CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

PROPOSED REAR EXTENSION, ALTERATIONS TO ROOF, CONVERSION OF UPPER FLOORS TO ACCOMMODATE 8 NEW RESIDENTIAL APARTMENTS

AT **82-84 MARKET STREET, MANCHESTER**

For: Cambridge Park LTD C/O WUKPG LTD

Version A: 22.10.25

2024/0443/CIS/02

designforsecurity

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GREATER MANCHESTER POLICE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported

The proposed development has been well-considered from a crime prevention perspective. We welcome the engagement sought from the design team and appreciate their willingness to respond to advice to improve the security of the development.

We welcome the continuing investment in residential accommodation within the city centre and support the proposals.

From a crime prevention perspective, the positive features of the development include: the development will result in the re-use of vacant floorspace; the building, Market Street and Sickle Street will be more animated; there will be an appropriate number of apartments for space of this size; the entrance door will be appropriately located; measures will be included to allow residents and visitors to review activity on Sickle Street prior to leaving the building; additional lighting and other streetscene improvements are included in the scheme; and, the development will generate greater activity in Sickle Street whilst also facilitating passive surveillance of the surrounding streets.

Advice is included in the report, which we consider will enhance security of the development and this set out in sections 3.3 and 4. The principal recommendations relate to the security standards of entrance doors, access controls, controlling the progress of non-residents through the development and arrangements for mail and parcel delivery.

Adrian Murphy *MRTPI*
Consultant
[redacted]

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1 The Site and Surroundings

The photographs and plan, below, show the application site, numbers 82-82 Market Street, and its surroundings. Edged in red on the plan, the site is located on the southern side of Market Street in the Upper King Street Conservation Area and within the retail core of Manchester city centre. Large retail stores that form part of the Arndale Centre dominate the northern side of Market Street opposite the site. Nº 78 Market Street ,a five-storey building, adjoins the western flank of the application premises, the ground floor of which is occupied by Gong Cha, a bubble tea cafe that trades from 12.00-20.00 daily. The entrance door to this building's upper floor office suites faces Spring Gardens. To the east of the application building there is a six-storey building; a branch of Barclay's occupies the ground floor whilst the upper floors are occupied by Kula, a development of five, serviced apartments. A narrow pedestrian/cycle-only route, Sickle Street, separates the Barclays/Kula building from the application premises. Though still narrow, Sickle Street widens at the rear of the application premises and is accessible to traffic from Fountain Street/Phoenix Street to the south-east. Secured by high, aluminium fencing and gates, the entrance to Kula is obliquely opposite the rear elevation of the application site. Accessed off Marble Street, with a secure, service yard and emergency exit on Sickle Street, the Bloc, a 3-16 storey, multi-faceted, office building (also with a hotel and food and beverage uses) adjoins the south-western corner of the application site.



Occupied by Greggs on the ground floor and with a red-brick upper floor façade, the application site lies on the south side of Market Street



An alternative view of the application premises along with the adjacent ornate stone-faced building at number 78 Market Street


The approach to the rear of the site at Sickle Street




A view of the side and angled, rear elevation of the application premises taken from Sickle Street


The passageway that connects Market Street with Sickle Street on the eastern side of the application premises



Horizontal-slat, aluminium fencing and gates secure the access to the Kula apartments

The application premises comprise a part four-, part three- storey, red-brick building, (rendered at ground floor level). There is also a basement floor. The four-storey element is at the front of the building. Most of the ground floor is occupied by Gregg's bakery, whose modern shopfront faces Market Street. The bakery is open seven days a week, with daily opening hours of 06.30 until 21.00 (08.30-19.00 on Sunday). Greggs is serviced from Market Street but there is a door on the rear elevation that provides access to the rear of the ground floor and to a stairway and lift that allow access to the vacant, upper floors. There are multiple rooms on the upper floors, most with windows overlooking the front, rear or side elevations, some of have steel bars mounted on the inner side of the window frames. Along with a pair of AC condenser units, this rear entrance is situated within a steel-palisade and steel-mesh enclosure. This enclosure and immediate environs are illuminated and monitored by CCTV mounted on neighbouring buildings. There is some lighting of Sickle Street, including along the narrow pathway adjoining the eastern elevation of the application site. On visiting the site, as well as the walls that enclose this pathway being repeatedly daubed with graffiti, I also observed evidence that the space at the rear of the application building is used by street drinkers.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood

The data below relates to crimes recorded between 1st September 2024 to 31st August 2025, committed within 500m of the site.

All crime

Domestic burglary	Non-domestic burglary	Criminal damage	Use, or threat, of violence	Theft - including shoplifting	Robbery	Drug offences	Theft from motor vehicle	Theft of motor vehicle	Bicycle theft
17	149	372	3,612	3,329	327	778	153	15	76

2.1.1 There were 8,828 crimes in the neighbourhood around the development site during the period analysed. This volume of crime is extremely high but typical for a neighbourhood within retail core of city centre Manchester.

2.1.2 The most common crimes recorded were:

- the use, or threat, of violence - 41%
- theft (including bicycle theft and shoplifting) - 39%
- drug offences 9%.
- criminal damage – 4%
- robbery – 4%
- vehicle crime, i.e., theft of, theft from and criminal damage to a vehicle - 2%

  burglary - 2%.

2.1.3 Crimes involving the use or threat of violence occurred throughout the area analysed, but there were concentrations at, and near, licensed premises on Deansgate and Peter Street, as well as in Piccadilly Gardens, where large numbers of people congregate. Offences mostly occurred over the weekend period, and during the late evening and early hours of the morning, which reinforces the consumption of alcohol being a significant factor in determining when and where such crimes occur.

2.1.4 Incidents of theft have taken place throughout the area, with hotspots at Piccadilly Gardens, licensed premises on Deansgate, Peter Street and Quay Street, and at retail premises in Market Street and the Arndale Centre. As well as shoplifting, offenders used pick-pocketing and distraction techniques to steal mobile phones, bags, and purses/wallets. Offenders have also targeted insecure items (mostly bags and mobile phones) left on or under tables in bars and restaurants.

2.1.5 The streets where the most crimes were recorded were:

- Market Street
- Picadilly/Piccadilly Gardens
- Peter Street
- Deansgate
- Corporation Street

Crime on Market Street and Sickle Street

2.1.6 Around 15% of all crime in the neighbourhood occurred on Market Street. There were just 3 crimes recorded as having taken place on Sickle Street - burglary, robbery and possession of class B drug.


Domestic burglary

2.1.7 There were 17 burglaries committed within the neighbourhood during the period analysed. The burglary rate is very much lower than the City of Manchester average for neighbourhoods of the same size and also significantly lower than rates across the conurbation and the country. There were no particular street or buildings where offences occurred. Offenders gaining entry to apartments by forcing a door was rare, more usual was theft of parcels of bicycles from the ground floor reception/lobby. Offenders


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tended to gain entry to an apartment building by tailgating residents or visitors through communal entrance doors.

Domestic Burglary – Day Range



Domestic Burglary – Time Range




2.1.8 The risk of domestic burglary is greatest on Tuesday and Thursday and between the hours of 02:00-03:00 and in the afternoon.

2.2 Crime rate comparison


Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester, Greater Manchester, and England & Wales

The rates below relate to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.

Domestic Burglary Crime Rates




Wounding Crime Rates




2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **88% lower** than the rate for Manchester, **85% lower** than the Greater Manchester rate and **84% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.2.2 The rate of wounding per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **172% higher** than the rate for Manchester, **271% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **608% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

Criminal Damage Crime Rates



Vehicle Crime Rates



2.2.3 The rate of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **106% higher** than the Manchester rate, **171% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **229% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

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2.2.4 The rate of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **123% higher** than the Manchester rate, **268% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **346% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.3 Typical modus operandi used in committing burglary & theft at apartments in Manchester, & measures to reduce vulnerabilities

2.3.1 Communal entrance and apartment entrance doors were targeted when left insecure

To minimise the risk of offenders tailgating through communal doors or entering apartments through insecure doors:

- communal entry doors should be self-closing and lock securely upon closure;
- install a secondary set of secure doors (airlock/secure lobby), that are also self-closing and self-locking;
- install lifts that are operated by a fob or card access control system;
- install CCTV cameras in the entrance lobby;
- apartment doors should be self-closing with a thumb-turn lock on the inner side that meets fire regulations, with clear, yet discreet, permanent instructions on the door to inform the resident that the door is not secure until the lock is turned; and,
- employ a concierge to supervise the entrance lobby.

2.3.2 Doors have been forced open

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all external doors and apartment entry doors should be certified to PAS 24 security standard - PAS 24 rated doors are very difficult to force open;
- 'recess-free' entrances should be installed so that entrance doors are easily visible - offenders will be less inclined to target properties where their actions may be witnessed;
- all external doors should be illuminated with dusk-to-dawn lighting. Light suggests a property may be occupied and may deter offenders from targeting a premise. Lighting will also support CCTV systems and highlight the actions of an offender, increasing the chance of a crime being witnessed; and,
- CCTV should be considered, to record activity within circulation spaces and around exterior of the building.

2.3.3 Ground floor windows were prised open, or the glazing smashed to gain access

To minimise the risk of offenders prising open windows or breaking glass to gain entry:

- avoid installing opening windows at street-level;
- install window locks and opening restrictors to any windows that are accessible from street level; and,
- install laminate glass on street-level windows and doors.

2.3.4 Offenders have entered communal cycle stores and stolen bicycles

To minimise the risk of offenders entering cycle stores:

- doors or gates to cycle stores should be self-closing and fitted with good quality locks (ideally a maglock, or similar, with a resistance force of around 4,500N), locking automatically upon closure; and,
- CCTV and PIR lighting should be installed within a store.

2.3.5 Theft of plant and machinery, and criminal damage during the construction period.

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting the construction site:

- a secure boundary should be erected around the site;

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- access should be restricted to contractors and authorised visitors;
- CCTV/security staff should patrol during non-working hours;
- lighting should be installed to illuminate activity;
- at the end of the working day, plant and machinery should be arranged to prevent forced access onto the site; and,
- plant and machinery should be fitted with a tracking device.

2.4 Environmental features of the site and surroundings that may influence crime patterns

2.4.1 Features of the physical environment can influence patterns criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect a potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether or not to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?
- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

2.4.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder at the site are as follows:

- public sector bodies and businesses/landlords tend to be more pro-active in the management and maintenance of the private and public spaces in this part of the city centre;
- the city centre has a broad and complementary range of retail, commercial, cultural, civic and leisure uses, which attracts a diverse range of people at all times of the day;
- there is a growing number of residential properties in this part of the core of the city centre;
- the environmental quality of Market Street is good, less so on Sickle Street when commercial bins are left on the street and doors and walls are daubed with graffiti;
- Market Street is pedestrian-friendly - such urban environments can encourage people to use the city centre and feel safe in doing so. The presence of large numbers of people tends to deter certain types of crime as there is a likelihood of intervention by the public be that direct intervention or reporting a crime to the appropriate authority ;
- activity and passive surveillance generated by occasional passing pedestrians and users of the Kula apartments as they come and go can act as a deterrent to those intent on committing crime or anti-social activities;
- windows at upper floors of the application building allow views over Market Street Sickle Street and an oblique view over the passageway;
- windows of the Kula apartments overlook Sickle Street. The presence of guests, or lights switched on in the apartments suggesting a presence, may deter some offenders from acting unlawfully;
- street lighting is very good on Market Street and, assuming it is in working order, adequate at the side and rear of the application building;
- private and public CCTV cameras monitor activity in the area; and,
- the current, rear entrance door is located within a secure compound - although this method securing doors is not always appropriate, particularly in a conservation area.

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2.4.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder, and these include:

- there is a high volume of crime in the city centre, indicating that offenders are active in the area, although retail and the night-time economy premises, rather than residential property, seem to be a particular focus for such activity;
- there is high volume, footfall on Market Street, some of the people passing the site may be intent on criminal or anti-social activity;
- the permeability of the city centre presents would-be offenders with easy and convenient routes to and from the site;
- there is evidence of street drinkers using the space at the rear of the site;
- Sickle Street is essentially a service route with little to attract people resulting is infrequent footfall, lack of natural surveillance and activity generally at the rear of the application site. Suich conditions allow offenders (criminal or anti-social) to act with little prospect of being witnessed in the act;
- the graffiti daubed walls of Sickle Street passageway can induce a fear of crime in users of the space;
- the aggressive security measures (palisade fencing and wire mesh) securing the plant and doorway at the rear of the application site suggests that these may have been targeted in the past; and,
- the apartments at the Kula development are principally marketed for short-stay guests. Those letting the apartments may be less inclined to respect the amenity other residents as they come and go from the development, particularly late at night; and,
- during the construction phase of any development, the presence of a site compound, however small, can be an attraction for offenders, who may also target property in the vicinity of the compound.

3 Relevant Planning History

3.1.1 In April 2025, an application seeking permission to convert the upper floors to eight apartments and to carry out enabling works to enable the conversion, including: a) the erection of a single-storey extension on Sickle Street (to facilitate the provision of a new entrance from the rear to the upper floors); b) an extension at third-floor level; and, c) alterations to the roof. The application was withdrawn in May 2025.

3.1.2 An application to create a new entrance on the chamfered, rear corner of the building off Sickle street and block-up the existing rear access door was submitted in May 2021 and approved in October 2021. The new entrance, secured with an aluminium framed, glazed door with canopy door would provide a more attractive and functional entrance, allowing the upper floors to be re-used as offices. Although the approved plans do not indicate the presence of the air conditioning units, the steel-palisade enclosure would be removed and the rear wall re-rendered.

4 Development Appraisal

4.1 The proposed development

4.1.1 The proposed development is very similar to that withdrawn earlier this year and includes:

- erection of a small, infill extension at third floor level;
- alterations to the roof;
- creating a new entrance on the chamfered corner of the building onto Sickle Street;
- repurposing the existing entrance on the rear elevation;
- removal of the steel-palisade enclosure and relocating the air conditioning units; and,
- conversion of the upper floors to residential use – eight apartments in total.

4.1.2 There are no proposals to alter the Greggs bakery or basement floor of the building.

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4.1.3 Marked with a lightweight, glass canopy he proposed new, single-leaf, entrance door will be installed on the chamfered, south-west corner of the rear elevation. The door will open inwards into a lobby with direct access to a lift and staircase allowing access to the upper floors. For safety and security reasons, a monitor linked to CCTV cameras, mounted adjacent to the residential entrance/exit door will allow residents and visitors a view of Sickle Street prior to leaving the building.

4.1.4 The existing, outward opening, rear door on the south-east elevation will be partially infilled and slightly relocated and repurposed for fire escape and refuse removal. Similarly, a monitor linked to CCTV cameras, mounted adjacent to the residential entrance/exit door will allow residents a view of Sickle Street prior to removing bins from the building .

4.1.5 The four upper floors will each accommodate a one-bedroom and a two-bedroom apartment. A cycle storage space will be provided within each apartment.

4.1.6 Refuse bins will be stored on the landing of each floor and removed by residents via the lift and secondary door to Sickle Street on collection day.

4.1.7 Externally, three additional bollards will be installed at the turning area of Sickle Street to protect the new entrance door and prevent access to vehicles along the passageway at the side of the building. The pedestrian-only area will be extended to reflect the positioning of the new bollards. New, dusk-to-dawn lighting will be mounted on the side and rear elevations, whilst CCTV cameras with wide angel lenses will allow the immediate are to be monitored electronically.

4.2 Positive aspects of the proposals

4.2.1 The re-use of the property is welcomed. Properties that remain vacant are often targeted by thieves and vandals. The resulting visible signs of decay can attract further abuse, which is then likely to negatively affect neighbouring premises.

4.2.2 The proposed use will bring activity and passive surveillance to Market Street and Sickle Street during the day and long into the evening.

4.2.3 Whilst there is no car parking within the development, public transport and taxi ranks are located close-by.

4.2.4 The scheme is one of a high quality of design and the design team have been responsive to measures to improve the security of the development. Such developments tend to be more pro-actively managed by managing agents and by the residents.

4.2.5 There will be eight apartments in the development, which is considered sufficient to provide a reasonable prospect of a presence of residents throughout the day and particularly at night, who will provide activity and passive supervision within the development, which can help to deter offenders from targeting the property.

4.2.6 Residents of smaller developments are more likely to interact with their neighbours as they come and go, whilst the presence of strangers in the building, or at the entrance doors, is more likely to be challenged by residents. Such positive behaviours can deter offenders from attempting to enter the property.

4.2.7 External, single-leaf, entrance doors are a more secure option than pairs of doors.

4.2.8 The residents/visitor entrance door will be as prominently located as feasible given the environment.

4.2.9 External, CCTV cameras will be installed to monitor the approaches to the entrance and escape doors. Residents will be able to review live images of the street as they prepare to leave the building. Additionally, a camera will be located within the ground floor lobby to monitor activity at the stairs and lift, as well as at the two external doors and any mail/parcel boxes.

4.2.10 Apartment and stairwell windows will facilitate surveillance and the spread of artificial light over the surrounding streets.

4.2.11 Secure cycle parking is included, albeit within the apartments.

4.2.12 Refuse storage is contained within the building.

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4.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the development

Control entry into the building

4.3.1 Access controls will need to be deployed at the entrance and escape/refuse doors in order to restrict access to residents and authorised visitors.

4.3.2 In addition to the door being monitored by CCTV and brightly illuminated, both the residents' entrance door and escape/refuse route door must be security-rated, self-closing and lock securely upon closure. They should be secured with an electrically operated, multi-point lock, activated with a residents' fob. We recommend the avoidance of glazing in any part of either door.

4.3.3 An audio-visual unit, with a link to each apartment should be fitted at the residents' entrance door to enable residents to vet callers prior to releasing the lock from within their respective apartment and allowing access to *bona fide* visitors only.

Control movement from the lobby/landing to the apartments

4.3.4 In order to reduce the risk of visitors or intruders tailgating into the building without due supervision, the landing-to-lobby door to each pair of apartments should be fitted with a key- or fob-operated lock. These doors should be self-closing and lock on closure. Egress through these doors should be handle action only.

4.3.5 Ideally, the operation of the lift should be restricted to residents holding a suitably programmed fob.

Apartment security

4.3.6 Each apartment should be fitted with a security-rated, entrance door that includes a door viewer and an opening limiter.

Mailboxes and parcel store

4.3.7 The theft of parcels from the lobbies of apartment schemes in Greater Manchester is a consistent problem. Consequently, arrangements for mail and parcel deliveries should be considered at an early stage. We recommend the installation of lockable, wall-mounted mailboxes and a lockable, one-way drop, parcel box for larger items (the key/fob to which all residents should have). The mailboxes and parcel drop should not be readily visible from the entrance door, so should be set behind a screen or in the recess under the staircase. The parcel box should be robust secured to a wall or the floor.

5 Physical Security

The following specification should be adopted, which meets the security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

5.1 Doors and Access Controls

☐ The residents' entrance and escape/refuse doors should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2. It must include an electronic lock capable of being operated via an access control system and be fitted with a door closer and a locking system that automatically secures the door upon closure. The outer handles should be fixed.

☐ An intercom, with two-way audio and one-way video, should be provided at the residents' entrance door linked to a handset in each apartment to allow residents to vet visitors prior to allowing entry via a remote door release.

☐ Apartment entrance doors must also be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24 and be fitted with a door viewer and chain opening limiter. These doors must also be self-closing and, ideally, lock upon closure.

☐ Ideally, the lift should be operated with a residents' fob.

☐ The doors connecting landing to apartment lobbies on each level should be fitted with a mechanical or an electronic lock operated by a residents' fob. Residents and visitors should be able to release the doors from the inner sides by handle action or push button.

5.2 Glazing

☐ Though not advised, any glazing to external doors should be BS EN:P1A or P4A-rated, laminate glass.

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5.3 Signage

☐ Signage to indicate the name of the development should be included at the residents' entrance.

5.4 Intruder alarm

☐ It is good practice to fit an alarm to each apartment.

5.5 CCTV

☐ The CCTV system installed should accord with that described and illustrated on the proposed plans and supporting document.

5.6 Lighting

☐ The external lighting installed should accord with that described and illustrated on the proposed plans and supporting document

☐ Lights should be operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor.

6 Management & Maintenance

☐ A maintenance plan should be drawn up for the building, to address issues such as cleaning of the communal areas, responsibility for removal and return of refuse bins, removal or graffiti, and maintenance of lighting, CCTV cameras and monitors, and access controls.

7 Secured by Design (SBD)

☐ Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial buildings, and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

A Contact Register

Date	Contact	Summary of Contact
04.09.25	David Tye, Paul Butler Associates	Request for Crime Impact Statement
11.09.25		Site visited
22.10.25	David Tye, Paul Butler Associates	Report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following document:

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	Stage 3 Developed Design	24.09.25	B

Should any changes to the scheme, it may be necessary for Design for Security to review the recommendations in this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Date	Revisions
A	22.10.25	

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D Glossary

Physical Security Standards

PAS 24

Enhanced security performance requirements for doorsets and windows in the UK. Doorsets and windows intended to offer a level of security suitable for dwellings and other buildings exposed to comparable risk. It is designed to mimic an attack by an opportunist burglar, using tools which are easy to conceal.

STS 201

Enhanced security to satisfy the requirements for certification of doorsets, equivalent to test standard to PAS 24.

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors, roller shutters, fences and barriers. Products are rated via the term Burglary Resistance (BR) and range from BR1 (lower security rating) to BR6 (higher security rating).

LPS 1175

Physical security for products manufactured for perimeter, façade, internal spaces and entrapment protection. The higher the security rating, the more formidable the security product.

Developed following extensive consultation with stakeholders, the most recent issue sees the previous single digit performance classifications (i.e. Security Ratings 1 to 8) extended to one formed of two elements that illustrate performance in terms of:

- *Threat level (first element) – Letter (A to H) corresponding with the tool kit used to evaluate the product's intruder resistance and number of attackers involved.*
- *Delay (second element) – Numeric value (1, 3, 5, 10, 15 or 20) corresponding with the minimum delay (in minutes) provided by the product when placed in a locked condition.*

BS EN 1627

European standard for the burglary resistance of pedestrian doorsets, windows, curtain walling, grilles and shutters. It defines six resistance classes, from RC1 to RC6, with RC1 being the lowest level of resistance and RC6 the highest. These classes indicate the level of resistance to forced entry, with higher classes requiring more time and specialized tools to breach.

BS EN 356

European standard that specifies the resistance of laminated glazing (i.e. two or more layers of glass bonded together with a plastic interlayer) to manual attacks, such as might occur during forced entry or vandalism. It classifies laminated glass into different resistance levels, ranging from P1A to P8B, with P1A being the lowest and P8B the highest.

Useful Websites

Design For Security – Designing Out Crime *– apply for Crime Impact Statements or the Secured by Design Award from Greater Manchester Police*

Secured by Design - Secured by Design *– SBD Award Scheme, Design Guides and Member Companies*

ParkMark - Home *– Park Mark Safer Parking Award Scheme*

NBS Source *– find, select and specify building products (including security-certified products)*

RedBook Live - LPCB Red Book *– search for LPS 1175 certified products*

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