

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

3 no. B2/B8 USE CLASS UNITS WITH ANCILLARY OFFICES
CONCORD BUSINESS PARK, THREAPWOOD ROAD, WYTHENSHAWE

For: Karlin VMH Ltd.
Version A: 03/12/2025
Reference: 2016/0095/CIS/01

designforsecurity

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GREATER MANCHESTER POLICE

Concord Business Park, Threapwood Road, Wythenshawe

URN: 2016/0095/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security additions/improvements required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Secure enclosure of site, particularly robustly where the perimeter could be vulnerable to damage, scaling and penetration (i.e. where the site boundary abuts the footpath through Hatchetts Wood to the west and the rear access road off Hatchett Road/the wooded area to the south).
- Continuation of perimeter fenceline along gable elevation of Unit 3 (adjacent to the 5 no. additional parking spaces), to provide an extra layer of protection to the building shell.
- It is recommended that the gates at the entrance to the site are access-controlled on a 24/7 basis, but at least outside of normal working hours if access is required. Secondary fencelines/gates are recommended to prevent unauthorised access to the service yards and the hidden side/rear elevations of the buildings if/when the site is publicly accessible.
- Control of access into/around the units.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.

Bradley Hart

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site lies to the west of Threapwood Road and to the south of Simonsway in the Wythenshawe area of south Manchester. The site is located within Concord Business Park, comprising of office blocks sat within landscaped grounds.


The site itself is currently formed by a large office block (occupied by Virgin Media) with an access road running around it serving large surface parking areas to the south and west of the building and some smaller areas along the Simonsway frontage of the building. Vehicular access/egress to/from the site is via automatic vehicular barriers on Threapwood Road, with separate pedestrian access points off Simonsway to the north and from the Peel Hall Metrolink stop to the north-east.

The Simonsway frontage of the site is formed by grassland and mature trees/vegetation – some of which obscures views of and from the street.

There are heavily wooded areas to the immediate east, south and west of the site, which includes a footpath link along the western boundary of the site linking Simonsway to Hatchett Road (a residential road which features a rear access route along part of the southern boundary of the site). These routes are separated from the site by dilapidated timber and chain link fencing, with high welded-wire mesh fencing topped with barbed wire behind to the site itself – indicating that issues with unauthorised access may have been experienced in the past.

Open land/routes adjacent to (and particularly to the rear of) buildings and sites can often lead to nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues and secluded routes can leave legitimate users intimidated/vulnerable, particularly after dark. Adjacent sites/premises can also often be vulnerable to unauthorised access, as they can provide easy access/escape routes that benefit from little/no natural surveillance or direct overlooking.

The wider surrounding area includes residential estates to the north and east (interspersed with areas of landscaping) and Atlas Business Park and Ringway Trading Estate to the south-east, beyond which is JetParks Ringway airport parking.





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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Local Crime Summary

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st November 2024 to 31st October 2025.

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
11	<5	28	127	16	<5	<5	11	5	<5

2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area is relatively low for the Manchester division, with the less serious wounding being by far the most prevalent type of recorded crime.


2.1.2 Recorded crime occurs through the local area, with particular concentrations in the primarily residential areas to the north-east (around/off Peel Hall Road/Calve Croft Road), north-west (around/off Brownley Road/Simonsway) and south (around/off Shadowmoss Way/Portway) of the site. Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the most commonly reported less serious woundings, with the majority of incidents involving disputes between known associates and neighbours.

2.1.3 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed industrial/office development, the more detailed analysis below will look at use-specific burglary and theft and local vehicle crime.


2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Industrial): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against industrial units, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.

Manchester Industrial Burglary – Day Range



Manchester Industrial Burglary – Time Range




2.2.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of burglary at Manchester industrial premises peaks on Sunday/Monday.

2.2.2 Time Range: During the day, the risk peaks late at night and during the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target such commercial premises at these times when it is dark, industrial areas/streets are typically quiet, units are usually closed or operate with fewer staff and offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.

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Manchester Industrial Burglary – Point of Entry




2.2.3 Point of Entry: At Manchester industrial premises, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure shutters using bodily pressure and implements (particularly metal bars and vehicles) in order to gain access.
- In a number of cases, the point of entry was 'unknown'. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers, visitors or employees before gaining access to back-of-house/staff areas and stealing property unnoticed.
- Doors have been forced open using tools/implements or when they have been left insecure by members of staff.
- Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.
- Offenders have penetrated through walls and roofs to gain unauthorised access.


2.3 Theft (Manchester Industrial): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against industrial units, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.

Manchester Office Theft – Day Range



Manchester Office Theft – Time Range



2.3.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of theft from industrial units in Manchester peaks on Saturday.


2.3.2 Time Range: During the day, the risk peaks during the late morning/afternoon. There are two common occurrences of theft – the theft of personal property within buildings (e.g. cash, bags, wallets/purses etc.) and the theft of tools, materials and plant stolen from service yards.

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
2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Offices): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.


M/cr Manchester Office Burglary – Day Range



M/cr Manchester Office Burglary – Time Range



M/cr Manchester Office Burglary – Point of Entry



2.4.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester is greatest on Tuesday, Thursday and Sunday.

2.4.2 Time Range: During the day, the risk of burglary at Manchester office premises rises into the evening/late at night. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.


2.4.3 Point of Entry: The majority of burglaries at offices in Manchester have been committed through doors. Burglaries against office buildings in this area do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing tools with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks. Offenders have also smashed glazed panels in doors and windows to gain entry. A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through 'unknown' and 'legitimate' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.

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
2.5 Theft (Manchester Offices): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.

Manchester Office Theft – Day Range



Manchester Office Theft – Time Range



2.5.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester offices is greatest on Monday and Tuesday and is generally lower over the weekend (when many are shut).

2.5.2 Time Range: During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking around midday. During these times, many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out.

2.6 General Risk Factors

2.6.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery of businesses
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Employee theft
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.7 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.7.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting Manchester industrial and office premises are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Manchester Industrial: Forcing open secure shutters using bodily pressure and implements (particularly metal bars and vehicles) in order to gain access.

  Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Sections 4.1/4.2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack. Avoid locating shutters in concealed areas where a concerted attack from

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an offender is unlikely to be witnessed. Ensure that parked vehicles and stored materials do not obscure sight lines.

- Manchester Industrial & Offices: In a number of cases, the point of entry was 'unknown'. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers, visitors or employees before gaining access to back-of-house/staff areas and stealing property unnoticed.

  Possible Solution – There should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that callers to units are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed access into them (see Section 4.1/4.4). All individual rooms/areas should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be secure areas for staff to store their belongings while at work. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour.

- Manchester Industrial & Offices: Doors have been forced open using tools/implements or when they have been left insecure by members of staff.

  Possible Solution - Although the location of doors should be considered (ideally placed where they can be readily observed, so that potential criminals would be more easily detected), it is inevitable that some will be located where they will benefit from lower levels of natural surveillance. All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV (see Sections 4.6, 4.8 & 4.9) can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.

- Manchester Industrial & Offices: Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.

  Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. Windows that are particularly vulnerable should be secured with security-certified shutters out-of-hours (see Section 4.2).

- Manchester Industrial: Offenders have penetrated through walls and roofs to gain unauthorised access.

  Possible Solution - Ideally, single storey building elements should be avoided. If they are absolutely necessary, care should be taken in their design to ensure that roof areas or upper floor windows are not accessible, for example, with the use of high-level/overhanging eaves, high balustrades etc. There should be no features of the building or any nearby hard/soft landscaping features that would facilitate climbing. Any 'accessible' skylights should incorporate at least one pane of laminated glazing and should be secured with internally fixed grilles/bars to prevent unauthorised access. The construction of the roof itself and all external walls should also be robust enough to withstand penetration (see Section 4.3).

- Manchester Industrial: Theft of externally stored materials, tools and plant equipment

  Possible Solution - The integrity of the boundary treatments should be evaluated and regularly checked for defects. Inappropriately parked vehicles/trailers and other externally stored items can obscure the spread of lighting and CCTV coverage, creating potential areas of intense shadowing and blind spots. It is recommended that this is considered in the external arrangement, and 'no store/park' areas specifically identified to avoid inadvertently blocking surveillance. Storage/parking areas close to boundaries should also be avoided as they may mask any damage to perimeter fencing (see Section 4.11).

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

3.1.1 The proposal is to demolish the existing office building and erect 3 no. B2/B8 units with ancillary offices, along with associated parking and landscaping. The proposed scheme will be enclosed with 2400mm high welded-wire mesh fencing, with vehicular and pedestrian gates at the site entrance off Threapwood Road to the east. Each of the units will feature an entrance lobby with W/C, a ground floor warehouse space (with potential shower/changing/locker positions with tenants to install) and mezzanine office space, with a safeguarded external area for future sprinkler tanks to be installed by tenants.

3.1.2 Unit 1 will be located to the north of the site and will be served by a service yard (comprising of 1 no. HGV dock, 2 no. level access loading bays and a 25m turning circle) and a car park (including 28 no. spaces), as well as a long stay cycle store for 20 no. cycles, 10 no. short stay cycle spaces and a bin store.

3.1.3 Unit 2 lies to the west of the site and will be served by a gated service yard (comprising of 2 no. HGV docks, 2 no. level access loading bays and a 25m turning circle) and a car park (including 28 no. spaces), in addition to a long stay cycle store for 24 no. cycles, 10 no. short stay cycle spaces and a bin store.

3.1.4 Unit 3 will be located to the south of the site and will be served by a service yard (comprising of 3 no. HGV docks, 2 no. level access loading bays and a 25m turning circle) and a car park (including 35 no. spaces and an additional 5 no. spaces along the eastern elevation, outside of the site perimeter), as well as a long stay cycle store for 28 no. cycles, 10 no. short stay cycle spaces and a bin store.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The proposed development will continue to provide activity and surveillance to the area when the units are operational.

3.2.2 All vehicular and HGV access to and egress from the site will be via Threapwood Road, allowing all activity, surveillance and security to be focussed in a single formalised location.

3.2.3 The site will be enclosed within a secure site perimeter fenceline – providing an additional layer of protection to the building shells (particularly out-of-hours) and allowing for the management of legitimate access/prevention of unauthorised access.

3.2.4 Some of the buildings will front towards the car parks serving them, allowing employees to partially overlook their vehicles from routinely occupied rooms. The main entrance to each unit will be located in a prominent position, where it can be clearly seen from the parking areas and the access road.

3.2.5 The proposed car parking/servicing areas will be located directly in front/to the side of the units and will be overlooked, to some degree, from within the buildings themselves.

3.2.6 The footprint of the buildings is simple, with no recesses that could provide cover for covert criminal activity. The buildings will also be sufficiently tall enough to make unauthorised access to the roof difficult.


3.2.7 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design/construction of the scheme. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design/specification of the development can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

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
3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 As proposed, the site perimeter will be formed by 2400mm high Paladin fencing, with vehicular and pedestrian gates at the main entrance off Threapwood Road. It is highly recommended that the perimeter is formed by welded-wire mesh fencing to a police preferred specification (see Section 4.6), ideally 358 gauge that would be harder to penetrate or scale. Where the site boundary abuts the footpath through Hatchetts Wood to the west and the rear access road behind the properties on Hatchett Road and the wooded area to the south – where offenders could access particularly hidden portions of the perimeter fenceline and operate for extended periods of time without being seen – consideration should be given to the fencing being higher (e.g. 3000mm high) to provide some extra protection. It is highly recommended that a comprehensive survey of the land along the public side of the fenceline is undertaken, to ensure that any external features that may form climbing aids (such as tree branches etc.) are removed or pruned where necessary (again, see Section 4.6 for more information). Care must also be taken to ensure that the panels marked as 'demountable to allow maintenance or existing sewer below' are securely fixed when in place to prevent removal by offenders.



3.3.2 Part of the gable elevation of Unit 3, adjacent to the 5 no. additional parking spaces serving the unit, lies outside of the perimeter fencing and will be accessible off the access road serving the site. This may leave the fabric of the building itself vulnerable to damage and attack/penetration (particularly out-of-hours). It is highly recommended that the fenceline is continued along the façade (see illustration opposite, with fenceline highlighted in red) to provide an extra layer of protection to the building shell.



- *2400mm high perimeter fenceline*
- *Access-controlled gates to site entrance*
- *3000mm high perimeter fenceline to particularly vulnerable areas*
- *Secondary fencelines to secure service yards and hidden elevations of the buildings if gates to main site entrance are left open during normal working hours*

Given the site will include 3 no. units and multiple users (providing the opportunity for offenders to gain access to the site anonymously, without being challenged), consideration should be given to the gates at the entrance to the site being automatically operated at all times, in order to prevent unauthorised access during operational hours as well as at night/when closed. The vehicular and pedestrian gates should be operated on access and egress by staff key fob/proximity reader or via an audio/video access control system linked to each unit – ensuring that visitors are vetted before being allowed access. If the gate/s must be left open during operational hours, they should at least be secured and operated via access controls if staff access is required outside of normal working hours (e.g. 6pm-7am). Manual gates securing such sites with multiple users are unlikely to be utilised effectively. If the estate is to be open/accessible during the day, it is highly recommended that secondary fencelines/gates (which could be lower) are incorporated to prevent unauthorised access to the service yards serving the units and the hidden side/rear elevations of the units at all times of the day (see opposite for illustration & Sections 4.4/4.6 for more details).

3.3.4 The control of access into and around the units themselves will also be paramount to their security. Ideally, entrance lobbies should be staffed at all times when the units are operational, allowing staff to have full surveillance of everyone entering/leaving the premises. All visitors should report to a reception for vetting by staff before gaining access to the rest of the unit. In the absence of a staffed reception, the main entrance doors should be capable of being controlled remotely by office or warehouse staff, to prevent unauthorised access. All individual offices or rooms housing sensitive/desirable items should be capable of being secured when unoccupied (see Sections 4.1/4.4). If the estate is to be open/accessible during the day, it is essential that that the service yards and loading bay doors of the

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units are not left insecure and unattended at any time, which would allow offenders to circumnavigate the access-controlled main entrances.

3.3.5 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in staff and visitors.

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4 Physical Security

In addition to the layout issues highlighted within Section 3, the following checklist forms the physical security requirements for the scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

It is recognised that if the units are being constructed on a speculative basis, some of the security measures for each of the individual units listed below (such as access-controlled entrances and intruder alarms) may be for the end owners/occupiers of the units to install rather than the developers. However, they would be required for the scheme as a whole to achieve the full SBD Award.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ All external doors (single and double leaf) must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, LPS 1175 B3/SR2 or STS 202 BR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ Access through the main entrance of each unit should be capable of being controlled remotely by reception staff if/when required or by office staff if a reception desk is not staffed at any point), to ensure any visitors are vetted or are greeted/escorted before being allowed access into the building (see Section 4.4 for more information).
- ☐ Any sectional loading bay doors must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 B3/SR2. If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- ☐ Internal doors/frames to any offices, meeting rooms, back-of-house plant/service/stores etc. within the units should be robust/solid-core (minimum 44mm thick) and capable of being secured when unoccupied. Staff should be able to store their belongings in a secure area while at work.

4.2 Windows & Shutters

- ☐ All windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 B3/SR2. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be fixed with a secure glazing retention system (e.g. with security glazing tape, with a dedicated security sealant/gasket or a secure mechanical fixing system from the glazing retention tests within the BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 standards)
- ☐ Any ground floor and any other easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ If shutters are to be installed, they should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 B3/SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Ideally, any external shutters should have shutter-boxes and guides built into the fabric of the buildings – where they would be less vulnerable to attack and less visually intrusive.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ The inner pane within double-glazed glazing units at ground floor level (or where otherwise accessible) should have no less than a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under BS EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ If there are to be any vision panels within loading bay doors that cannot include laminated glazing, they should include a material of a similar strength (e.g. multi-layer acrylic/polycarbonate or hammerglass) to ensure they are resistant to shattering and penetration.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall (or a material of similar strength, such as welded-steel or expamet mesh) behind any cladding to the buildings, to a minimum height of 2000mm from external ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the buildings itself is not vulnerable to attack.

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☐ Any louvres to plant areas should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed, and designed to ensure that they cannot be used as a climbing aid to reach upper floor windows. Security-certified louvered doorsets are also available if required (search SBD compliant products at Secured by Design).

☐ There should be no features of the building (such as projecting canopies/window cills, exposed rainwater down pipes, projecting steel frame/cladding features etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby lighting columns, handrails, street furniture etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to upper floor windows or over boundaries.

☐ Where glazed elevations are potentially accessible to vehicles, they should be protected by anti-ram bollards.

4.4 Access Controls

☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads (which can be easily observed/shared and are rarely changed). The following doors/gates should operate on access control:

- The pedestrian and vehicular gates at the entrance to the site, controlled on access and egress (i.e. no induction loop) via staff key-fob/proximity reader or via an audio/visual access-control system linked to each unit. The gate/s should ideally be secured and operate via the access-control system on a 24/7 basis, but at least outside of normal working hours if staff access is required (e.g. 6pm-7am).
- The main entrance doors to each unit if/when required outside of normal working hours or when reception is not staffed (operated by staff card/key-fob and via video access controls linked to the reception/offices/warehouse).
- Any internal doors providing access to obvious high risk areas e.g. server rooms, storage areas, staff changing facilities/lockers etc. (operated by authorised staff card/key-fob only).
- Doors to any staff changing facilities/lockers operated by staff key-card.

☐ The electric locking system to be used throughout the site/units should be fully auditable (i.e. allowing the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Staff cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled to ensure that mis-use is prevented. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work and keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

4.5 Alarms

☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to each unit, linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

4.6 Boundaries

☐ The site perimeter should be defined by 2400-3000mm high security, rigid-panel, welded-wire mesh fencing and gates (ideally 358 gauge with small apertures to deter scaling and cutting, particularly along the vulnerable western and southern boundaries) with anti-tamper fixings to secure the panels to posts - please see illustration within Section 3.3 and Product Category Search for a list of Police approved perimeter security suppliers. A sliding vehicular gate is preferred to the site entrance (which is easier to operate and secure remotely), but if double gates must be used they should overlap when closed and should not be capable of being forced open.

☐ Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of retaining walls and fencing should have panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid. Care should also be taken to ensure that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and the gates should be located away from other climbing aids,



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such as low walls, streetlights, trees etc. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. The gap at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.

- ☐ The service yards and the hidden sides/rears of the units should be secured with 2100mm high secondary fencelines and gates if the main entrance gates are to remain open during normal working hours (see Section 3.3 for illustration), in order to prevent unauthorised access to the service areas and hidden elevations/doors of the units during operational hours. If panic mechanisms are required on the inner face of any pedestrian gates for escape purposes, they should not be capable of being reached/operated from the external face of the fencelines/gates. Gates to service yards should not be left open/unattended at any time.
- ☐ Care should also be taken to ensure there are no trees or any other hard/soft landscaping features immediately adjacent and on the publicly accessible side of any secure boundaries that could be used as a climbing aid to scale the fencing. Any such features should be pruned or removed where possible. The site boundary treatment should also be positioned on hard standing ground. Where this is not possible, the ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary.
- ☐ It is highly recommended that the condition of the fencing along the perimeter of the site is regularly inspected for signs of damage/attack and is repaired immediately if any incidents are experienced. Where exposed, the perimeter fencing to the service yards should be protected on the inner side from potential damage from large vehicles, using crash barriers or rails, to deflect any encroachment and maintain a secure boundary.
- ☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.

4.7 Parking Areas

- ☐ Lighting to all parking areas should be in accordance with BS 5489, with an average lux level 20 and a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- ☐ The surface of the parking/service areas should be even tarmac or concrete. The integrity of the surface treatment should be maintained to ensure that there is no loose material that can be used to commit crime.
- ☐ Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated to avoid confusion or conflict, with pedestrian routes/directions clearly signed.
- ☐ Where feasible, traffic calming measures should be incorporated to limit the speed of vehicles within the site.

4.8 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to all parking/servicing areas and service routes within the site, in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Fittings should produce ‘white’ light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Dusk ‘til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors and loading bay doors.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.9 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Suitable locations for this scheme would be: the entrance to the site, all service/parking areas, the external facades and main entrance/lobby of each unit and access to any internal areas/rooms housing sensitive/dangerous equipment. Designers should consider the following guidance when planning a CCTV strategy:

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- Resolution and Identification - Select camera resolution based on identification requirements and field of view. More megapixels provide higher detail, but also increase bandwidth and storage requirements. Recommended resolution levels:
  - 1080p (2MP): General indoor and corridor surveillance.
  - 4MP–8MP (4K): Entrances, exits, and high-security areas for facial or number plate recognition.
  - >8MP: Large-area coverage or post-event digital zooming.
- Image Quality - High-quality imaging is the foundation of effective CCTV. Selecting cameras with the right sensor size, lens aperture, and image processing capabilities ensures accurate visual data capture across lighting conditions. Key considerations:
  - Larger sensors and low f-number lenses capture more light and deliver better contrast.
  - Use Wide Dynamic Range (WDR) cameras for scenes with bright and dark areas.
  - Apply Day/Night and IR-capable cameras for low-light performance.
  - Frame rates between 25–30 fps are recommended for motion clarity.
- Camera Placement and Coverage - Camera placement directly affects image usability. Ensure coverage overlap and proper mounting height to minimise blind spots. Placement principles:
  - Mount indoor cameras between 2500–3000mm high to prevent tampering while retaining facial detail.
  - Outdoor cameras should be positioned to avoid glare and direct sunlight.
  - Slight overlap of camera fields ensures seamless coverage.
  - Combine wide-angle lenses for area coverage and narrow lenses for detail zones.
- Environmental and Housing Considerations - Outdoor and exposed cameras must withstand environmental and mechanical impacts. Select housings rated for weather and vandal resistance.
  - Minimum IP65/66 for outdoor use.
  - IK10 or equivalent vandal-resistant enclosures.
  - Integrated IR or Optimized IR functions for low-light areas.
  - Avoid steep downward angles; maintain clear facial perspective.
- Network and System Design - Design the video system architecture around IP-based network cameras for scalability, reliability, and flexibility. Core design elements:
  - Use Power over Ethernet (PoE) to simplify installation.
  - Calculate bandwidth and storage based on resolution, frame rate, and retention time.
  - Apply compression standards (H.264/H.265) to optimise storage.
  - Ensure strong cybersecurity: password protection, encryption, network segmentation.
- Maintenance and Quality Assurance - Routine inspection and maintenance are critical to sustaining image quality and reliability:
  - Perform day/night checks post-installation.
  - Clean lenses regularly and inspect mounting fixtures.
  - Review recorded footage to confirm identification quality.
  - Update firmware and review network security periodically.

4.10 Landscaping

☐ In vulnerable locations such as around site/building frontages and entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow unimpeded surveillance and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.

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☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

4.11 Other

☐ The position of ancillary structures, parked trailers and any external storage areas should be carefully considered in relation to the following:

- Their potential to block sight lines and create hiding places.
- Their potential to obscure CCTV and lighting.
- Their potential to create climbing aids that would assist unauthorised exit/entry over boundary fencing.
- Their potential to obscure damage to fencelines.

Any proposed lighting columns, street furniture, tree/shrub planting etc. within or external to the site perimeter should also be reviewed in relation to the above issues.

☐ Any cycle parking areas should be located where they can be well-overlooked from routinely occupied rooms within the building and should ideally include individual secure lockers (for example Diamond Rated Secure Cycle Lockers UK Wide | BikeAway Warrior Cycle Lockers) or at least 'Sheffield' type stands, which both wheels and the crossbar can be locked to rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: Downloads – Design For Security.

☐ Any external bin/recycling stores should be secure, lockable and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

☐ Any lockers within staff changing facilities must be robust/secure and all users should be encouraged to use them and not leave belongs unattended in changing areas. Staff should undertake regular inspections of any changing facilities or locker areas.

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5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the units must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the building. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:

- Opening and closing the site/units, including staff arrival and departure;
- Management of deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
- Details of staff security training;
- Location and management of any smoking areas;
- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. access control systems, alarm systems, CCTV cameras, lighting etc;
- Frequent physical check of all perimeter fencing to check for evidence of breaches;
- Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc;
- Refuse collection arrangements; and
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees.

5.1.2 Any high value equipment within communal areas (e.g. computers, televisions, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

5.1.3 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left in the street for extended periods/overnight. Servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods.

5.1.4 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the site/units, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff-only/back-of-house areas.

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. Please see Secured by Design - Secured by Design for more information. To apply for the SBD Award for your development in Greater Manchester, please visit Apply for Secured by Design – Design For Security.

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A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
5th November 2025	Adail	Receipt of CIS instruction form & site plan
6th November 2025	Adail	Quote issued & request for additional info
7th November 2025	Adail	Confirmation of instruction/fee & receipt of additional plans
3rd December 2025	Adail	Email correspondence re: report completion & payment
4th December 2025	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
21701-THPL-XX-XX-DR-A-110	Proposed Site Plan – Option 1 (SUPERSEDED)	5.10.25	P04
21701-THPL-XX-XX-DR-A-110	Proposed Site Plan – Option 1	6.11.25	P05
21701-THPL-XX-XX-DR-A-111	Proposed Unit 1 Ground Floor Plan	6.11.25	P01
21701-THPL-XX-XX-DR-A-112	Proposed Unit 1 First Floor Plan	6.11.25	P01
21701-THPL-XX-XX-DR-A-113	Proposed Unit 1 Roof Plan	6.11.25	P01
21701-THPL-XX-XX-DR-A-114	Proposed Unit 2 Ground Floor Plan	6.11.25	P01
21701-THPL-XX-XX-DR-A-115	Proposed Unit 2 First Floor Plan	6.11.25	P01
21701-THPL-XX-XX-DR-A-116	Proposed Unit 2 Roof Plan	6.11.25	P01
21701-THPL-XX-XX-DR-A-117	Proposed Unit 3 Ground Floor Plan	6.11.25	P01
21701-THPL-XX-XX-DR-A-118	Proposed Unit 3 First Floor Plan	6.11.25	P01
21701-THPL-XX-XX-DR-A-119	Proposed Unit 3 Roof Plan	6.11.25	P01
21701-THPL-XX-XX-DR-A-120	Proposed Unit 1 Sections	6.11.25	P01
21701-THPL-XX-XX-DR-A-121	Proposed Unit 2 Sections	6.11.25	P01
21701-THPL-XX-XX-DR-A-122	Proposed Unit 3 Sections	6.11.25	P01
21701-THPL-XX-XX-DR-A-123	Proposed Unit 1 Elevations	6.11.25	P01
21701-THPL-XX-XX-DR-A-124	Proposed Unit 2 Elevations	6.11.25	P01
21701-THPL-XX-XX-DR-A-125	Proposed Unit 3 Elevations	6.11.25	P01

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Date	Revisions
A		

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D Glossary

Physical Security Standards

PAS 24

Enhanced security performance requirements for doorsets and windows in the UK. Doorsets and windows intended to offer a level of security suitable for dwellings and other buildings exposed to comparable risk. It is designed to mimic an attack by an opportunist burglar, using tools which are easy to conceal.

STS 201

Enhanced security to satisfy the requirements for certification of doorsets, equivalent to test standard to PAS 24.

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors, roller shutters, fences and barriers. Products are rated via the term Burglary Resistance (BR) and range from BR1 (lower security rating) to BR6 (higher security rating).

LPS 1175

Physical security for products manufactured for perimeter, façade, internal spaces and entrapment protection. The higher the security rating, the more formidable the security product.

Developed following extensive consultation with stakeholders, the most recent issue sees the previous single digit performance classifications (i.e. Security Ratings 1 to 8) extended to one formed of two elements that illustrate performance in terms of:

- *Threat level (first element) – Letter (A to H) corresponding with the tool kit used to evaluate the product's intruder resistance and number of attackers involved.*
- *Delay (second element) – Numeric value (1, 3, 5, 10, 15 or 20) corresponding with the minimum delay (in minutes) provided by the product when placed in a locked condition.*

BS EN 1627

European standard for the burglary resistance of pedestrian doorsets, windows, curtain walling, grilles and shutters. It defines six resistance classes, from RC1 to RC6, with RC1 being the lowest level of resistance and RC6 the highest. These classes indicate the level of resistance to forced entry, with higher classes requiring more time and specialized tools to breach.

BS EN 356

European standard that specifies the resistance of laminated glazing (i.e. two or more layers of glass bonded together with a plastic interlayer) to manual attacks, such as might occur during forced entry or vandalism. It classifies laminated glass into different resistance levels, ranging from P1A to P8B, with P1A being the lowest and P8B the highest.

Useful Websites

Design For Security – Designing Out Crime *– apply for Crime Impact Statements or the Secured by Design Award from Greater Manchester Police*

Secured by Design - Secured by Design *– SBD Award Scheme, Design Guides and Member Companies*

ParkMark - Home *– Park Mark Safer Parking Award Scheme*

NBS Source *– find, select and specify building products (including security-certified products)*

RedBook Live - LPCB Red Book *– search for LPS 1175 certified products*

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