



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

**Development of offices and retail
Ebsworth street**

For: Moston Superstore
Version A: 07/11/25
Ref: 2025/0344/CIS/01

designforsecurity



Ebsworth Street

URN: 2025/0344/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported

The scheme has been well designed, will add activity, natural surveillance, and incorporate crime prevention measures and generate retail business to this area of the Stockport district.

The layout of the proposed development is an improvement on that which currently occupies the site. There is also an opportunity to include measures which will greatly improve the security of the site more generally, and of the quality of the environment on and around the site.

We are happy to support the development subject to suitably addressing the recommendations that are set out in section 3.3 of this report and following the physical security specification set out in section 4. The principal recommendations include:

- The inclusion of suitable boundary fencing and secure gate
- Installing security rated entrance and escape doors, glazing and shutters
- Securing the staff welfare area and manager's office
- Installing appropriate lighting, CCTV and intruder alarm systems

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police will support the application and request that conditions be included requiring any outstanding security issues are appropriately addressed and requiring the development to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken within and around the site.

The site is located on Kenyon Lane and Ebsworth St housing a surface grade car park.

The site is located within a predominantly residential area of Moston.

The proposed site shares its neighbouring northern boundary with the rear service road of a series small commercial/retail units facing onto Moston Lane. The remaining boundaries face onto surrounding streets; Kenyon Lane to the east, Penn St to the south & Ebsworth St to the west.


Facing onto Penn St is Lightbowne Sports & Social Club.

Parking in the area is in high demand with on-street parking dominant due to the sites proximity to Moston Lane and the retail offering.


Boundary treatments around the site consist of a grass landscape strip with a selection of trees. A height restriction barrier marks the entrance to the car park off Ebsworth St.

A Metrolink tram stop is located approx. 1.5km south east of the site providing links to Manchester or Rochdale.

There was evidence of anti-social behaviour on site with examples of damage to vehicles with broken window glass in places.




1 – View across Kenyon Lane towards the site.



2 – Height barrier entrance off Ebsworth St.




3 – Terrace houses opposite the site on Ebsworth St.




4 – Rear of commercial /retail units.



7 – Lightbowne Sports & Social Club.



6 – Commercial/retail units on Moston Lane.



5 – View across Kenyon Lane towards the site.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Local Crime Summary

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st October 2024 to 30th September 2025.

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
30	<5	47	288	49	13	11	45	7	<5

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is high for Manchester with Less serious wounding, domestic burglary and vehicle crime being the highest recorded offences taking place within the area.
- 2.1.2 Less serious wounding has taken place throughout the local area, with hotspots occurring around Ashley Lane to the south as well as Lightbowne Road and Kenyon Lane. Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the highest recorded offences taking place, with domestic disputes and offences between known associates being the most common M.O (modus operandi). Offences have largely taken place within dwellings and residential streets, as well around the local educational facility.
- 2.1.3 Domestic burglary has taken place throughout the local area as it is made up of residential estates; Ashley Lane and Spreadbury Street to the south of the proposed site have experienced a large volume of offences. Offenders have mostly targeted the rear of properties, smashing glazing, snapping locks and forcing entry. The rear of properties are often targeted as they are usually not overlooked, reducing the possibility that the offender will be seen.
- 2.1.4 Vehicle crime in the local area is high, with theft from and criminal damage to a vehicle being the most commonly reported vehicle crime taking place. Offenders have targeted the small residential streets around Kenyon Lane and Lightbowne Road. Offenders have used implements in order smash glazing, causing damage to the vehicle and gaining access to objects within the vehicle. Offenders have also used tools in order to remove vehicle parts and vehicle registration plates. Sharp implements have been used in order to cause damage to paint work and body work.

2.2 Risk Factors - Offices

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft

2.3 Risk Factors - Retail

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Commercial burglary
- Cash robbery
- Unauthorised access to private spaces/Tailgating

- Shoplifting
- Employee theft
- Theft of customer / staff property
- Criminal damage to property

2.4 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.4.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting retail and commercial premises are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

2.4.2 Forcing open secure windows and doors (mostly to the rear of the property) using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors into apartment blocks before allowing them access to the building (also see section 4.1). The main communal entrances should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access.

2.4.3 Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements (mostly to the rear of the property).

Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.2), with key operated locks and opening restrictors. All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points. Windows to accessible elevations should be protected by some defensible space, to define them as entirely separate from the street and protect them from attack and nuisance/anti-social behaviour.

2.4.4 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.



Possible Solution - Front doors should be visible to neighbouring properties and from the 'street' rather than set within recesses or on more secluded elevations. Front doors should include a split spindle mechanism which locks on closure and can only be opened from outside with a key.

2.4.5 Offenders targeted entrance apartment doors by 'tailgating' or posing as legitimate visitors, before forcing open individual apartment doors or targeting those left insecure by residents.


Possible Solution - All individual apartments should be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.), cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection...

2.5 Non-Domestic Burglary (Offices): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area.




- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester is greatest on Tuesday, Thursday and Sunday. During the day, the risk of burglary at Manchester office premises rises into the evening/late at night. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.



- 2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** The majority of burglaries at offices in Manchester have been committed through doors. Burglaries against office buildings in this area do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing tools with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks. Offenders have also smashed glazed panels in doors and windows to gain entry. A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through 'unknown' and 'legitimate' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.

2.6 Theft (Offices): Risk Analysis




The data below relates to thefts within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester offices is greatest on Monday and Tuesday and is generally lower over the weekend (when many are shut). During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking around midday. During these times, many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out

2.7 Non-Burglary Risk Analysis – Retail Premises

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.





2.7.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Wednesday. During the day the risk of burglary at retail premises increases in the early hours of the morning (12am – 6am). Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed, and the streets are quiet. Offenders perceive the risk of being witnessed or apprehended at its lowest.

2.7.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been the occurred most frequently:

- Smashed glazing in windows and doors to gain entry to premises.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and tailgating / exploitation insecure doors to gain access to staff only areas.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily force and implements to gain entry.
- Opening secure doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain entry.

2.8 Theft Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.8.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of theft from retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Friday and Saturday. During the day the risk of theft at retail premises peaks in the late morning and into the evening (10:30am – 8pm). Small, personal items are being targeted, mostly mobile phones, purses, and bags.

2.9 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.9.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Tuesday around midnight (23:00-01:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles at this time when they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 Erection of a 2 storey class E retail unit with retail use on ground level (703 sqm gross), basement cold storage and first floor offices / administrative / storage space, 28 car parking spaces and associated hard and soft landscaping, to be accessed via Ebsworth street.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The new development will new retail offering to the area along with job opportunities to the local community.
- 3.2.2 Vehicular access into the site will be via a slightly modified/upgraded site entrance in the same location as the existing site entrance from Ebsworth Street in accordance with Highways consultants recommendations.
- 3.2.3 Front-of-house customer areas and back-of-house staff-only area are well-defined.
- 3.2.4 The main entrances to the proposed building will be in prominent, highly visible locations.
- 3.2.5 A combination of boundary treatments low knee high rails and soft landscaping to the site frontage present an open & approachable development without stressing on the security measures. Additional fencing and boundary treatments prevent unfettered access out-of-hours to the bin store compound and secure fencing to the rear of the site, to prevent unauthorised access at all times.
- 3.2.6 Access to the waste/recycling areas of the site will be controlled by lockable gate to a secure enclosure, meaning the public will not have access to this space.
- 3.2.7 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the dwellings, avoiding the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the developments are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 A thorough review of all boundaries and adjacent landscaping should be undertaken. The proposed landscaping should be maintained & managed so that it does not provide a climbing aid or hiding space.
- 3.3.2 Signage should be used to direct people through the development - to the appropriate parking spaces, service areas and office entrances.
- 3.3.3 Staff lockers should be provided, and in a location where there is a high level of activity and surveillance, so that staff can safely store personal items during the working day.
- 3.3.4 Internally, the buildings should be capable of zoning so that entry to parts of the premises can be effectively controlled. Movements in and out of the buildings should be confined to specific areas and access controls used to ensure only authorised staff can enter controlled areas.
- 3.3.5 The position of ancillary structures and temporary facilities, external storage, gardening and parking areas should be carefully considered in relation to the following:-
 - Potential to block sight lines and create hiding places
 - Potential to obscure CCTV and lighting
 - Potential to create climbing aids that would assist unauthorised exit / entry over boundary fencing.
 - Their potential to obscure damage to fence line.
- 3.3.6 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in staff and visitors.

4 Physical Security (Commercial Use)

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation in addition to the layout issues highlighted within Section 3.3.

4.1 Doors & Access Controls

- ☐ All external doors (single and double leaf) must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery
- ☐ If the main entrances to the buildings are to be formed by sliding doors, these cannot be certified to the above standards. Any sliding doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+), should incorporate laminated glazing, have multi-point locking (preventing sliding and lifting) and be protected by a shutter (certified to LPS 1775 SR2) out-of-hours.
- ☐ Any shutters/sectional overhead doors must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2. If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- ☐ A robust access control system should be employed, operable by staff swipe card or fob (rather than numeric key pads) preventing unauthorised access to staff-only areas. The following doors and gates should operate on access control:
 - Staff-only personnel doors;
 - Staff rest rooms/locker rooms;
 - Management/cash offices;
- ☐ Any cash offices/key stores should have solid masonry walls, no adjacent false/suspended ceilings and a security-certified doorset (see above). A time-delay safe, certified to LPS 1183, is advised. The doors/frames to all other internal areas, offices, meeting rooms, general stores etc. should be robust/solid-core (minimum 44mm thick) and capable of being secured when unoccupied. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ All windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions.
- ☐ Any ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) should be lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall or material of similar strength (e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind or within any cladding to the main showroom/workshop buildings, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the building fabric itself is not vulnerable to attack.
- ☐ Any louvres to the buildings should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed, and designed to ensure that they cannot be used as a climbing aid to reach upper floor windows or onto roof areas. Security-certified louvred doorsets are also available if required (e.g. <http://www.securedbydesign.com/members/premier-ss-ltd/>).

- ☐ The construction of any potentially accessible roof areas should also be carefully considered to prevent criminal intrusion. Certificated lightweight roof systems are available to LPS 1175 SR1. Alternatively, expanded metal or welded mesh should be incorporated between the skins of double-skinned roof coverings or within the roof space. The eaves of any single-storey elements should be as high as possible and design of the eaves themselves should also discourage climbing e.g. rounded/overhanging eaves. There should be no other features of the buildings (such as projecting window cills, canopies below the level of the single storey eaves, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby boundaries, trees, lighting columns, handrails etc.) that may provide climbing aids onto roof areas.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover each building, linked to contacts on all external doors/loading bay doors, PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows and the back-of-house perimeter fencing, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ The back-of-house area to the rear of the site should be enclosed with high-security, rigid-panel welded-wire mesh fencing (ideally 358 gauge, with small apertures making it difficult to cut/scale and deterring throwing items to damage vehicles), to a minimum height of 2400mm. Care should be taken to ensure that panels are fixed securely to the posts (with anti-tamper fixings) and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points to gates should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. The fencing/gates should also be located away from any other climbing aids, such as lighting columns, trees, junction boxes etc.
- ☐ The automatic vehicular sliding gate to the back-of-house area should also be 2400mm high, operated on access and egress by staff proximity reader/key fob or operated remotely by staff within the buildings (via a video access control system – so that delivery drivers can be vetted before being allowed access into the site). Any personnel gates should also be 2400mm high, self-closing/locking and fob-in/fob-out.
- ☐ The site boundary treatments should be positioned on hard standing ground. Where this is not possible, the ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary.
- ☐ A perimeter protection system should be installed to relay information to the CCTV/alarm monitoring centre that there has been a perimeter security breach. The condition of fencing along the perimeter of the site should be regularly inspected for signs of damage/attack.
- ☐ Perimeter fencing (where exposed) should be protected on the inner side from potential damage from large vehicles, using crash barriers or rails to deflect any encroachment and maintain a secure boundary. The position of any ancillary structures (e.g. bin stores) and any external storage areas should be carefully considered in relation to the following:
 - Their potential to block sight lines and create hiding places.
 - Their potential to obscure CCTV and lighting.
 - Their potential to create climbing aids that would assist unauthorised exit/entry over boundary fencing.
 - Their potential to obscure damage to fencelines.

Any proposed lighting columns, street furniture, tree/shrub planting etc. within or external to the site perimeter should also be reviewed in relation to the above issues.

- ☐ The frontages of the site should be secured with bollards and retractable bollards/vehicle barriers at the vehicular entrances to the customer car parks/display areas, in order to prevent theft of vehicles and unauthorised vehicles getting close to the buildings out-of-hours.

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to all vehicular/pedestrian access routes and parking areas, in accordance with BS 5489. Lighting to all parking/vehicle display areas should display an average lux level of 20, with a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors/shutters.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.7 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an [acceptable standard](#) that will allow for [identification](#) of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are '[Overview](#)' and '[Recognition](#)', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [all building entrances, circulation spaces \(internal and external\), key and parts/tools/materials stores and all vehicle parking/display areas.](#)

4.8 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as around/adjacent to entrances, parking areas and footpaths any low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people, premises and vehicles (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

-
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.9 Other

- ☐ Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the site and the buildings, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff-only areas.
- ☐ Any bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.
- ☐ Any cycle parking areas should be well-overlooked from the buildings and should include 'Sheffield' stands, which both wheels and the crossbar can be locked to rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: <http://designforsecurity.org/downloads>

5 Commercial Internal Layout Guidance

The internal layout of any commercial units should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. Design for Security understands that the designers and client may not always know who will be occupying their units once complete, and therefore, the end-users requirements. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

6 Retail Units

- 6.1.1 Clear views should also remain from the premises through to the public realm, i.e. large promotional signs should not obstruct views.
- 6.1.2 Careful consideration should be given to the location of paypoints to ensure that staff have full surveillance over the entrance to the unit.
- 6.1.3 Internal aisles and product displays should be aligned to assist surveillance from pay points and avoid blind-spots. There should be no items of high-value displayed close to the entrance of the unit.
- 6.1.4 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any tills, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.
- 6.1.5 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible (see Section 6.4) and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.

7 Management & Maintenance

- 7.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the commercial units must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the units. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:
- Opening and closing of premises, including staff arrival and departure;
 - Cash management within the premises - consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods;
 - Cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices (which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe to meet insurance needs);
 - Management of stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
 - Details of staff security training;
 - Location and management of any smoking areas;
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras etc;
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
 - Refuse collection arrangements.
- 7.1.2 Any high value equipment (e.g. computers/TVs, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 7.1.3 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the site and each of the premises, but also to deter unauthorised access to resident or staff-only areas.
- 7.1.4 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left accessible for extended periods. Servicing activities should also not require any service doors to remain open and unattended for prolonged periods.

8 Construction

- 8.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 8.1.2 Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

9 Useful References

9.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 9.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. Please see [Secured by Design - Secured by Design](#) for more information. To apply for the SBD Award for your development in Greater Manchester, please visit [Apply for Secured by Design – Design For Security](#).

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
05/09/25	Roman Summer Associates	Application received
10/10/25	Roman Summer Associates	Client confirmation
14/10/25	GMP	Invoice issued
07/11/25	DfS	Site visit
07/11/25	DfS	CIS completed

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	353 - Design and Access Statement - V1	01/11/25	
	353-MSA-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-00-002_P01_Existing Site Information	05/09/25	
	353-MSA-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-00-100_P01_Proposed General Arrangement	05/09/25	
	353-MSA-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-00-101_P01_Proposed General	05/09/25	
	353-MSA-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-00-200_P01_Proposed Elevations & Site and	05/09/25	
	353-MSI-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-00-002_P02_Existing Site and Location Plan	01/11/25	
	353-MSI-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-00-100_P02_Proposed General	01/11/25	
	353-MSI-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-00-101_P02_Proposed General	01/11/25	
	353-MSI-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-00-110_P01_Detailed Site Plan	01/11/25	
	353-MSI-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-00-200_P02_Proposed Elevations and Site	01/11/25	
	353-MSI-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-00-300_P02_Proposed Sections	01/11/25	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Date	Revisions
A	0711/2025	

D Glossary

Physical Security Standards

PAS 24

Enhanced security performance requirements for doorsets and windows in the UK. Doorsets and windows intended to offer a level of security suitable for dwellings and other buildings exposed to comparable risk. It is designed to mimic an attack by an opportunist burglar, using tools which are easy to conceal.

STS 201

Enhanced security to satisfy the requirements for certification of doorsets, equivalent to test standard to PAS 24.

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors, roller shutters, fences and barriers. Products are rated via the term Burglary Resistance (BR) and range from BR1 (lower security rating) to BR6 (higher security rating).

LPS 1175

Physical security for products manufactured for perimeter, façade, internal spaces and entrapment protection. The higher the security rating, the more formidable the security product.

Developed following extensive consultation with stakeholders, the most recent issue sees the previous single digit performance classifications (i.e. Security Ratings 1 to 8) extended to one formed of two elements that illustrate performance in terms of:

- Threat level (first element) – Letter (A to H) corresponding with the tool kit used to evaluate the product's intruder resistance and number of attackers involved.
- Delay (second element) – Numeric value (1, 3, 5, 10, 15 or 20) corresponding with the minimum delay (in minutes) provided by the product when placed in a locked condition.

BS EN 1627

European standard for the burglary resistance of pedestrian doorsets, windows, curtain walling, grilles and shutters. It defines six resistance classes, from RC1 to RC6, with RC1 being the lowest level of resistance and RC6 the highest. These classes indicate the level of resistance to forced entry, with higher classes requiring more time and specialized tools to breach.

BS EN 356

European standard that specifies the resistance of laminated glazing (i.e. two or more layers of glass bonded together with a plastic interlayer) to manual attacks, such as might occur during forced entry or vandalism. It classifies laminated glass into different resistance levels, ranging from P1A to P8B, with P1A being the lowest and P8B the highest.

Useful Websites

[Design For Security – Designing Out Crime](#)

– apply for Crime Impact Statements or the Secured by Design Award from Greater Manchester Police

[Secured by Design - Secured by Design](#) – SBD Award Scheme, Design Guides and Member Companies

[ParkMark - Home](#) – Park Mark Safer Parking Award Scheme

[NBS Source](#) – find, select and specify building products (including security-certified products)

[RedBook Live - LPCB Red Book](#) – search for LPS 1175 certified products