

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

RESIDENTIAL (56 no. APARTMENTS) & 4 no. RETAIL UNITS (524sqm.)
LANE END ROAD, BURNAGE, MANCHESTER

For: Hasaza Estates Limited
Version B: 12/03/2026
Reference: 2025/0070/CIS/02

designforsecurity

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GREATER MANCHESTER POLICE

Lane End Road, Burnage, Manchester

URN: 2025/0070/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security additions/improvements required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- The rear entrances to the apartment and retail units off the undercroft car park must be to a secure standard and must be entirely separate (with no internal linkages) to avoid providing opportunities that could be exploited by offenders.
- Secure enclosure of residents car park along potentially exposed/vulnerable eastern boundary (as well as the cycle stores within it), with an automatic shutter to the vehicular entrance, to prevent unauthorised access. Prevention of access to first floor podium above car park.
- Secure system to control resident/visitor access to apartments (preferably via one main entrance off the street where activity and security can be focussed), including post/parcel deliveries.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Sections 4 & 5 of this report.

Bradley Hart

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site is bounded by Lane End Road to the north, Kingsway (A34) to the west and Fog Lane to the south, in the Lane End Road Neighbourhood Centre of Burnage in south Manchester.

The northern portion of the site is currently occupied by a single-storey pharmacy unit (with hardstanding/informal parking areas to the west and south) and 2 no. commercial units (including a hot food takeaway) fronting onto Lane End Road, with gated access routes to the side/rear. The south-eastern portion of the site is formed by a small area of landscaped open space.

The existing pharmacy unit has window and door openings to it's northern, western and southern elevations secured with external shutters out-of-hours, as does the adjacent commercial unit – indicating they may have experienced crime and disorder issues in the past.


The gated side/rear access alleyway between the existing pharmacy and the adjacent commercial unit is enclosed with a low wall and railings above along the informal parking area to the rear of the pharmacy – although a railing panel has been removed making unauthorised access easier. When such routes are publicly accessible, they can leave hidden doors/windows vulnerable to attack unseen, provide easy access/escape routes for offenders to utilise unseen and foster nuisance/anti-social behaviour issues.

The informal parking area to the side/rear of the Pharmacy is enclosed with low-level railings/bollards along the street frontages, with a low-level vehicle barrier at the entrance off Fog Lane.

The area of open land to the south-east of the site is also defined by low-level railings along the informal parking area and the Fog lane frontage, to deter unauthorised vehicular access. To the immediate east of the site, fronting onto Land End Road, is a shuttered commercial unit with a gated side/rear access (left open when the site visit was carried out) and an Enterprise car hire unit with compound enclosed with walls and Palisade fencing/gates. There is also a medical centre fronting onto Burnage Lane, with a rear parking area enclosed with high welded-wire mesh fencing and a sliding gate off Fog Lane.

On the opposite side of Fog Lane from the site is a blocks of apartments, also served by a rear car park enclosed with high walls/railings and automatic vehicular gates to prevent unauthorised access.

In the wider locale, the district centre includes a number of retail and commercial premises, including hot food takeaways. While such premises can provide legitimate activity and surveillance opportunities to an area, they can also often be a focal point for nuisance/anti-social behaviour issues, particularly late at night.





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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Crime Summary

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st February 2025 to 31st January 2026.

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
16	<5	31	155	16	10	<5	9	14	<5

2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area is approximately average for the Manchester division, with less serious wounding and criminal damage being the most commonly reported. Recorded offences have occurred through the local area, with particular concentrations around/off the main arterial routes of Kingsway/Fog Lane/Lane End Road and the primarily residential neighbourhoods around/off Parrs Wood Road and Baricroft Road.


2.1.2 Assaults, public order and harassment offences have been most reported less serious woundings, with the majority of incidents involving disputes between known associates and neighbours, as well as cases of domestic violence. Criminal damage offences have primarily targeted vehicles parked on streets (smashing windows and denting/scratching bodywork), as well as residential properties (damaging doors, windows and garden fences).

2.1.3 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed residential development and retail units, the more detailed analysis below will look at residential burglary, vehicle crime and use-specific burglary/theft.


2.2 Local Crime Rate Comparison

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site between 1st February 2025 to 31st January 2026. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.

Comparison of Burglary Dwelling Rates at Site (km), Manchester and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Wounding Rates at Site (km), Manchester and Greater Manchester




2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **55% lower** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **42% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **41% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.


2.2.2 The rate of woundings in the local area is **49% lower** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **53% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **11% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.

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Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (km), Manchester and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (km), Manchester and Greater Manchester




2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage in the local area is **29% lower** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **36% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **22% lower** the rate for England & Wales.

2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime in the local area is **55% lower** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **25% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **9% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.


2.3 Local Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site between 1st February 2025 to 31st January 2026.

Local Domestic Burglary – Day Range



Local Domestic Burglary – Time Range




2.3.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of domestic burglary in the local area is highest on Tuesday, Friday and Saturday.

2.3.2 Time Range: During the week, the risk peaks during the afternoon, when residents are more likely to be away from home (at work or otherwise) and offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without being disturbed. At the weekend, offenders tend to target properties in the early hours of the morning, when it is dark, streets are typically quieter than during the day and they perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.

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Local Domestic Burglary – Point of Entry




2.3.3 Point of Entry: In the local area, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:

- Where entry points are unknown, this is likely to be where offenders have exploited insecure communal entrances or have tailgated into blocks of flats behind genuine visitors/residents to gain access unnoticed. Offenders are likely to have also exploited insecure doors and windows to individual properties.
- Doors have frequently been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or the glazing within them has been smashed to gain entry.
- Offenders have gained access to rear gardens and targeted sheds.


2.4 Local Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site between 1st February 2025 to 31st January 2026.

Local Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Local Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.4.1 Day Range: During the day, the risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on Monday and Tuesday.

2.4.2 Time Range: During the day, the risk fluctuates throughout the day and peaks just after midnight - when it is dark and vehicles are left unattended for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity of offenders.

2.4.3 Offenders have smashed glazing to cause damage, gain access to vehicles to steal items or to steal vehicles themselves. Keys have also been stolen or cloned to steal vehicles. Offenders have also removed car parts and registration plates, as well as damaged tyres and vehicle paintwork.


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2.4.4 Vehicles parked on streets or within open communal parking areas, where they are easily accessible and cannot be easily overlooked by their owners, are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked within secure/enclosed parking facilities or within the curtilages of individual properties.


2.5 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.


Manchester Retail Burglary – Day Range



Manchester Retail Burglary – Time Range



Manchester Retail Burglary – Point of Entry



2.5.1 Day Range: The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester peaks slightly on Wednesday, but remains relatively consistently high across the week.

2.5.2 Time Range: During the day, the risk of burglary peaks late at night and during in the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target commercial premises at these times when they are closed, it is dark and the areas in which they are typically located are quiet - all of which contribute to offenders perceiving a lower risk of being observed or detected.

2.5.3 Point of Entry: In burglaries at Manchester retail premises, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:

- A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through shutters, forcing them open by various means including using implements to force them upwards, using vehicles to ram them and using tools to cut through them.
- Offenders have also routinely forced open doors with bodily pressure and tools, as well as smashing glazed panels within them to gain unauthorised access.
- Windows have also been prised open or smashed by offenders.


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- A high number of burglaries are recorded as having 'legitimate' or 'unknown' entry points. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers before targeting restricted/back-of-house areas (such as staff rooms, stock rooms etc.) unnoticed.
- Offenders have gained access to premises by gaining access through the roofs of single-storey elements or by penetrating through walls.


2.6 Theft (Manchester Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.

Manchester Retail Theft – Day Range



Manchester Retail Theft – Time Range



2.6.1 Day/Time Range: During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester retail premises remains consistently high across the week. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated in the afternoon and early evening. This is when retail premises are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to offend are greater. The majority of thefts are either of staff property or of/from the handbags of shoppers (such as mobile phones, purses etc.). Thefts of staff property are more likely to be noticed at either midday, when lunch breaks are taken, or during the late afternoon when staff are leaving for the day.

2.1 General Risk Factors

2.1.1 Residential: The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Anti-social behaviour
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Neighbour disputes
- Poor maintenance of access control systems
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.1.2 Retail: The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery
- Shoplifting
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work

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- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Employee theft
- Loitering groups
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent MOs (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting local residential properties and Manchester retail premises are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Local Residential: Where entry points are unknown, this is likely to be where offenders have exploited insecure communal entrances or have tailgated into blocks of flats behind genuine visitors/residents to gain access unnoticed. Offenders are likely to have also exploited insecure doors and windows to individual properties.

  Possible Solution - A robust access control system should be in place to allow the concierge/residents to vet visitors before allowing them access to the development. Consideration could also be given to 'airlock' lobby system, which features a secondary entrance door that only releases when the external door has closed, reducing the opportunities for tailgating unnoticed. The main communal entrance/s should also be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access.

  All individual apartments should also be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (also Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection.

  All ground floor/accessible windows should also be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.2), with key operated locks and opening restrictors. Windows to accessible elevations should be protected by some defensible space, to define them as entirely separate from the street and offer them some protection from unauthorised access as well as nuisance/anti-social behaviour.

- Local Residential: Doors have frequently been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or the glazing within them has been smashed to gain entry.

  Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.

  All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well-away from locking points.

- Local Residential: Offenders have gained access to rear gardens and targeted sheds.

  Possible Solution - All private spaces to the sides/rear of the buildings should be robustly enclosed, particularly where adjacent to publicly accessible space, to deter unauthorised access (see Section 4.5). Open pedestrian routes/accessible land to the rear of the properties should be avoided. Lighting to the front and rear of dwellings can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime (see Section 4.6). All cycle stores/sheds should be adequately secured to prevent unauthorised access/theft (see Section 4.7).

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- Local Vehicle: Vehicles have been targeted when parked on the street or within publicly accessible communal parking areas

  Possible Solution - It is essential that the development is designed so that resident's vehicles are secured and overlooked. Ideally, any surface communal parking areas serving apartment buildings or groups of houses should be located directly in front of the dwellings they serve, clearly separated from the streets or any areas of adjacent open space/pedestrian routes. Any side, rear, undercroft or basement communal parking areas must be secured to prevent unauthorised access to where hidden doors, windows and parked vehicles could be attacked unseen.

- Manchester Retail: A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through shutters, forcing them open by various means including using implements to force them upwards, using vehicles to ram them and using tools to cut through them

  Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 5.2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, ideally the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack.

- Manchester Retail: Doors have been forced open with tools and bodily pressure to gain entry

  Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 5.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries (see Section 5.6), lighting (see Section 5.7) and CCTV (see Section 5.8) can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.

- Manchester Retail: Windows have also been prised open or smashed by offenders

  Possible Solution - All external windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 5.2) where possible, which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 5.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Vulnerable shopfronts should be secured with security-certified shutters out-of-hours.

- Manchester Retail: A high number of burglaries are recorded as having 'legitimate' or 'unknown' entry points. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers before targeting restricted/back-of-house areas (such as staff rooms, stock rooms etc.) unnoticed

  Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Section 5.1).

- Manchester Retail: Offenders have gained access to premises by gaining access through the roofs of single-storey elements or by penetrating through walls.

  Possible Solution - Ideally, single storey building elements should be avoided. If they are absolutely necessary, care should be taken in their design to ensure that roof areas or upper floor windows are not accessible, for example, with the use of high-level/overhanging eaves, high balustrades etc. There should be no features of the building or any nearby hard/soft landscaping features that would facilitate climbing. Any 'accessible' skylights should incorporate at least one pane of laminated glazing and should be secured with internally fixed grilles/bars to prevent unauthorised access. The construction of the roof itself and all external walls should also be robust enough to withstand penetration.

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

3.1.1 The proposal is to demolish the existing buildings and erect a mixed-use development with 4 no. retail units (Use Class E) at the ground floor and 56 no. residential apartments (Use Class C3) above, with first floor podium and rooftop garden spaces and undercroft car parking.

3.1.2 The proposed retail units will front onto Lane End Road, Kingsway (A34) and Fog Lane and the residential apartments will be served by 2 no. communal entrances fronting onto the junction of Kingsway and Fog Lane and fronting onto Lane End Road. The undercroft car park (accessed through a roller shutter off Fog Lane) will comprise of 25 no. vehicle spaces and cycle racks with rear communal access to the apartments and the rear of each ground floor retail unit. The first floor of the building will incorporate a shared garden on a podium above the ground floor car park, with an additional shared rooftop garden at fourth floor level (and private terraces to the rooftop apartments).

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The proposed development will bring additional activity, overlooking and surveillance to the area at all times of the day and night.

3.2.2 The building will present an active frontage to Lane End Road, Kingsway and (to a lesser extent) Fog Lane - enlivening the street scene and helping to provide useful natural surveillance over the street.

3.2.3 The residential entrances to the building will be located in prominent positions and will be capable of being clearly seen from the public realm.

3.2.4 The proposed apartments will be provided above street level, meaning that residents' possessions cannot be easily observed and unauthorised entry is more effectively prevented. This also reduces the potential impacts of excessive noise, nuisance and anti-social behaviour (particularly at night).

3.2.5 The undercroft residential parking area will be capable of being enclosed and gated to prevent unauthorised access to where parked vehicles could be attacked unseen and where the sheltered space could foster loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour.

3.2.6 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 It is not ideal that the undercroft residential car park will provide access to the rear doors of the proposed ground floor retail units and visa versa, as this could cause conflict and may provide opportunities that could be exploited by offenders. The retail and residential entrances off the car park must be to a secure standard (see Sections 4.1 & 5.1) and should not be capable of being left open/insecure. As proposed, the ground floor unit COM-00-03 and the rear residential entrance share a communal corridor, leaving both uses vulnerable to unauthorised access. Commercial and residential uses within the building should be entirely separate, with no internal linkages. The rear entrance to the apartments off the car park and the rear entrance to unit COM-00-03 must be entirely separate.

3.3.2 The undercroft car park will not be overlooked from within the building, leaving the rear entrances to the apartments, the rear of the retail units and parked vehicles vulnerable to attack unseen if left potentially accessible, as well as leaving the area vulnerable to fostering, loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues. The rear access alleyway between the site and the adjacent unit to the east is gated, but was left insecure at the time the site visit was carried out. Should this hidden space be left open/accessible, offenders could access the hidden western boundary and operate for extended periods of time without being seen. As such, it is essential that the eastern boundary of the site is

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particularly securely enclosed (see Section 4.5 for more information) to prevent unauthorised access. The balustrades to the first floor podium above the car park above these fencelines should be fixed flush with the outer skin of the podium/brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that could provide a climbing aid. The windows, doors and glazing accessible from the podium shared garden (as well as the rooftop shared garden and terraces) should be to the same physical security standards as those at ground level (see Sections 4.1, 4.2 & 4.3).

3.3.3 The vehicular entrance to the car park (off Fog Lane) should be fitted with a high-speed automatic shutter (to reduce the potential for tailgating), operated by resident key fob/proximity reader only (also see Section 4.5). The pedestrian entrance off the car park should be security-certified and access-controlled (again see Section 4.1) to ensure that if unauthorised access is gained to this area (e.g. via tailgating, climbing/penetrating boundary treatments, forcing open the shutter etc.), further access to the building is prevented. The car park should not include visitor spaces and the cycle stores within the parking area should also be securely enclosed/gated (see Section 4.7).

3.3.4 It is preferable to have one communal residential entrance to the building, allowing all activity and security to be focussed in one location, set away from immediately adjacent commercial entrances, med points or bus stops which could provide the opportunity for offenders to legitimately loiter/attempt to gain access via tailgating. The communal residential entrance/s to the building should be formed by a single-leaf, self-closing doorset secured with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the security-certification, which is easier to secure and operate remotely via an access control system. There should also be a secure system for the delivery of post that does not require access to all floors of the building (see Section 4.1 for more information). Given the emerging theft of parcel thefts, there should be a secure system for depositing parcels, such as the smart parcel boxes used by the major internet shopping companies, incorporated within the secure postal lobby (again, see Section 4.1 for more information).

3.3.5 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents, visitors, staff and customers.

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4 Physical Security (Residential)

The following checklist (Sections 4 & 5) forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors & Access Controls

- ☐ All external doorsets should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery. Security-certified louvered doorsets are also available if required to refuse stores (see www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search for SBD-compliant products).
- ☐ The main communal entrance/s to the building should be formed by single-leaf, self-closing/locking doorsets secured with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, which is easier to secure and operate remotely via an access control system. They should be capable of being controlled remotely by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set), so that residents can vet callers to the building before allowing them access.
- ☐ There should be a secure system for the delivery of post without needing to provide access to all floors of the building. Postal delivery arrangements should ideally allow for external deposits and internal withdrawals by residents. If not, there should be a 'secure lobby' arrangement, with a secondary communal door to the same security specification as the outer door, to allow for deliveries without providing access to all floors of the building. The postboxes themselves should be of robust construction, with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). There should also be a secure system for depositing parcels within the secure postal lobby, such as the smart parcel boxes used by the major internet shopping companies. All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access control system.
- ☐ The communal entrance doorset off the undercroft parking area should be entirely separate from the retail uses and should also be a security-certified, single-leaf, self-closing/locking doorset secured with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, operated by resident key-fob only on access and egress. The external doorset to the residential refuse store should be secured and operated in the same way.
- ☐ All individual internal apartment entrance doorsets must also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead. Chain limiters to apartment entrance doors are recommended, but not generally essential.
- ☐ Any patio doors to the first and fourth floor apartment accessible from shared gardens/terraces should also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Internal doors/frames to the refuse store and any other stores, plant rooms etc. should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick), self-closing, with 3 hinges and an electrically operated lock controlled by staff/resident key-fob.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Accessible windows (i.e. any at ground level and any accessible from first and fourth floor shared gardens/terraces), where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be fixed with a secure glazing retention system (e.g. with security glazing tape, with a dedicated security sealant/gasket or a secure mechanical fixing system from the glazing retention tests within the BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 standards).
- ☐ Any accessible opening lights must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

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4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All glazing up to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible e.g. from upper floor shared gardens/terraces) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be no features of the building (such as projecting window cills, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby boundaries, trees, lighting columns, handrails etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to upper level windows or over boundaries.
- ☐ Any louvres to plant areas/refuse stores should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed, and designed to ensure that they cannot be used as a climbing aid.
- ☐ Internal walls between the residential and commercial portions of the building should either be of robust masonry construction or should incorporate timber sheathing (minimum 9mm thick) or expanded metal, in order to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack/penetration.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ Ideally, each apartment should have an intruder alarm to comply with BS EN 50131 for wired or wireless systems. They should be linked to contacts on all doors and PIR detectors should cover any accessible rooms with windows. If not, they should at least have a dedicated non-switched fuse spur to allow for the installation of an alarm.

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ The undercroft car park should be enclosed with full-height railings (or at least 2400mm high) along the eastern boundary of the site and up to the front building line along Lane End Road (please see Product Category Search for a list of Police approved perimeter security suppliers). Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of walls and railings should have panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid. Any pedestrian gates should be self-closing and 'slam to lock' (i.e. an automatic deadlocking mortice latch, key or fob operated from both sides), which cannot be left unlocked when shut. Any pedestrian gates required for emergency egress purposes should be fitted with a panic mechanism that cannot be reached/operated from the external face. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and the gates should be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, lighting columns etc. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds and the gap at the bottom of the gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.



- ☐ The entrance to the car park should be secured with an automatic high-speed shutter certified to LPS 1175 SR1/2 at the vehicular entrance off Fog Lane. The shutter should be operated by key fob/proximity reader, with no automatic egress (i.e. access control both 'in' and 'out'), so that criminals cannot gain access to the area, attack the vehicles and escape. It should be regularly maintained and immediately repaired/replaced if it fails, in order to continue preventing unauthorised access to the car park and the rear of the apartment building/retail units.
- ☐ The balustrades to the first floor podium above the car park above these fencelines should be fixed flush with the outer skin of the podium/brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that could provide a climbing aid.

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ Lighting to undercroft parking areas should be in accordance with BS 5489 and display an average lux level of 75-100, with a uniformity level of no less than 50%. Light-coloured walls and ceilings can help achieve this.
- ☐ External lighting must be provided to all external doors, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

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- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments or up to high-level windows or over boundaries. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.7 Other

- ☐ The cycle stores within the car park should be enclosed within their own secure compounds by 1800-2100mm high railings and a self-closing, 'slam to lock' gates (i.e. an automatic deadlocking mortice latch, key or fob operated from both sides). They should include 'Sheffield' style racks, or similar, that allow residents to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand, rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: www.designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/.
- ☐ A strategy should be defined to ensure refuse collections can take place while retaining a secure development.

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5 Physical Security (Retail)

5.1 Doors & Access Controls

- ☐ All external doors to the front and rear of the units (both single and double leaf) must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, LPS 1175 B3/SR2 or STS 202 BR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ If the main entrances to the retail units are to be formed by sliding doors, these cannot be certified to the above standard. Any sliding doors should be tested and certified to BS EN 1627 RC2+. At the very least, the sliding doors should incorporate laminated glazing, have multi-point locking (preventing sliding and lifting) and be protected by a shutter (certified to LPS 1775 A1/B3 SR1/2) out-of-hours.
- ☐ All back-of-house/staff areas within the retail units should not be publicly accessible. Internal doors to storage rooms, staff rooms and offices should be solid-core and self-closing - fitted with auditable access controls (i.e. proximity readers or swipe cards) or secured with keys (carried by staff only if required for duties and accounted for at all times). Any cash office should have solid masonry walls, no adjacent false/suspended ceilings and a security-certified doorset (see above). Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

5.2 Windows & Shutters

- ☐ All windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 B3/SR2. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be fixed with a secure glazing retention system (e.g. with security glazing tape, with a dedicated security sealant/gasket or a secure mechanical fixing system from the glazing retention tests within the BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 standards).
- ☐ Any shutters should be certified to LPS 1175 B3/SR2 (or A1/SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. If shutters are to be provided they should either be provided internally or, if they are to be externally mounted, shutter boxes and guides built into the fabric of the building (where they would be less visually intrusive and less vulnerable to damage).

5.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All glazing must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall (or material of similar strength e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind any cladding to the units, to a minimum height of 2000mm from external ground level, to ensure that the building fabric itself is not vulnerable to attack.
- ☐ Any glazed elevations of retail units should be protected by anti-ram bollards or re-enforced steel risers, to deter against ram-raid type attacks.
- ☐ Internal walls between the commercial and residential portions of the building (as well as between each of the commercial units themselves) should either be of robust masonry construction or should incorporate timber sheathing (minimum 9mm thick) or expanded metal, in order to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack/penetration.

5.4 Alarms

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover each of the units, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC). The alarm itself should ideally have two secure signalling paths (one being GSM radio back-up).

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5.5 Any ATM

☐ If any through-the-wall ATM is to form part of the proposal, it should be located to maximize surveillance over it and its users. It should also be located away from the entrances of the units and any nearby pedestrian crossings, benches or bus stops - where offenders could legitimately loiter or where members of the public would be funnelled into close proximity of the ATM and its users – providing opportunities to criminals. The following general measures should also be incorporated:

- Lighting should be provided to the area around any ATM to an adequate and uniform level (as defined within BS 5489), so as not to allow any areas of pooling/shadowing.
- Defensible space ground markings (e.g. 1m^2 painted area or change in surface texture) should be employed at the front of any ATM to indicate that only one user at a time may enter the space.
- Any ATMs should be covered by CCTV that should view the area and the users of the ATM, but not the ATM keypad itself.
- Any ATM should be protected by anti-ram bollards or similar to deter against ram-raid type attacks.
- Replenishment of any ATM should be carried out from a secure area inside the host building or while members of the public are excluded from the premises. A dedicated parking area should be provided for the cash-in-transit vehicle within the immediately vicinity of any ATM.

5.6 Lighting

☐ Dusk ‘til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors and undercroft areas.

☐ Fittings should produce ‘white’ light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundaries or up to high level windows. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

5.7 CCTV

☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Suitable locations for this scheme would be: all retail unit frontages/facades, the main entrances to each unit, internal circulation areas, sales counters/till positions and any ATMs. Designers should consider the following guidance when planning a CCTV strategy:

- Resolution and Identification - Select camera resolution based on identification requirements and field of view. More megapixels provide higher detail, but also increase bandwidth and storage requirements. Recommended resolution levels:
  - 1080p (2MP): General indoor and corridor surveillance.
  - 4MP–8MP (4K): Entrances, exits, and high-security areas for facial or number plate recognition.
  - >8MP: Large-area coverage or post-event digital zooming.
- Image Quality - High-quality imaging is the foundation of effective CCTV. Selecting cameras with the right sensor size, lens aperture, and image processing capabilities ensures accurate visual data capture across lighting conditions. Key considerations:
  - Larger sensors and low f-number lenses capture more light and deliver better contrast.
  - Use Wide Dynamic Range (WDR) cameras for scenes with bright and dark areas.
  - Apply Day/Night and IR-capable cameras for low-light performance.
  - Frame rates between 25–30 fps are recommended for motion clarity.

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- Camera Placement and Coverage - Camera placement directly affects image usability. Ensure coverage overlap and proper mounting height to minimise blind spots. Placement principles:
  - Mount indoor cameras between 2500–3000mm high to prevent tampering while retaining facial detail.
  - Outdoor cameras should be positioned to avoid glare and direct sunlight.
  - Slight overlap of camera fields ensures seamless coverage.
  - Combine wide-angle lenses for area coverage and narrow lenses for detail zones.
- Environmental and Housing Considerations - Outdoor and exposed cameras must withstand environmental and mechanical impacts. Select housings rated for weather and vandal resistance.
  - Minimum IP65/66 for outdoor use.
  - IK10 or equivalent vandal-resistant enclosures.
  - Integrated IR or Optimized IR functions for low-light areas.
  - Avoid steep downward angles; maintain clear facial perspective.
- Network and System Design - Design the video system architecture around IP-based network cameras for scalability, reliability, and flexibility. Core design elements:
  - Use Power over Ethernet (PoE) to simplify installation.
  - Calculate bandwidth and storage based on resolution, frame rate, and retention time.
  - Apply compression standards (H.264/H.265) to optimise storage.
  - Ensure strong cybersecurity: password protection, encryption, network segmentation.
- Maintenance and Quality Assurance - Routine inspection and maintenance are critical to sustaining image quality and reliability:
  - Perform day/night checks post-installation.
  - Clean lenses regularly and inspect mounting fixtures.
  - Review recorded footage to confirm identification quality.
  - Update firmware and review network security periodically.

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6 Internal Layout Guidance for Retail Units

The internal layout of the retail units should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. Design for Security understands that the designers and client may not always know who will be occupying their units once complete, and therefore, the end-users requirements. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

6.1.1 Clear views should also remain from the premises through to the public realm, i.e. large promotional signs should not obstruct views.

6.1.2 Careful consideration should be given to the location of paypoints to ensure that staff have full surveillance over the entrances to the units.

6.1.3 Internal aisles and product displays should be aligned to assist surveillance from pay points and avoid blind-spots. There should be no items of high-value displayed close to the entrances of the units.

6.1.4 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any tills, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.

6.1.5 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible (see Section 5.1) and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.

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7 Management & Maintenance

7.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the scheme must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the retail units. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:

- Opening and closing of the retail units, including staff arrival and departure;
- Cash storage/management within the premises;
- Cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices;
- Management of stock deliveries and waste collection;
- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. access controls, lighting, alarm system, CCTV cameras etc; and
- Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc.

7.1.2 The opening hours of the retail units should be consistent with other such premises in the locale and should not unduly conflict with other nearby uses.

7.1.3 Any high value equipment (e.g. computers/TVs, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

7.1.4 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left accessible for extended periods. Servicing activities should also not require any service doors to remain open and unattended for prolonged periods.

7.1.5 The upkeep of any residential development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Repairs to communal areas (e.g. access controls, vehicular gates/shutters, lighting, signage etc.)
- Litter/graffiti removal
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

7.1.6 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings. Low-level defensive planting beds can be used to great effect to funnel pedestrians away from vulnerable areas (such as gable walls, boundaries to private space or parking bays).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. Please see Secured by Design - Secured by Design for more information. To apply for the SBD Award for your development in Greater Manchester, please visit Apply for Secured by Design – Design For Security.

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A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
29 January 2026	Magnitude	Email correspondence re: fee for revising previous CIS
29 January 2026	Magnitude	Receipt of CIS instruction form
30 January 2026	Magnitude	Quote issued & request for additional info
30 January 2026	Magnitude	Confirmation of instruction & fee and receipt of additional info
4 to 5 February 2026	Magnitude	Email correspondence re: timescales
25 to 26 February 2026	Magnitude	Email correspondence re: timescales & payment
27 February 2026	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment
27 February 2026	Magnitude	Version A issued
12 March 2026	Magnitude	Receipt of email requesting minor amendment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
GDD25028-GDA-MB-ZZ-DR-A-1228	Proposed Site Plan	12/12/25	-
GDD25028-GDA-MB-GF-DR-A-1316	GA Plan Ground Floor	17/12/25	P01
GDD25028-GDA-MB-01-DR-A-1317	GA Plan First Floor	15/01/26	P02
GDD25028-GDA-MB-01-DR-A-1337	GA Plan Second – Third Floors	-	-
GDD25028-GDA-MB-04-DR-A-1318	GA Plan Fourth Floor	17/12/25	P01
GDD25028-GDA-MB-ZZ-DR-A-1319	GA Plan Roof		
GDD25028-GDA-MB-GF-DR-A-1624	Section A-A	15/01/26	-
GDD25028-GDA-MB-GF-DR-A-1625	Section B-B	15/01/26	-
GDD25028-GDA-MB-GF-DR-A-1626	Section C-C	15/01/26	-
GDD25028-GDA-MB-04-DR-A-1319	GA Plan Roof	12/12/25	-
GDD25028-GDA-MB-ZZ-DR-A-1414	Street Scene Elevation Kingsway	12/01/26	-
GDD25028-GDA-MB-ZZ-DR-A-1415	Street Scene Elevation Lane End Road	12/01/26	-
GDD25028-GDA-MB-ZZ-DR-A-1436	Street Scene Elevation Fog Lane	12/01/26	-
GDD25028-GDA-MB-ZZ-DR-A-1620	GA Elevations	12/01/26	P01
GDD25028-GDA-MB-ZZ-DR-A-1629	Window Reveal Detail	16/01/26	-
GDD25028-GDA-MB-ZZ-PP-A-1835	Design and Access Statement		
GDD24001-GDA-MB-ZZ-DR-A-0414	Street Scene Kingsway	-	P01

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Date	Revisions
A		
B	12/03/2026	Minor amendment to wording

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D Glossary

Physical Security Standards

PAS 24

Enhanced security performance requirements for doorsets and windows in the UK. Doorsets and windows intended to offer a level of security suitable for dwellings and other buildings exposed to comparable risk. It is designed to mimic an attack by an opportunist burglar, using tools which are easy to conceal.

STS 201

Enhanced security to satisfy the requirements for certification of doorsets, equivalent to test standard to PAS 24.

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors, roller shutters, fences and barriers. Products are rated via the term Burglary Resistance (BR) and range from BR1 (lower security rating) to BR6 (higher security rating).

LPS 1175

Physical security for products manufactured for perimeter, façade, internal spaces and entrapment protection. The higher the security rating, the more formidable the security product.

Developed following extensive consultation with stakeholders, the most recent issue sees the previous single digit performance classifications (i.e. Security Ratings 1 to 8) extended to one formed of two elements that illustrate performance in terms of:

- *Threat level (first element) – Letter (A to H) corresponding with the tool kit used to evaluate the product's intruder resistance and number of attackers involved.*
- *Delay (second element) – Numeric value (1, 3, 5, 10, 15 or 20) corresponding with the minimum delay (in minutes) provided by the product when placed in a locked condition.*

BS EN 1627

European standard for the burglary resistance of pedestrian doorsets, windows, curtain walling, grilles and shutters. It defines six resistance classes, from RC1 to RC6, with RC1 being the lowest level of resistance and RC6 the highest. These classes indicate the level of resistance to forced entry, with higher classes requiring more time and specialized tools to breach.

BS EN 356

European standard that specifies the resistance of laminated glazing (i.e. two or more layers of glass bonded together with a plastic interlayer) to manual attacks, such as might occur during forced entry or vandalism. It classifies laminated glass into different resistance levels, ranging from P1A to P8B, with P1A being the lowest and P8B the highest.

Useful Websites

Design For Security – Designing Out Crime – *apply for Crime Impact Statements or the Secured by Design Award from Greater Manchester Police*

Secured by Design - Secured by Design – *SBD Award Scheme, Design Guides and Member Companies*

ParkMark - Home – *Park Mark Safer Parking Award Scheme*

NBS Source – *find, select and specify building products (including security-certified products)*

RedBook Live - LPCB Red Book – *search for LPS 1175 certified products*

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