

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

50 NO. HOUSES
ELSA ROAD, LEVENSHULME

For: Southway Housing Trust
Version A: 7th January 2026
Reference: 2025/0442/CIS/01

designforsecurity

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GREATER MANCHESTER POLICE

Elsa Road, Levenshulme

URN: 2025/0442/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recommendations made

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The proposed residential development is acceptable in general and the broadly complies with Secured by Design standards on layout; however, the following recommendations should be implemented where possible.

- The proposed development should not compromise the security of existing alleyway gating schemes.
- Rear boundaries adjacent the allotments would benefit from a greater level of security, to prevent offenders from climbing or damaging fences in these areas.

More details can be found in section 3.3 where there are there are a number of recommendations which would enhance the security of the development and it is highly recommended that these are considered. It is also recommended that the development is built to Secured by Design standards.



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1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located in the Levenshulme area of Manchester.

The site is roughly rectangular and the boundaries are defined by Anchor Close to the North, Levenshulme allotments to the East and South, and to the West the site is bound by the rear boundaries of houses on Marcliffe Drive.

The main entrance to the site is located on Elsa Road, which is restricted with a full height metal gate. The publicly accessible boundary to the site, opposite Anchor Close and Hallsville Road, is defined with a concrete panel fence. In some areas the fence is dilapidated and the site has been made secure with temporary herras fencing plugging the gaps.

Houses surrounding the site is generally terraced houses, with housing to the North of the site having a Radburn style layout. Some alleyways in the area have been gated by the council, restricting access to residents. There was some litter in the surrounding street, but no obvious signs of criminality/antisocial behaviour.











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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st December 2024 to 30th November 2025 within 500m of the site.

2.1 Local Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
20	<5	17	90	10	<5	5	9	6	<5

2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area is …

2.1.2 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed residential scheme, the more detailed analysis below will focus on local domestic burglary and vehicle crime.

2.2 General Risk Factors

2.2.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds, or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.3 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.3.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting residential properties are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

2.3.2 Forcing open secure windows and doors (mostly to the rear of the property) using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain entry to the property.

Possible Solution - All external door sets should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (see section 4.1). Rear doors should be positioned within the secure rear boundary to restrict access to residents. Ground floor and easily accessible windows should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (i.e. BS PAS 24).

2.3.3 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.

Possible Solution - Front doors should have split spindles or a fixed external handle so then cannot be opened from outside without a key. Rear doors should be positioned in secure rear gardens with

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appropriate boundary treatments. Ground floor windows should have restrictors installed so that they cannot be opened from the outside if left insecure.


2.3.4 Breaking glazing in windows and doors using implements.

Possible Solution - All ground floor and easily accessible glazing should be laminated to prevent it from being easily damaged by offenders to gain entry (see section 4.3. for more details).


2.4 Local Crime Rate Comparisons

The graphs below compare the local rates of crime (i.e. crimes per 1,000 dwellings) with the average rates for Manchester, Greater Manchester and England & Wales.


Domestic Burglary Crime Rates




Wounding Crime Rates



Criminal Damage Crime Rates



Vehicle Crime Rates



2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **23% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **1% lower** than Greater Manchester and **1% higher** than England & Wales.

2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **67% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **55% lower** than Greater Manchester and **13% lower** than England & Wales.


2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **66% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **56% lower** than Greater Manchester and **46% lower** than England & Wales.

2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **67% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **46% lower** than Greater Manchester and **34% lower** than England & Wales.


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2.5 Local Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis


Local Domestic Burglary – Day Range



Local Domestic Burglary – Time Range



Local Domestic Burglary – Point of Entry



2.5.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of domestic burglary is highest on Friday in the morning (04:00-05:00). Offenders tend to target dwellings at this time when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving them the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 Point of Entry: In the local area, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:


- In cases where the entry point is recorded as 'unknown' it is likely that the offenders have exploited insecure doors.
- Forcing open secure doors using bodily pressure and implements.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.

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
2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.6.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime peaks on Thursday in the morning (03:00-06:00) and before midday (11:00-12:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles at these times when they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time whilst they are at work or asleep.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

3.1.1 The proposed development is 50 no. houses on vacant land which was previously used as a cricket ground (Levenshulme Cricket Club). The houses will be a mix of detached, semi-detached, and mews properties. All houses will have two parking spaces which are positioned to the front, side, or rear of the dwellings. The main vehicular access into the development will be formed by a continuation of Elsa Road, with secondary access taken from Anchor Close.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The proposed development will generate legitimate activity in the area, such as residents, visitors, and postal workers/couriers. Active use of the space reduces opportunities for misuse, loitering, or concealment, as offenders are less likely to act in areas where they risk being observed or challenged.

3.2.2 Houses within the development are positioned to overlook each other. This layout promotes natural surveillance, allowing residents to observe activity around their homes. High levels of natural surveillance can discourage antisocial behaviour and criminal activity, as offenders prefer locations where they cannot be easily seen.

3.2.3 Rear gardens of the central plots are generally interlocked, sharing boundaries and creates continuous lines of private space. This design reduces the likelihood of an offender gaining access from the rear, which reduces the potential for an offender break into a property from the rear. Some of the proposed properties will interlock with the rear gardens of existing houses that are adjacent the site.

3.2.4 All dwellings are provided with designated car parking spaces, typically located on driveways at the front of the property. This ensures vehicles are visible to their owners and neighbours, reducing the risk of theft or vandalism. Where parking is to the side or rear of a dwelling, they are positioned so they remain overlooked by other houses, maintaining a high level of surveillance and security.

3.2.5 Communal gates are positioned at the entrance to the passageways to the rears of gardens, close to the front elevation of the houses. This position avoids the creation of recessed spaces which can allow an offender to climb over, or force a gate open, without being seen.

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3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 The existing alleyway gate adjacent no. 1 Anchor close should not be compromised by the position of proposed fence lines. It is recommended that the positioning of the secure rear/side boundary of plot no. 33 is carefully considered so that the alleyway remain secure and accessible only to residents.



3.3.2 Communal gates into alleyways must be full height, of robust construction, and capable of being locked from both sides. The use of a double-sided key lock, or a long-throw bolt lock, designed for keyed access on both faces reduces the potential for the gate to be left insecure by a resident which could potentially compromise the security of a number of dwellings.

3.3.3 Rear garden fences, adjacent the existing allotments, are particularly vulnerable to being climbed due to the lack of security afforded to the allotments. To prevent these boundaries from being easily climbed it is recommended that they are a minimum of 2100mm high and of robust construction (i.e. close boarded timber and concrete gravel board base). To further restrict access to the rear boundaries, a strip of defensible planting or dense shrubbery would prevent offenders from easily access the rear fence.

3.3.4 Where parking spaces are positioned to the rear of dwellings, or at the side of the dwelling, where they cannot be easily seen from the dwelling there should be illumination to allow them to be viewed from other houses at night and to deter offenders from targeting parked vehicles (i.e. plots 15, 39 & 43).

3.3.5 It is highly recommended that the proposed dwellings be built to Secured by Design standards detailed in section 4 of this report.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation in addition to the layout issues highlighted within Section 3.3.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ Front and rear doors to dwellings must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222.
- ☐ Any external French/double doors or sliding doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222.
- ☐ Front doors to properties should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key.
- ☐ Front doors should have either fixed sidelights or door viewers.
- ☐ Chain limiters are recommended but not generally essential.
- ☐ Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Garage doors should be certified to LPS 1175 SR2 or STS202.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR A, STS 204, or STS 222.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

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4.3 Glazing

- [ ] Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- [ ] If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either:
  - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
  - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- [ ] If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.
- [ ] If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

4.5 Boundaries

- [ ] Rear boundaries should generally be 1800mm high and of close boarded timber construction. It is recommended that the top 300mm consist of trellis structure.
- [ ] Rear boundaries that are adjacent to public space should have a masonry (or other hardwearing) base, with timber fence above to a total height of 2100mm. It is recommended that the top 300mm consist of trellis structure.
- [ ] Where a rear/side boundary is immediately adjacent the allotment there should be a strip of defensible planting to restrict access and protect against criminal/accidental damage.
- [ ] Sub-divisional rear boundaries may be as low as 1500mm.
- [ ] The fronts of properties should be demarcated by low boundaries such as planting and/or railings to an approximate height of 1000mm.
- [ ] Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.
- [ ] Gates into the rear curtilage of dwellings should be in keeping with the height of adjacent boundary treatments and incorporate either:
  - A pad lockable bolt to the midpoint of the internal face, or
  - A key operable deadlock

4.6 Landscaping

- [ ] In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- [ ] Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- [ ] Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- [ ] There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

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4.7 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to the front and rear of dwellings, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible).
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.
- ☐ Parking areas to the rear/side of houses should be illuminated.

4.8 Other

- ☐ Meter cupboards should be located to the fronts of properties only, not in the private areas.

5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter/graffiti removal
- Repair to communal areas (access controls, lighting, signage etc.)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. Please see Secured by Design - Secured by Design for more information. To apply for the SBD Award for your development in Greater Manchester, please visit Apply for Secured by Design – Design For Security.

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A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
Chris Parks	20/11/2025	CIS application received

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
23118 (PL) 001	Site Location Plan	19.11.25	*
23118 (PL) 002	Existing Site Plan	19.11.25	*
23118 (PL) 010	Proposed Site Layout	20.02.25	E
23118 (PL) 105	House Type A1 – Proposed Plans & Elevations	17.03.25	B
23118 (PL) 110	House Type B – Proposed Plans & Elevations	17.02.25	B
23118 (PL) 120	House Type C – Proposed Plans & Elevations	17.02.25	B
23118 (PL) 130	House Type D – Proposed Plans & Elevations	24.02.25	B
23118 (PL) 140	House Type E – Proposed Plans & Elevations	17.02.25	D
23118 (PL) 150	House Type E(M3) – Proposed Plans & Elevations	19.02.25	B

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Date	Revisions
A	07/01/2026	

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D Glossary

Physical Security Standards

PAS 24

Enhanced security performance requirements for doorsets and windows in the UK. Doorsets and windows intended to offer a level of security suitable for dwellings and other buildings exposed to comparable risk. It is designed to mimic an attack by an opportunist burglar, using tools which are easy to conceal.

STS 201

Enhanced security to satisfy the requirements for certification of doorsets, equivalent to test standard to PAS 24.

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors, roller shutters, fences and barriers. Products are rated via the term Burglary Resistance (BR) and range from BR1 (lower security rating) to BR6 (higher security rating).

LPS 1175

Physical security for products manufactured for perimeter, façade, internal spaces and entrapment protection. The higher the security rating, the more formidable the security product.

Developed following extensive consultation with stakeholders, the most recent issue sees the previous single digit performance classifications (i.e. Security Ratings 1 to 8) extended to one formed of two elements that illustrate performance in terms of:

- *Threat level (first element) – Letter (A to H) corresponding with the tool kit used to evaluate the product's intruder resistance and number of attackers involved.*
- *Delay (second element) – Numeric value (1, 3, 5, 10, 15 or 20) corresponding with the minimum delay (in minutes) provided by the product when placed in a locked condition.*

BS EN 1627

European standard for the burglary resistance of pedestrian doorsets, windows, curtain walling, grilles and shutters. It defines six resistance classes, from RC1 to RC6, with RC1 being the lowest level of resistance and RC6 the highest. These classes indicate the level of resistance to forced entry, with higher classes requiring more time and specialized tools to breach.

BS EN 356

European standard that specifies the resistance of laminated glazing (i.e. two or more layers of glass bonded together with a plastic interlayer) to manual attacks, such as might occur during forced entry or vandalism. It classifies laminated glass into different resistance levels, ranging from P1A to P8B, with P1A being the lowest and P8B the highest.

Useful Websites

Design For Security – Designing Out Crime *– apply for Crime Impact Statements or the Secured by Design Award from Greater Manchester Police*

Secured by Design - Secured by Design *– SBD Award Scheme, Design Guides and Member Companies*

ParkMark - Home *– Park Mark Safer Parking Award Scheme*

NBS Source *– find, select and specify building products (including security-certified products)*

RedBook Live - LPCB Red Book *– search for LPS 1175 certified products*

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