CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

DEVELOPMENT OF PURPOSE-BUILT STUDENT ACCOMMODATION

AT 78 SACKVILLE STREET, MANCHESTER

For: Hermes Asset Weston Limited

Version A: 16.12.25

2025/0407/CIS/01

designforsecurity

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GREATER MANCHESTER POLICE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported

We welcome the continuing investment in this part of central Manchester and support redevelopment of this site for a comprehensive student accommodation scheme. The development has been well considered from a crime prevention perspective, and it will make a positive contribution to the redevelopment of the neighbourhood into a vibrant, city centre neighbourhood. Design for Security are happy to support the proposals.

Positive aspects of the scheme include:

- management staff will be present;
- the accommodation will be fully serviced;
- the density of development will generate significant level of street activity as residents and visitors come and go;
- the location and orientation of buildings and uses within will promote activity and surveillance in the most appropriate areas;
- the location of the resident entrances are appropriately located;
- the location of the management office is ideal; and,
- a range of residents' amenity spaces and facilities are proposed.

To improve the scheme from a crime prevention perspective, include:

- appropriate access controls at relevant doors to control access into and through the building;
- design boundary treatments that allow for controlling access to the courtyard and woodland edge at least outside of daylight hours;
- use of security certified doors and glazing throughout;
- ensuring the cycle hub and access to it is very secure;
- a good quality CCTV system and complementary lighting; and,
- a crime awareness/prevention information pack for residents.

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will make representations to Manchester Planning to require the inclusion of a condition requiring the development to be constructed in accordance with the security recommendations and specification set out in section 3.3. and 4 of the Statement.

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1 The Site and Surroundings

The application site and its surroundings are shown on the plan and photographs below. The site, edged in red on the plan, is located on the south side of Charles Street in Manchester city centre. Charles Street is a well-trafficked street that connects Sackville Street to the east with Oxford Road and Princess Street to the west. An eight-storey, circa 130 room, Ibis Hotel stands at the junction of Charles Street and Princess Street adjacent to the site's north-western corner. There is a redundant multi-storey car park on the north side of Charles Street facing the site. A planning application to demolish this car park and adjacent commercial units, collectively known as Plot H of the ID Manchester Strategic Regeneration Framework area, was recently approved. This framework aims to create a world-leading applied innovation district to be achieved through comprehensive development at the former UMIST Campus. Plot H is intended to be used to provide over 1,500 apartments. The Framework area includes the largely modernist, former campus buildings to the east of Sackville Street and those to the south of the site. The River Medlock flows within a culvert immediately south of the site.




Looking west at the site from the junction of Sackville Street and Charles Street




The entrance to the Pendulum Hotel and Manchester Conference Centre on Sackville Street



The entrance to the Weston Halls of Residence on Charles Street and adjacent children's nursery






Looking north across the Weston and Pendulum site from the elevated walkway at Drover Lane



A westerly view along Charles Street with the site on the left and redundant Charles Street Multi-storey Car Park on the right



Looking east across Sackville Street from the site towards former UMIST buildings that form part of the ID Manchester Strategic Regeneration Framework area

The application site is currently occupied by Weston Hall and the Pendulum Hotel/Manchester Conference Centre. Weston Hall is a part 5- and part 7-storey, multi-faceted, brick building that provides accommodation for around 500 students. Part of the ground floor of the building, and accessed from Charles Street, has been used as a children's day nursery. The Pendulum Hotel rooms is of a similar design and includes 117 guest rooms as well as conference facilities. The site has no on-site parking or vehicular access.

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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood

The data below relates to crimes recorded between 1st February 2022 to 31st January 2023, committed within 500m of the site.

All crime

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Crimes involving the use or threat of violence	Theft (including shoplifting)	Robbery	Drug related offences	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
37	85	176	1,916	1,344	115	307	181	24	70

2.1.1 There were 4,185 recorded crimes in the neighbourhood around the development site during the period analysed. This is around ten times the number for a typical neighbourhood within Manchester but not unusual for one within the city centre.

2.1.2 The most common crimes recorded were:

- the use, or threat, of violence - 46%
- theft (including shoplifting) - 32%
- drug related offences – 7%
- vehicle crime, i.e., theft of, theft from and criminal damage to a vehicle - 5%
- criminal damage – 4%
- robbery – 3%
- burglary - 3%.

2.1.3 The streets/places with the most recorded offences were:

- Oxford Road/Street – 527 crimes
- Princess Street – 407 crimes
- Canal Street – 363
- Sackville Street - 268
- Portland Street – 254 crimes
- Whitworth Street – 194 crimes
- Bloom Street – 157 crimes
- Piccadilly (Place/Station/Approach) - 150 crimes
- Chorlton Street – 122 crimes
- London Road – 106 crimes


2.1.4 The principal focal points for criminal activity largely theft and crimes involving the use or threat of violence, were the licensed premises in the principal night-life areas, particularly in the Village, Oxford Road/Street, Princess Street, Portland Street and Piccadilly. Hotspots for vehicle crime were the multi-storey car parks on and around, Whitworth Street and the surface car parks at Store Street (near Piccadilly Station) and Charles Street, west of the site. Five crimes were recorded at the same, three of which involved the use or threat of violence with one drug offence and one of criminal damage.

Domestic burglary


2.1.5 There were 37 domestic burglaries committed within the neighbourhood during the period analysed. Given the density of residential development in the city centre, the rate of burglary is very low. Buildings or streets where there were three or more than offences committed included: Whitworth Street (8), Circle Square (5), Charles Street (4), Granby Row (4) and London Road (3).

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Burglary Dwelling – Day Range



Burglary Dwelling – Time Range



2.1.6 The risk of domestic burglary is greater on a Thursday and Friday. Offences are most commonly committed in during standard working hours and around mid-night.,

2.1.7 Of the 37 incidents of burglary, the offender entered via an unlocked door or used a duplicate key-card in three-quarters of the incidents. Mail and parcels were stolen from lobbies and mail rooms of apartment buildings on six occasions.


2.1.8 The means by which an offender entering a building was often unknown, suggesting doors were not secured or the offender tail-gated a resident or *bona fide* visitor.

2.2 Crime rate comparison


Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester, Greater Manchester, and England & Wales

The rates below relate to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.

Domestic Burglary




Wounding Crime Rates




2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **77% lower** than the rate for Manchester, **71% lower** than the Greater Manchester rate and **70% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.2.2 The rate of wounding per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **21% lower** than the rate for Manchester, **7% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate but **104% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

Criminal Damage



Vehicle Crime



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2.2.3 The rate of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **42% lower** than the Manchester rate, **24% lower** than the Greater Manchester rate and **8% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.2.4 The rate of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **2% higher** than the Manchester rate, **68% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **104% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.3 Typical modus operandi used in committing burglary, theft, criminal damage and vehicle-related crimes in residential settings in Manchester, & measures to reduce vulnerabilities

2.3.1 Communal entrance doors and apartment entrance doors were targeted when left insecure

To minimise the risk of offenders tailgating through communal doors or entering apartments through insecure doors:

- communal entry doors should be self-closing and lock securely upon closure;
- install a secondary set of secure doors (airlock/secure lobby), that are also self-closing and self-locking;
- install lifts that are operated by a fob or card access control system;
- install CCTV cameras in the entrance lobby;
- apartment doors should be self-closing with a thumb-turn lock on the inner side that meets fire regulations, with clear, yet discreet, permanent instructions on the door to inform the resident that the door is not secure until the lock is turned; and,
- employ a concierge to supervise the entrance lobby.

2.3.2 Doors have been forced open

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all external doors and apartment entry doors should be certified to PAS 24 security standard - PAS 24 rated doors are very difficult to force open;
- 'recess-free' entrances should be designed so that doors are readily visible - offenders will be less inclined to target properties where their actions may be witnessed;
- all external doors should be illuminated with dusk-to-dawn lighting. Light suggests a property may be occupied and may deter offenders from targeting a premise. Lighting will also support CCTV systems and highlight the actions of an offender, increasing the chance of a crime being witnessed; and,
- CCTV should be considered, to record activity within circulation spaces within the building and around exterior of the building.

2.3.3 Ground floor windows were prised open, or the glazing smashed to gain access

To minimise the risk of offenders prising open windows or breaking glass to gain entry:

- avoid installing opening windows at street level;
- install window locks and opening restrictors to any windows that are accessible from street level; and,
- install laminate glass on street level windows and doors.

2.3.4 Vehicles were targeted when parked on driveways, in unsecured car parks or on the 'street'

To minimise the risk of vehicle-related crime:

- car parking should be located within the boundaries of the property, within an area that is both very secure and well overlooked by residents or monitored by an effective CCTV system. Consideration should be given to installing automatic vehicle gates and fencing around car parks.

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2.3.5 Offenders have entered communal cycle stores

To minimise the risk of offenders entering cycle stores:

- cycle stores should be secure rooms or stores;
- appropriate CCTV and PIR lighting should be installed within a store; and,
- doors or gates to cycle stores should be fitted with good quality locks (ideally a maglock or similar with a resistance force of around 4500N), be self-closing and lock automatically upon closure.

2.3.6 Offenders have damaged boundary fencing

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting fencing:

- rear garden boundaries should avoid being exposed to the public realm;
- communal pathways providing access to rear gardens should be secured with self-closing, self-locking gates; and,
- fencing should be especially robust when unavoidably exposed to the public realm.

2.3.7 Theft of plant and machinery, and criminal damage during the construction period.

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting the construction site:

- a secure boundary should be erected around the site;
- access should be restricted to contractors and authorised visitors;
- security staff should patrol during non-working hours;
- lighting and CCTV should be installed to illuminate the site and record activity;
- at the end of the working day, plant and machinery should be arranged to prevent forced access onto the site; and,
- plant and machinery should be fitted with a tracking device.

2.4 Environmental features in the area that may influence crime patterns

2.4.1 Features of the physical environment can influence patterns criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?
- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

2.4.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder at the site are as follows:

- the rate of burglary in this neighbourhood is much lower than that of Manchester, Greater Manchester and England and Wales;
- there is a development framework, the ID Manchester Strategic Regeneration Framework in place to guide investment in the wider neighbourhood;
- the high-level of investment proposed in the neighbourhood is likely to result in more pro-active management and maintenance of the private and public spaces;
- the site currently includes well-managed occupied buildings with associated day and evening activity;

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- Sackville Street and Charles Street are both well-trafficked and have a regular flow of pedestrians during the day , both of which add to the general surveillance of the street and adjacent buildings;
- the buildings have a reasonable level of security with access controls, CCTV and lighting and adequately robust doors and windows; and,
- there have been just five crimes recorded at the hotel, none of which involved burglary or theft, and no crimes at the halls of residence.

2.4.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder, and these include:

- the site is located in a neighbourhood with a high volume of crime;
- the site is located in a neighbourhood where the rate of violent crime and vehicle crime is above the Manchester, Greater Manchester and England and Wales rates;
- the number of robberies in the vicinity of the site is a concern;
- there are numerous, often infrequently used, pedestrian routes to the south and east of the site, which may facilitate offenders moving through the neighbourhood intent on targeting individuals or property as they do so;
- the site lies close to a series of well-trafficked routes, i.e., Whitworth Street, Oxford Road and Princess Street. Routes such as these can act as a conduit for crime, with criminals using these routes to seek out criminal opportunities; and,
- due to the closure of the multi-storey car park and relocation of departments from the UMIST buildings, there is a much lower level of street activity and passive surveillance of the streets and buildings than in recent years.

3 Development Appraisal

3.1 The proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed two-phase development comprises the demolition of the existing buildings on the site followed by the erection of a series of residential towers providing around 2,500 student accommodation on 51-week leases, with internal and external amenity spaces.

3.1.2 Phase A, orientated towards Sackville Street, includes the construction of a 50-storey tower alongside an 18-storey block, with a 9-storey connecting building . This phase will deliver 1,292 bedrooms, a mix of one and two person studios and multi-resident, cluster flats.

3.1.3 Phase B includes a 24- and 32-storey blocks, with a single storey connecting building, orientated towards the Charles Street. Again, this phase will deliver 1,188 bedrooms, also a mixture of studios and multi-resident, cluster flats.

3.1.4 A landscaped courtyard and woodland edge will provide a series of external spaces for residents.

3.2 Positive aspects of the proposal

3.2.1 We welcome the investment and continuing regeneration of this part of central Manchester.

3.2.2 The proposals will result in an uplift in the vitality and viability of the neighbourhood. The development will help to continue to repopulate this part of the city centre and create activity through the day and at weekends.

3.2.3 The site's proximity to the city centre and the University will make this an interesting place to live. Developments with a strong sense of place tend to have greater longevity and are more likely to attract and retain people.

3.2.4 A residential development is an appropriate use for the site given the existing and emerging land uses in the neighbourhood.

3.2.5 IQ Student Accommodation have an excellent record in developing good quality, student-living schemes.

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3.2.6 The footprints of the buildings are relatively simple and free of recesses and makes securing the entire site quite straightforward if necessary.

3.2.7 Staff will be present in the building. A management presence will not only discourage offender attempts to gain entry to the scheme but also gives residents a readily accessible contact to whom they may report issues. Such provision can help to instil confidence in residents that the development is secure and that maintenance issues will be dealt with promptly.

3.2.8 Similarly, surveillance across the site will be enhanced by the well-considered location of the social facilities within the buildings, and the location of residential entrances.

3.2.9 The inclusion of internal and external amenity/social space provides an opportunity for residents to meet and build relationships, which can help to develop a sense of community within the scheme and deters crime and anti-social behaviour.

3.2.10 Residents and visitors coming and going, particularly on the lower floors, will overlook entrances to the development and the private and public realm. Natural surveillance over the public realm can help to maintain order.

3.2.11 The communal entrance doors will be suitably positioned. Secure lobbies will be created to reduce the risk of offenders tailgating residents or *bona fide* visitors and delivery staff.

3.2.12 Lighting from the development will contribute to public lighting around the site. Good public, and building, lighting can significantly reduce the public's fear of crime.

3.2.13 Access controls can be deployed at the communal entrance doors and service doors to restrict access into the development to residents and authorised visitors.

3.2.14 Living accommodation is at upper floor levels, which will result in a greater degree of privacy and security to the residents, without compromising natural surveillance of the public realm by the same residents. Often, residents of ground level apartments/studios in the city centre that lack defensible space suffer from anti-social behaviour, a lack of privacy, and their accommodation is more susceptible to theft and burglary.

3.2.15 The development is located in an area with good access to shops, services and public transport so the absence of car parking is not an issue.

3.2.16 Refuse storage has been included on the site.

3.3 Recommendations to enhance the security of the development and the surroundings

Management

3.3.1 Students should be issued with an information pack containing, *inter alia*:

- crime prevention/awareness - particularly keeping safe at night when returning to the accommodation;
- deterred from car ownership whilst resident due to the lack of available parking;
- respecting the amenity of other residents in the neighbourhood when returning to the accommodation late at night;
- being vigilant in allowing others access to the building; and,
- using appropriate entrance doors to enter and leave the building.

External courtyard and woodland edge

3.3.2 We recommend the installation of appropriately high (2100mm), well-designed, robust boundary treatments. They should allow the external areas to be secured, at least, outside of daylight hours. Narrow, secluded pathways at the north-western and south-eastern fringes of the site should be particularly avoided.

Main entrances and reception areas

3.3.3 All residents and visitors should access the building via the main entrance doors.

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3.3.4 The outer entrance doors should be security-rated, fitted with an electronic locking system and automated, and capable of restricting access to residents or staff holding an appropriate fob or pass card.

3.3.5 An audio-visual unit should relay images (one way) and audio (two ways) from the outer entrance doors to staff at the reception desk to allow for vetting visitors prior to allowing entry via a remote lock release.

3.3.6 To minimise the risk of 'tail-gating' legitimate residents/visitors, the inner lobby doors should also be automated and fitted with electronic locks capable of restricting access to residents or staff holding an appropriate fob or pass card, with a remote lock release activated by staff at reception.

3.3.7 Visitors to the building should be required to report to reception, whereupon staff should alert the student; schemes where students admit visitors remotely by way of electronic door lock release from inside their apartment or cluster is considered less secure.

3.3.8 The reception desk should be staffed throughout the day and at night.

3.3.9 In order to restrict access to residents and visitors to appropriate areas of the building, management may wish to consider installing card/fob activated, electronic locks to appropriate doors to control circulation or access to social spaces where a 'membership' (e.g., gym and dining rooms) or booking is required.

3.3.10 All external doors should be security rated.

3.3.11 Internal doors to plant rooms may be secured with FD-30 rate doors fitted with a fob-operated electronic or mechanical lock.

Studios

3.3.12 The studio entrance doors should be security-rated and include an electronic lock, which forms part of the security certification.

Cluster flats

3.3.13 The entrance door to a cluster should be security-rated and include an electronic lock, which forms part of the security certification.

3.3.14 Study bedroom doors should include an electronic lock and a fixed outer handle so that entry is only possible with an appropriately authorised card/fob.

Cycle hub

3.3.15 Secure cycle parking should be provided.

3.3.16 The external entrance doors to the cycle hub should be security-certified and be self-closing and self-locking. An alarm should sound at reception if this door remains open.

3.3.17 Internal circulation doors should be FD-30 rated and secured with a fob-activated electronic lock.

3.3.18 A fob should be used to enter and leave the store(s). These doors should be self-closing and self-locking.

3.3.19 Cycle stands/racks should allow the cyclist to secure the wheels and frame to the stand/rack.

CCTV and lighting

3.3.20 A CCTV system should be installed capable of monitoring all building elevations and external doors, the lobby and reception area, the service access gates and the cycle stores.

3.3.21 All external doors should be illuminated from dusk to dawn.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

Main entrance

☐ The main entrance doors should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, and include a multi-point electronic lock, (which is an integral part of the certification), capable of being operated via an electronic, access control system.

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- [ ] The doors should be self-closing and self-locking.
- [ ] An audio-visual unit should relay images (one way) and audio (two ways) from the entrance to the reception desk. Staff should be able to open the outer and inner doors remotely.

External means of escape

- [ ] The means of escape doors should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- [ ] There should be no external ironmongery on the escape doors.
- [ ] The doors should be self-closing and self-locking.

Cycle stores

- [ ] The external cycle store doors should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- [ ] The cycle store doors should be fob activated to both enter and to leave.
- [ ] All cycle store access doors should also be self-closing and lock securely upon closure.

Bin stores

- [ ] The external doors should be certified to LPS 1175 sr 2.
- [ ] The internal doors should be fitted with an electronic lock requiring a fob/card to activate the lock on entry and exit.
- [ ] In an emergency, panic hardware is acceptable on the inside of the street-facing doors.
- [ ] All doors should also be self-closing and lock securely upon closure.

Plant room and sub-station

- [ ] The external doors to sub-station and plant rooms should be certified to LPS 1175 sr 2, or be of steel construction, set in a steel frame and fitted with two British Standard locks or Sold Secure padlocks fitted at 1/3 points on each set of doors.

Inner lobby doors

- [ ] To minimise the risk of intruders 'tail-gating' legitimate residents/visitors, the inner lobby doors should include an electronic lock activated by a residents' fob. The doors should be self-closing and lock securely upon closure.

Studio and cluster flat entrance doors

- [ ] Entrance doors to the studios and cluster flats should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2 and include a door viewer. The doors should be self-closing and self-locking.
- [ ] Study bedroom doors should be FD-30 rated, solid-core doors fitted with a Secured by Design certified electronic lock and include a door viewer.

Management offices and parcel rooms

- [ ] The doors to the management offices and mail/parcel rooms should be fitted with a British Standard lock or Secured by Design certified, electronic lock and be self-closing and lock securely on closure.

Roof access

- [ ] Doors providing access to roof spaces should be restricted to key-holding management and maintenance staff. The doors should be FD30-rated and fitted with at least one British Standard lock.

4.2 Windows

- [ ] Any opening windows at ground floor should be certified to PAS 24 or LPS 1175 sr2, have key-operated window locks and tamper-proof opening restrictors (limiting opening to 100mm) fitted.

4.3 Glazing

- [ ] Glazing within all of the ground floor entrance doors or means of escape doors, and ground floor windows/curtain walling, must incorporate at least one pane of glass BS EN356 P1A rated. The

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remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass. In the city centre it is advisable to use laminate glazing throughout the building.

4.4 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to all external doors, the entrance gates and pathways around the development. Lights should be operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor.
- ☐ The main residents' entrance and the cyclist's entrance should be particularly well lit.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.

4.5 CCTV

- ☐ A CCTV system should be installed.
- ☐ Suitable locations for cameras are:
    - all elevations of the building, with particular focus on all external doors and the approach to the main entrance;
    - lobby;
    - reception area;
    - the means of escape doors (internal view); and,
    - the cycle store entrance doors and the within stores.
- ☐ Images should be, ideally, monitored, but at least recorded, with recording equipment securely located in the administration office, or at a suitable off-site CCTV monitoring/recording centre.

4.6 Cycle stores

- ☐ The external entrance doors to the cycle stores should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ An alarm should sound at reception if an external door remains open.
- ☐ The internal doors securing the cycle stores should be at least FD30 rated and fitted with an electronic lock. A fob/card should be used to activate the door to enter and leave the stores. The doors should be self-closing and self-locking. An alarm should sound at reception if the doors remain open.
- ☐ Cycle stands/racks should allow the cyclist to secure the wheels and frame to the stand/rack.

4.7 Signage

- ☐ Signs to indicate the name of the development should be erected at the main entrances and around the periphery.

5 Construction

- ☐ The developer should take appropriate measures to secure the site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in and out.
- ☐ The contractor should be a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme'.
- ☐ Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority, SIA, approved, (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

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6 Secured by Design (SBD)

☐ To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

A Contact Register

Date	Contact	Summary of Contact
17.10.25	Armaan Chowdhury, Cumming Group	Request for crime impact statement
16.11.25		Site visited
16.12.25	Armaan Chowdhury, Cumming Group	Report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	General arrangement and schedule		

In the event of changes to the scheme, it may be necessary for Design for Security to review the recommendations made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Date	Revisions
A	16.12.25	

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D Glossary

Physical Security Standards

PAS 24

Enhanced security performance requirements for doorsets and windows in the UK. Doorsets and windows intended to offer a level of security suitable for dwellings and other buildings exposed to comparable risk. It is designed to mimic an attack by an opportunist burglar, using tools which are easy to conceal.

STS 201

Enhanced security to satisfy the requirements for certification of doorsets, equivalent to test standard to PAS 24.

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors, roller shutters, fences and barriers. Products are rated via the term Burglary Resistance (BR) and range from BR1 (lower security rating) to BR6 (higher security rating).

LPS 1175

Physical security for products manufactured for perimeter, façade, internal spaces and entrapment protection. The higher the security rating, the more formidable the security product.

Developed following extensive consultation with stakeholders, the most recent issue sees the previous single digit performance classifications (i.e. Security Ratings 1 to 8) extended to one formed of two elements that illustrate performance in terms of:

- *Threat level (first element) – Letter (A to H) corresponding with the tool kit used to evaluate the product's intruder resistance and number of attackers involved.*
- *Delay (second element) – Numeric value (1, 3, 5, 10, 15 or 20) corresponding with the minimum delay (in minutes) provided by the product when placed in a locked condition.*

BS EN 1627

European standard for the burglary resistance of pedestrian doorsets, windows, curtain walling, grilles and shutters. It defines six resistance classes, from RC1 to RC6, with RC1 being the lowest level of resistance and RC6 the highest. These classes indicate the level of resistance to forced entry, with higher classes requiring more time and specialized tools to breach.

BS EN 356

European standard that specifies the resistance of laminated glazing (i.e. two or more layers of glass bonded together with a plastic interlayer) to manual attacks, such as might occur during forced entry or vandalism. It classifies laminated glass into different resistance levels, ranging from P1A to P8B, with P1A being the lowest and P8B the highest.

Useful Websites

Design For Security – Designing Out Crime *– apply for Crime Impact Statements or the Secured by Design Award from Greater Manchester Police*

Secured by Design - Secured by Design *– SBD Award Scheme, Design Guides and Member Companies*

ParkMark - Home *– Park Mark Safer Parking Award Scheme*

NBS Source *– find, select and specify building products (including security-certified products)*

RedBook Live - LPCB Red Book *– search for LPS 1175 certified products*

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