CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Development of new entertainment venue
Alan Turing Way

For: Manchester City Football Club
Version A: 20/01/26
Reference: 2025/0440/CIS/01

designforsecurity

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GREATER MANCHESTER POLICE

Alan Truing Way

URN: 2025/0440/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Application supported

This development has been assessed using the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' in order to identify any opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The proposed development is welcomed. The design of the scheme is very positive from a pedestrian safety perspective, with an interest in maintaining a safe and secure environment.

Given the levels of crime in the area currently, it is also likely that offenders will be attracted to the development. Consequently, the site and the premises within it will need to be secure, with security an integral element of the design and management of the development.

In general, the proposed scheme has been found acceptable, but further consideration of some aspects is advised, as stated in section 3.3 of this report:

- Staffing and monitoring of main entrances to event space to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising.
- Employ management staff/security staff to assist event building staff and monitor customers, especially at the busier times on event days, evenings and weekends in particular.
- Access & maintenance control within the building and BOH areas
- Landscaping design and features within the public realm to be robust
- Lighting within the public realm
- Event management plan
- Car parking

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

This study area is bounded by Gibbson St (access road off Alan Turing Way), The metro line to the north of the site and the Etihad Stadium and hotel development to the southwest and car parking to the immediate southern boundary and Alan Turing Way to the east.

The wider area contains a mix of uses ranging from private residential (semi-detached streets and apartment blocks) to the east, large retail & food outlets, sports facilities, public realm and associated car parking.

The site is located within the Man City Etihad estate and is a key destination on the periphery of the city centre. The surrounding area of SportsCity contains sporting attractions such as the Etihad stadium, an athletics stadium, indoor tennis & the national squash centre.

The proposed site is afforded excellent public transport links; with local bus routes and two tram stops in close vicinity. Vehicle transport routes to the site are provided along Alan Turning Way, with good links to, in and around the city. In addition to the public transport & vehicle routes there are two public walking routes from the city to SportsCity, approx. 1.5miles from Piccadilly train station.

The entire campus boundaries of the site are currently fenced off with 2.4m+ high weld-mesh fencing. There are a number of gated vehicle and pedestrian access points located around the campus. There is no direct access to the site from the canal tow path.


1 – View east of site from within the Etihad campus.

2 –View north towards the COOP Live.


3 – View south towards the Etihad stadium.

7 – View west over the Ashton canal.

6 – Existing water tanks behind boundary fencing.

5 – Existing car park.

4 – View east along Gibbson St access road off Alan Turing Way.

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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Local Crime Summary

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st December 2024 to 30th November 2025.

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
<5	<5	33	289	45	17	6	19	<5	6

2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the past 12 months has been average for the Manchester division, with less serious wounding, criminal damage and theft having been most commonly reported. The site is located close to a number of sports and events venues which often increases the likelihood of crime and disorder issues. The majority of offences have taken place at hotspots within these venues, as well as at the Etihad Campus tram stop and around Bradford Road to the north.

2.1.2 Less serious woundings have taken place throughout the local area, particularly at the hotspots mentioned above. Assaults and public order offences have been most reported less serious woundings, with incidents often involving altercations between fans attending sports and music events, as well as disputes between staff and customers in retail outlets. There have also been some cases of domestic violence in the residential neighbourhoods in the wider area.

2.1.3 Criminal damage offences have also occurred all throughout the local area, whereby offenders have targeted vehicles parked on streets or within parking facilities by using implements to dent or scratch the bodywork and smash the glazing in the windows of cars. There have also been cases of offenders damaging the external doors and windows of properties, which have mainly happened during disputes with alcohol consumption often being a factor.

2.1.4 Theft offences have predominantly occurred within the sports and events venues where offenders have targeted insecure items, coats or bags left on or under tables and benches, as well as used pickpocketing and distraction techniques in order to obtain items stored on the person such as mobile phones, wallets and purses.

2.1.5 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed entertainment development, the more detailed analysis below will look at use-specific burglary and theft and local vehicle crime.

2.2 Risk Factors – Theatre Venues

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Theft of personal property
- Unauthorised access to buildings and private spaces
- Acts of criminal damage during the construction period
- Criminal damage
- Theft of/from vehicles

2.3 Risk Factors – Licenced Premises

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Cash robbery
- Burglary
- Criminal damage to property

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- Controlled access
- Employee theft
- Theft of personal property
- Loitering groups/Anti-social behaviour
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.4 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.4.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting entertainment and sports uses are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

2.4.2 Mcr. Entertainment Facilities: Offenders have forced open doors using bodily pressure and implements/tools, smashed glazed panels within doors or targeted them when left insecure by staff.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV (see Sections 4.6, 4.8 and 4.9) can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by staff, users or passers-by.

2.4.3 Mcr. Entertainment Facilities: Windows have also been targeted, with offenders prised them open, removing the beading/glazing or smashing the glazing to gain unauthorised access.

Possible Solution - All windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. In vulnerable locations, shutters, external bars or perforated protective panels may be necessary to provide extra protection.

2.4.4 Mcr. Entertainment Facilities: Offenders have gained access to insecure rooms/areas unnoticed, before targeting school equipment.

Possible Solution – There should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that visitors to the building are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed access to all areas. All visitors should report to reception for vetting before gaining further access into the school. Reception staff should be given flexibility over permitting access into the building at different times of the day. Effective access controls within the buildings should assist in restricting entry to vulnerable areas.

2.4.5 Mcr. Entertainment Facilities: Shutters have been forced upwards to gain unauthorised access or to access doors/windows behind them.

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack.

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2.5 Non-Domestic Burglary (GM Event Spaces): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against event spaces, recorded in the Greater Manchester area.

GM Event Spaces Burglary – Day Range



GM Event Spaces Burglary – Time Range



2.5.1 Day/Time Range: During the week, the risk of burglary at event spaces in Greater Manchester peaks on Monday and Sunday, when they are less likely to be in use. During the day, the risk peaks in the evening/late at night, when they are likely to be closed or have fewer employees on-site, meaning offenders perceive a lower risk of being detected.

GM Event Spaces Burglary – Point of Entry



2.5.2 Point of Entry: At Greater Manchester event spaces, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:

- Doors have been targeted most frequently, with offenders forcing them with implements/bodily pressure or targeting them.
- Shutters have also been forced open to gain access to premises or the doors/windows behind them.

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2.6 Theft (GM Event Spaces): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against event space, recorded in the Greater Manchester area.

GM Event Space Theft – Day Range



GM Event Space Theft – Time Range



2.6.1 Day/Time Range: During the week, the risk of theft at event spaces in Greater Manchester peaks on Saturday, when venues are often at their busiest. During the day, the risk peaks late at night – with offenders targeting the belongings of customers/patrons and staff (particularly mobile phones and purses/wallets), often by using pick pocketing and distraction techniques.

2.7 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.7.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Wednesday in the evening (21:00-22:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles at this time when they tend to be left unattended and out of sight of owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

3.1.1 The proposed development comprises a 600-capacity entertainment venue for an immersive show-experience. The proposed development will be temporary in nature and dismantled at the end of the 5-year period.

3.1.2 Full Planning Permission is sought for a temporary use (5 year period).

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The new development will create a controlled entrance area allowing staff to observe user movement in, out and around the proposal. Increasing the staff control of the entrance and improvements in natural surveillance within the scheme provides a safe and enjoyable experience for all users.

3.2.2 The increased activity, improved lighting and natural surveillance associated with the development will greatly enhance the experience of the range of users and pedestrian in this section of Manchester.

3.2.3 Opening the views across the zones and plots will facilitate mutual surveillance between the courts and the public realm spaces around.

3.2.4 The proposed development will be within range of the existing comprehensive CCTV system for the wider Etihad campus estate.

3.2.5 Event management staff will direct diners through the public realm/Etihad campus to the building prior & post event hours.

3.2.6 The public realm space will help to support event goers to meet up in a managed and safe environment for all.

3.2.7 The increased activity and natural surveillance associated with the development will greatly enhance the experience within the immediate Etihad campus.

3.2.8 The proposed building will be suitably secure and incorporate the latest technologies allowing for an auditable tracking system for the operators.

3.2.9 A comprehensive operating management plan has been prepared and developed in relation to the event team(s), estate management team and the existing security team.

3.2.10 The proposal will generate greater legitimate activity over longer periods and will help to increase informal policing of the area.

3.2.11 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the dwellings, avoiding the need for obtrusive retrofitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the developments are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

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3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 Any planting should avoid creating concealed areas or hiding places, and should not obscure sight lines close to circulation areas. The position of trees should be devised in conjunction with lighting and CCTV proposals in order to avoid blocking effective coverage. Account should be taken of the likely growth characteristics and maintenance regime.

3.3.2 No long-term (over the course of an event), event user car parking within 30m of the building, to provide adequate standoff when considering vehicle borne IEDs.

3.3.3 Any glazing to proposed elevations along or in close proximity to crowded pedestrian routes should incorporate laminated glass (see section 4.3 for further detail).

3.3.4 Consideration for safe bicycle storage should be embedded within the landscape design of the wider campus. Short-stay cycle parking stands should be located where they can be readily observed. The location of cycle stores within area should consider the position, inherent physical security and safety of cyclists using the facility. Cycle stands should be located 30m from the building to provide adequate stand-off when considering IED's.

3.3.5 Install a CCTV system to monitor the site throughout the day and night. External areas around the buildings should be capable of surveillance by staff from inside the premises. Where direct views are not possible, a monitored CCTV system should be visible and link into the existing Etihad Campus CCTV system.

3.3.6 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work. There should also be a secure cash office or management plan for cash storage with a safe providing adequate capacity and overnight cover. The correct size and category of safe should be determined by an assessment of prospective takings and to meet insurance needs. Consideration should also be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind the bar area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in the till during busy periods.

3.3.7 Installing Grippa™ clips or other similar property security clips to tables to allow customers in the food and beverage units and outdoor seating to secure their bags or coats/jackets

3.3.8 Any storage containers used should meet the LPS 1175 standard (or at least adhere to the principles of LPS 1175 certification), to allow management staff too securely store stock and close up the units overnight.

3.3.9 Transport routes which dissect the area can form conduits for crime and anti-social behaviour. Movement along them (Canal tow paths and Tram lines), should be audited for the boundary security and suitability and a maintenance programme be implemented to ensure a lasting secure line against the canal towpath.

3.3.10 The development of the public realm space will encourage further significant pedestrian footfall in the area. The aspirations of the plans also seek to extend the use of this space beyond event times. It is therefore recommended that planners, developers, and architects concerned with this development consult with Counter Terrorism Security Advisors (CTSA), throughout the planning and implementation of this development with a view to ensure protection from VAW attacks is as comprehensive as realistically possible. This engagement will also afford the opportunity to consider other attack methodologies and potential mitigations against them. The design team have on a number of occasions discussed the proposals with a GMP CTSA consultant and team leader and most if not, all public dwell spaces are within protected HVM zones.

3.3.11 Given the specific location of the proposed development, it is imperative that the management event team should liaise with local GMP Neighbourhood Team and the GMP Special Operations Planning Unit post planning submission. This relationship will establish the proposed management plan and its impact on the existing Etihad campus and how the new development will be managed across the year(s).

3.3.12 Security measure carefully incorporated into the environment and building design can ensure that buildings and the environment is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime. The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features

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built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime.

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4 Physical Security (Event Use)

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation in addition to the layout issues highlighted within Section 3.3.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SRB3 (issue 8).
- ☐ Garage or sectional overhead doors must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2. If circumstances could prevent this.
- ☐ All internal doors / frames to staff areas / stores / offices should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and fitted with auditable access controls. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys / passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ All windows should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 where possible. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standard, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions.
- ☐ Any ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) should be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ If any shutters are to be installed, they should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Ideally, any shutters should have shutter-boxes and guides built into the fabric of the building – where they would be less vulnerable to attack and less visually intrusive.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing within the vicinity of crowded places should incorporate laminated glazing. Any glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate 6mm outer pane and at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass. It is recommended that glazing to elevations adjoining pubic areas or evacuation routes should also be laminated.
- ☐ All new glazing up to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) should incorporate at least one pane of a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ All glazing other than that with solid backing to the rear, such as glazing to spandrel panels and shadow boxes shall include laminate glass with a minimum 1.52mm thick PVB interlayer for the inner pane. For structural silicone glazing (SSG) systems, the bonding to façade frames shall be to the laminated panes of IGUs. Where the glazing retention is via pressure plates/caps, the bite of the pressure plate/cap shall be minimum 30mm.

4.4 Curtain Walling

Glazed curtain walling

- ☐ Secured by Design recognises four distinct types of glazed wall systems. These are:
  - Large glazed units connected by 'spider clamp' system.
  - Glazed units directly retained within a framing system (usually aluminium)
  - Framed windows installed within a separate framing system.

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- Framed windows connected to other framed windows to create a window wall.

☐ Glazed curtain walling must be installed using a secure glazing retention system. The method of retaining glass must include one or more of the following:

- Security glazing tape
- Dedicated security sealant or gasket
- A secure mechanical fixing system (Evidence will be required to prove the system is secure. This may be achieved by utilising the specific glazing retention test within PAS 24:2012 or by indicative test on the retention system to LPS 1175: Issue 7, SR1 or STS 202: Issue 3, BR1)

☐ Framed windows (3 and 4 above) used within the construction of a window wall must be certified to one of the following requirements:

- BS PAS 24:2016
- STS 204 Issue 3: 2012

☐ LPS 1175 Issue 7:2010 Security Rating 1

4.5 Boundaries

☐ Fencing / boundary treatments separating the public realm from private space should not include any potential climbing aids. Avoid locating items of street furniture close by that could provide footholds.

4.6 Landscaping

☐ Tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.

☐ Street furniture should be designed to withstand casual acts of vandalism. When selecting or designing street furniture, consider how easily and quickly items can be repaired or replaced following damage. When commissioning bespoke street furniture and public artworks it is also important to be mindful of the potential for attack and ease of repair. These features are best positioned where there is plenty of formal and informal surveillance, so any criminal acts are more likely to be witnessed.

☐ To avoid compromising the security of buildings street furniture must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments or onto terraces. Security can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close to fencing.

☐ Tree Establishment. Avoid the use of tree stakes by using an underground guying system. Irrigation systems / pipes should include tamper-proof coverings to avoid potential criminal damage / blockage.

☐ Use of loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

☐ Surfaces that could be vulnerable to graffiti should be formed of a resistant material or have a resistant coating applied at the outset in order to facilitate rapid removal, e.g. ‘easy-on’ (see www.urbanhygiene.com for details).

☐ Cycle stands intended for short-stay use should enable cyclists to secure both wheels and the frame and obtained from an SBD-approved supplier.

☐ Security Bollards

- Fixed and raising bollards are acceptable should they be successfully tested to PAS 68-1:2013 / IWA-14 and installed to PAS 69/IWA-14A.
- Bollards providing passive protection should be successfully tested to BS 170-1

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4.7 Communal Areas

- Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of the development should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

4.8 Gates

☐ Design of Gates. Gates will need to prevent people from clambering (or being tempted to climb) round them. Consideration should be given to inclusion of an emergency release button / device to allow anyone trapped inside to get out and reduce potential for entrapment (this should be beyond reach of people outside the gate and should also include an alert relay to the CCTV control room on activation of the gate at these times).

☐ Ease of repair. It is likely that gates will be subject to criminal damage to make them difficult to close or lock. The design should be sufficiently robust to withstand this kind of attack but also should be capable of rapid repair. Use of bespoke components may create delays in obtaining replacements.

- There should be minimal ground clearance beneath the gate, to reduce the potential for crawling into the secure area.

4.9 Lighting

☐ External lighting should be provided in accordance with BS 5489. The spread of lighting should be evenly distributed with no areas of shadowing or pooling. Levels should be sufficient to support the CCTV systems in operation in the area. The position of light sources must not create glare or be dazzling at eye level, nor shine directly into the CCTV cameras.

☐ Fittings should produce ‘white’ light, as opposed to yellow / orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.

4.10 Car parking and service areas

☐ No long-term (over the course of an event), event user car parking within 30m of the building, to provide adequate standoff when considering vehicle borne IEDs

☐ Lighting to surface car parking should be in accordance with BS5489 and display an average lux level of 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%.

☐ Lighting to the internal parking areas should display an average lux level of 75-100, with a uniformity level of no less than 50%.

☐ Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated, with pedestrian routes/directions clearly signed.

☐ Electronic car park exit gates/shutters should be fob-in and fob-out; they should not operate on an induction loop (i.e. not open automatically).

☐ Pedestrian gates in to car parks should also be fob in and fob out only.

4.11 CCTV

☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

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- [ ] With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- [ ] Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- [ ] **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- [ ] **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- [ ] The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: Main circulation routes / elevations and entrances to new pavilions / sheltered area between the two buildings / main gathering spaces.

4.12 Other

- [ ] There must be no features of the building envelope which create sheltered/hiding places or ledges, which could endanger passers-by or encourage loitering.
- [ ] Any rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- [ ] Any bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

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5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up to date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures, and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:

- Opening and closing of premises, including staff arrival and departure.
- Cash management within the premises - consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.
- Cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices (which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe to meet insurance needs).
- Management of stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods).
- Details of staff security training.
- Location and management of any smoking areas.
- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras etc.
- Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
- Refuse collection arrangements.

5.1.2 The opening hours of any restaurants, licensed premises or retail units should be consistent with other such premises in the locale and should not unduly conflict with other nearby uses. Sufficient levels of service staff should be provided at busy periods to reduce waiting times and the potential for frustration, aggression and conflict.

5.1.3 Any high value equipment (e.g. computers/TVs, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

5.1.4 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the site and each of the premises, but also to deter unauthorised access to resident or staff-only areas.

5.1.5 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left accessible for extended periods. Servicing activities should also not require any service doors to remain open and unattended for prolonged periods.

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

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7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. Please see Secured by Design - Secured by Design for more information. To apply for the SBD Award for your development in Greater Manchester, please visit Apply for Secured by Design – Design For Security.

7.2 Counter Terrorism Security Advice

7.2.1 Given the location/nature of the proposed scheme, the local Counter Terrorism Security Advisor (CTSA) has highlighted that the development may be at an increased risk. Please contact ctpnw.protect@gmp.pnn.police.uk for more information and advice.

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A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
18/11/25	Manchester City FC	CIS instructed
26/11/25	Manchester City FC	CIS confirmed
01/12/25	GMP	Invoice issued
11/02/26	DfS	Site visit
06/03/26	DfS	CIS completed

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	Project Taverna - Aerial - Issue 01	23/02/26	
	Project Taverna - Entrance - Issue 01 (1)	23/02/26	
	Project Taverna - Construction Management Plan - v.1 - DRE Comments	23/02/26	
	3679.3-PLA-XX-XX-DR-L-0001-Landscape General Arrangement (2)	23/02/26	
	3697.3-ID-002-04-DAS-Landscape-Chapter	23/02/26	
	260303_12591108_Project Taverna Crowd Movement	23/02/26	
	PTMC-PRP-XX-00-DR-A-02300 P01 Ground Floor Plan (1)	23/02/26	
	PTMC-PRP-XX-01-DR-A-02301 P01 First Floor Plan (1)	23/02/26	
	PTMC-PRP-XX-02-DR-A-02302 P01 Second Floor Plan (1)	23/02/26	
	PTMC-PRP-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-01020 P02 Proposed Site Plan with Constraints	23/02/26	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Date	Revisions
A	06/03/2026	

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D Glossary

Physical Security Standards

PAS 24

Enhanced security performance requirements for doorsets and windows in the UK. Doorsets and windows intended to offer a level of security suitable for dwellings and other buildings exposed to comparable risk. It is designed to mimic an attack by an opportunist burglar, using tools which are easy to conceal.

STS 201

Enhanced security to satisfy the requirements for certification of doorsets, equivalent to test standard to PAS 24.

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors, roller shutters, fences and barriers. Products are rated via the term Burglary Resistance (BR) and range from BR1 (lower security rating) to BR6 (higher security rating).

LPS 1175

Physical security for products manufactured for perimeter, façade, internal spaces and entrapment protection. The higher the security rating, the more formidable the security product.

Developed following extensive consultation with stakeholders, the most recent issue sees the previous single digit performance classifications (i.e. Security Ratings 1 to 8) extended to one formed of two elements that illustrate performance in terms of:

- *Threat level (first element) – Letter (A to H) corresponding with the tool kit used to evaluate the product's intruder resistance and number of attackers involved.*
- *Delay (second element) – Numeric value (1, 3, 5, 10, 15 or 20) corresponding with the minimum delay (in minutes) provided by the product when placed in a locked condition.*

BS EN 1627

European standard for the burglary resistance of pedestrian doorsets, windows, curtain walling, grilles and shutters. It defines six resistance classes, from RC1 to RC6, with RC1 being the lowest level of resistance and RC6 the highest. These classes indicate the level of resistance to forced entry, with higher classes requiring more time and specialized tools to breach.

BS EN 356

European standard that specifies the resistance of laminated glazing (i.e. two or more layers of glass bonded together with a plastic interlayer) to manual attacks, such as might occur during forced entry or vandalism. It classifies laminated glass into different resistance levels, ranging from P1A to P8B, with P1A being the lowest and P8B the highest.

Useful Websites

Design For Security – Designing Out Crime *– apply for Crime Impact Statements or the Secured by Design Award from Greater Manchester Police*

Secured by Design - Secured by Design *– SBD Award Scheme, Design Guides and Member Companies*

ParkMark - Home *– Park Mark Safer Parking Award Scheme*

NBS Source *– find, select and specify building products (including security-certified products)*

RedBook Live - LPCB Red Book *– search for LPS 1175 certified products*

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