

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

48 Store Street, Manchester

73 No. Apartments

FOR: Piccadilly Wharf Ltd

VERSION B: 3rd November 2025

REFERENCE: 2021/0139/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

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CPT
CRIME PREVENTION TEAM

48 Store Street, Manchester

2021/0139/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recommendations made

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The following areas have been identified as a concern and should be addressed (see section 3.3 for more details).

- Vehicle/pedestrian gates to the yard should operate on an access control system.
- Access control into/around the building and external areas.
- Physical security of the building.

Additionally, there are a number of recommendations made in section 3.3 of this report which would enhance the security of the development, and it is highly recommended that these are considered. It is also recommended that the development is built to Secured by Design standards.



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
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1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located on the periphery of Manchester city centre, close to Piccadilly railway station, the Northern Quarter, and Great Ancoats Street.

The site itself is roughly rectangular and it is bound to the by Store Street, to the East the site is bound by an adjacent apartment (at a higher level), to the South the site is bound by the rear of an apartment development located off Chapeltown Street, and to the West the site is bound by a vacant industrial estate.

The local area is typically residential, with a number of industrial/commercial uses. Opposite the site on Store Street is a large low-rise apartment building - Wharf Close Apartments. There has been some graffiti in the local area (see photographs opposite) but not on residential buildings.













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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

Crime Summary *The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st August 2024 to 31st July 2025.*

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
20	71	211	1,484	579	173	45	241	27	57

2.1.1 In the last 12 months, the volume of crime in the local area has been extremely high – with the most prevalent types of crime being violence, theft, vehicle crime, criminal damage and robbery. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues. The majority of recorded incidents of less serious wounding, theft, robbery and criminal damage are concentrated around Piccadilly Gardens, the Northern Quarter, Canal Street and Piccadilly Station and incidents of vehicle crime are concentrated where there are public car parks around the city centre.

2.1.2 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed food hall development, the more detailed analysis below will look at use-specific burglary and theft and local vehicle crime.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 Theft of parcels from accessible areas

Possible Solution – A secure parcel store should be provided for residents within the ground floor lobby area, accessible by fob and covered by CCTV.

2.2.2 Forcing open secure doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to apartments

Possible Solution - All apartment entrance doorsets should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (i.e. BS PAS 24).

2.2.3 Entering apartment buildings by means of insecure doors/ tailgating residents and gaining access to communal areas.

Possible Solution - There should be access controlled secure doorsets restricting access to the circulation core of the building to reduce the possibility of would-be offenders from tailgating residents and visitors into the building.

2.2.4 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors to gain access into communal areas and apartments

Possible Solution – All ground floor communal doors should be fitted with door closers and lock automatically, to prevent these doors from being left open and insecure. Any publicly accessible apartment entrance doors should be fitted with a split-spindle, or fixed external handle, to prevent them from being opened from the outside when unlocked. Any accessible windows should be restricted in opening to prevent them from being fully opened if left insecure.

2.3 Possible Solution – Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:


- Domestic burglary
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour

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
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Crime Rates


Comparison of Domestic Burglary Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester




Comparison of Wounding Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester



2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **83% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **78% lower** than Greater Manchester and **78% lower** than England & Wales.

2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **35% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **84% higher** than Greater Manchester and **252% higher** than England & Wales.

2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **4% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **36% higher** than Greater Manchester and **66% higher** than England & Wales.


2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **115% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **254% higher** than Greater Manchester and **330% higher** than England & Wales.

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
2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.


Burglary Dwelling – Day Range



Burglary Dwelling – Time Range



Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry



2.5.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of domestic burglary is highest on Thursday in the morning (10:00-11:00). Offenders tend to target dwellings at this time during the working week when they are often left empty for long periods of time whilst the owners are out at work, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- In cases where the entry point has been recorded as 'unknown' it is likely that the offender has exploited insecure windows and doors.
- Using bodily pressure or implements to force open secure windows and doors.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development is of 73 no. apartments in a single block.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The proposed development site is presently vacant. The development of the site will increase residential activity in this area to the benefit of existing residential developments.

3.2.2 There are on-street parking bays in the local area allowing visitors to park in close proximity to the building.

3.2.3 The main entrance to the building is taken from the principal elevation on Store Street.

3.2.4 The main communal entrance to the building is taken from the front elevation where it can be overlooked from Store Street and the apartment building opposite.

3.2.5 The proposed coffee shop at ground floor will generate activity during the day when the building may be underused with people out at work.

3.2.6 Store Street is a well used pedestrian route into the city centre from Great Ancoats Street, providing the site with high levels of passive surveillance.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 There should be some form of defensible space or protection to the ground floor windows to reduce the potential for antisocial/criminal behaviour and to give residents privacy. Defensible space could be provided with low railings, planting/shrubbery, ornamental bars (or similar screen) to the lower half of the window, or window planters. Any low level glazing should be obscured to provide privacy for residents and to reduce the potential for residents to keep curtains/blinds drawn at all times.

3.3.2 The vehicular gates restricting access to the side of the building into the yard area should be an automated gate, operated with remote/fob or similar, to ensure that this area remains secure. The operating speed of the gate should not be too slow that it allows opportunities to tailgate.

3.3.3 Pedestrian and vehicular gate designs should be carefully considered so that opportunities to climb are not designed in. Gates should not have exposed hinges, locking apertures, or mid-rails that could be used as footholds. It is recommended that gates are a minimum of 2100mm high and of robust construction (see section 4.7 for more details).

3.3.4 External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock operating with an electronic access control system.

3.3.5 Access into the building should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.

3.3.6 Access into the post/parcel room should be restricted to residents with an access controlled door. There should be CCTV within the room tom deter theft.

3.3.7 Secure post boxes should be provided within the post/parcel room, with a fob issued to Royal Mail which can only be used to access the main entrance and the post room, but not any other areas of the building.

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3.3.8 Other couriers/parcel delivery services should deliver mail directly to the resident rather than being granted access into the building.

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4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification. Access into the build should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. Apartment entrance doors must have a door viewer.
- ☐ External apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. Apartment entrance doors must have a door viewer and have a split spindle or fixed handle.
- ☐ Construction of internal walls surrounding internal apartment entrance doors (600mm either side of the door set) should incorporate a resilient layer to reduce the risk of anyone breaking through the wall to access the locking mechanism. The resilient layer should be timber (minimum thickness of 9mm) or expanded metal.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR A, STS 204, or STS 222.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall or material of similar strength (e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind or within any new cladding/insulated panels to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either:
  - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems

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- BS 6799 for wireless systems

☐ If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

4.5 Access Control

☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:

- Communal entrances
- Post/parcel room
- Circulation cores
- Cycle store

4.6 Bicycle Parking Areas

☐ Doors in to the cycle parking area(s) must be certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, with access restricted to registered residents (i.e. genuine bicycle owners)..

☐ Cycle stands should either be U-profile or Sheffield style stands. If rack storage is used it should be possible for both wheels and the frame to be secured.

4.7 Lighting

☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the development in accordance with BS 5489. Lighting should be taken from a variety of sources and levels (i.e. columns, up lighting) to provide a greater level of coverage and avoid shadows/pooling.

☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

☐ Dusk-til-dawn lighting, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is

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also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
11/03/2021	Diane Ellis	CIS application received
10/06/2021	Diane Ellis	Revised plans received
23/09/2025	John (Merebridge Construction)	Revised plans received

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
25-008-FA-XX-XX-DR-A-02101	Proposed Site Plan	30 Aug 2025	P1
25-008-FA-XX-00-DR-A-03100	GA Plans – Proposed – Level 00 (Ground)	30 Aug 2025	P1
25-008-FA-XX-01-DR-A-03101	GA Plans – Proposed – Level 01 (First)	30 Aug 2025	P1
25-008-FA-XX-02-DR-A-03102	GA Plans – Proposed – Level 02 (Second)	30 Aug 2025	P1
25-008-FA-XX-ZZ-DR-A-03103	GA Plans – Proposed – Level 03–13	30 Aug 2025	P1
25-008-FA-XX-14-DR-A-03114	GA Plans – Proposed – Level 14 (Fourteenth)	30 Aug 2025	P1
25-008-FA-XX-15-DR-A-03115	GA Plans – Proposed – Level 15 (Fifteenth)	30 Aug 2025	P1
25-008-FA-XX-16-DR-A-03116	GA Plans – Proposed – Level 16 (Roof)	30 Aug 2025	P1

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

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C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Revised drawings	

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