



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

**DEVELOPMENT OF 14 DWELLINGS
PENNINGTON STREET**

For: Onward Homes
Version A: 11th December 2025
Reference: 2025/0443/CIS/01

designforsecurity

Pennington Street

URN: 2025/0443/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed. If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 3.3 and 4 of this report.

Matthew Granelli

Design for Security Consultant

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
1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site is located between Pennington Street and Park Grove. The site is currently unused green space.

The site is bound by Pennington Street and Park Grove with these roads forming the North and South boundaries respectively. The West boundary is shared with the railway and the East boundary is form by the boundaries of existing properties.

The surrounding buildings are mainly residential developments, with commercial properties present towards the main road (A6).



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st December 2024 to 30th November 2025 within 500m of the site.

2.1 Local Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
21	5	53	308	30	14	7	47	10	26

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the past 12 months has been above average for the Manchester division, whereby less serious wounding, criminal damage and theft have been most commonly reported. These incidents have occurred all throughout the local area in the residential neighbourhoods surrounding the site.
- 2.1.2 Less serious wounding offences have taken place all around the local area, where assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the most reported less serious woundings occurring. The majority of incidents have involved disputes between known associates and neighbours, as well as some cases of domestic violence.
- 2.1.3 Criminal damage against vehicles and dwellings have accounted for the majority of criminal damage offences taking place. In most cases offenders have targeted vehicles parked on the streets and in parking facilities by using objects or implements to smash the glazing in the windows and damage the bodywork of cars, vans and buses. Offenders have also used objects to smash the glazing in the front windows and damage external doors to properties. These offences have mostly occurred during disputes.
- 2.1.4 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed residential scheme, the more detailed analysis below will focus on local domestic burglary and vehicle crime.

2.2 General Risk Factors

- 2.2.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:
- Domestic burglary
 - Theft from gardens, sheds, or garages
 - Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
 - Theft of, or from, vehicles
 - Bogus callers and distraction burglary
 - Anti-social behaviour
 - Neighbour disputes
 - Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
 - Unauthorised access to private spaces
 - Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.3 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.3.1 Using bodily pressure or implements in order to force open secure windows and doors or have been targeted when left insecure by residents.

Possible Solution - All external doors and windows should be certified to recognised security standards, which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.

Clearly defined defensible space between dwelling frontages and the 'street' can provide a degree of separation between public and semi-private space and act as a psychological barrier to some offenders, who are more likely to feel under observation/scrutiny from the street or overlooking properties. Such boundary definitions can also reduce the risk of criminal damage and nuisance/anti-social behaviour. All private spaces to the sides/rear of dwellings should be robustly enclosed, particularly where adjacent to publicly accessible space, to deter unauthorised access. Open pedestrian routes/accessible land to the rear of the properties should be avoided. Lighting to the front and rear of dwellings can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime.

- 2.3.2 Smashed glazing in windows or doors.





Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points.

- 2.3.3 Vehicles have been targeted, particularly when parked on-street.

Possible Solution - It is essential that the development is designed so that resident vehicles are secured and overlooked. It is preferable that all houses either have the provision to garage vehicles or have in-curtilage car parking arrangements, well-overlooked from habitable room windows.




2.4 Local Crime Rate Comparisons

The graphs below compare the local rates of crime (i.e. crimes per 1,000 dwellings) with the average rates for Manchester, Greater Manchester and England & Wales.



- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **59% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **48% lower** than Greater Manchester and **47% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **44% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **24% lower** than Greater Manchester and **45% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **47% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **31% lower** than Greater Manchester and **16% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **35% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **8% higher** than Greater Manchester and **31% higher** than England & Wales.

2.5 Local Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis





2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on Tuesday in the morning (10:00-11:00) and just before midnight (23:00-00:00). Offenders often target dwellings in the morning during the working week when it is likely that the owners are out at work. Offenders also target dwellings at night when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving them the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:

- In cases where the entry point is recorded as 'unknown' it is likely that the offenders have exploited insecure doors.
- Forcing open secure doors using bodily pressure and implements.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Wednesday in the morning (03:00-04:00 and 10:00-11:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles at these times when they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development is to include 14 no. dwellings and a new access road.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposal will bring additional legitimate activity to a currently vacant site. Redevelopment with housing and repopulation of the site should help to generate a sense of ownership and responsibility and improve informal policing of the area.
- 3.2.2 The proposed development will bring activity, overlooking and surveillance to the area during the day and night.
- 3.2.3 The houses will have habitable room windows to their front, maximising surveillance opportunities over the street, parked vehicles and between dwellings.
- 3.2.4 The footprint of the buildings has been kept simple, with no doors hidden in deep recesses or behind building lines (where they would be vulnerable to attack).
- 3.2.5 The majority of the proposed houses will be served by in-curtilage parking spaces directly in front of them, allowing residents to secure/overlook their own vehicles and limiting opportunities to criminals
- 3.2.6 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the dwellings, avoiding the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the developments are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The gates to access the rear garden of plots 5 & 6 should be brought forward in line with the front elevation of the dwelling, so possible offenders cannot operate without being seen.
- 3.3.2 Parking spaces at the sides and rears of dwellings should be illuminated to a high standard to reduce the potential for vehicles to be targeted.
- 3.3.3 Boundaries should be appropriately high and robust. Rear and side boundaries that are adjacent to public space should have a masonry (or other hardwearing) base, with timber fence above to a total height of 2100mm. It is recommended that the top 300mm consist of trellis structure. Rear boundaries adjacent secure areas can 1800mm in height.
- 3.3.4 Access into rear gardens, from front gardens, should be restricted as close to the front elevation of dwellings as possible, to prevent creating a concealed area which could potentially be exploited by offenders.
- 3.3.5 Where there is a communal gate providing access to multiple gardens it should be of robust construction (i.e. metal railings), self-closing, and be capable of being secured from both sides.
- 3.3.6 Front gardens should be well defined with a low boundary treatment or low-level planting (i.e. to an approximate height of 1000mm).
- 3.3.7 The proposed access road should be illuminated to adoptable standard, to reduce the potential for crime and fear of crime.
- 3.3.8 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation in addition to the layout issues highlighted within Section 3.3.

4.1 Doors (Houses)

- ☐ Front and rear doors to dwellings must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222.
- ☐ Any external French/double doors or sliding doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222.
- ☐ Front doors to properties should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key.
- ☐ Front doors should have either fixed sidelights or door viewers.
- ☐ Chain limiters are recommended but not generally essential.
- ☐ Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR A, STS 204, or STS 222.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- ☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.
- ☐ If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ The proposed boundaries comply with the Secured by Design standards – Drawing no. 1351-106 Rev A.
- ☐ Rear boundaries should generally be 1800mm high and of close boarded timber construction. It is recommended that the top 300mm consist of trellis structure.
- ☐ Rear boundaries that are adjacent to public space should have a masonry (or other hardwearing) base, with timber fence above to a total height of 2100mm. It is recommended that the top 300mm consist of trellis structure.
- ☐ Sub-divisional rear boundaries may be as low as 1500mm.

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- ☐ The fronts of properties should be demarcated by low boundaries such as planting and/or railings to an approximate height of 1000mm.
 - ☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.
 - ☐ Gates into the rear curtilage of dwellings should be in keeping with the height of adjacent boundary treatments and incorporate either:
 - A pad lockable bolt to the midpoint of the internal face, or
 - A key operable deadlock

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to the front and rear of dwellings and the apartment building, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible).
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.
- ☐ Parking areas to the rears and sides of houses should be illuminated.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter/graffiti removal
 - Repair to communal areas (access controls, lighting, signage etc.)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. Please see [Secured by Design - Secured by Design](#) for more information. To apply for the SBD Award for your development in Greater Manchester, please visit [Apply for Secured by Design – Design For Security](#).

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
21/11/2025	DK Architects	CIS Application
24/11/2025	DfS	CIS Fee Proposal
01/12/2025	DK Architects	CIS Confirmation
03/12/2025	DfS	Site Visit

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
1351-010	Site Location Plan		
1351-099	Existing Site Plan		
1351-100E	Proposed Site Plan		
1351-101A	House Type A - 1B2P M4-3 Bungalow		
1351-102A	House Type B - 2B4P		
1351-103B	House Type C - 2B4P Corner Unit		
1351-104C	House Type D - 3B6P		
1351-105B	House Type E - 3B6P Corner Unit		
1351-106A	Proposed Boundary Treatments		
1351-107	Proposed Hard Landscaping		
1351-108	Proposed Bin and Cycle Store Strategy		
1351-109	Proposed Site Plan - House Types		
1351-200A	Proposed Street Scenes		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Date	Revisions
A		