



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

251 no. DWELLINGS
LAND BOUNDED BY CHEETHAM HILL ROAD, LORD STREET & FERNIE STREET, CHEETHAM HILL, MANCHESTER, M4 4EX.

For: Linear Living Ltd
Version B: 28th November 2025
Reference: 2025/0294/CIS/01

designforsecurity

Land bound by Cheetham Hill Road, Lord Street and Fernie St

URN: 2025/0294/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Security additions/improvements required.

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Access to the roof terrace on the 15th floor and access to both cores on the ground floor should not impede the security of the apartments of this floor. Unfortunately, additional doors cannot be provided to allow access to other residents while maintaining a secure floor as this would impede the smoke control strategy. With this in mind these floors should be covered by a CCTV system.
- The rear of the building along Fernie Street is not well overlooked and this could leave it vulnerable to antisocial behaviour or criminality, such as loitering or defacement to the building. It is highly recommended that this elevation of the building is illuminated at ground floor level and has good CCTV coverage so that any incidents can be responded to in a timely manner.
- Doors from the cores onto each floor should be fitted with access control to only allow residents of the floor to gain access.
- The colonnade and the external areas to the townhouses should be illuminated to a high standard.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.

Matthew Granelli

Design for Security Consultant

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
1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site is located at the road junction of Cheetham Hill Road & Lord St. The site is currently vacant and secured by timber hoarding.

The site is bound by Cheetham Hill Road, Lord St & Fernie St with the above roads forming the West, North and East boundaries respectively. The South boundary is shared by an existing petrol station.

The surrounding buildings are mixture of commercial, retail and residential developments, it benefits from good levels of natural surveillance. Cheetham Hill Road is one of the main vehicular/pedestrian routes into the city centre.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st November 2024 to 31st October 2025 within 500m of the site.

2.1 Local Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
10	27	88	375	134	16	38	15	22	9

- 2.1.1 The volume of crime over the past 12 months in the local area is high, with the most prevalent types of recorded crime being less serious wounding, vehicle crime and theft. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in, or within, close proximity of city centres where there is a higher concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to larger number of crime and disorder issues.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have taken place throughout the local area, with a hotspot of offences occurring around Victoria Station/AO Arena and around/off Cheetham Hill Road. Assaults and public order offences have been the highest recorded less serious woundings taking place, often occurring late at night/over the weekend with alcohol consumption being a contributing factor.
- 2.1.3 Theft offences have also taken place throughout the local area, with a hotspot of offences around/off Lord Street to the east and Victoria Station/AO Arena to the south. Theft of parcels/bags left unattended from doorsteps, tables and communal areas of flats have accounted for most of the recorded offences, as well as incidents of personal thefts (with offenders using pickpocketing and distraction techniques to obtain items such as mobile phones or wallets/purses). There have also been cases of clamps placed by the Council being removed and stolen from parked vehicles in the local area.
- 2.1.4 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed residential scheme, the more detailed analysis below will focus on local domestic burglary and vehicle crime.

2.2 General Risk Factors

- 2.2.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:
- Domestic burglary
 - Theft from gardens, sheds, or garages
 - Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
 - Theft of, or from, vehicles
 - Bogus callers and distraction burglary
 - Anti-social behaviour
 - Neighbour disputes
 - Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
 - Unauthorised access to private spaces
 - Poor maintenance of access control systems



2.3 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting residential properties are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

2.3.1 Smashed glazing in windows and doors.

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points.

2.3.2 Using bodily pressure or implements in order to force open secure windows and doors or have been targeted when left insecure by residents.

Possible Solution – All external doors and windows should be certified to recognised security standards, which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and locking, thus reducing the opportunity of them being left insecure.





All individual apartments should also be secured with a robust entrance doorset, to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection.

2.3.3 Posing as a legitimate resident and gaining access to communal areas of apartment buildings by tailgating residents and via insecure doors.

Possible Solution – A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to the building before allowing them access. The main communal entrance should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. Consideration could also be given to 'airlock' lobby system, which features a secondary entrance door that only releases when the external door has closed, reducing the opportunities for tailgating unnoticed.




2.4 Local Crime Rate Comparisons

The graphs below compare the local rates of crime (i.e. crimes per 1,000 dwellings) with the average rates for Manchester, Greater Manchester and England & Wales.



- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **87% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **84% lower** than Greater Manchester and **83% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **52% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **34% lower** than Greater Manchester and **25% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **42% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **24% lower** than Greater Manchester and **8% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **29% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **112% higher** than Greater Manchester and **157% higher** than England & Wales.

2.5 Local Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis





2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary has been high throughout the working week, peaking just after midnight (00:00-01:00). Offenders often target dwellings at night when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving them the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:

- In cases where the entry point is recorded as 'unknown' it is likely that the offenders have exploited insecure doors.
- Forcing open secure doors using bodily pressure and implements.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Friday and Saturday in the evening (18:00-21:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles at this time when they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 Demolition of existing structures and erection of a residential apartment development comprising 251no. dwellings (Use Class C3) with landscaping and associated works.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will increase residential activity in the local area. Areas of high activity can deter offenders if they feel that they could be seen committing a crime or behaving antisocially.
- 3.2.2 The main entrance to the building is taken from Cheetham Hill Road where it is overlooked. The building will provide an active frontage to Cheetham Hill Road.
- 3.2.3 The surrounding streets are very busy at all times of the day and evening/night with vehicular and pedestrian traffic, allowing for passive surveillance opportunities. The main entrances to the buildings are in prominent locations where they can easily be seen by residents on approach.
- 3.2.4 There will be a large amount of secure bicycle parking in each underground parking facility, allowing residents to secure their bicycles.
- 3.2.5 There will be a secondary access control doorset between the main communal entrances to the buildings and the circulation core, reducing the potential for tailgating.
- 3.2.6 Post boxes/parcel stores will be located in the ground floor lobby area, allowing postal deliveries to take place without the need for further access into the residential areas of the buildings.
- 3.2.7 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the dwellings, avoiding the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the developments are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Access to the roof terrace on the 15th floor and access to both cores on the ground floor should not impede the security of the apartments of this floor. Unfortunately, additional doors cannot be provided to allow access to other residents while maintaining a secure floor as this would impede the smoke control strategy. With this in mind these floors should be covered by a CCTV system.
- 3.3.2 The rear of the building along Fernie Street is not well overlooked and this could leave it vulnerable to antisocial behaviour or criminality, such as loitering or defacement to the building. It is highly recommended that this elevation of the building is illuminated at ground floor level and has good CCTV coverage so that any incidents can be responded to in a timely manner.
- 3.3.3 Doors from the cores onto each floor should be fitted with access control to only allow residents of the floor to gain access.
- 3.3.4 The colonnade and the external areas to the townhouses should be illuminated to a high standard.
- 3.3.5 External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock operating with an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
- 3.3.6 Access into the buildings should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.

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- 3.3.7 A secure mail delivery system should be supplied, to allow delivery without access to the whole building. Given the emerging trend of parcel thefts (particularly at apartment blocks), consideration should also be a secure system for depositing parcels (see Section 4.1 for more information).
 - 3.3.8 There should be a secondary access-controlled door into the circulation cores of the building to reduce the potential for tailgating. It is recommended that on a development of this size that access control is required to access each individual floor to further restrict access.
 - 3.3.9 Doors into cycle stores should be certified to a burglary resistant standard and operate on an access control system, operated with resident's key card/fob. Access into cycle stores should be restricted to genuine users rather than every resident of the building/block. Cycle stands should be 'Sheffield' style or U-profile to allow both wheels and the frame to be secured. The bicycle store should be illuminated to a high standard.
 - 3.3.10 Any resident's amenity space should be restricted to residents on an access control system. The access control system to these areas should be auditable so that in the event of any damage, or an incident, management can see who has had access to the space.
 - 3.3.11 All resident's amenity spaces and staff only areas should operate on an audible access control system.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation in addition to the layout issues highlighted within Section 3.3.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification. Access into the build should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.
- ☐ Apartment and townhouse entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. Entrance doors must have a door viewer.
- ☐ Construction of internal walls surrounding internal apartment entrance doors (600mm either side of the door set) should incorporate a resilient layer to reduce the risk of anyone breaking through the wall to access the locking mechanism. The resilient layer should be timber (minimum thickness of 9mm) or expanded metal.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR A, STS 204, or STS 222.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall or material of similar strength (e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind or within any new cladding/insulated panels to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- ☐ If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
 - Communal entrances
 - Communal areas
 - Bicycle stores
 - Circulation cores at each floor
 - Amenity space
 - Staff only areas
 - Parcel rooms

4.6 Bicycle Parking Areas

- ☐ Doors into the cycle parking area(s) must be certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, with access restricted to registered residents (i.e. genuine bicycle owners).
- ☐ Cycle stands should either be U-profile or Sheffield style stands. If rack storage is used it should be possible for both wheels and the frame to be secured.
- ☐ Externally positioned cycle stands should be illuminated to a high standard.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the development in accordance with BS 5489. Lighting should be taken from a variety of sources and levels (i.e. columns, up lighting) to provide a greater level of coverage and avoid shadows/pooling.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ All elevations and entrances of the building should be illuminated,

4.8 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

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- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images, then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
 - ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
 - ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals.
 - ☐ Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter/graffiti removal.
 - Repair to communal areas (access controls, lighting, signage etc.)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. Please see [Secured by Design - Secured by Design](#) for more information. To apply for the SBD Award for your development in Greater Manchester, please visit [Apply for Secured by Design – Design For Security](#).

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
30/07/2025	Enabl	CIS Application
05/08/2025	DfS	Request for No. of units
07/11/2025	Enabl	No. of units confirmation
11/11/2025	DfS	CIS Fee Proposal
13/11/2025	Enabl	CIS Confirmation
26/11/2025	DfS	Site visit

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
NO1LOR-AEW-XX-01-DR-A-21001	Proposed GA Plan - First		P02
NO1LOR-AEW-XX-02-DR-A-21002	Proposed GA Plan - Second (to 14th)		P03
NO1LOR-AEW-XX-16-DR-A-21016	Proposed GA Plan - Sixteenth (to 22nd)		P02
NO1LOR-AEW-XX-23-DR-A-21023	Proposed GA Plan - Twenty Third		P01
NO1LOR-AEW-XX-B1-DR-A-21050	Proposed GA Plan - Basement		P02
NO1LOR-AEW-XX-RF-DR-A-21040	Proposed GA Plan - Roof		P02
NO1LOR-AEW-XX-XX-DR-A-31000	Proposed Elevation A - West (Cheetham Hill Road)		P04
NO1LOR-AEW-XX-XX-DR-A-31001	Proposed Elevation B - North (Lord Street)		P04
NO1LOR-AEW-XX-XX-DR-A-31002	Proposed Elevation C - East (Ferne St)		P04
NO1LOR-AEW-XX-XX-DR-A-31003	Proposed Elevation D - South		P04
NO1LOR-AEW-XX-XX-DR-A-50000	GA Section AA		P04
NO1LOR-AEW-XX-XX-DR-A-50001	GA Section BB		P04
NO1LOR-AEW-XX-XX-DR-A-50002	GA Section CC		P01
NO1LOR-AEW-XX-XX-DR-A-50003	GA Section DD		P01
NO1LOR-AEW-XX-XX-DR-A-50004	GA Section EE		P01
NO1LOR-AEW-XX-XX-SH-A-0002	Accommodation Schedule - 251 apts		P12
NO1LOR-AEW-XX-XX-SK-A-90001	Strategy - External Wall		P01
NO1LOR-AEW-XX-ZZ-DR-A-21102	Core Plan - First (up to Twenty Second)		P02
NO1LOR-AEW-XX-00-SK-A-90008	Strategy - Basement Lid Thermal Requirements		P01
NO1LOR-AEW-SI-XX-DR-A-05000	Site Location Plan		P03
NO1LOR-AEW-SI-XX-DR-A-05001	Existing Site Plan		P05
NO1LOR-AEW-SI-XX-DR-A-05100	Proposed Site Plan		P03
NO1LOR-AEW-XX-B1-DR-A-05200	Proposed GA Plan - Basement		P04
NO1LOR-AEW-XX-00-DR-A-05201	Proposed GA Plan - Ground		P04
NO1LOR-AEW-XX-00-DR-A-05204	Proposed GA Plan - Fifteenth Floor (Terrace)		P03

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Date	Revisions
A	28/11/2025	First Issue
B	09/01/2026	CIS updated in line with latest drawing and comments