



The Trilogy

Planning Gateway One

18 September 2025

Quartz Service

19978

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Revision History

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1. Introduction

The Government made a commitment to introduce a Planning Gateway One which has been in effect since 1st August 2021 and has two key elements:

- To require the developer to submit a fire statement, setting out fire safety considerations specific to the development, with a relevant application for planning permission for developments that involve one or more "relevant buildings", and;
- To establish the Health and Safety Executive as a statutory consultee for relevant planning applications.

Under Planning Gateway One, "relevant buildings" are defined as buildings that:

- Contain two or more dwellings or educational accommodation, and;
- Meet the height condition of 18m or more in height, or 7 or more storeys.

"Dwellings" includes flats and "educational accommodation" means residential accommodation for the use of students boarding at a boarding school or in later stages of education.

Given the above requirements, the Trilogy development, and most specifically Block A, is considered to be a relevant building, as it will include dwellings and will be c.29m in height, comprising of 10 storeys (Ground plus 9 upper floors). Therefore, a fire statement is required for Planning Gateway One.

This report constitutes the Planning Gateway One Fire Statement, which sets out the fire safety considerations specific to the development, and will be submitted as part of the relevant application for planning permission.

This report substantially follows the form template guidance as published by the Security of State and includes information about the following:

- The principles, concepts and approach relating to fire safety that have been applied to each building in the development.
- The site layout.
- Emergency vehicle access and water supplies for firefighting purposes.
- What, if any, consultation has been undertaken or issues relating to the fire safety of the development and what account has been taken of this.
- How any policies relating to fire safety in relevant local development documents have been considered.

2. Fire Statement Form

The below information highlights the projects description and the associated information to complete the Fire Statement Form.

Table 2.1 Application Form

Application	
Site Address	The Trilogy, 27 Ellesmere St, Manchester M15 4RU
Description of proposed development including any change of use (as stated on the application form).	The description, as stated on the planning application form is: <i>“Demolition of structures and erection of a ground and first floor extension an additional storey to Block A to deliver 8no. additional apartments (Use Class C3), alterations to the internal courtyard to include 3no. work from home pods and a muti use pod, and associated landscaping and boundary treatment.”</i>
Name of person completing the fire statement (as Section 15), relevant qualifications and experience.	Hadrien Fruton – Associate Fire Engineer MSc CEng MIFireE Hadrien has a wide range of experience in residential buildings around England. Hadrien has worked on buildings with various heights from small dwellinghouses to residential buildings up to 100m tall towers, offering private and affordable accommodation. These buildings have ranged from Private Rented Sector (PRS) Schemes, mixed use residential buildings, single stair residential buildings, open-plan apartment layouts, various smoke ventilation strategies for common corridors, sprinklered and unsprinklered buildings and various types of façade design such as traditional, unitised and stick systems. Hadrien was also part of the Expert Witness team that worked on the Grenfell Public Inquiry, Phase 2 with a focus on the Management and Maintenance of Grenfell Tower and how the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) complied with their duties under the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 (RR(FS)O). Alec Storey – Director BSc (Hons) CEng MIFireE Alec is a Member of the Institution of Fire Engineers and is a Chartered Engineer, achieved through the Institution of Fire Engineers. Alec has worked in fire engineering consultancy for over 20 years, since graduating from the University of Leeds with a BSc (Hons) Degree in Fire Science. Alec is also a holder of an Expert Witness Certificate following successful completion of the training and assessment course provided by Cardiff University Bond Solon (CUBS). Alec has led the fire engineering design on projects across all sectors and sizes and has extensive experience of prestigious residential, educational, transport, sport, and commercial developments. He has developed fire safety strategies for projects within the UK and internationally, utilising both UK guidance and standards and international design codes, alongside computational fluid dynamics fire and smoke modelling and evacuation modelling, to provide pragmatic design solutions that meet both design aspirations and fire safety requirements.

Application	
State what, if any, consultation has been undertaken on issues relating to the fire safety of the development and what account has been taken of this.	The BSR is aware of the development, as it is an in-use Higher Risk Building (HRB). It has a Registration number HRB09657Y3B5 and received a Building Assessment Certificate dated 13th March 2025. The pre-application submitted in the past did not cover Fire Safety as it only focused on the principle of the development rather than key technical disciplines. No consultation has been made the Building Safety Regulator (BSR) as part of this work. Revision P01 of the technical note contained within the appendix to this document was discussed with Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service during a meeting on the 27th August 2025. The note included in this Appendix is the revision P02 which has been updated following the meeting with the Fire & Rescue Service and additional MEP coordination.
Site Layout	
The proposed site layout is shown below within Figure 2.1, along with an aerial view of it in Figure 2.2.	The Trilogy development, located on Ellesmere Street in Manchester, consists of three residential blocks: - Block A is currently a nine-storey building (Ground to Eighth) and measures approximately 26.7m to the highest occupied floor. It contains residential apartments on all floors in addition to ancillary accommodation on the Ground floor (substation, gym and store). A single stair provides escape from all floors, in addition to the main firefighting stair and lift located in Block B and accessed via a link bridge. - Block B is a twelve-storey building (Ground to Eleventh) and measures approximately 36.1m to the highest occupied floor. It contains residential apartments on all levels and is provided with two stairs, one of which is a firefighting stair serving both Block A and Block B. - Block C is an eight-storey building (Ground to Seventh) and measures approximately 23.6m to the highest occupied floor. Residential accommodation is provided on all levels alongside ancillary accommodation on the Ground floor. A single firefighting stair serves all floors of the building. The extended common corridor travel distances from the stair to the furthest apartment (approximately 27.5m) have been justified by CFD modelling within the original fire safety strategy report by Omega Fire. A basement level is also located beneath all three blocks, which provides car parking for 75 cars, as well as cycle store and various tank/meter rooms. Access to the car park is nonetheless only provided through Block B and Block C (i.e. there is no access to the basement via Block A). The work undertaken will be only in Block A and the ground floor space between the three blocks. Enhancements to the level of fire safety will also be undertaken to Block B as it is connected and shares escape routes with Block A. The building schedule will therefore exclude Block C, which is not affected by the proposed work.




Figure 2.1 Typical Upper Floor Layout (Existing and Proposed)



Figure 2.2 Aerial view of the development

Table 2.2 Building Schedule

Site Information					Building Information		Resident Safety Information		
a) Block number as per site layout plan above.	b) - Block height (m). - Number of storeys excluding those below ground level. - Number of storeys including those below ground level.	c) Proposed use (one per line)	d) Location of use within block by storey.	e) Standards relating to fire safety/approach applied.	f) Balconies.	g) External wall system.	h) Approach to evacuation.	i) Automatic water suppression.	j) Accessible housing provided.
Block A	29.80m in height. 10 storeys (G+9) 0 storeys.	Ground and Level 01 is to be combined residential and ancillary accommodation. Level 02 – 09 is to be residential only.	Ground – Level 01 Level 02 – 09	BS 9991:2015 for existing areas. BS 9991:2024 where possible for new areas BS 9991:2015 for existing areas. BS 9991:2024 where possible for new areas	N/A	Class A2-s1, d0 or better for materials and products and external surface of the outermost layer of the external wall (rather than “materials which become part of an external wall” as Regulation 7(2) didn’t apply at the time of design and construction). Class A2-s1, d0 or better external walls materials will apply for the new storey.	Simultaneous for ancillary areas. Stay put for residential.	Residential sprinkler system of BS 9251:2014 is currently installed in all the apartments and ancillary areas. The use of BS 9251:2021 for the new ancillary areas and new storey will be reviewed, but it is unlikely that the reconfigured system will be able to meet the BS 9251:2021 recommendations. No ancillary area will be over 100m².	M4(2)
Block B (for information only. No work done other than enhancements)	36.10m in height. 12 storeys (G+11) 1 storey (Basement).	Ground to Level 11 is residential only. Basement includes car park, cycle store and plant rooms.	Ground – Level 01 Basement	BS 9991:2015 BS 9991:2015	N/A	Class A2-s1, d0 or better for materials and products and external surface of the outermost layer of the external wall (rather than “materials which become part of an external wall” as Regulation 7(2) didn’t apply at the time of design and construction)	Stay put for residential. Simultaneous for ancillary areas.	Residential sprinkler system of BS 9251:2014 is currently installed in all the apartments. No sprinklers at Basement level.	M4(2)

Specific Technical Complexities	
Explain any specific technical complexities in terms of fire safety (for example green walls) and/or departures from information in the building schedule above.	The latest revision of the original fire safety strategy report for the development is dated 22nd January 2019. The building received a Completion Certificate from Manchester City Council Building Control on the 31st May 2019. It has been in occupation since that date and the latest fire risk assessment was completed on the 18th November 2024 by Allsop. Under the Building Safety Act, the development is a Higher Risk Building (HRB) and it has a Registration number HRB09657Y3B5. A final Safety Case Report was issued on the 16th October 2024 by Allsop, following feedback from the Building Safety Regulator. The building received a Building Assessment Certificate dated 13th March 2025. The proposed work will include a “material change of use”, “building work”, and changes that are not material, as defined in the Building Regulations 2010 (as amended). Due to the “material change of use”, the areas affected by the work should demonstrate compliance with the functional requirements of Schedule 1 Part B of the Building Regulations 2010. Compliance with the latest fire safety guidance is typically used to demonstrate compliance with the functional requirements, which would be BS 9991:2024 in the context of the development due to the presence of open-plan apartments currently not covered under Approved Document B Volume 1 – ‘Dwellings’. Due to the significant changes in guidance between the 2015 Edition and the 2024 Edition of BS 9991, full compliance with the 2024 Edition will have a significant impact on the rest of the development that is unaffected by the work. For instance, the addition of an evacuation lift on the new Level 09 to comply with Clause 7.4 of BS 9991:2024 will affect all the floor levels below and will: • Affect the superstructure (new opening, new beams around the openings, review of the additional load of the concrete shaft) and substructure, including the Ground floor slab (removal of a large concrete bay to allow for the lift pit to be built, and re-construction of the slab) and the foundations of the building (changes to the existing foundations would be required), which would make it challenging and expensive for an existing and occupied building; • Lead to redesigning every floor level, including moving walls, moving services layout, removing the ceilings, etc., leading to additional cost for the operator and disturbance for the occupants; • Potentially change the number of apartments in the building or the type of apartment (e.g. a 1 bedroom becoming a studio). The former will lead to a “material change of use” under the Building Regulations, requiring every single floor to fully comply with the new BS 9991:2024, and the latter will change the unit mix, which could lead to planning issues. It is considered disproportionate to change the entirety of Block A (i.e. to change the existing eight upper floors) on the basis of the additional level of risk provided by the introduction of eight new apartments on the top floor level (i.e. net increase of six apartment in Block A due to the loss of two apartments at Ground floor). It is, therefore, proposed for the top floor level to comply as much as possible with the latest guidance within BS 9991:2024, whilst taking into account the existing and occupied nature of the building, the structural implications of fully complying with BS 9991:2024, the financial implications of undertaking such works, and the implications on occupants currently living in the building. Some fire safety improvements will be provided to the rest of the floor levels, in order to increase the overall level of safety in the building. As Block A is accessed via Block B on a day-to-day basis and the firefighting shaft serving Block A is located in Block B, some of the fire safety improvements for Block A will also be provided in Block B. A full technical note has been provided as an appendix to this document, which explains what fire safety measures from BS 9991:2024 will be introduced to Block A and to Block B, along with any potential non-compliance and challenges to be resolved at RIBA Stage 3. Revision P01 of this note was discussed with Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service during a meeting on the 27th August 2025 and was updated to a Rev P02 following that meeting and based on further coordination with the MEP team.

Specific Technical Complexities	
Issues which might affect the fire safety of the development	
Explain how any issues which might affect the fire safety of the development have been addressed.	The building, as designed and built, has followed: - the approval process through a Building Control completion certificates - various fire risk assessments under the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 - a Safety Case Report process to achieve a Building Assessment Certificate (as it is an HRB). The current building and associated fire safety features can, therefore, be considered to be provided with an adequate level of safety. If the Block A had originally been designed with 9 storeys above Ground, instead of the 8 storeys currently provided, the same fire safety measures as those provided on the lower floor levels would have been provided at Level 09 (i.e. the applicable design guidance would not have considered the additional floor to require any further provisions). The addition of a further storey in Block A and the increased area of amenity spaces at Ground floor, therefore, do not make the building more unsafe than it was before, even if those areas were designed solely following guidance within BS 9991:2015. However, as mentioned previously, BS 9991:2024 will be used to increase the overall level of safety, where possible. Notwithstanding, full compliance with all the recommendations of BS 9991: 2024 cannot reasonably be achieved. The key fire safety measures that will require further investigation and are unlikely to achieve full compliance with current guidance are: - The provision of an evacuation lift complying with BS EN 81-76:2025 - This would require the introduction of a compliant secondary power supply (i.e. a generator) in the building, a new ATS status indicating panel, wireless combined Fire Service and refuge communication system, updates to the cause and effect, and addition of heat detection in the lift lobbies. The evacuation lift provisions will be further reviewed against recommendations in Annex G of BS 9999, but if the conclusion of the exercise is that the evacuation lift will deviate so much from either guidance that it becomes a bespoke design, then the evacuation lift may not be provided. This is to avoid providing a false sense of safety to occupants by providing an “evacuation lift” that does not match the expected technical specifications for such a lift. - The provision of an evacuation lift lobby complying with the recommendations in BS 9991:2024 – This would require new smoke vents in the façade (which is highly disruptive to the building and its occupants) and would require an apartment entrance door to be relocated so that no apartment opens into each lobby. Therefore, additional justification will be provided to show that even if the evacuation lift lobby is not fully compliant, it is still improving the existing situation, in which evacuation lift is provided. - The provision of a sprinkler system in the new areas complying with BS 9251:2021– This would require an increase in the incoming water supply or a larger water tank (neither of which may be feasible), an increase in the pipe size, and a secondary power supply, either via a diesel pump or a diesel generator (which will come with their own challenges, e.g. engine exhaust routing, noise attenuation, etc.). The sprinkler system is, therefore, likely to remain a BS 9251:2014 system extended to the new areas, with some enhancements, if possible. Those key fire safety measures will be further reviewed at RIBA Stage 3. Additional information on the challenges have also been documented in the Technical Note appended to this document.
Local development document policies relating to fire safety	
Explain how any policies relating to fire safety in relevant local development documents have been taken into account.	There are no specific local fire safety policies relevant to this development.
Emergency road vehicle access and water supplies for firefighting purposes	
Fire service site plan.	The Fire Service access plan has been provided below within Figure 2.3 below.

Specific Technical Complexities	
Firefighting provisions.	The Trilogy Block A is greater than 18m in height. For Fire Service access, the original design of Block A relies on the firefighting shaft within the Block B due to both blocks being sprinklered and being connected on every single floor level. The proposed Block A Level 09 will follow the same strategy and will be accessed for firefighting activities via the residential firefighting shaft in Block B. The firefighting shaft is provided with: • A firefighting stair at least 1100mm in clear width. • A 1m² geometric free area AOV provided at the head of the stair. • A vented common corridor acting as the firefighting lobby. It is proposed to change the layout so that the firefighting stair opens into a smoke vented evacuation lift lobby on every floor level. • The firefighting lift will also open into that lobby and is located within 7.5m of the firefighting stair. • The fire main is provided within the stair on every floor level, and all areas of each floorplate are within 60m. A 60m hose distance (instead of 45m) is applicable as there will be a sprinkler system installed throughout the building. As the building has a top floor lower than 50m in height, the fire main is dry rising fire main. The inlet is provided on the firefighting stair façade at Ground floor level. • The fire main inlet is within 18m of the fire appliance when the Fire Service arrive on site.
Emergency access roads.	Access to the Block B firefighting shaft is via Chester Road. The road is an existing street and is expected to meet the minimum road requirements.
Siting of fire appliances.	The fire appliances will be able to park directly outside of Block B on Chester Road and within 18m of the fire main inlet - see Figure 2.3 below.
Suitability of water supply for the scale of the development proposed.	Fire hydrants are required to be within 90m of the fire main inlet points. The closest existing fire hydrant, as seen on Google Street view, is located 100m away from the Core B fire main inlet on Chester Road. Another fire hydrant is located on Ellesmere Street, located approximately 152m away when laying the hose on the road around the block, or 72m when laying the hose through the building via the reception space. This is nonetheless an existing situation deemed suitable by both the Fire & Rescue Service and the BSR. The location of the fire hydrants is shown within Figure 2.3 below. A utility survey will be asked to the water company at RIBA Stage 3 to determine the location of other hydrants nearby.




Figure 2.3 Fire Service Site Plan

Fire Statement Completed By			

Appendix 1. Technical Report – Proposed concept fire strategy

Client	MREF III Manchester Property S.À.R.L.
Project	The Trilogy, Manchester
Discipline	Fire Engineering
Revision	P02
Author	Hadrien Fruton, Alec Storey
Date	18 September 2025

Proposed concept fire safety strategy for material change of use

The Trilogy development is a build to rent (residential) scheme in Manchester that opened in April 2019. The building is occupied and has a fire safety strategy report (based on BS 9991:2015), fire risk assessment, Safety Case Report, and a Building Assessment Certificate as it is a Higher Risk Building (HRB).

The client is looking to expand the existing amenity provision at Ground floor into both Ground and First floor. To do so, they will remove two existing apartments, construct a single storey extension between Block A and Block C, and add a room at First floor level. The proposed work will mainly affect Block A, but the amenity space at Ground floor level will link all blocks.

In addition, a new floor level will be added to Block A, replicating the floor plate below and creating eight new apartments (to offset the loss of the two Ground floor level apartments). This work will be defined as a 'change of use' under the Building Regulations 2010 (as amended) and, therefore, compliance with the latest fire safety design guidance (e.g. BS 9991:2024) should be sought in order to demonstrate compliance with the Building Regulations.

Full compliance with guidance within BS 9991:2024 will be challenging due to the existing and occupied nature of the building and due to the significant changes in guidance that have occurred since the original design based on BS 9991:2015 and the completion of the building in 2019.

The objective of this note is to provide a high-level description of the proposed changes to the Trilogy development and the proposed concept fire safety strategy for those changes, in order to determine if the proposed approach could be deemed satisfactory for Gateway 2 submission under the Building Safety Regulations process, or if there are already some key issues that can be identified with the proposal.

1. Background

1.1 Project Description

The Trilogy development, located on Ellesmere Street in Manchester consists of three residential blocks:

- Block A is a nine-storey building (Ground to Eighth) and measures approximately 26.7m to the highest occupied floor. It contains residential apartments on all floors in addition to ancillary accommodation on the Ground floor (substation, gym and store). A single stair provides escape from all floors, in addition to the main firefighting stair and lift located in Block B and accessed via a link bridge.
- Block B is a twelve-storey building (Ground to Eleventh) and measures approximately 36.1m to the highest occupied floor. It contains residential apartments on all levels and is provided with two stairs, one of which is a firefighting stair serving both Block A and Block B.
- Block C is an eight-storey building (Ground to Seventh) and measures approximately 23.6m to the highest occupied floor. Residential accommodation is provided on all levels alongside ancillary accommodation on the Ground floor. A single firefighting stair serves all floors of the building. The extended common corridor travel distances from the stair to the furthest apartment (approximately 27.5m) has been justified by CFD modelling within the original fire safety strategy report by Omega Fire.

A basement level is also located beneath all three blocks, which provides car parking for 75 cars, as well as cycle store and various tank/meter rooms. Access to the car park is nonetheless only provided through Block B and Block C (i.e. there is no access to the basement via Block A).




Figure 1.1 Typical floor plan



Figure 1.2 Development overview – Aerial view

1.2 Regulatory compliance

The latest fire safety strategy report for the development was issued by Omega Fire, under Rev O and dated 22nd January 2019. The building received a Completion Certificate from Manchester City Council Building Control on the 31st May 2019. It has been in occupation since that date and the latest fire risk assessment was completed on the 18th November 2024 by Allsop.

Under the Building Safety Act, the development is a Higher Risk Building (HRB) with a Registration number HRB09657Y3B5.

A final Safety Case Report was issued on the 16th October 2024 by Allsop, following feedback from the Building Safety Regulator. Finally, a Building Assessment Certificate was issued on the 13th March 2025.

1.3 Proposed work

1.3.1 Expansion of the existing amenity provision at Ground and First floor levels

This work will include:

- Removing two Ground floor apartments in Block A and replacing them with a gym, storage, and a multipurpose room. This is considered as a 'material change of use' under the Building Regulations 2010 (as amended), and this area should fully comply with the latest fire guidance to demonstrate compliance with Schedule 1 Part B of the Building Regulations.
- The erection of a single storey extension between Block A and Block C where the proposed co-working space will be located. This area is considered as 'building work' under the Building Regulations 2010 (as amended), and this area should fully comply with the latest fire guidance to demonstrate compliance with Schedule 1 Part B of the Building Regulations.
- The reconfiguration of the existing amenity space to create other amenity spaces (the reception, the staff office, the parcel & locker room). This change is 'non-material' as long as the proposed arrangement and provisions are not made worse than existing. Therefore, there is no requirement to demonstrate compliance with the Building Regulations for this area. Nonetheless, due to all the spaces at Ground floor being connected, and as this work provides the opportunity to improve the overall level of safety in the building, compliance with the latest fire guidance will be sought, in order to demonstrate compliance with Schedule 1 Part B of the Building Regulations.
- An additional room will be added at First floor level next to Block C, which will be accessed from Block B via a corridor above the new amenity space. This area is considered as 'building work' under the Building Regulations 2010 (as amended), and this area should fully comply with the latest fire guidance to demonstrate compliance with Schedule 1 Part B of the Building Regulations.
- Block B and Block C residential areas will have a connection with the space, but should not be affected by the work.

The existing and proposed floor plans for Ground and First floors are shown in the figures below. All amenity spaces will be used only by the residents of the development, and any of their guests.




Figure 1.3 Existing Ground Floor




Figure 1.4 Proposed Ground Floor




Figure 1.5 Existing First Floor




Figure 1.6 Proposed First Floor

1.3.2 Central courtyard enhanced landscaping

The existing central courtyard between Block C and Block B will be upgraded to improve visual appearance, biodiversity and will include an exercise and wash area for dogs, along with a barbecue area.

There two key items to note:

1. The barbecue area will need to be booked, there is a 24/7 concierge and it will remain a managed area. The risk of uncontrolled use and accumulation of fire load around the barbecue is, therefore, limited. In addition, the barbecue is away from the façade of the buildings, so unlikely to lead to a façade fire. It is also located away from the main exit, so unlikely to prevent occupants to escape. Finally, the floor surface in this area is hard landscape (tiles) so unlikely to ignite and allow horizontal fire spread if any hot items fall on it.
2. BS 9991:2024 recommends a maximum travel distance of 18m in a single direction and 45m where escape is available in more than one direction. This is a significant change to the 2015 Edition which allowed a travel distance of 45m before requiring an alternative escape route. It is nonetheless our opinion that the proposed design is still acceptable as the changes are only minor and do not significantly increase the risk to occupants. Moreover, the space is external so smoke and heat will not accumulate. This will provide more time for occupants to escape. The level of radiation received in an external space will also be lower than in a covered space.

As the changes are minor, they will not affect the existing fire safety strategy and will not be addressed further within this document.



Figure 1.7 Ground floor Central Courtyard - Existing



Figure 1.8 Ground floor Central Courtyard - Proposed

1.3.3 Additional floor level on Block A

The third change is the construction of a new Ninth floor on top of Block A to accommodate eight new apartments. The additional floor will mimic the floor plate of Eighth floor and will be provided with access to an escape stair (an extension of a the existing stair, to the left of the plan) and access into Building B via a bridge link (to the right of the plan), as shown in Figure 1.9.

The addition of a new storey with additional dwellings is considered a 'material change of use' under the Building Regulations 2010 (as amended). As such, the new top floor should fully comply with the latest fire guidance to demonstrate compliance with Schedule 1 Part B of the Building Regulations.




Figure 1.9 Block A Rooftop Extension – Ninth Floor

2. Proposed design

2.1 Compliance with the Building Regulations 2010

As explained above, various areas at Ground floor and on the top storey will need to comply with the latest fire guidance to demonstrate compliance with the functional requirements of Schedule 1 Part B of the Building Regulations 2010 (as amended).

The existing fire safety strategy report has been developed using BS 9991:2015 due to the presence of open-plan apartments, which are not covered by Approved Document B. The Block A will still include open-plan apartments and the new top floor (Ninth floor) will also be provided with open-plan apartments, so Block A should comply with guidance within the latest BS 9991:2024.

Whilst this is, in practice, relatively simple to achieve at Ground floor level, having the new top floor fully compliant with BS 9991:2024 will have a significant impact on all the existing lower floor levels. For instance, the addition of an evacuation lift on the top floor will affect all the floor levels below and will further change the number of apartments in the building, leading to a 'material change of use' on every floor level, as well as potentially creating structural issues.

Therefore, it is proposed for the top floor level to comply as much as possible with the latest guidance within BS 9991:2024, whilst taking into account the existing and occupied nature of the building, the structural implications of fully complying with BS 9991:2024, the financial implications of undertaking such works, and the implications on occupants currently living in the building. It is considered disproportionate to change the entirety of Block A (i.e. to change the existing eight upper floors) due to the additional level of risk provided by the introduction of eight new apartments on the top floor level (i.e. net increase of six apartments in Block A due to the loss of two apartments at Ground floor).

An additional level of complexity is associated with Block A being accessed via Block B on a day to day basis, as the only lifts are located in Block B, and the firefighting shaft serving Block A is located in Block B. Therefore, both blocks could be considered as one building. Consequently, some of the fire safety improvements provided in Block A will also be provided in Block B where reasonably practicable and will provide a clear improvement to the existing level of safety.

The following sections, therefore, detail what measures recommended in BS 9991:2024 will be adopted, and in which block they will be adopted.

Finally, as Block A has a top storey greater than 18m in height, Regulation 7(2) under the Building (Amendment) Regulations 2018 will apply.

2.2 Classification under the Building Safety Act

All the blocks in the development have a top storey greater than 18m in height, therefore, they are all considered as Higher Risk Buildings (HRB) under the Building Safety Act 2022 and the Higher-Risk Buildings (Descriptions and Supplementary Provisions) Regulations 2023.

Further governmental advice has been provided via the link below with regards to the definition of a Higher Risk Building during the occupation phase of the building:

<https://www.gov.uk/guidance/criteria-for-being-a-higher-risk-building-during-the-occupation-phase-of-the-new-higher-risk-regime>

Blocks A, B and C are all linked at Ground floor level and Blocks A and B are connected via a bridge link on every floor level. The development, therefore, appears to match the definition reproduced below:




Diagram 5 shows two seven storey residential towers (tower 5A and tower 5B) attached by a party wall, with doorway access for residents to move between them and a third seven storey residential tower (tower 5C) attached to tower 5B via a walkway.

Figure 2.1 Example buildings defined under the building definition (Diagram 5 from the link above)

The diagram above matches the interconnection between each block in the development. Consequently, Blocks A, B and C cannot be considered as independent sections and will be considered as one building for the higher risk regime.

Nonetheless, the definition of a “Building” under the Building Safety Act, does not apply to the definition of a “building” relevant to the ‘material change of use’ under the Building Regulations. Therefore, the improvements to be made to Block A, can reasonably only be made to Block A (and potentially Block B), but not to all blocks, as they are not considered as one “building” under the Building Regulations definition.

Regardless of the above, the impact of the work in Block A and Block B on Block C will need to be reviewed as part of the Gateway 2 submission, as the submission will be made for the single building that is formed of Block A, B and C under the BSA.

2.3 Proposed design solution

Now that the regulatory framework for the work under the Building Regulations and the Building Safety Act has been clarified, this section will review each part of the building individually, explaining which fire safety measures will be provided.

As the project is as RIBA Stage 2, the design is still being developed and there are known non-compliances that will need to be further reviewed.

2.3.1 Amenity space at Ground and First floors

It is proposed that the Ground floor level will fully comply with guidance within BS 9991:2024. This will include:

- A Category L3 fire detection and alarm system should be provided, with an increased level of detection to cover all the rooms (i.e. a Category L1 but without the void coverage).
- Code compliant travel distance in the amenity space: 18m in a single direction, 45m for escape in more than one direction (Table 16 of BS 9991). At first floor level, there is an extended travel distance of approximately 22m instead of 18m. It is our opinion that this extended travel distance is acceptable as occupants will be awake and familiar with the building, the space will be sprinklered, it will be provided with an automatic fire detection system, the occupancy will be limited to 60 persons. When compared to recommendations in BS 9999 for a similar type of occupancy the maximum travel distance in a single direction allowed would be 26m (A1 risk profile).
- There are inner-inner room situations (storage through multipurpose room through reception; co-working through coworking through reception) that are not permitted under BS 9991. It is our opinion that in the

context of the development they are acceptable as all the rooms will be provided with a fire detection and alarm system, thus providing early warning. The inner-inner room (co-working space) will be glazed, thus providing visual cues (e.g. sight of smoke) to occupants of what is happening outside of their rooms, thus decreasing the pre-movement time. The inner-inner room (storage) will rarely be accessed and no occupant will permanently be there. All the rooms at Ground floor will be provided with a sprinkler system, thus slowing the fire growth and allowing more time for occupants to escape.

- In multi stair buildings, the ancillary area should be separated from any stair by protected lobby or protected corridor on the storey where the ancillary accommodation is provided (Clause 34.e.1). A protected common corridor is provided between the stair and any ancillary accommodation, thus this is complied with.
- In multi stair buildings, the ancillary areas should be separated from the common corridors by a protected lobby where the escape route is in a single direction (Clause 34.e.2). Block A, which is the only block affected by the work, has a common corridor at Ground floor level provided with escape in more than one direction. Block B also has a common corridor with two directions of escape on all floor levels, including at First floor where a new amenity space linked to it will be added. Block C has a common corridor with escape in a single direction, nonetheless the amenity space connecting to Block C is an existing situation (i.e. it is currently opening directly into the Reception), therefore it is not proposed to add a lobby. This is on the basis that the reception will be moved away from Core C, will be provided with a sprinkler system that will contain the fire growth or extinguish the fire, and there will be 24/7 staff in the only area with fire load so they will be able to take early firefighting actions.
- A sprinkler system will be provided in all the amenity rooms and in the amenity corridor, to comply with Clause 17 of BS 9991 asking for a sprinkler system to BS 9251:2021 for buildings greater than 11m in height. Even though the amenity corridor is expected to be sterile, it will be provided with a sprinkler system to comply with Note 6 of Clause 17 of BS 9991. Following further review from the MEP engineer with the original sprinkler sub-contractor, it will be extremely challenging to upgrade the full system to a Category 4 to BS 9251:2021. The system is therefore likely to remain a BS 9251:2014 system with some upgrades where feasible.
- Clause 5.6 of BS 9251:2021 restricts the size of any non-residential areas covered by the sprinkler system to 100m². Even though the sprinkler system will be provided to the 2014 Edition, this recommendation from the 2021 Edition will be complied with, except for the reception area which will be open to the amenity corridor, with a total area of 167m². This is nonetheless considered acceptable, as the area with fire load (i.e. the reception space) is 67m² and, therefore, below the 100m² restriction. As the amenity corridor will be fire sterile (except for a couple of items of furniture and the post boxes) and sprinklered, the fire is unlikely to spread into an area greater than 100m². The building management is currently not allowing any parcels to be stored in the corridor, including near the post boxes, as a parcel room is provided. This management policy should continue.
- The evacuation from the amenity space directly to outside is provided via two accommodation stairs: one onto Ellesmere Street and one onto Chester Road. Mobility impaired occupants might not be able to use those stairs as there would be no location for them to safely wait. It is, therefore, proposed that they escape via the common corridor into Block A or Block B and into the protected stairs that will be provided with a refuge and an Emergency Voice Communication device (see Section 2.3.3). Escape is also possible into Block C, but would rely on the existing management strategy to evacuate an occupant requiring assistance, as it is not proposed to undertake any changes to this block. The travel distance measured up to the door into the common corridor in Block A, B or C is code compliant.
- The additional fire safety measures provided in the residential areas of Block A on the upper floor levels will also be provided at Ground floor level in the residential areas.
- The furniture and internal layout of the First floor level (i.e. number of seats, table, chair, etc) will be such that it will naturally limit the occupancy in the amenity area at First floor level to 60 persons. A management strategy should also be developed to ensure that 60 persons limit is adhered to (e.g. through a booking system or monitoring).

Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3 show the proposed Ground and First floor levels.




Figure 2.2 Proposed fire safety strategy at Ground floor level



- The cooking appliances in the apartments will be located 1.8m away from a 0.9m escape route as per Figure 2 of BS 9991:2024.
- Unlike the existing floor levels, a 1.5m² Automatic Openable Vent (AOV) on the façade is not permitted be provided to ventilate smoke from the common corridor in front of the escape stair. This is because Table 3 of BS 9991: 2024 does not allow smoke ventilation to be provided via AOVs on the façade for buildings greater than 18m. Instead, AOVs will be provided within the roof of that portion of the common corridor, as they will be less subject to wind effect. They should be located away from the stair AOV and should have a total aerodynamic free area of at least 0.9m².
- The existing stair AOV should be relocated to the top of the extended stair enclosure.
- A BS 8629 Evacuation alert system (EAS) will be provided to the top floor and to all the units in Block A, as the top storey of the building is greater than 18m in height (Clause 48.3 of BS 9991: 2024).
- The stair capacity for a simultaneous evacuation (e.g. if the EAS is used, or for any other reason) has been reviewed as part of the work. This has been reviewed based on two stairs (one in Block A, and one in Block

B) and guidance within Approved Document B Volume 2 that provides stair capacity for simultaneous evacuation. Guidance within BS 9991:2024 (Corrigendum 1) has not been used due to the error in the formula when it was converted from meters in ADB to millimetres in BS 9991. The stairs are 1200mm in clear width based on the drawings (to be confirmed on-site) and will serve nine storeys above Ground, thus allowing 600 persons per stair. A typical floor level includes five 1-bed and three 2-bed apartments. Assuming two persons per room and an additional guest in the living room, that is 30 persons per floor level over nine storeys that is 270 persons in total. The stairs are accessed via a smoke vented lobby and should, therefore, not be discounted, however, even when discounting one stair, the other stair will have more than sufficient capacity to accommodate all the occupants in the building evacuating simultaneously.

- No evacuation lift will be provided in Block A next to the existing escape stair but instead one in Block B will be provided (see Section 2.3.3). Adding an evacuation lift next to the existing stair in Block A to comply with Clause 7.4.1 of BS 9991: 2024 is challenging. This is due to the extent of the work required structurally (both superstructure and substructure), the financial implications, the impact on current occupants of the apartments next to the stair, and the potential loss of apartment or change of unit mix that could affect Planning.
- A 900 x 1400mm refuge with Emergency Voice Communication will be provided in the protected stair in Block A, as well as the stair in Block B (see following Section 2.3.3). The full landing of the stairs appears sufficiently wide to accommodate a wheelchair without reducing the clear width of the stair should a simultaneous evacuation be used.
- The building currently has R60 structural fire resistance (60min fire resistance for loadbearing) as it is between 18m and 30m in height. The design team has reviewed the exact building height, along with additional surveys, and the height of the top storey will be 29.80m, allowing for 20cm of construction tolerance on-site. However, it is noted that if the *“upper floor surface of top floor to ground level on lowest side of building”* is greater than 30m then this would increase the structural fire resistance requirement to R120.
- A Category 4 sprinkler system to BS 9251: 2021 will be required as the building is greater than 11m in height (Clause 17 of BS 9991: 2024). Sprinkler heads will be required in the common corridors and the stairs to comply with Note 6 of Clause 17. BS 9251 permits sprinklers to be omitted from a stair based on certain requirements (i.e. non combustible floorings, walls and ceilings), and it will be further reviewed if the recommendations in BS 9991 takes precedence over the one in BS 9251. Following conversations with the MEP team, it is understood that upgrading the existing BS 9251:2014 sprinkler system to a BS 9251:2021 on the top floor (or in the full building) would be challenging as it could lead to stripping out the existing pumps, tanks and piping and replacing them. Replacing the pipes will also lead to removing and replacing the full ceiling in the areas concerned. In addition, changing the water tank will lead to major disruption to the water services throughout all three blocks to accommodate the change. This will, therefore, be further reviewed at RIBA 3, but it is likely that the BS 9251:2014 exiting system will be extended to the new areas, with some enhancements where practically feasible.
- To comply with Regulation 7(2), materials which become part of an external wall, or specified attachment, must be of European Classification A2-s1, d0 or A1, classified in accordance with BS EN 13501-1. The roof slab will provide clear separation between the existing façade and the façade of the new floor level. As described in Section 2.3.3 thereafter, no work will be undertaken to the existing façade.
- As the new Ninth floor is occupied, it is recommended to prioritise the apartments close to the Core B bridge for mobility impaired occupants, as they will be closer to the evacuation lift in Core B. This is an action for the company managing the building and/or the Responsible Person at RIBA 6 and RIBA 7.

The proposed fire safety strategy at Ninth floor is shown in Figure 2.4 below.




Figure 2.4 Proposed fire safety strategy at Ninth floor (new floor level)

2.3.3 Block A and Block B – Existing Upper storeys

- The distance to the cooking appliances, like in Unit 3B identified in the Omega Fire Strategy report, will remain as they are as no work is to be undertaken to the existing units.
- In Block A, the AOVs provided on the façade to enable smoke ventilation to the common corridors will remain as no work is to be undertaken to those floor levels. A change of guidance does not mean that previous fire guidance was unsafe and, therefore, it is our opinion that keeping those AOVs would be reasonable.
- A BS 8629 Evacuation alert system (EAS) will be provided to all apartments in Block A only. Even though only one floor level is added and the additional risk due to the increased number of occupants is created by that floor, providing the EAS only to Ninth floor is not considered a suitable option, as it could create operational issues for the Fire Service. As Block B is separated from Block A and as external fire spread calculations appear to have been undertaken between Block A and Block B using a notional boundary, both blocks are considered as separated and with their own independent escape routes. Therefore, the EAS will not be provided in Block B. It should also be noted that, as shown in Figure 1.2, the Block B wall facing Block A appears to be made from concrete with no openings other than the door to the link bridge.
- A 900 x 1400mm refuge with Emergency Voice Communication should be provided in each stair of Block A and Block B on every floor level, including Ground floor level, as the final escape is at Lower Ground. Based on the drawings, it appears that there is sufficient space on the full landings for the refuge not to decrease the clear width of the stairs. This will need to be further checked on-site, nonetheless should the refuge decrease the clear width of the escape route on the landing, this would be considered acceptable due to the 'stay put' evacuation policy in the building and the number of stairs provided (i.e. a decrease in escape clear width will not impact the low number of occupants expected to escape via any stair at a given time).
- The refuges and EVC in Block B are provided due to the provision of an evacuation lift (see bullet point below). Having two separate management arrangements for the same building (i.e. one for the stair with evacuation lift and one for the stair without) would make it more complicated to manage and would create

confusion. Furthermore, adding a refuge only to the stair associated with the evacuation lift would discriminate, or remove the alternative means of escape for mobility impaired occupants, as they would only be able to call for help in one location.

- It is proposed that an evacuation lift is provided to Core B. The lift should be designed and installed to BS EN 81-76: 2025 for a Class B with a minimum lift car area of Type 3 or Type 4 according to EN 81-70:2021+A1: 2022 Table 3. It is proposed for the lift to have an automatic evacuation operation and a driver assisted evacuation mode. Following conversations with the MEP engineer, full compliance with BS EN 81-76 is unlikely to be achieved, and compliance with Annex G of BS 9999 will be sought instead, though some challenges have already been identified such as the secondary power supply which might not comply with current standards and will need to be further investigated at RIBA 3.
- A smoke vented lobby will need to be provided in front of the evacuation lift, with no apartments opening into it. The smoke ventilation strategy for this lobby has been reviewed and it would be extremely difficult to have a code compliant smoke ventilation system without making significant changes to the façade of the building to introduce AOVs. This is explained in the email provided in Appendix A 1 that details all the options reviewed during a fire workshop on the 3rd September 2025 and their feasibility. One apartment per floor level will open into this lobby. Whilst not code compliant, the introduction of an evacuation lift and a lift lobby will still increase the overall level of safety.
- The existing smoke ventilation system venting the common corridor will be used to smoke ventilate the lift lobby. The common corridor will therefore become unvented, which is acceptable as escape is available in two directions.
- The type of service risers provided inside the lift lobby should be further reviewed to comply with recommendations within Clause 7.4.3 of BS 9991: 2024 which allows services risers (that do not contain motorized equipment or similar with a potential to malfunction and cause fire) and distribution boards.
- Sprinkler coverage is to be extended into the common corridors and stair of Block A only. This is to comply with Note 6 of Clause 17 of BS 9991: 2024. It will be a Category 4 sprinkler system designed and installed to BS 9251: 2021. No additional sprinkler system coverage will be added to Block B as it is separated from Block A and considered as a separate block in terms of external fire spread. As explained in Section 2.3.2, upgrading the existing BS 9251:2014 sprinkler system to a BS 9251:2021 standard on the top floor, or in the full building, would be challenging as it could lead to stripping out the existing pumps, tanks and piping and replacing it. This will, therefore, be further reviewed at RIBA 3.
- The existing façade build-up is to be reviewed based on an EWS1 form or an FRAEW report. Nonetheless, it will be for information only as the Building (Amendment) Regulations 2018 came into force on the 21st December 2018 and the building was already too advanced in construction for it to apply. The fire safety strategy report nonetheless states that any insulation product, filler material (not including gaskets, sealants and similar), etc. used in the external wall construction should be of limited combustibility. Limited combustibility was defined in Approved Document B as EuroClass A1 or A2-s3,s2, but did other type of materials tested to BS 476 that might not equivalent to the EuroClass. The safety case report for the building states:

“An EWS1 report was undertaken at the Trilogy. The findings were that the construction of the external wall consists of non-combustible materials along with suitable cavity barriers installed at compartmentation lines and around openings, therefore, they do not pose a risk for fire spread across the building.”
- Way finding signage for the Fire Service should be provided in the firefighting stair and evacuation lift lobby of Block B to comply with Clause 48.2 of BS 9991: 2024.
- The secondary power supply suitability for the additional active fire safety systems (evacuation lift and the secondary pump for the Category 4 BS 9251: 2021 sprinkler system) should be reviewed at RIBA 3.

- The Responsible Person should be consulted to determine if they can manage the EVC in Block A and B as it will change their management strategy. This could be undertaken as part of the further management changes that will be required under The Fire Safety (Residential Evacuation Plans) (England) Regulations 2025 that will come into force on the 6th April 2026.
- Throughout the lifetime of the building (RIBA 7), it is recommended to prioritise allocating the apartments closest to the Core B bridge for mobility impaired occupants, as they will be closer to the evacuation lift in Core B. This is an action for the company managing the building and/or the Responsible Person.

The proposed fire safety strategy on the typical floor level of Block A and Block B is shown in Figure 2.5 below. No work will be undertaken to Block C and, therefore, no improvement works will be undertaken to this block.




Figure 2.5 Proposed fire safety strategy on the existing floor levels in Block A and Block B

3. Conclusion

The work proposed to be undertaken to the building means that it is necessary to demonstrate compliance with the functional requirements of Schedule 1 Part B of the Building Regulations 2010 compliance, typically by following the recommendations of the latest fire safety guidance. However, full compliance with the recommendations within BS 9991: 2024 cannot be achieved due to the existing and occupied nature of the building.

Section 2.3 described the proposed fire safety strategy for the areas of work (i.e. Ground and First, plus Ninth floor) and to the existing areas. This section identified the proposed compliance with BS 9991: 2024, and the proposed improvements, as well as the known non-compliances with BS 9991: 2024 that previously complied with BS 9991: 2015 and will, therefore, remain as they are.

Overall, it is our opinion that, subject to further design and validation, the proposed work will demonstrate compliance with the functional requirements of Schedule 1 Part B1 to B5 of the Building Regulations 2010 (as amended).

A 1. Smoke ventilation review of the proposed lift lobby

Hadrien Fruton


From: Hadrien Fruton
Sent: 04 September 2025 10:18
To: 'Joe Hynes'; cionita@chapmantaylor.com; rbarry@chapmantaylor.com; Diana Paune; Catalina Ionita
Cc: Michael Paschali; swilton@quartzprojectservices.com; berfani@quartzprojectservices.com; Tony Hood; Alec Storey
Subject: The Trilogy - Smoke ventilation to evacuation lift [Filed 04 Sep 2025 10:17]
Categories: Filed by Mail Manager

Good morning all,

Thank you for your time yesterday.

As discussed, BS 9991 states that smoke should not be extracted from the lift lobby itself, and smoke ingress to the lobby should be limited. Moreover, no apartment should open directly into the evacuation lift lobby.


To do so, the “code compliant” method would be to smoke ventilate the lift lobby and the common corridor on each sides of it. Having a code compliant layout would result in the introduction of a cross corridor door, and the introduction of two AOVs on the façade. This is schematically shown below. Due to the significant impact on the existing building, this solution was discarded.




A solution focusing only on Block B was discussed, where only one AOV is provided in the link bridge, and a cross corridor door is provided to create a lift lobby with no apartment opening into it was discussed. Nonetheless, adding the AOV on the link bridge would mean removing the full cladding on one side of the link bridge, which would be costly, and would also have an impact on the occupants of Block A throughout the work. The AOV, if used as air inlet (e.g. to provide replacement air to the mechanical extract in the common corridor) could be suitable on the façade, but not as smoke outlet due to the potential wind effect (and not allowed in BS 9991). Finally, the Block A common corridor would be unvented, which is a deviation from the guidance in BS 9991. This option was also not judged as suitable.




An option to use the AOV in the link bridge to ventilate the Block A common corridor was discussed, but in addition to the issues above, the space in front of the firefighting lift and firefighting stair would not be smoke vented, which would create conditions worse than in the existing building and would not be suitable.



We have discussed introducing a smoke shaft in one of the risers, instead of providing an AOV on the façade. The risers are nonetheless full and there would not be sufficient space to provide a smoke shaft of a suitable size. It also does not resolve the non-compliance for the Block A smoke ventilation. This option was also discarded.



An option was discussed with Alec during our internal catch-up yesterday afternoon, which would be to take advantage of the removal of the cladding in the link bridge to provide two AOVs next to each other and move the cross corridor door to the middle of the bridge. This would allow to provide smoke ventilation to both the Core A common corridor and the lift lobby in Block B. Nonetheless, as the building is greater than 18m in height, an AOV on the façade cannot be used for smoke exhaust. In addition, the two AOVs are likely to be too close to each other, and smoke contamination from one fire compartment to another could occur. This option was discarded.




The final design option was to provide a cross corridor door so that the mechanical extract is provided inside of the evacuation lift lobby. This nonetheless means that one apartment will be opening into the evacuation lift lobby in every floor. This is against guidance within BS 9991, but this increases the level of safety compared to the existing situation with 5 apartments opening into the common corridor in which the lifts open. Occupants from both Block A and Block B could be using the evacuation lift to evacuate. As there are 17 apartments on a typical floor level, that is a 1 in 17 (5.9%) probability of a fire starting in the apartment opening into the lift lobby. Should this occur, occupants in the other apartments could go to the second protected stair, wait in the refuge and use the emergency voice communication (EVC) to call for assistance. This is also a better situation than the current one where no EVC devices are provided in either block. The common corridor that was previously smoke vented will now be unvented. This is compliant as occupants in this common corridor will have two direction of escapes.

[@Joe Hynes](#) should review the existing functioning of the mechanical smoke extract to determine where the pressure sensors are provided (if any), and if they need to be moved inside the vented lift lobby. Alternatively, it should be confirmed if the stair door opening direction needs to be changed to be used as replacement air. The evacuation lift will have smoke being extracted into it smoke ingress into the lift lobby will not be prevented, as recommended by BS 9991. Whilst this is a deviation, it has been demonstrated that providing a fully compliant design in the context of an existing building is extremely difficult. Moreover, Annex G of BS 9999 that provides guidance on evacuation lifts, does not require the evacuation lift lobby to be smoke vented, and allows accommodation to open directly into the lift lobby. Therefore, even though compliance with BS 9991 cannot be achieved, compliance with Annex G of BS 9999 which is still relevant for evacuation lifts, will be complied with.

[@Catalina Ionita](#) could you please update the drawings to show the door more or less where shown?

Whilst not code compliant, this solution could be suitable and would enable to provide an evacuation lift that will be protected, as best as possible in the context of an existing building. It will also be an improvement to the existing condition that do not have an evacuation lift.

It would nonetheless carry an approval risk until Gateway 2.



I hope this helps.

Regards,

Upcoming leave:
Wednesday PM 11th September to Monday 15th September (inclusive).

We create safe spaces
where people, businesses
and communities thrive.