 24

Enhanced security performance requirements for doorsets and windows in the UK. Doorsets and windows intended to offer a level of security suitable for dwellings and other buildings exposed to comparable risk. It is designed to mimic an attack by an opportunist burglar, using tools which are easy to conceal.

STS 201

Enhanced security to satisfy the requirements for certification of doorsets, equivalent to test standard to PAS 24.

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors, roller shutters, fences and barriers. Products are rated via the term Burglary Resistance (BR) and range from BR1 (lower security rating) to BR6 (higher security rating).

LPS 1175

Physical security for products manufactured for perimeter, façade, internal spaces and entrapment protection. The higher the security rating, the more formidable the security product.

Developed following extensive consultation with stakeholders, the most recent issue sees the previous single digit performance classifications (i.e. Security Ratings 1 to 8) extended to one formed of two elements that illustrate performance in terms of:

- Threat level (first element) – Letter (A to H) corresponding with the tool kit used to evaluate the product's intruder resistance and number of attackers involved.
- Delay (second element) – Numeric value (1, 3, 5, 10, 15 or 20) corresponding with the minimum delay (in minutes) provided by the product when placed in a locked condition.

BS EN 1627

European standard for the burglary resistance of pedestrian doorsets, windows, curtain walling, grilles and shutters. It defines six resistance classes, from RC1 to RC6, with RC1 being the lowest level of resistance and RC6 the highest. These classes indicate the level of resistance to forced entry, with higher classes requiring more time and specialized tools to breach.

BS EN 356

European standard that specifies the resistance of laminated glazing (i.e. two or more layers of glass bonded together with a plastic interlayer) to manual attacks, such as might occur during forced entry or vandalism. It classifies laminated glass into different resistance levels, ranging from P1A to P8B, with P1A being the lowest and P8B the highest.

Useful Websites

[Design For Security – Designing Out Crime](#) – apply for Crime Impact Statements or the Secured by Design Award from Greater Manchester Police

[Secured by Design - Secured by Design](#) – SBD Award Scheme, Design Guides and Member Companies

[ParkMark - Home](#) – Park Mark Safer Parking Award Scheme

[NBS Source](#) – find, select and specify building products (including security-certified products)

[RedBook Live - LPCB Red Book](#) – search for LPS 1175 certified products