



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Development of 34 Dwellings
Chapman Street

For: Centrepoint Independent Living Programme
Version A: 05/02/26
Reference: 2026/0001/CIS/01

designforsecurity

Chapman Street

URN: 2026/0001/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported

We welcome the investment in this part of Gorton and support redevelopment for residential purposes.

From a crime prevention perspective, the positive features of the development include: the scheme design is of a high quality; the orientation of apartments/studios and placement of shared facilities will focus activity on appropriate areas of the site whilst also facilitating passive surveillance over surrounding streets; residents amenity spaces have been included; and cycle parking is also provided.

Advice is included in the report, which we consider will enhance security of the development and this set out in section 3.3 and 4. The recommendations are summarised as follows:

- Secured by Design accredited doors and window frames and laminate glass should be used in construction.
- devise an access control strategy that restricts access to the development to residents and their *bona fide* visitors.
- install appropriately high fencing (2.4m) to secure the vulnerable boundary of the development.
- ensure pedestrian gates are secure.
- invest in high quality public realm and landscaping.
- include measures to prevent anti-social behaviour towards the street-facing windows.
- install appropriate lighting to the development, particularly to external doors, cycle and refuse stores, and pathways.
- installing a CCTV system.
- arrangements for mail delivery should not compromise the security of the mail or the apartments.

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will make representations to Manchester Planning to require the inclusion of a condition requiring the completed development to achieve Secured by Design, SBD, accreditation. Should the recommendations included in this report be adopted, I have every confidence that the scheme will achieve the award and the condition met.

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The development is situated on Chapman St & Cross Lane, Gorton. The site is located approx. 350m north of the busy Hyde Road, an arterial main road connecting Manchester city centre & eastern district of GM.

The site is served well by a number of public transport routes located nearby including Gorton train station (approx. 650m north), Belle Vue train station (approx. 750m east) and bus stops on Chapman St. Hyde Road is well supported with a number of bus routes.


The surrounding area contains a mix of residential (social & private), predominately houses. In addition to the residential uses there is a substantial area in close proximity to the site which contains a concentration of industrial & light industrial uses.

The Fallowfield Loop & Yellow Brick Road are pedestrian & cycle paths located nearby.

Further along Chapman St. is St James' Primary school.

The site is a former mugga sports pitch which has fallen into disrepair over the years and has now become a target for fly-tipping and anti-social behaviour.

A pedestrian footpath on the northern boundary divides the site from the Shalom Christian church.



1 – View into the site.



2 – Pedestrian footpath.




3 – Evidence of fly-tipping.



7 – Neighbouring commercial building.



6 – View along Carfax St.



5 – route into the site.



4 – Existing neighbouring church building.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st January 2025 to 31st December 2025 within 500m of the site.

2.1 Local Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
39	15	107	357	58	14	9	42	23	16

- 2.1.1 The level of crime in this area is w average for Manchester but high for Greater Manchester. There is particularly an issue with Less serious wounding, criminal damage and domestic burglary offences. These offences are spread across the whole area where there are residences, with several small concentrations of 2-4 offences. These concentrations are centred on areas with easier access to rear gardens from alleyways or open areas. It is likely that offenders prefer to access premises in this way as it reduces the likelihood of them being witnessed entering the property.
- 2.1.2 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed residential scheme, the more detailed analysis below will focus on local domestic burglary and vehicle crime.

2.2 General Risk Factors

- 2.2.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds, or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.3 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.3.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting residential properties are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

2.3.2 Communal entrance doors and apartment doors were targeted when left unsecured by residents.

To minimise the risk of offenders tailgating through communal doors or entering apartments through unsecured doors:

- communal entry doors should be self-closing and lock securely upon closure;
- install a secondary set of secure doors (airlock/secure lobby), also self-closing and self-locking;

- lifts should be operated by an access control system;
- install CCTV cameras in the entrance lobby;
- employ a concierge; and,
- apartment doors should be self-closing with a thumb turn lock on the inner side that meets fire regulations.

2.3.3 Doors and windows have been forced open

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors and windows:

- all external doors and apartment entry doors, and all accessible windows, should be certified to PAS 24 security standard - PAS 24 rated doors and windows are very difficult to force open;
- external entrance and means of escape doors should be readily visible from the street or surroundings - offenders will be less inclined to target properties where their actions may be witnessed;
- restrict access to secluded elevations with appropriately high and robust fencing;
- all external doors should be illuminated with dusk-to-dawn lighting. Light suggests property is occupied and may deter offenders from targeting it. Lighting will also support CCTV systems and highlight the actions of an offender, increasing the chance of a crime being witnessed; and,
- CCTV should be considered to record activity within and around exterior of the building.

2.3.1 Glazing in doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry or commit criminal damage

To minimise the risk of offender smashing glazing in doors and windows:

- laminate glass should be fitted to all external doors and to all windows on the ground or accessible floors of the development; and,
- any accessible windows should be fitted with locks and opening restrictors.

2.3.2 Offenders have stolen bicycles

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting bicycles:

- a cycle store should be provided within a secure part of the site;
- CCTV should monitor activity in and around cycle stores; and,
- PIR lighting should be installed to illuminate the cycle store.

2.3.3 Vehicles were targeted when parked in unsecured car parks or on the 'street'

To minimise the risk of vehicle-related crime:

- car parking should be located within the boundaries of the development, within an area that is secure and overlooked by residents or monitored by an effective CCTV system. Consideration may be given to installing automatic vehicle gates and fencing around the car parks.

2.3.4 Offenders have damaged boundary fencing

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting fencing:

- fence panels should be especially robust when exposed to the public realm.





2.3.5 Theft of plant and machinery, and criminal damage during the construction period.

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting the construction site:

- a secure hoarding should be erected around the site with access restricted to contractors and authorised visitors;
 - security staff should patrol the site or visit during non-working hours;
 - lighting and CCTV should be installed to illuminate the site and record activity; and,
- plant and machinery should be fitted with tracking devices, and, at the end of the working day, it should be arranged to prevent forced access onto the site and to minimise the risk of theft.




2.4 Local Crime Rate Comparisons

The graphs below compare the local rates of crime (i.e. crimes per 1,000 dwellings) with the average rates for Manchester, Greater Manchester and England & Wales.



- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **22% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **0% higher** than Greater Manchester and **2% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **33% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **9% lower** than Greater Manchester and **73% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **10% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **44% higher** than Greater Manchester and **75% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **26% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **21% higher** than Greater Manchester and **48% higher** than England & Wales.

2.5 Local Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis





2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary is highest on Tuesday and Saturday just after midnight (00:00-01:00). Offenders tend to target dwellings at night when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving them the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:

- In cases where the entry point is recorded as 'unknown' it is likely that the offenders have exploited insecure doors.
- Forcing open secure doors using bodily pressure and implements.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Friday and Sunday in the evening (17:00-19:00) and around midnight (23:00-01:00). Offenders often target vehicles at these times when they tend to be left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The applicants are applying for full planning application to develop the site for residential use.
- 3.1.2 The proposal will provide a two storey residential development comprising of 34 single-occupancy homes, entrance lobby, communal area, central courtyard and associated plant and servicing areas.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 Many of the apartments will have routinely occupied rooms overlooking the adjacent communal areas, and garden areas, which will help to increase natural surveillance of accessible areas around the block. Landscaping must not obstruct views over the entrance.
- 3.2.2 The internal areas of the block appear to be generally free of obstacles; thus, an intruder would find difficulty in hiding within the communal parts of the buildings. Doors to individual apartments are positioned almost flush with the corridor walls. All communal doors within the corridors should include glazed elements to improve sight lines.
- 3.2.3 The entrance is laid out and allows the potential to create a secure lobby so that visitors can be vetted prior to permitting further access to the building.
- 3.2.4 The development will result in the removal of a disused facility which might otherwise become a greater target for vandals and increasingly an eyesore. Such sites can attract further criminal behaviour, which may affect surrounding properties. For pedestrians, passing such places on a daily basis, especially at night, this can feel very disconcerting and increase the fear of crime.
- 3.2.5 The proposed development will bring additional activity, overlooking and surveillance to the area at all times of the day and night.
- 3.2.6 The proposed building clearly defines the front of the building, and the entrance can be located and navigated.
- 3.2.7 The building will present additional active frontage to Cross Lane, enlivening the street scene and helping to provide useful natural surveillance over the street.
- 3.2.8 The footprint of the building has been kept simple, with no doors/windows hidden within deep recesses or behind building lines (where they would be vulnerable to attack).
- 3.2.9 The private garden space to the centre of the building will be enclosed, preventing unauthorised access to where criminals could attack the building/exploit opportunities unseen.
- 3.2.10 Due to the nature of the building use the development will incorporate communal amenity spaces allowing friendships to develop and building a sense of community within the building.
- 3.2.11 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the dwellings, avoiding the need for obtrusive retrofitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the developments are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The communal entrance must be well lit, be fitted with security-certified doors and fitted with an electrically operated, multi-point lock, activated with a programmable fob. There should also be an audio-visual link to each apartment, so that residents can remotely allow *bona fide* visitors.
- 3.3.2 Access into the building should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set), so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access in to the reception area only prior to providing access further into the building.
- 3.3.3 A variety of lighting sources should be used to illuminate the environment rather than reliance on one type of lighting which can lead to pooling/shadowing.
- 3.3.4 To minimise the risk of offender's tail-gating legitimate residents/visitors, the secondary doors into lobby entrance, should also include access controls. Access controls will need to be used at the communal entrances to restrict entry into the development to residents and their authorised visitors.
- 3.3.5 Residential post - Arrangements for the delivery of post should not allow postal staff to have access to internal areas of the residential area beyond the reception space. Mailboxes for residents should be located either within a secure lobby area or use a 'through-the-wall' post box arrangement. Further design details of these ancillary spaces are to be developed.
- 3.3.6 Cycle stores for residents are provided to the southern side of the building. Entry to the stores must be restricted to genuine cyclists only, on application to the managers of the building. Racks within the enclosures should allow cyclists to lock the frame and both wheels and should be obtained from a Secured by Design-approved supplier (see www.securedbydesign.com for details).
- 3.3.7 Communal facilities amenity. The robust management of such areas is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour.
- 3.3.8 The boundary treatments to the block are vitally important to secure them. The sides (including gables up to or as close as possible to the front building line), should be defined as private space and adequately secured to prevent unauthorised access (see Section 4.5). As such, this side footpath boundary should be particularly robustly defined.
- 3.3.9 It is highly recommended that no detailing in the brickwork and metalwork railings to the footpath elevation does not provide easy climbing access into the courtyard. This boundary wall and railing should be 2.4m high.
- 3.3.10 Definition of front gardens, definition of frontages. Garden boundaries should be well-defined to indicate ownership, using low walls, railings, planting and / or surface materials, and discourage intruders from approaching the dwellings and parked vehicles, or taking short cuts.
- 3.3.11 Security measures carefully incorporated into the building design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime. The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime.
- 3.3.12 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation in addition to the layout issues highlighted within Section 3.3.

4.1 Doors (Houses)

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to STS202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
- ☐ Arrangements for residents to admit visitors. Communal entrance and inner lobby / zone doors should be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on a phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can confirm the identity of visitors before allowing them access themselves.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The post boxes themselves should be of robust construction, with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access-controlled main entrance.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead.
- ☐ Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Doors to storage / meter rooms should have 44mm solid core doors, 3 hinges, with a mortised sash lock to BS3621/8621 to allow the rooms to be secured when not in use.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ Any external french/double doors or sliding doors to easily accessible balconies or terraces should also be certified to BS PAS 24, SPS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2 and should include laminated glazing (see below).
- ☐ The doors to the cycle store should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2, or be steel gates within steel frames. These doors/gates should both be self-closing and lock securely upon closure and be accessible by a programmable fob.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems

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- ☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ Secure boundaries should be formed around the car park and residential boundaries. Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of walls and railings should have railing panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid.
- ☐ Inward opening automatic gates to provide access to the courtyard area must be certified to one of the following standards:
 - LPS 1175: Issue 7, SR2
 - STS 202: Issue 3, BR2
 - Sold Secure Gold
- ☐ PAS 68: 2013

4.6 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors (manual override is also permissible).
- ☐ Lighting in the car park should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout/lux plan.
- ☐ Lighting to undercroft parking areas should display an average lux level of 75-100, with a uniformity level of no less than 50%.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.8 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [Main entrances](#), [foyer](#), [stairs](#), [lift lobbies](#), [landings](#), [cycle stores](#), [bin store entrances](#).

4.9 Other

- ☐ Meter cupboards to apartments should be located to the fronts of properties only or within a secure cupboard / room inside the block but not inside individual apartments. Smart meters are acceptable.
- ☐ Any externally mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- ☐ Partition walls between flats and corridors should be of masonry construction or include reinforcement such as a layer of expanded metal mesh.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the buildings. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter and graffiti removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and tree
 - Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

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- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. Please see [Secured by Design - Secured by Design](#) for more information. To apply for the SBD Award for your development in Greater Manchester, please visit [Apply for Secured by Design – Design For Security](#).

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
05/01/26	3DReid	Application received
05/01/26	3DReid	Client confirmation
05/01/26	GMP	Invoice issued
29/01/26	DfS	Site visit
05/02/26	DfS	CIS completed
10/02/26	DfS	CIS issued
10/02/26	DfS	Version B CIS issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	250128-3DR-ZZ-00-DR-A-08010-P01-Proposed Plan - Ground Floor	23/01/26	
	250128-3DR-ZZ-01-DR-A-08011-P01-Proposed Plan - First Floor	23/01/26	
	250128-3DR-ZZ-R1-DR-A-08012-P01-Proposed Plan - Roof	23/01/26	
	250128-3DR-ZZ-XX-DR-A-08100-P01-Proposed Street Elevations	23/01/26	
	250128-3DR-ZZ-XX-DR-A-08101-P01-Proposed Street Elevations	23/01/26	
	250128-3DR-ZZ-XX-DR-A-08102-P01-Courtyard Elevations	23/01/26	
	250128-3DR-ZZ-XX-DR-A-08210-P01-Proposed Sections - Short	23/01/26	
	250128-3DR-ZZ-XX-DR-A-08211-P01-Proposed Sections - Long	23/01/26	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Date	Revisions
A	10/02/2026	
B	10/02/2026	Minor text amendments

D Glossary

Physical Security Standards

PAS 24

Enhanced security performance requirements for doorsets and windows in the UK. Doorsets and windows intended to offer a level of security suitable for dwellings and other buildings exposed to comparable risk. It is designed to mimic an attack by an opportunist burglar, using tools which are easy to conceal.

STS 201

Enhanced security to satisfy the requirements for certification of doorsets, equivalent to test standard to PAS 24.

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors, roller shutters, fences and barriers. Products are rated via the term Burglary Resistance (BR) and range from BR1 (lower security rating) to BR6 (higher security rating).

LPS 1175

Physical security for products manufactured for perimeter, façade, internal spaces and entrapment protection. The higher the security rating, the more formidable the security product.

Developed following extensive consultation with stakeholders, the most recent issue sees the previous single digit performance classifications (i.e. Security Ratings 1 to 8) extended to one formed of two elements that illustrate performance in terms of:

- *Threat level (first element) – Letter (A to H) corresponding with the tool kit used to evaluate the product's intruder resistance and number of attackers involved.*
- *Delay (second element) – Numeric value (1, 3, 5, 10, 15 or 20) corresponding with the minimum delay (in minutes) provided by the product when placed in a locked condition.*

BS EN 1627

European standard for the burglary resistance of pedestrian doorsets, windows, curtain walling, grilles and shutters. It defines six resistance classes, from RC1 to RC6, with RC1 being the lowest level of resistance and RC6 the highest. These classes indicate the level of resistance to forced entry, with higher classes requiring more time and specialized tools to breach.

BS EN 356

European standard that specifies the resistance of laminated glazing (i.e. two or more layers of glass bonded together with a plastic interlayer) to manual attacks, such as might occur during forced entry or vandalism. It classifies laminated glass into different resistance levels, ranging from P1A to P8B, with P1A being the lowest and P8B the highest.

Useful Websites

[Design For Security – Designing Out Crime](#)

– apply for Crime Impact Statements or the Secured by Design Award from Greater Manchester Police

[Secured by Design - Secured by Design](#) – SBD Award Scheme, Design Guides and Member Companies

[ParkMark - Home](#) – Park Mark Safer Parking Award Scheme

[NBS Source](#) – find, select and specify building products (including security-certified products)

[RedBook Live - LPCB Red Book](#) – search for LPS 1175 certified products