

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Development of Retail and Office use
Portland St.

For: Bruntwood Aviva 2 Ltd
Version C: 18/02/26
Reference: 2025/0052/CIS/01

designforsecurity

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GREATER MANCHESTER POLICE

Portland Street

URN: 2025/0052/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The scheme has been very well designed from a crime prevention perspective. The proposed uses seem appropriate and will make a positive contribution to the redevelopment of the area. The mix of uses has the potential to create a very vibrant location. Developments where there is an active use mix tend be better managed and less prone to crime and disorder issues.

- consider the installation of access controls (for night-time use) at the shop entrance door to allow staff to vet customers prior to releasing the door and allowing *bona fide* entry
- access controls should be employed to prevent entry to the staff area
- appropriate CCTV and alarm systems should be installed
- an operating policy should be developed

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police will support the application and are likely to recommend that a condition requiring the change of use to be implemented in accordance with the recommendations set out within this report be imposed.

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The Site is bound by Chorlton Street to the northeast, MSCP ramp access to the southeast (immediate rear of the building), Sackville Street to the southwest, and Portland Street to the northwest.

This area of the city centre hosts a mixture of café/bars, hotel and retail premises. Commercial office accommodation is the dominant use within the building.

The ground floor houses the Polish Consulate. Entrance to this unit is via a dedicated doorway off Portland St. This Use is to remain and will not be incorporated into the proposals.


Portland St is a busy central road, both for vehicle and pedestrian traffic.

To the rear of the site is the busy National Express coach station with a MSCP above. To the immediate northeast of the site is Yates pub, a popular & busy leisure establishment.

A vehicle access ramp leads from Chorlton St to the MSCP. A pedestrian ramp connects from the rear of the site onto the vehicle ramp, allowing pedestrians access from the MSCP into the rear of the proposed building.

The site is located between three busy central districts, Chinatown to the northwest, Piccadilly Gardens to the north and the Gay Village to the southeast. All neighbourhoods are popular destinations across the day and nighttime.





1 – The site & existing building on Portland St.



2 – Popular drinking establishment, Yates.


3 – Existing bus stop on Portland St in front of the site.


7 – Public realm / non-space.


6 – Pedestrian access via ramp to MSCP.


5 – Sackville St. Coach station & MSCP.


4 – Public realm in front of the site.

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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Local Crime Summary

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st December 2024 to 30th November 2025.

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
26	128	303	2,647	847	246	54	216	30	71

2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is high for Manchester, with less serious wounding, theft and vehicle crime being the highest reported crimes. The location of the proposed site should be taken into consideration when looking at the crime statistics as the site is located within the city centre where there is a high concentration of retail outlets, licenced premises and restaurants, leading to an increase of crime and disorder in the area.

2.1.2 Less serious woundings have taken place throughout the local area, particularly around Canal Street and towards the Northern Quarter. Both areas have a high volume of bars and clubs. Offences have mostly occurred over the weekend period (Friday – Sunday) during the late evening and early hours of the morning when most premises in the area are closing. Assaults and public order offences have been the highest recorded less serious woundings in the local area, with offences often taking place between known associates, with alcohol often being a factor.

2.1.3 Thefts have taken place throughout the area, with hotspots occurring to the east, around Canal Street and to the north around Piccadilly Gardens and the Northern Quarter. Offenders have mostly used pick pocketing techniques and distraction methods in order to obtain personal belongings, mostly mobile phones, bags and purses/ wallets. Offenders have also targeted insecure items (mostly mobile phones) left on or under tables in bars and restaurants.

2.1.4 Vehicle crime in the local area has mostly taken place in private car parks and vehicles using on street parking facilities. Theft from a motor vehicle has been the highest recorded vehicle crime with offenders using implements and objects in order to smash glazing and access the interior of the vehicle. Offenders have also targeted vehicle registration plates, using tools to remove them.

2.1.5 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed commercial development, the more detailed analysis below will look at use-specific burglary and theft and local vehicle crime.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting commercials uses are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

2.2.2 **Opening of secured doors and windows using bodily force or implements to gain entry**.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements.

2.2.3 **Smashing glazing in windows and doors to gain entry**.

Possible Solution – All new ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. In vulnerable locations, shutters, grilles or perforated protective panels may be necessary to provide extra protection.

2.2.4 **Theft of personal property from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables**.

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Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats (see Section 4.4). The layout of the premises can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment.

2.2.5 **Offenders posing as legitimate customers, gaining access to staff only areas**.

Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Section 5.1).

2.3 Risk Factors - Offices

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft

2.4 Risk Factors - Retail Premises

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Commercial burglary
- Cash robbery
- Unauthorised access to private spaces/Tailgating
- Shoplifting
- Employee theft
- Theft of customer/staff property
- Criminal damage to property

2.5 Risk Factors - Cycle Storage

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Unauthorised access to non-public areas
- Criminal damage to property
- Arson
- Violence towards staff and other users
- Cycle security
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Controlled access (staff/user only)
- Loitering groups
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Robbery


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- Employee theft
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space


2.6 Non-Domestic Burglary (Offices): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area.

Manchester Office Burglary – Day Range




Manchester Office Burglary – Time Range



2.6.1 Day/Time Range: During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester is greatest on Tuesday, Thursday and Sunday. During the day, the risk of burglary at Manchester office premises rises into the evening/late at night. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.

Manchester Office Burglary – Point of Entry




2.6.2 Point of Entry: The majority of burglaries at offices in Manchester have been committed through doors. Burglaries against office buildings in this area do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing tools with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks. Offenders have also smashed glazed panels in doors and windows to gain entry. A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through 'unknown' and 'legitimate' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.

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
2.7 Theft (Offices): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area.

Manchester Office Theft – Day Range



Manchester Office Theft – Time Range




2.7.1 Day/Time Range: During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester offices is greatest on Monday and Tuesday and is generally lower over the weekend (when many are shut). During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking around midday. During these times, many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out

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
2.8 Non-Domestic Burglary (Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.


Retail Burglary – Day Range



Retail Burglary – Time Range



Retail Burglary – Point of Entry



2.8.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Wednesday. During the day the risk of burglary at retail premises increases in the early hours of the morning (12am – 6am). Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed, and the streets are quiet. Offenders perceive the risk of being witnessed or apprehended at its lowest.

2.8.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been the occurred most frequently:


- Smashed glazing in windows and doors to gain entry to premises.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and tailgating / exploitation insecure doors to gain access to staff only areas.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily force and implements to gain entry.
- Opening secure doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain entry.

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
2.9 Theft (Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.

Retail Theft – Day Range



Retail Theft – Time Range




2.9.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of theft from retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Friday and Saturday. During the day the risk of theft at retail premises peaks in the late morning and into the evening (10:30am – 8pm). Small, personal items are being targeted, mostly mobile phones, purses, and bags.


2.10 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.10.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime peaks on Saturday in the morning (11:00-12:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles at this time when they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time whilst they are attending the city centre, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

3.1.1 Full Planning Permission for façade refurbishment and extension works to lower floors (incl. external cycle store) at Manchester One, 53 Portland Street, Manchester.

3.1.2 …

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 It appears that a number of the existing street furniture elements, billboard signage and lamppost are being moved as part of the proposals to the public realm. These proposals are welcomed as the replacement creates a more welcoming and clutter free approach to the new main front entrance on Portland Street.

3.2.2 Building footprint. The building footprint at ground floor level is relatively simple and contains no areas of potential concealment. All doors and shutters appear to be flush with the external elevations of the buildings, removing areas of potential concealment that could be subject to abuse.

3.2.3 The main pedestrian entrances to the buildings are located in prominent locations, which are readily apparent on approaching from the surrounding public realm.

3.2.4 Glazed elevations surrounding the new build at ground floor level will help to enliven the street scene and enhance natural surveillance of and from the building.

3.2.5 Storage and servicing functions, including refuse stores, are contained within secure enclosures within the footprint of the building.

3.2.6 The proposals for the development clearly define the different uses of the building and all entrances can be easily located and navigated.

3.2.7 The foyer/reception zones provide the opportunity for good levels of security at a central control point for the commercial/office spaces.

3.2.8 The internal layout of the building appears capable of being divided into identifiable zones, allowing separation of accessible and restricted areas.

3.2.9 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the dwellings, avoiding the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the developments are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

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3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 Reception Lobby. The reception lobby should be laid out to allow staff at the desk to effectively monitor personnel entering or leaving the building through the main pedestrian entrances. Reception staff must also have a good view of the area immediately in front of the building allowing activity in this area to be easily supervised. Measures must be included to prevent visitors / intruders from progressing beyond the entrance lobby without authorisation. Access to the stair core and lifts from the entrance lobby should require passage through access-controlled turnstiles or doors.

3.3.2 The access-control strategy adopted for the development should be capable of confining movement into and through the building, thus allowing staff and visitors to only enter parts of the site to which they have legitimate reason to be present. Access permissions should be fully auditable and regularly reviewed.

3.3.3 Access controls and flexibility of use within the building. When accommodating customer requirements for increased flexibility of space within the building, the security of these areas must not be compromised nor impact on other parts of the building. Space shared by a variety of users at varying times means that an intruder is less likely to be identified – it is therefore essential that accommodation is provided for the secure storage of personal items, for instance while staff are away from their work space. Facilities intended for use by external visitors (e.g. cafes / conference and meeting rooms), must be designed so that further access to the building is rigorously controlled. It should not be possible for the staff/visitors of one office floor / suite to access another. All individual office levels or suites should be fitted with self-closing, access-controlled doors, operated by staff swipe cards / fobs or by intercoms linked to individual receptions and all rooms within office suites should be capable of being deadlocked when unoccupied. Where the upper floor office areas are subdivided into smaller individual units, each suite of offices should be capable of separation with their own individual access controls. Access to plant / service/storage areas should also be fitted with auditable access controls (authorised personnel only).

3.3.4 Post. Reception and distribution of post within the building should be considered. Incoming post and deliveries should be processed at one single point, in an area that can be easily isolated. Post rooms should not be located close to main exit routes as this could affect prompt evacuation.

3.3.5 Current drawings show cycle parking for building users is contained in a dedicated . Entry into this space should be strictly limited via the access-controlled system under the building management system ensuring only genuine cyclists can gain access. Racks within the cycle stores should allow bikes to be locked by the frame and both wheels and should be obtained from a Secured by Design approved supplier (see www.securedbydesign.com).

3.3.6 The refuse store arrangement should allow bins to be collected without the need to leave bins out on the street for long periods of time; and operated so that the building can be secured while collections are taking place.

3.3.7 Staff should be given flexibility over permitting access into the building at different times of the day and night. The main entrance doors should be capable of being controlled remotely by reception staff if required, to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/anti-social behaviour in/around the entrance lobby. If the building is to be open at any time without a concierge or security presence in the lobby area, the doors should be secured and a single-leaf entrance door should be controlled by means of a video access control system linked to each individual office suite (allowing staff to vet callers before allowing them access).

3.3.8 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

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4 Physical Security (Commercial Use)

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation in addition to the layout issues highlighted within Section 3.3.

4.1 Doors

☐ All external doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.

☐ Sliding doors should be tested and certified to BS PAS 24, ENV 1627-30 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.

☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

☐ If the building is to be occupied by multiple tenants, all individual office levels or suites should be fitted with self-closing access-controlled solid-core doors (minimum 44mm thick), operated by staff swipe cards/fobs or by intercoms linked to individual receptions and any rooms within office suites should be capable of being deadlocked when unoccupied. The doors into the emergency escape cores at each level should be fitted with electromagnetic locks, connected to the fire alarm, so that people at one level cannot access other levels. Once an emergency escape core is accessed, the only means of egress should be at ground floor level.

☐ Internal doors to storage rooms should be solid core, minimum 44mm thick with a multi-point locking mechanism.

4.2 Shutters

☐ Where grilles or shutters are required for additional protection the minimum certification required is:

- LPS 1175: Issue 7 Security Rating 1
- STS 202: Issue 3, Burglary Rating 1

4.3 Windows

☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.

☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

☐ Security ratings higher than those listed above may be required dependant on:

- type of risk,
- level of crime risk,
- location of building *or*
- security level of the door or window to be protected.

4.4 Glazing

☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass. It is recommended that glazing to elevations adjoining pubic areas or evacuation routes should also be laminated.

4.5 Wall Construction

Glazed curtain walling and window walls

☐ Secured by Design recognises four distinct types of glazed wall systems. These are:

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- Large glazed units connected by ‘spider clamp’ system.
- Glazed units directly retained within a framing system (usually aluminium)
- Framed windows installed within a separate framing system.
- Framed windows connected to other framed windows to create a window wall.

☐ Glazed curtain walling must be installed using a secure glazing retention system. The method of retaining glass must include one or more of the following:

- Security glazing tape
- Dedicated security sealant or gasket
- A secure mechanical fixing system (Evidence will be required to prove the system is secure. This may be achieved by utilising the specific glazing retention test within PAS 24:2012 or by indicative test on the retention system to LPS 1175: Issue 7, SR1 or STS 202: Issue 3, BR1)

☐ Framed windows (3 and 4 above) used within the construction of a window wall must be certified to one of the following requirements:

- BS PAS 24:2016
- STS 204 Issue 3: 2012
- LPS 1175 Issue 7:2010 Security Rating 1
- LPS 2081 Issue 1:2014 Security Rating A

4.6 Alarms

☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover all building on the site, linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

4.7 Access Control

☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:

- Main Entrance Doors
- Turnstiles / doors off reception lobby
- Doors to each individual level / suite
- Refuse / service areas
- Doors into cycle store
- Conference / meeting rooms

☐ The electric locking system to be used throughout the building should be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Staff cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated / disabled to ensure that misuse is prevented.

4.8 Lighting

External lighting

☐ Dusk ‘til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

☐ Fittings should produce ‘white’ light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

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Internal Lighting

☐ Internal lighting should be operated by detection devices which will automatically switch lights on with movement activity in each room.

4.9 CCTV

☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

☐ Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

☐ Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are ‘Overview’ and ‘Recognition’, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: Entrances to site, external areas all around the new building and ancillary facilities, external doors including emergency egresses / hatches, access-controlled doors & cycle parking areas.

4.10 Fit out

☐ Design for Security understands that the designers and client may not always know who will be occupying their buildings once complete, and therefore the end-users requirements. Typical components which are subject to fit-out are:

- Internal access control
- Internal doors in to premises
- Alarm systems

☐ These features can be critical to a secure environment, and we would urge the client to provide would-be tenants with the contact details for Design for Security, who will provide free advice on internal security matters so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

4.11 Other

☐ Reception desk and staff. Reception staff should have a clear view of the approaches to all entrances. Reception desks require restricted access from the public side the desk should be deep enough to afford protection for the receptionist. Access beyond a public reception area should be controlled by the receptionist or fob.

☐ Effective signage is important to help customers / visitors navigate around the area, so they can easily find the various facilities and locate exit points.

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5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 The designer must ensure that this report is included within the BIM management model so that all parties are aware of the requirements for construction and management.

5.1.2 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff and residents should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.

5.1.3 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter and graffiti removal to ensure that the site remains in good repair.
- Regular inspection, service and repair to communal security features (lighting, signage, access controls, CCTV, alarms, fencing & gates)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees to ensure that sight lines are maintained and coverage of lighting and CCTV is not impaired.

5.1.4 Ensure that the site management is for which the building / site was designed able to cope with the remains in place, such as 24 hour concierge / security patrols.

5.1.5 Information regarding security features (such as specifications of windows / doors and systems performance) should be conveyed to the ultimate owners or managers of the site to ensure that any future replacements continue to provide the same level of security and maintain any security accreditation for the development.

5.1.6 All communal or amenity areas should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space is not detrimental to its surroundings.

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6 Commercial Internal Layout Guidance

6.1.1 The internal layout of any commercial units should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. Design for Security understands that the designers and client may not always know who will be occupying their units once complete, and therefore, the end-users requirements. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

6.2 Restaurants/Cafes/Licensed Premises

6.2.1 Restaurants/cafes/licensed premises can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:

6.2.2 Opportunities - Large numbers of people congregating in restaurants/licensed premises generates opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons are stationary for long periods of time, making them easier to target.

6.2.3 Lack of attention - The movement of people, noise, social interaction and other factors mean patrons can be easily distracted.

6.2.4 Cohesion – Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent restaurants/licensed premises means that such a venue would lack ‘community territoriality’ (i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them). This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur.

6.2.5 Customer turnover – High turnover with high levels of customer movement within an establishment, are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.

6.2.6 Valuable goods – Often available and possibly on show, a particular problem in external seating areas. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – such as mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys etc.

6.2.7 Stealth - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.

6.2.8 In order to minimise these issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:

6.2.9 The main entrances to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising.

6.2.10 Customers entering/leaving the premises through the main entrances should be easily observed by staff. Staff should also have clear views of any W/Cs to monitor their use.

6.2.11 The internal layout of premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.

6.2.12 Consideration should be given to high/wide bars/service counters, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers’ reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of any bars/service counters should be prevented (e.g. with lockable hatches that cannot be easily scaled).

6.2.13 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.

6.2.14 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible (see Section 6.4) and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.

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6.2.15 It is highly recommended that any customer tables are fitted with Chelsea Clips, to reduce the opportunities for theft (see below).



6.2.16 Public toilets can give rise to problems and the following issues should be considered:

- Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work etc. should be used.
- Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
- Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening as this will aid gaining access in an emergency. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 200mm from the floor and to reduce the top height.
- Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
- Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
- Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.

6.3 Retail Units

6.3.1 Clear views should also remain from the premises through to the public realm, i.e. large promotional signs should not obstruct views.

6.3.2 Careful consideration should be given to the location of paypoints to ensure that staff have full surveillance over the entrance to the unit.

6.3.3 Internal aisles and product displays should be aligned to assist surveillance from pay points and avoid blind-spots. There should be no items of high-value displayed close to the entrance of the unit.

6.3.4 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any tills, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.

6.3.5 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible (see Section 6.4) and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.

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7 Management & Maintenance

7.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the commercial units must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the units. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:

- Opening and closing of premises, including staff arrival and departure;
- Cash management within the premises - consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods;
- Cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices (which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe to meet insurance needs);
- Management of stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
- Details of staff security training;
- Location and management of any smoking areas;
- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras etc;
- Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
- Refuse collection arrangements.

7.1.2 The opening hours of any restaurants, licensed premises or retail units should be consistent with other such premises in the locale and should not unduly conflict with other nearby uses. Sufficient levels of service staff should be provided at busy periods to reduce waiting times and the potential for frustration, aggression and conflict.

7.1.3 Any high value equipment (e.g. computers/TVs, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

7.1.4 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the site and each of the premises, but also to deter unauthorised access to resident or staff-only areas.

7.1.5 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left accessible for extended periods. Servicing activities should also not require any service doors to remain open and unattended for prolonged periods.

8 Construction

8.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

8.1.2 Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

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9 Useful References

9.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

9.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. Please see Secured by Design - Secured by Design for more information. To apply for the SBD Award for your development in Greater Manchester, please visit Apply for Secured by Design – Design For Security.

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A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
05/02/25	Deloitte LLP	CIS Application
26/11/25	Deloitte LLP	CIS Confirmation
09/10/25	DfS	Site Visit
09/12/25	Client	Invoice paid
18/12/25	DfS	CIS Rev A Issued
29/01/26	DfS	CIS Rev B Issued
18/02/26	DfS	CIS Rev B Issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	Manchester One - Information Pack	05/02/25	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Date	Revisions
A	15/12/2025	
B	27/01/26	Minor text amendments within the report.
C	18/02/26	Red line plan updated.

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D Glossary

Physical Security Standards

PAS 24

Enhanced security performance requirements for doorsets and windows in the UK. Doorsets and windows intended to offer a level of security suitable for dwellings and other buildings exposed to comparable risk. It is designed to mimic an attack by an opportunist burglar, using tools which are easy to conceal.

STS 201

Enhanced security to satisfy the requirements for certification of doorsets, equivalent to test standard to PAS 24.

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors, roller shutters, fences and barriers. Products are rated via the term Burglary Resistance (BR) and range from BR1 (lower security rating) to BR6 (higher security rating).

LPS 1175

Physical security for products manufactured for perimeter, façade, internal spaces and entrapment protection. The higher the security rating, the more formidable the security product.

Developed following extensive consultation with stakeholders, the most recent issue sees the previous single digit performance classifications (i.e. Security Ratings 1 to 8) extended to one formed of two elements that illustrate performance in terms of:

- *Threat level (first element) – Letter (A to H) corresponding with the tool kit used to evaluate the product's intruder resistance and number of attackers involved.*
- *Delay (second element) – Numeric value (1, 3, 5, 10, 15 or 20) corresponding with the minimum delay (in minutes) provided by the product when placed in a locked condition.*

BS EN 1627

European standard for the burglary resistance of pedestrian doorsets, windows, curtain walling, grilles and shutters. It defines six resistance classes, from RC1 to RC6, with RC1 being the lowest level of resistance and RC6 the highest. These classes indicate the level of resistance to forced entry, with higher classes requiring more time and specialized tools to breach.

BS EN 356

European standard that specifies the resistance of laminated glazing (i.e. two or more layers of glass bonded together with a plastic interlayer) to manual attacks, such as might occur during forced entry or vandalism. It classifies laminated glass into different resistance levels, ranging from P1A to P8B, with P1A being the lowest and P8B the highest.

Useful Websites

Design For Security – Designing Out Crime *– apply for Crime Impact Statements or the Secured by Design Award from Greater Manchester Police*

Secured by Design - Secured by Design *– SBD Award Scheme, Design Guides and Member Companies*

ParkMark - Home *– Park Mark Safer Parking Award Scheme*

NBS Source *– find, select and specify building products (including security-certified products)*

RedBook Live - LPCB Red Book *– search for LPS 1175 certified products*

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