CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Erection of a three-storey building to form student accommodation (*Sui generis*) comprising 36 no. bedspaces and communal spaces, together with re-organisation of car parking, site-wide landscaping strategy, cycle parking and waste storage

At: **Land to the rear of Ladybarn House, Carill Drive, Fallowfield, Manchester**

For: **Almero Student**

Version A: **29.01.26**

2015/0907/CIS/01

designforsecurity

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GREATER MANCHESTER POLICE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported

The scheme has been well considered from a crime prevention perspective and will add activity, natural surveillance and interest to this part of Fallowfield. Design for Security are happy to support the proposals but, because this neighbourhood has one of the highest burglary rates in Greater Manchester, we recommend that a very high standard of security is set out for the development, so that the risk of the property and future residents being targeted by offenders is minimised.

Positive aspects of the scheme include:

- the facility will be managed by a company with experience for the management of student accommodation;
- staff will be present throughout the day in the wider development;
- the density of development will generate significant activity;
- the orientation of building promotes activity and surveillance in the most appropriate areas;
- the location of the entrance doors is appropriate;
- there will be defensible space around all sides of the building;
- residents' amenity spaces are proposed;
- secure, though limited, car parking is included;
- cycle parking is provided; and,
- a suitable area for refuse storage has been identified.

To improve the scheme from a crime prevention perspective:

- supplement the planting around the site's perimeter to ensure the boundaries are adequately secure;
- control access into the car park more robustly
- install security certified doors, window frames and glazing to the building;
- install access controls at the site and building entrances; and,
- relocate and enhance the security of the cycle storage.

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police will support the application and seek the inclusion of a condition requiring the development to address our security concerns relating to cycle storage, in particular, and for the development to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

Adrian Murphy *MRTPI*

Consultant

e: adrian.murphy@designforsecurity.org

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
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1 The Site and Surroundings

The photographs and plan, below, show the application site and its surroundings. The site, Ladybarn House, edged in red on the plan, is located in Fallowfield, South Manchester, at the south-eastern corner of the Wilmslow Road (A6010)/Moseley Road (B5093) junction. Wilmslow Road, a principal arterial route, is heavily trafficked, which includes a very high frequency bus service and well-used, segregated, cycle lanes; it connects Fallowfield with the University of Manchester campus and city centre to the north and the suburbs of Withington and Didsbury to the south. Moseley Road is busy, less so than Wilmslow Road, and includes non-segregated, cycle lanes some on-street parking east of the site, there is no on-street parking on Wilmslow Road in the vicinity of the site. Close to the site, Wilmslow Road includes a range of retail, office, and licensed premises, whilst Moseley Road is primarily residential in character with a terraced house and apartments. Currently undergoing major redevelopment, Fallowfield Campus, the University of Manchester primary halls of residence accommodation, lies opposite Ladybarn House at the Wilmslow Road/Moseley Road junction. When redevelopment is complete it will provide accommodation for 5,400 students. Carill Drive lies to the south of Ladybarn House; it connects Moseley Road to the east with Wilmslow Road to the west. A series of bollards and carriageway narrowing restrict movement through the junction to pedestrians and cyclists. On the south side of Carill Drive, facing Ladybarn House, there are two terraces of houses separated by Standish Road. Residential uses dominate the wider neighbourhood, a high proportion of which are student lets.




A view of the Ladybarn House site from the east on Moseley Road



Looking west along Carill Drive with Ladybarn House on the right and terraced housing on the left



Bollards and a narrowing of the carriageway prevent vehicles using the Carill Drive/Wilmslow Road junction





A view of the site from the residential property on the south side of Carill Drive



The rear elevation of Ladybarn House and car park



Looking west across car park the foreground will be the site of the proposed building

Ladybarn house is an L-shaped, part five, part four-storey, brick-built, commercial and residential building. Erected in the 1990's the building occupies the most of the northern and all of the western parts of the site. The commercial floorspace is located at ground floor level with four separate units facing Wilmslow Road. Three of the units appear to be occupied by sandwich and specialist non-alcoholic drink outlets drink, the fourth appears to now be an entrance and reception space and shared space for residents of Ladybarn House. There are several entrance doors to the residential parts of the building on both the Moseley Road elevation and on the rear elevation. A footpath connects Carill Drive to one of the rear elevation entrance doors. Accessed from two places on Carill Drive, the southern part of the site is principally used for car parking. It is surfaced in brick paviours, whilst arm barriers (with audio link to commercial outlets/staff/residents) restrict unauthorised vehicles from entering the site. The western part of the car park is used for parking and servicing associated with the commercial units. Refuse bins are stored somewhat haphazardly on the edges of the car park. Bicycle storage is limited to a secure locker on the southern edge of the car park. A triangular-shaped, residents' amenity area comprising lawn with seating and several mature trees has been laid out the eastern part of the site. The boundaries to the Carill Drive and Moseley Road are defined with low walls with railings, in places supplemented with beech or laurel hedge, they largely restrict entry to the site to purposely designed entrances. There is good lighting, some CCTV coverage of the site, particularly so at the rear, and clear signage

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

The data below relates to crimes committed with 500m of the site between 1st December 2024 and 30th November 2025.

2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood around the site

All crime

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Use, or threat, of violence	Theft including shoplifting	Robbery	Drug offences	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
68	13	52	363	168	17	79	39	13	48

2.1.1 There were 860 recorded crimes in the neighbourhood around the development site during the period analysed. This number is more than double that recorded in a typical neighbourhood within Manchester. The neighbourhood does include a high number of bars, takeaways, retail outlets and student accommodation, all of which tend to be crime attractors or crime generators.

2.1.2 The most commonly crimes recorded were:

- Crimes involving the use, or threat, of violence - 42%
- Theft (including bicycle theft, robbery, and shoplifting) - 25%
- Burglary – 9%
- Drug offences – 9%.

2.1.3 Burglary in this neighbourhood is unusually high, accounting for 9% of all recorded crimes. In many neighbourhoods, burglary accounts for around just 4-5% of all crimes . Theft is also common. Hotspots for theft include local supermarket, bars and cafes and student accommodation, where theft of bicycles is a particular issue.

2.1.4 There streets experiencing the most crimes were:


- Wilmslow Road (346 offences)
- Moseley Road (485)
- Wilbraham Road (43)
- Ladybarn Road (37)

2.1.5 There were just 5 offences recorded as having taken place at Carill Drive, and 3 at Ladybarn House. Carill Drive offences were all vehicle-related (1 theft of a car and 4 thefts from a vehicle). Ladybarn House crimes included 2 episodes of harassment and 1 of criminal damage, which occurred in one of the commercial units.


Domestic burglary

2.1.6 There were 68 burglaries committed within the neighbourhood during the period analysed. Clusters of burglary occurred on the terraced streets east of the application site, on the terraced streets centred on Cawdor Road north-west of the site, and west of the site - centred on Wynnstay Grove. Properties on Wynnstay Grove, Lombard Grove and Granville Road were the most frequently targeted.

Burglary – Day Range




Burglary – Time Range



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2.1.7 The risk of burglary is much greater at the weekend than during the working week. Incidents of burglary occur throughout the day but rise very sharply around mid-night.

Burglary – Point of Entry




2.1.8 In half of the 68 cases of burglary in this neighbourhood, the means of gaining entry to a property was unclear; offenders were likely to have entered via an unsecured door or window. Doors were forced in 22 burglaries with offenders applying bodily force or smashing glazed panels. Forcing a window open or smashing the glass and entering occurred 8 times. On 3 occasions an offender targeted a garden shed and there were 2 burglaries where an external wall was breached in order to gain entry.


Vehicle crime

2.1.9 The risk of vehicle-related is moderate throughout the week but rises sharply at the weekend. The most common time for such crimes to be committed is in evening.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range




Vehicle Crime – Time Range




2.2 Crime rate comparison

Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester, Greater Manchester, and England & Wales *England & Wales data is from January – December 2021.*

Burglary




Wounding




2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **98% higher** than the rate for Manchester, **155% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **161% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.2.2 The rate of wounding per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **30% lower** than the rate for Manchester, **5% lower** than the Greater Manchester rate and **81% higher** than the rate across England & Wales.

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2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **31% lower** than the Manchester rate, **9% lower** than the Greater Manchester rate and **10% higher** than the rate across England & Wales.

2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **12% lower** than the Manchester rate, **45% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **76% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.3 Typical modus operandi used in committing burglary, theft, criminal damage and vehicle-related crimes in Manchester, & measures to reduce vulnerabilities

2.3.1 Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools to drill locks

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all external doors should be certified to PAS 24 security standard - PAS 24 rated doors are very difficult to force open;
- entrance doors should be visible to neighbouring properties and from the 'street' rather than set within recesses or on more secluded elevations. Offenders will be less inclined to target properties where their actions may be witnessed;
- private gardens should be enclosed with appropriately high fencing and locking gates so that rear doors are only accessible to residents; and,
- secluded passageways to the sides and rear of properties should be avoided wherever possible as such routes can facilitate offender access to secluded areas of a site, as well as attract anti-social behaviours such as graffiti, fly-tipping or damage to fencing.

2.3.2 Doors have been targeted when left insecure

To minimise the risk of 'walk-in' burglaries:

- entrance doors should be fitted with a fixed handle or a 'split spindle', so that the only way in is with a key;
- communal entrance doors should be self-closing and lock automatically upon closing;
- defensible space should be provided between dwellings and the 'street', i.e. a small front garden enclosed with a 1000mm high fence. A degree of separation between public and private space can act as a psychological barrier to some offenders, who are then less willing to cross from public to clearly defined private space. Such boundary definition can also reduce the risk of criminal damage to property; and,
- dusk-to-dawn lighting should be fitted to all external doors. Light suggests a dwelling is occupied and highlights the actions of intruders.

2.3.3 Windows have been prised open by offenders

To minimise the risk of prising windows open:

- all ground floor windows should be certified to PAS 24 security standard - PAS 24 rated windows are very difficult to force open;

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- all ground floor windows should include key-operated locks and opening restrictors; and,
- access to the rear should be controlled by the erection of robust boundaries and locking gates. Pedestrian routes alongside the rear boundaries should be avoided. As a means to break and enter, offenders are more likely to target windows on secluded side or rear elevations.

2.3.4 **Glazing in rear doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry**

To minimise the risk of offender smashing glazing in doors and windows:

- laminate glass should be fitted to all external doors and to all windows on the ground floor of the development.

2.3.5 **Bikes were stolen from cycle stores at halls of residence, apartments and a gym**

To minimise the risk of bicycle theft:

- provide cycle parking in a convenient, secure store within the building, or in a store which has self-closing, self-locking doors or gates, and is only accessible to residents in possession of a programmable, key-fob.

2.3.6 **Offenders have damaged boundary fencing**

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting fencing:

- communal pathways should be secured with self-closing gates; and,
- fencing should be robust where exposed to the public realm.

2.3.7 **Theft of plant and machinery, and criminal damage during the construction period.**

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting the construction site:

- a secure boundary should be erected around the site;
- access should be restricted to contractors and authorised visitors;
- security staff should patrol during non-working hours;
- lighting and CCTV should be installed to illuminate the site and record activity;
- at the end of the working day, plant and machinery should be arranged to prevent forced access onto the site; and,
- plant and machinery should be fitted with a tracking device.

2.4 Environmental features of the site and surroundings that may influence crime patterns

2.4.1 Features of the physical environment can influence patterns of criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect a potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether or not to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?
- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

2.4.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder at the site are as follows:

- currently, Ladybarn House is largely ignored by offenders;
- the perimeter of the site is very well defined with boundary walls, railings and hedges, which are particularly robust and are likely to be unaffected by attempts at vandalism;

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- the boundaries limit access into the site to designated places;
- entrance doors to Ladybarn House have additional protection in the form of security shutters or steel plate to protect locking points;
- Ladybarn House and car park are well-illuminated and monitored by CCTV;
- the site is reasonably prominently located at the junction of Carill Drive and Moseley Road, benefitting from casual supervision by occupants of passing vehicles and pedestrians;
- staff within the reception areas are able to supervise the site and immediate surroundings, particularly during office houses;
- Almero Student are experienced in managing student accommodation in numerous prominent university cities;
- the passive and active surveillance by residents of Ladybarn House and activity generated as they come and go will help deter offenders;
- the site is overlooked by houses on the south side of Carill Drive, the front windows of which facilitate surveillance over the site by residents;
- since acquisition of Ladybarn House, Almero Student have commenced an investment programme resulting in improvements to communal facilities for residents as well as improvements to the commercial units; and,
- street-based CCTV on Wilmslow Road may help to detect offenders operating in the neighbourhood.

2.4.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder and the fear of crime, and these include:

- the level of crime, particularly burglary, drug offences, vehicle crime and robbery in the immediate vicinity of the site are a concern. New developments in this location are likely to attract the interest of opportunist as well as professional criminals. Despite a recent good record, the risk of burglary criminal damage, theft (especially bicycle theft) and anti-social behaviour affecting the property and its residents remains high;
- as is the case with student dominated neighbourhoods, the local population can lack stability very stable with a high turnover of residents. Neighbourhoods where there is a high turnover of residents and there are clear signs of physical deterioration and neglect tends to increase an offenders' perception that areas are vulnerable to crime, and their actions will go unchallenged;
- the lack of off-street parking in the immediate vicinity of the site and restrictions to parking on the results in on-street parking, which is being targeted by offenders. Further development in the area may lead to increase pressure for parking on the surrounding streets, which may lead to an increase vehicle-related crime in the neighbourhood;
- Ladybarn House and some of the nearby properties have been adapted to reduce the risk of being targeted by criminals. Adaptations include the addition of roller shutters and grilles/bars to windows. Such features suggest a property has been targeted in the past and can generate feelings of insecurity amongst local residents as well as being an unsightly addition to a site or building; and,
- the proximity of evening economy outlets attracts offenders, to the area late at night who target customers or premises in the neighbourhood.

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development involves the erection of a free-standing, rectangular-shaped, three-storey building providing an additional 36 student bedspaces at the site, together with ground floor communal space, reorganisation of the car park, landscaping, and cycle and waste storage facilities.



Illustrative proposed front view from Carill Drive (west) source: Design and Access Statement, BAL Architects

3.1.2 The proposed building will be largely brick-built and sited centrally on the southern half of the site between Ladybarn House and Carill Drive, an area currently used for parking and as a pedestrian pathway connecting Carill Drive to the rear entrance doors of Ladybarn House.

3.1.3 On the building's ground floor there will be a central, entrance lobby with two, communal entrance doors - one facing Carill Drive and the other facing one of the entrance doors to Ladybarn House. There will a staircase within the lobby connecting the ground with the upper floors. A lift is not proposed. Two cluster flats each with six study bedrooms together with communal living/dining rooms, each located at the ends of the circulation corridor, will be accommodated on this floor. A plant room will occupy the space under the stairs.

3.1.4 The buildings upper floors will provide similar accommodation to that on the ground floor with the exception of slightly larger plan on the first floor and larger still plant/storeroom on the second floor. The flat roof will be accessed via a roof hatch and will accommodate photo-voltaic panels.

3.1.5 Externally, as a result of the siting of the proposed building, the eastern vehicle entrance will be closed and the size of the car park will be significantly reduced, resulting in just the six spaces at the western fringe of the car park remaining. Nine cycle hoops providing space for eighteen bikes will be installed - four of which will be located close to the retained vehicle entrance, three positioned towards the rear entrance door to the reception area and two adjacent to the north-west corner of the proposed building. A new, gated area for bin storage will be created at the south-western corner of the site. A series of ramps, steps and pathways will facilitate circulation between the street, the car park, and the new and existing buildings. The existing outdoor amenity space at the eastern fringe of the site will be retained and enhanced. The arrangement of low wall, railing and hedge planting will continue to define the Moseley Road and Carill Drive boundaries, supplemented and repaired where necessary.

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3.2 Features of the development that will promote safety and security

3.2.1 Given the proximity of the universities and other student accommodation, the proposed development seems an appropriate.

3.2.2 The main entrance and secondary entrance doors to the new building will be suitably located on the Carill Drive and Ladybarn house facing elevations.

3.2.3 A secure lobby will be provided.

3.2.4 The existing perimeter walls, railings and hedges will be retained, clearly defining the edge of the development and helping to distinguish public space from semi-private space.

3.2.5 Along with the boundary treatments, there will be a degree of separation between the perimeter of the site and the proposed building, providing an area of defensible space between passing public and the building.

3.2.6 Surveillance across the site and Carill Drive will be enhanced by the well-considered location of facilities within the building and the location of entrance doors.

3.2.7 Lighting from the development will contribute to public lighting around the site. Good public, and building, lighting can significantly reduce the public's fear of crime.

3.2.8 The development will continue to be managed by Almero Student, a company with experience of managing similar accommodation in several locations across the UK. A management presence is particularly welcome as visible staff in the development will not only discourage offender attempts to gain entry to the scheme but also gives residents a readily accessible contact to whom they may report management issues. Such provision can help to instil confidence in residents that the development is secure and that maintenance issues will be dealt with promptly.

3.2.9 The separated and elevated position, relative to the public realm, of the study bedrooms will result in a greater degree of privacy and security for residents than might otherwise have been the case were the building positioned at the very edge of the site.

3.2.10 The inclusion of social spaces associated with each cluster and the external amenity space for the use of all current, and future, residents provide an opportunity for residents to meet and build relationships, which can help to develop a sense of community and greater vigilance within the scheme to deter crime and anti-social behaviour.

3.2.11 I have no issue with the reduced number of parking spaces provided given the proximity and abundance of public transport nearby and lower levels of car ownership amongst future residents.

3.2.12 Cycle parking will be provided on the site. However, given the volume of bicycle theft in this neighbourhood, I have little confidence that any bikes parked at the stands will be adequately secure and will remain unused by residents.

3.2.13 Refuse bins will be located within a gated area at the south-western fringe of the site.

3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the development

3.3.1 Ideally, to enhance security at the site, the existing vehicle barrier should be replaced with an automated, vehicle gate, and a powered, pedestrian gate to the side of it to provide a secure accessible route into the development. The pedestrian/cyclist gate should be secured with an electronic lock with the lock and gate opening activated by a fob presented to a reader. Both vehicle and pedestrian/cyclist gates should close automatically and be secure upon closure.

3.3.2 A self-closing manual gate should be installed to define the boundary of Carill Drive and the pathway to the entrance to the new building. Railings, around 1200mm high, should guide pedestrians to the entrance door and prevent access along the front of the building from the pathway.

3.3.3 Boundary walls and railings should be repaired and extended as necessary to ensure the boundary is secure. Beech or laurel hedge should be encouraged around the edges of the communal garden to enhance security and privacy.

3.3.4 Pathways within the site, and the entrance doors and gates entrance gates should be illuminated from dusk to dawn.

3.3.5 CCTV cameras capable of monitoring activity at the entrance gates, the car park, cycle parking, along pathways, at entrance doors and in the entrance-lobby should be installed.

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3.3.6 Because of the volume of cycle theft in this neighbourhood, a secure cycle store(s) should be provided. Because of the limited space available, a 'bike share' scheme may be suitable for this development. The store should be located in a position where it will benefit from passive surveillance by staff and residents but not easily visible from the public realm so that it is out of view or the sphere of awareness of the passing public. Cycle lockers like that already on the site may be suitable. A suitable place for such lockers would within the landscaped verge of the pathway between the new building and Ladybarn House.

3.3.7 Each entrance door should be security-rated, with entry restricted to residents or staff holding an appropriate fob. The doors should be self-closing and lock securely upon closure.

3.3.8 An audio-visual unit should be installed at the Carill Drive entrance door to relay images (one way) and audio (two ways) from each cluster flat and/or reception staff in order to allow residents/staff to vet visitors prior to allowing entry, via a remote lock release.

3.3.9 All mail should be directed to the Ladybarn House reception.

3.3.10 All glazing within external doors and the ground floor windows should include laminate glass.

3.3.11 The cluster flat entrance doors should be security-rated, include an electronic lock that forms part of the security certification, and a door viewer. These doors should also be self-closing and self-locking.

3.3.12 Study bedroom doors should include an electronic lock and a fixed outer handle, so that entry is only possible with an appropriately programmed fob. These doors should also be self-closing.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

☐ The communal entrance doors should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, and include a multi-point electronic lock, (which is an integral part of the certification), capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. These doors should be self-closing and lock securely upon closure.

☐ Entrance doors to the cluster flats should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2 and include a door viewer.

☐ Study bedroom doors should be solid-core, FD30-rated, and fitted with an electronic lock. The lock should be activated with a fob.

4.2 Windows frames and glazing

☐ All opening windows at ground floor level should be certified to PAS 24, have key-operated window locks and tamper-proof opening restrictors (limiting opening to 100mm) fitted.

☐ Glazing within ground floor windows must incorporate at least one pane of glass that achieves a BS EN356 P1A rating. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

☐ Glazing within external doors must incorporate at least one pane of glass that achieves at least a BS EN356 P1A rating.

4.3 Entrance gates and boundary details

☐ The vehicle gate to the car park should be around 1500mm high, automated and activated on entry with a fob.

☐ The pedestrian/cyclist gate to the accessible route should be around 1500mm, and fitted with a fob-operated, electronic lock, e.g. a maglock, with a holding force of 4500N. An intercom may be necessary at this gate also so that visitors with mobility issues can also communicate with staff and residents. The gate should be self-closing and lock upon closure.

☐ Wherever possible, the existing boundary walls, railings and hedges should be retained.

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☐ Dense shrubs should be introduced to prevent intruders gaining access to the development where the boundary walls and railings are not sufficiently high as to prevent entry.

4.4 Access controls

☐ To restrict access to authorised staff, residents and contractors, access controls should be installed at the following:

- Car park entry gates
- The communal entrance doors to the new building
- Cluster flat entrance doors
- Study bedroom entrance doors

☐ Electronic locks should have a holding force of around 4500N.

☐ Refuse store gates should be self-closing.

4.5 Lighting

☐ External, LED, white lighting should be provided to both external doors of the new building, to the pathways and the car parking and cycle store. Lights should be operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor.

4.6 CCTV

☐ A CCTV system should be capable of monitoring the following:

- the approaches to the pedestrian and vehicle entrance gates;
- the entrance doors and lobby of the new building;
- circulation pathways; and,
- the car park and cycle store.

4.6.1 A monitor should be placed at reception desk to allow staff to review images.

4.6.2 Images should be recorded with recording equipment securely located in the management office or transmitted to a suitable off-site, CCTV monitoring/recording centre.

4.7 Cycle stores

☐ The cycle store(s) should be compliant with LPS 1175 sr1 or similar.

4.8 Signage

☐ Similar to elsewhere on the site, signage to indicate the name and address of the development, the name of the new building, contact details of the management company, and informing residents, staff and visitors that CCTV is in operation should be erected at the vehicle and pedestrian entrances to the site and at the entrance doors to the new building.

5 Management & Maintenance

☐ A security plan should be prepared. It should set out the details of the staffing of the development; the site-wide CCTV; procedures for programming, issuing and cancelling gate/door entry fobs; procedures for parcel and other mail delivery; procedures for managing visitors to the development; and, address maintenance and repairs to:

- perimeter walls, gates and fencing
- access control systems
- communal areas

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- lighting
- signage
- the CCTV system.

6 Construction

☐ The developer should take appropriate measures to secure the site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in and out.

☐ The contractor should be a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme'.

☐ Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority, SIA, approved, (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

7 Secured by Design (SBD)

☐ Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of a development and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
01.10.25	James McAllister, THIS Planning	Request for crime impact statement
16.12.25		Site visited
29.01.26	James McAllister, THIS Planning	Report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and documents:

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
P0010	Site location plan	09.08.24	00
P0100	Existing site plan	09.08.24	00
P0200	Proposed site plan	09.08.24	00
P2000	Proposed ground floor plan	09.08.24	00
P2000	Proposed ground floor plan	09.08.24	00
P2001	Proposed level 1 plan	09.08.24	00
P2002	Proposed level 2 plan	09.08.24	00
P2003	Proposed roof plan	09.08.24	00
P2100	Proposed front and rear elevations	09.08.24	00
P2101	Proposed side elevations and section	09.08.24	00
	Design and access statement	27.08.24	
	Transport statement	July 2024	
	Planning statement	September 2024	

In the event of any significant changes to the scheme, it may be necessary to review the recommendations made in the report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions	Date
A		29.01.26

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D Glossary

Physical Security Standards

PAS 24

Enhanced security performance requirements for doorsets and windows in the UK. Doorsets and windows intended to offer a level of security suitable for dwellings and other buildings exposed to comparable risk. It is designed to mimic an attack by an opportunist burglar, using tools which are easy to conceal.

STS 201

Enhanced security to satisfy the requirements for certification of doorsets, equivalent to test standard to PAS 24.

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors, roller shutters, fences and barriers. Products are rated via the term Burglary Resistance (BR) and range from BR1 (lower security rating) to BR6 (higher security rating).

LPS 1175

Physical security for products manufactured for perimeter, façade, internal spaces and entrapment protection. The higher the security rating, the more formidable the security product.

Developed following extensive consultation with stakeholders, the most recent issue sees the previous single digit performance classifications (i.e. Security Ratings 1 to 8) extended to one formed of two elements that illustrate performance in terms of:

- *Threat level (first element) – Letter (A to H) corresponding with the tool kit used to evaluate the product's intruder resistance and number of attackers involved.*
- *Delay (second element) – Numeric value (1, 3, 5, 10, 15 or 20) corresponding with the minimum delay (in minutes) provided by the product when placed in a locked condition.*

BS EN 1627

European standard for the burglary resistance of pedestrian doorsets, windows, curtain walling, grilles and shutters. It defines six resistance classes, from RC1 to RC6, with RC1 being the lowest level of resistance and RC6 the highest. These classes indicate the level of resistance to forced entry, with higher classes requiring more time and specialized tools to breach.

BS EN 356

European standard that specifies the resistance of laminated glazing (i.e. two or more layers of glass bonded together with a plastic interlayer) to manual attacks, such as might occur during forced entry or vandalism. It classifies laminated glass into different resistance levels, ranging from P1A to P8B, with P1A being the lowest and P8B the highest.

Useful Websites

Design For Security – Designing Out Crime *– apply for Crime Impact Statements or the Secured by Design Award from Greater Manchester Police*

Secured by Design - Secured by Design *– SBD Award Scheme, Design Guides and Member Companies*

ParkMark - Home *– Park Mark Safer Parking Award Scheme*

NBS Source *– find, select and specify building products (including security-certified products)*

RedBook Live - LPCB Red Book *– search for LPS 1175 certified products*

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