

SECURITY NEEDS ASSESSMENT

1-3 York Street, Manchester

46 No. Bedroom Boutique Hotel

FOR: ALLISON PIKE PARTNERSHIP

VERSION A: 6th August 2025

REFERENCE: 2022/0445/ENV/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

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1-3 York Street, Manchester

SECURITY NEEDS ASSESSMENT

The purpose of this document is to achieve the following objectives, to facilitate the creation of secure, and safe, developments:

i. A visual audit of the site and surroundings, identifying environmental cues and features relevant to the security of this development.

ii. Consultation with relevant stakeholders, in order to obtain an understanding of crime and disorder issues in the locality of the development site.

iii. Comprehensive crime pattern analysis of the area surrounding the site to identify the actual risks to this development.

iv. Identification of risks specific to the proposed, likely, or potential use of the buildings or development.

v. Identification of risks specific to the proposed, likely, or potential user groups of the building(s).

vi. Identification of any detrimental effects the development may have on the existing community/local area.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The proposed development is a change of use of the upper floors of the building to a hotel. The existing building has a good level of security with many of the original robust features retained. The building has an active bar/restaurant at ground floor level that generates legitimate activity during the day and in the evening. The entrance to the hotel is located in a visible location and the reception desk is positioned where it can overlook guest and visitors entering the hotel, the plans indicate there will be doors into hotel corridors with can be secured to restrict access to guests and staff. There are a number of recommendations made in section 3 of the report but it is my option that if the development is managed well there is no significant risk of the hotel being targeted by offenders or those antisocially minded.



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
1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located in the city centre area of Manchester, in close proximity to Market Street, Spring Gardens, and the Town Hall.

The site is roughly square in shape and the boundaries are defined by 19 Spring Gardens to the North, to the East by Milk Street, to the South by York Street, and to the West by Spring Gardens.

The site is currently developed and occupied by the Grade II listed Manchester and Liverpool District Bank, an Edwardian bank building constructed in 1902. The ground floor of the building operates as a licensed premises and it is currently occupied by Browns Brasserie and Bar. The main entrance into the building is located on the corner of Spring Gardens and York Street














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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2024 to 30th June 2025.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
16	203	360	3,026	886	336	67	184	16	66

2.1.1 The overall rate of crime over the past 12 months has been high for the Manchester division, with less serious wounding, theft and criminal damage having been the highest recorded offences taking place. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres where there is a higher concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a higher number of crime and disorder issues.

2.1.2 Less serious woundings have occurred throughout the local area, with assaults and public order offences having been the most reported. These incidents have involved disputes between both known and unknown associates, often occurring in the evening and alcohol

2.1.3 In cases of theft offenders have used distraction and pick pocketing techniques to remove items from the person in crowded areas, and have targeted insecure items, bags or coats on tabletops and benches in public spaces, retail outlets and restaurants. There have also been cases of parcel theft from communal areas of apartment buildings.

2.1.4 Criminal damage offences have also occurred throughout the local area, whereby offenders have targeted vehicles by using implements to smash the glazing in windows and dent the bodywork of cars. Offenders have also targeted properties using objects and bodily pressure to damage the external doors and windows, as well as internal furniture, which have mainly occurred during disputes.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 **Offenders Posing as Guests or Legitimate Customers Accessing Staff-Only/Restricted Areas**

Unauthorised individuals may blend in with legitimate guests or visitors, exploiting busy or understaffed moments to access restricted areas such as staff rooms, storage areas, or administrative offices. These areas often contain valuable items, sensitive information, or personal belongings of staff.

- Reception staff should verify the identity and purpose of all visitors. Use sign-in systems and issue temporary access passes only when necessary.
- Use keycard/fob access for staff-only doors, with clear signage indicating restricted access.
- Provide lockable lockers or secure rooms for staff to store personal items.
- Install CCTV in corridors leading to restricted areas to deter and detect unauthorised access.

2.2.2 **Offenders Entering Rooms Using Forged or Stolen Electronic Keycards/Fobs or Exploiting Insecure Doors**

Electronic keycards and fobs can be cloned or stolen, especially if guests leave them unattended. Insecure doors may also be manipulated or bypassed, allowing unauthorised access to guest rooms.

- Use solid core doors (minimum 44mm thick) with reinforced frames to resist tampering.
- Ensure doors are flush fitting with minimal gaps to prevent prying.
- Install auditable access control systems like VingCard/Salto that log each entry attempt, allowing for post-incident review.
- Integrate with hotel management software to deactivate lost/stolen cards immediately.

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- Prevent doors from being left ajar by installing closers that ensure full closure after use.
- Inform guests about the importance of safeguarding their keycards and reporting any loss immediately.

2.2.3 Doors Forced Open with Bodily Pressure or Tools/Implements

Criminals may use brute force or tools to break into rooms, especially if doors are weak or poorly secured. This method is often quick if the door is not built to resist such attacks.

- Use certified doorsets that meet standards such as PAS 24 or LPS 1175. These certifications ensure resistance to forced entry.
- Connect external doors to alarm systems that trigger alerts upon forced entry attempts.
- Conduct routine checks to ensure doors and locks remain in good condition and meet security standards.

2.3 Risk Factors - Hotels

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:


- Burglary of hotel rooms
- Robbery to business
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property
- Unauthorised access to buildings / private space
- Employee theft
- Violence towards staff
- Acts of criminal damage during the construction period

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
2.4 Burglary Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against hotels, recorded in the Manchester area.


Manchester Hotel Burglary – Day Range



Manchester Hotel Burglary – Time Range



Manchester Hotel Burglary – Point of Entry



2.4.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of burglary at Manchester hotels fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Tuesday. During the day, the risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning. It is likely that offenders target hotels at these times when guests are likely to be out of their rooms or when staffing levels are likely to be lower – allowing offender's time to attempt to gain unauthorised access without being detected.

2.4.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:


- Offenders posing as legitimate customers to gain entry before targeting insecure doors/ restricted areas.
- Opening secured doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain access.
- Exploitation of insecure doors to gain entry to hotel room.
- In cases of unknown point of entry offenders have often gained possession of the hotel room key card and accessed the room, removing personal and business property.

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
2.5 Theft Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against hotels, recorded in the Manchester area.

Hotel Theft – Day Range



Hotel Theft – Time Range



2.5.1 Day/ Time Range: The risk of theft at Manchester hotels generally increases over the weekend with the risk of theft increasing around lunchtime and in the evening/early hours of the morning. This is when hotel restaurants, bars and gyms are likely to be at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. It is possible that the risk increases at these times when hotels typically have more guests and the opportunity to carry out such offences is greater. Thefts of personal property (such as mobile phones, bags and purses/wallets) are the most routinely stolen items.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 Full planning permission has been granted to transform the currently vacant first, second, third, and fourth-floor offices into a 46-bedroom boutique hotel, with the reception located on the second floor and associated linen storage, miscellaneous storage, and plant rooms. The proposed changes include creating an accessible entrance by removing steps and lowering the ground floor, undertaking internal renovations for the hotel conversion and service installation, modifying second and third-floor rear windows for glazed-in louvres, adding slate vents to the rear roof, constructing a new lift shaft at the back of the building, and restoring original wall and ceiling finishes in parts of the second, third, and fourth-floor corridors

3.2 Local Impact of the Development

Identification of any detrimental effects the development may have on the existing community.

3.2.1 The proposed development is to change the exiting upper floors of the building to be used as a boutique hotel. The city centre location is an ideal location for a hotel and the site is located in a prominent location. Hotels can be targeted by offenders, but these can be mitigated against with the use of appropriate security measures (i.e. physical and electronic security measures) and it is unlikely that the building is going to have any significant impact on the local area with regards to criminal and antisocial behaviour.

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3.3 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.3.1 The proposed hotel use is appropriate for this city centre location. There are a number of hotels in the local area in close proximity of the site.

3.3.2 The building has a busy bar/restaurant at ground floor which generates legitimate activity in the area and building during the day and in the evening, which can deter offenders or those antisocially minded from operating.

3.3.3 The hotel is well served by public transport, and it is unlikely that guests or staff will need to park for long periods of time away from the building, which could leave their vehicles vulnerable to criminals. If guests are arriving by vehicle there are secure car parks in the area which they can be directed to.

3.3.4 The main entrance to the hotel is positioned on the front elevation of the building, on /York Street, which can be easily viewed from the surrounding area.

3.3.5 The reception area will be located on the second floor, where staff will be able to view and vet anyone who has entered the building before they can access hotel corridors.

3.3.6 The local area is very busy during the day and at night, reducing the potential for criminals to target the building without being seen.

3.3.7 All hotel rooms are located above ground floor, reducing the potential for noise disturbance late at night.

3.4 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.4.1 The main entrance into the building should be capable of operating on an access control system, allowing staff to restrict access at certain times of the day (i.e. in the evening and at night) to prevent unauthorised access into the building.

3.4.2 Doors into hotel room corridors should only be accessible/operable by guest key card, ensuring that access can only be gained by guests of that specific area of the hotel.

3.4.3 Hotel bedroom doors/frames should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick), self-closing, and fitted with auditable access controls secured with an electronic lock (i.e. Onity, VingCard, Saflok, and SALTO). There should be an internal thumb-turn to allow guests to secure the room.

3.4.4 There should be a safe within each hotel room that operates on the same access control system as the bedroom door, or hotel safe with a programmable digital code and have an audit facility.

3.4.5 All doors/frames to staff areas/stores/offices should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and fitted with auditable access controls. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times

3.4.6 There should be a comprehensive CCTV system covering the hotel. Areas that should be covered include the main entrance, stair core, lifts, reception area, and hotel corridors (see section 4.7 for more details).

3.4.7 Staff should be aware of Operation Makesafe and safeguarding, be aware of main signs of potential CSE (child sexual exploitation).

3.4.8 The hotel management should consider membership of the Manchester Hoteliers Association (MHA), who share best practice in security management and recruitment.

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4 Management & Maintenance

4.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the hotel must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the development. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made east for people to raise concerns or report observations.

4.1.2 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Repair to communal areas (such as access controls, CCTV, lighting, signage etc.)
- Litter/graffiti removal

4.1.3 The hotel management should consider membership of the Manchester Hoteliers Association (MHA), who share best practice in security management and recruitment.

4.1.4 All high value equipment (e.g. computers,, flat screen monitors/televisions, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

4.1.5 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the building, but also to deter unauthorised access to back-of-house/staff-only areas.

4.1.6 A strategy should be prepared to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

5 Construction

5.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

5.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

6 Useful References

6.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

6.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

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A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
26/06/2025	Simon Pryce	SNA application received

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
MAB46 AP01 REV H	PART GROUND AND FIRST FLOOR AS PROPOSED		
MAB46 AP02 REV K	SECOND FLOOR PLAN AS PROPOSED		
MAB46 AP03 REV J	THIRD FLOOR PLAN AS PROPOSED		
MAB46 AP04 REV H	FOURTH FLOOR PLAN AS PROPOSED		
MAB46 AP05 REV A	EXISTING & PROPOSED BASEMENT PLANS		
MAB46 AP06	EXISTING ROOF PLAN		
MAB46 AP06	EXISTING ROOF PLAN		
MAB46 AP08	EXISTING EXTERNAL ELEVATIONS 1 OF 2		
MAB46 AP09	EXISTING EXTERNAL ELEVATIONS 2 OF 2		
MAB46 AP10 REV A	PROPOSED EXTERNAL ELEVATIONS 1 OF 2		
MAB46 AP11 REV B	PROPOSED EXTERNAL ELEVATIONS 2 OF 2		
MAB46 AS01 REV A	PART GROUND AND FIRST FLOOR AS EXISTING		
MAB46 AS02 REV A	SECOND FLOOR PLAN AS EXISTING		
MAB46 AS03 REV A	THIRD FLOOR PLAN AS EXISTING		
MAB46 AS04 REV A	FOURTH FLOOR PLAN AS EXISTING		
MAB46 AS05	SITE LOCATION PLAN		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
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