



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

PHASE 1 HYBRID PLANNING APPLICATION MIX MANCHESTER

For: Airport City Limited Partnership

Version A: 13th March 2026

Reference: 2025/0322/CIS/01

designforsecurity



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported with Further Points for Consideration

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - <http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/>), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed development is suitable for this area, it is in keeping with similar uses in the area, and the layout of the development is broadly acceptable with regards to designing out crime. There are a number of recommendations made in section 3.3 of this report including, but not limited to, the below:

- The proposed development has the potential to generate flyparking due to the close proximity of the airport. It is recommended that measures are taken to reduce the potential for misuse of the site.
- The physical security of the building and illumination, CCTV and access control, should be carefully considered across the site, to deter criminals from targeting the buildings or misuse of the site by those antisocially minded.

It is highly recommended that these points are considered, along with the remaining points in section 3.3 of the report.



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
1 Visual Audit

The proposed development sites can be seen on the adjacent map, with the full site in block grey and the outline site hatched in red. The site is located in the area to the North of Manchester Airport.

The full application site is bound by Enterprise Way to the North and West, to the East the site is bound by an existing access road and adjacent development plot, to the South the site is bound by Ringway Road North. The main outline application site is roughly triangular, and it is bound by Thorley Lane to the North, Enterprise Way to the East, and Ringway Road North to the South. There is also a small outline area within and immediately to the east of the full application site - which comprises parcel B-D.

The full application site is currently vacant, previously developed land, which has been prepared for development with access roads and some infrastructure such as the bridge which crosses Ringway Road North at the South.

The outline application site is currently in use as a car park serving Manchester airport (Jet Parks 1), which is accessed off Thorley Lane.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Local Crime Summary

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st October 2024 to 30th September 2025.

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
25	15	175	832	385	42	11	60	32	15

In the past 12 months there has been a high level of crime in the local area which is characterised by the airport to the South and residential areas to the North. Typically, vehicle crime and theft is highest in the airport and surrounding area, with burglaries, criminal damage and violent crimes occurring in more residential areas, which is broken down below.

Airport area:

- Ringway Road (214 incidents) and Manchester Airport (118 incidents) dominate as crime hotspots, along with Outwood Lane, and local car parking facilities.
- Common offences include theft, theft from motor vehicles, and criminal damage, reflecting high footfall and large car parking facilities.

Residential areas:

- Rowlandsway (113 incidents), Portway (98), and Hale Top (79) are the most affected streets, with Forum Square, Simonsway, and Bailey Lane also having large numbers of incidents.
- Crimes in these more residential areas include less serious wounding, criminal damage, and domestic burglary, which are more typical of residential areas.

2.2 Risk Factors - Industrial

2.2.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Employee theft
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.3 Risk Factors - Offices

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Violence towards staff

- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft

2.4 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.4.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting industrial uses in the area are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

2.4.2 Forcing open shutters using bodily pressure and implements/ tools to gain access.

Possible Solution – Install security-certified shutters (see Section 4.2). Where external shutters are used, integrate shutter boxes and guides into the building fabric to prevent tampering. Avoid placing openings in concealed areas to reduce the risk of undetected attacks.

2.4.3 Opening secure doors using bodily force and implements/tools to gain entry to property.

Possible Solution - Fit all external doors to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1).

2.4.4 Open access to service yards has allowed offenders to enter freely before targeting restricted areas.

Possible Solution - Implement robust perimeter boundaries and controlled access gates. Gates should only open for verified vehicles. Ensure clear sightlines, eliminate recesses, and maintain effective lighting and CCTV coverage. Avoid storing materials or parking vehicles near boundaries to prevent obstruction and concealment.

2.4.5 Theft of staff property or unattended / insecure items of personal property.




Possible Solution - Deploy strict access control. Visitors should be vetted and escorted before accessing sensitive areas.

2.4.6 Damaging fencing and gates using tools in order to access the industrial unit

Possible Solution – Use robust boundary treatments capable of resisting tool attacks. Install on hardstanding to prevent crawling underneath and ensure sufficient height to deter climbing. Gates should match boundary height, minimise ground clearance, and avoid horizontal bars or exposed hinges.

2.5 Burglary Risk Analysis (Industrial Premises)


The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against industrial units, recorded in the Manchester area.




- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at Manchester industrial premises peaks on Sunday and Monday. Across the day, incidents most frequently occur late at night and during the early hours of the morning. Offenders typically target these premises during hours of darkness when industrial areas and streets are quiet, units are closed, or operating with minimal staff. These conditions present a perceived lower risk of observation or detection.
- 2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** At industrial premises across Manchester, the most frequently observed points of entry and methods of operation include forcing open secure shutters using bodily pressure and implements, particularly metal bars and vehicles, to gain access. In a number of cases, the point of entry was recorded as 'unknown', which likely reflects situations where offenders posed as legitimate customers, visitors, or employees to access back-of-house or staff-only areas and steal property unnoticed. Doors have also been forced open using tools or implements, or exploited when left insecure by staff, while glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to facilitate entry. In addition, offenders have breached walls and roofs to gain unauthorised access.

2.6 Burglary Risk Analysis (Offices)

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area.





- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester is highest on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Sundays. Across the day, this risk increases significantly during the evening and late-night hours, when premises are typically closed and unoccupied. These periods provide offenders with opportunities to gain unauthorised access with minimal risk of detection or intervention.



- 2.6.2 **Point of Entry:** The majority of burglaries at Manchester office premises occur through doors, often involving forced entry. Offenders frequently bring tools to facilitate entry, such as those used to force doors open or cut locks. In some cases, glazed panels in doors and windows have been smashed to gain access.
- 2.6.3 A substantial proportion of incidents involve entry through unknown or legitimate points of access. These cases likely include scenarios where offenders pose as legitimate customers, visitors, or employees to infiltrate staff-only areas. Methods such as exploiting insecure doors or tailgating are commonly used to steal property without immediate detection.

2.7 Theft Risk Analysis (Industrial Premises)



The data below relates to thefts within/against industrial units, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.7.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft from industrial units in Manchester peaks on Saturday. During the day, the risk peaks during the late morning/afternoon. There are two common occurrences of theft – the theft of personal property within buildings (e.g. cash, bags, wallets/purses etc.) and the theft of tools, materials and plant stolen from service yards

2.8 Theft Risk Analysis (Offices)



The data below relates to thefts within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.8.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester offices is greatest on Monday and Tuesday and is generally lower over the weekend (when many are shut). During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking around midday. During these times, many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out

2.9 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.9.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Tuesday just after midnight (00:00-02:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles at this time when they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

3.2 Hybrid Planning Application seeking:

- 1) Full planning permission for development of midtech units (Use Class E.g.(i, ii, iii)) and multi-storey car park (Use Class Sui Generis), alongside ancillary commercial uses (Class E) with associated access, servicing, public realm and landscaping .
- 2) Outline planning permission for development of a range of uses (comprising Use Class E.g., B2, C1) alongside a Multi-Storey Car Park (Use Class Sui Generis) and ancillary commercial uses (Class E), with associated access, servicing, public realm and landscaping. All matters reserved for future determination save for primary access.

3.3 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime based on the principles of CPTED, designing out crime, and Secured by Design guidelines.

- 3.3.1 The proposed development will bring the existing vacant land into use, generating legitimate activity in the area and reducing the potential for misuse.
- 3.3.2 The proposed use is appropriate for this area. Other developments in the area include industrial uses, offices, logistics, car parks, and hotels.
- 3.3.3 The surrounding road network is heavily used due to the close proximity of the airport, to the South. The constant passing of traffic during the day and at night will provide the development with a high level of passive surveillance.
- 3.3.4 The building footprints are generally rectangular with no recessed spaces, or similar, which could conceal an offender from view – reducing the potential for an offender to target these buildings.
- 3.3.5 The access road network does not feature any long, linear, stretches that could be misused antisocially by drivers.
- 3.3.6 There will be secure cycling parking within the multi-storey car park, allowing those working within the development to securely store their bicycle whilst at work. There will be short-term bicycle parking in the landscaped areas surrounding the units.
- 3.3.7 There will be motorcycle parking within the multi-storey car park, allowing workers travelling to work by motorcycle to secure their vehicle whilst at work within the car parking facility, rather than the surrounding area where they might be vulnerable to theft.
- 3.3.8 There will be street furniture, benches, and seating areas in the landscaped areas around the buildings. These areas will foster legitimate use around the buildings, which can deter misuse of the surrounding areas by those antisocially minded. The proposed street furniture will be durable and of a high-quality, which will prevent it from being easily damaged by those criminally minded.
- 3.3.9 The site has clear routes for pedestrians, cyclists, and vehicles, allowing for ease of navigation around the development and prevent conflict between users.
- 3.3.10 The proposed timber knee rail around the perimeter of plots A6, A3 & A1 will prevent them from being accessed by vehicles.

CPTED Principles

Territorial Reinforcement

Using physical or symbolic boundaries to create a clear sense of ownership, discouraging offenders by increasing the likelihood of detection.

Natural Surveillance

Designing buildings and spaces with clear sightlines and well-placed windows so that potential offenders feel visible, reducing the likelihood of crime.

Natural Access Control

Guiding people through spaces in ways that distinguish legitimate users from illegitimate ones, reducing opportunities for unauthorised access or offending.

Activity Support

Encouraging appropriate activities and movement in public areas to increase natural surveillance, while placing crime-attracting features in visible, well-used locations.

Space Management

Maintaining buildings and public areas to signal care and ownership; neglected spaces invite further disorder, while well-kept spaces deter crime.

Target Hardening

Using physical security measures, such as secure doors, windows, perimeter treatments, and alarms, to make committing crime more difficult.

- 3.3.11 There is one main vehicular entrance into the site, which will make securing the site easy if required – i.e. at night.

3.4 Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration, based on the principles of CPTED, designing out crime, and Secured by Design guidelines.

Site

- 3.4.1 The proposed permeable layout may create vulnerabilities if not carefully managed, as increased access and multiple escape routes can facilitate crime and antisocial behaviour.
- 3.4.2 The site benefits from its location in an area of high activity, with substantial vehicle traffic generated by the proximity to the airport, and the scale of the development is likely to generate high levels of pedestrian activity, particularly when future phases are developed, fostering legitimate activity which can deter offenders from operating. In addition, the provision of seating areas, clear pedestrian routes, and well-placed street furniture is expected to promote active use of public spaces. The public realm will direct pedestrians along visible, well defined, pathways, which reduces the opportunities for concealment and antisocial behaviour.
- 3.4.3 Overall, the layout is broadly acceptable from a crime-prevention perspective, provided robust management, effective access control, and a comprehensive CCTV strategy are implemented to maintain long-term security.

Use Class E.g(i,ii,iii) – Mid Tech Units

- 3.4.4 Shutters and sectional overhead doors are common targets for forced entry. It is highly recommended that all shutters and sectional overhead doors must be certified to a burglary-resistant standard (e.g., LPS 1175 SR 2).
- 3.4.5 Each unit should have a monitored intruder alarm installed or, at minimum, the necessary infrastructure to allow easy installation by tenants.
- 3.4.6 The development should incorporate a comprehensive CCTV system covering site entrances, industrial units, bicycle storage areas, and parking facilities. Each unit should include infrastructure to enable straightforward installation of a CCTV system by the end user.
- 3.4.7 Theft of personal property is among the most frequently reported crimes at industrial units. Staff lockers should be provided to allow employees to securely store personal belongings during working hours or be included as part of the fit out by the end user.

Multi-Storey Car Park

- 3.4.8 All vehicular and pedestrian entrances (i.e. into car parking levels) should be equipped with robust access control systems. Entry should be restricted to individuals holding a valid ticket or permit.
- 3.4.9 Vehicular access points should be secured with electronically operated barriers operating on an ANPR system or similar, to restrict access to genuine users
- 3.4.10 Pedestrian doors into the car parking levels should be fitted with electronic locks to prevent unauthorised entry (operated with a valid ticket/QR code etc.).
- 3.4.11 All external pedestrian doors must include door closers that fully engage locking mechanisms upon closure.
- 3.4.12 Escape doors should be designated for emergency use only, not for general circulation. These doors should be clearly signed and fitted with alarms to deter misuse.
- 3.4.13 Security staff should be present throughout operational hours and conduct regular patrols of the facility to deter crime and assist

Table L1: Lighting requirements for multi-storey/enclosed car parks

Areas	Av. lux	Min. lux	Uniformity
Parking bays and lanes	75	50	0.6
Ramps, corners and junctions	150	75	0.5
Vehicular entrances/exits	75 (night) 300 (day)	n/a	n/a
Pedestrian areas (stairs, lobbies etc)	100	50	0.5
Open roof level	30	10	0.33

Please Note:

- The Av (average) lux is the maintained average horizontal illuminance on the floor
- The Min (minimum) lux is the minimum horizontal illuminance at any location
- Reference should be made to BS 5489 part 9, for further information and guidance
- There may be scope for compromise on the above levels due to external factors

customers.

- 3.4.14 Any tickets/payment machines should be monitored by CCTV. Ticket machines should be emptied regularly, and cash stored in a safe certified to the relevant Loss Prevention Standard. If a cash room exists, it should have solid blockwork or reinforced studwork walls, and the doorset should comply with BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2.
- 3.4.15 Help points should be installed on each floor, enabling users to contact security staff in emergencies.
- 3.4.16 The car park should be illuminated in accordance with BS 5489 standards (refer to Table L1).
- 3.4.17 Parking bays should be sufficiently sized to accommodate larger vehicles (e.g., SUVs, crossovers, and 4x4s) to minimise conflicts between users.
- 3.4.18 Clear signage should guide both vehicles and pedestrians to appropriate exits.
- 3.4.19 A comprehensive CCTV system should cover all areas of the parking facility, including entrances, exits, payment points, and stairwells.
- 3.4.20 Access to staff-only areas should be strictly controlled. Clear signage should indicate restricted zones to prevent unauthorized entry and eliminate confusion as an excuse for trespassing.

Landscaping & External Spaces

- 3.4.21 The position of the site in relation to the airport leaves it vulnerable to fly parking, i.e. drivers waiting to pick up passengers from the airport to circumvent any fees from using the official short stay airport parking/picking up areas, particularly with the existing bridge link to the airport across Ringway Road West. On the day of visiting the site there were drivers waiting at the entrance to the site and the THG car park nearby, in addition to taxis waiting outside Kingsley Hall on Bailey Lane. It is recommended that measures are taken to reduce the potential for the circulation roads within the development being misused. In other roads surrounding the airport ANPR and CCTV cameras are used to detect misuse, which in conjunction with appropriate signage could be used with the proposed development.
- 3.4.22 Access to the link bridge should be well overlooked, illuminated, and covered by CCTV, to reduce the potential for antisocial behaviour and to deter criminality.
- 3.4.23 Landscaped areas potentially generate antisocial behaviour or misuse if poorly designed. It is highly recommended that, to ensure good sightlines, that tree canopies do not fall lower than 2000mm and shrubbery/planting is generally kept lower than 1000mm.
- 3.4.24 To enhance natural surveillance and minimise the risk of antisocial behaviour, crime, and fear of crime, proper lighting should be employed to illuminate both the building exteriors and any external spaces.
- 3.4.25 There should be a mix of lighting sources (i.e. illuminated bollards, lighting columns, exterior downlights, light stacks and wall mounted luminaires) within the landscaped area to ensure it is illuminated to a high standard when it is dark, to deter misuse and allow it to be easily surveyed from inside the buildings. Any seating areas should be capable of being viewed from inside the building and be covered by CCTV.
- 3.4.26 External lighting must be provided to all access roads and parking areas within the site, in accordance with BS 5489.
- 3.4.27 Lighting to vehicle circulation areas, service yards and car parks should be in accordance with BS 5489 and display an average lux level of 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- 3.4.28 Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by. Care must be taken to ensure that the landscaping in and around the site is maintained at an appropriate height, in order to prevent it impeding views to and from the site and avoid the creation of hiding places that could be exploited by offenders.

3.5 Outline Proposals

- 3.5.1 Design building footprints to be simple, minimising recesses that could conceal offenders. Emergency exit doors should be flush with external walls. Office windows should overlook site frontages. Main entrances/receptions must be clearly visible and directly accessible from site entry points.
- 3.5.2 Clearly separate private and public areas. Use secondary fences/gates to secure side/rear elevations and service yards. Install barriers at vehicular entrances to secure the site when closed.
- 3.5.3 Secure boundaries high-security rigid-panel welded-wire mesh fencing, which offers superior resistance to scaling, penetration, and damage compared to Palisade fencing. Ensure ground level changes do not

create climbing aids or gaps beneath fences/gates. Secure access to sides and rear of units to prevent entry from public parking areas.

- 3.5.4 Provide external lighting to all access roads and parking areas per BS 5489, achieving 20 lux average with $\geq 25\%$ uniformity. Use white light fittings and consider landscape growth to avoid light obstruction.
- 3.5.5 Maintain low planting (less than 1000mm) and tree canopies (above 2000mm) to ensure clear sightlines and eliminate hiding places.
- 3.5.6 Avoid vegetation or street furniture that aids climbing or obstructs views. Maintain landscaping to prevent concealment opportunities.
- 3.5.7 Design retaining structures to avoid creating easy access to secure areas.
- 3.5.8 Provide adequate on-site parking for staff and visitors to reduce off-site parking risks.
- 3.5.9 Locate cycle parking within secure, weatherproof enclosures—preferably inside buildings. External stores must be within secure boundaries. Visitor parking should be visible from staffed areas.
- 3.5.10 Position substations carefully to prevent concealment and vandalism. Ensure boundary treatments do not compromise adjacent security lines.
- 3.5.11 Implement a comprehensive, regularly reviewed security regime. Ensure staff understand and support security measures, with clear reporting channels for concerns.
- 3.5.12 Secure undeveloped plots with hoarding or similar barriers to prevent unauthorised access where appropriate.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Garage or sectional overhead doors must be tested and certified to RC2, LPS 1175 SR2 or STS202.

4.2 Windows, Curtain Walling, Cladding & Shutters

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified BS PAS 24, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR A, STS 204, or STS 222.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Shutters must be tested and certified to STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.
- ☐ Solid block walls should be provided behind any lightweight cladding to a height of 2400mm to prevent attacks to the cladding to gain access to buildings.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover each building, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.
- ☐ If an alarm isn't installed, then the infrastructure should be provided for one to be easily installed by the end user.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
 - External doors
- ☐ If an access control system isn't installed, then the infrastructure should be provided for one to be easily installed by the end user if required.

4.6 Boundaries

- ☐ Vehicular/pedestrian gates should be installed at the main entrance to the development so that pedestrian/vehicular traffic can be restricted and regulated as necessary (i.e. at night-time).
- ☐ Secure boundary treatments (including service yard boundaries) should generally be 2400mm high and of welded wire mesh construction. It is recommended that a 358-type fence panel is used in higher risk situations.
- ☐ Any new site boundaries should be a minimum of 3000mm high and of welded wire mesh construction. It is recommended that a 358-type fence panel is used in higher risk situations.
- ☐ There should be minimal ground clearance beneath the fence, to reduce the potential for crawling into secure areas.
- ☐ The site boundary treatment should be positioned on hard standing ground. Where this is not possible, the ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary.
- ☐ Gates should be in keeping with the height of adjacent boundary treatments and incorporate either:
 - A pad lockable bolt to the midpoint of the internal face, or
 - A key operable deadlock
- ☐ Double gates should have lockable (or externally inaccessible) drop bolts to each leaf.

4.7 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.8 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.9 CCTV

- ☐ The proposed development should be covered by a comprehensive CCTV system. Individual industrial units should have the infrastructure for the easy installation of a CCTV system if required by the end user.

4.10 Car Parks

- ☐ Lighting to car parks should be in accordance with BS 5489 and display an average lux level of 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout/lux plan.
- ☐ Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated, with pedestrian routes/directions clearly signed.

4.11 Other

- ☐ Staff lockers should be provided so that staff can safely store personal items during the working day.
- ☐ Any cycle stores should be secure, lockable, and weatherproof, enclosures.
- ☐ Any bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

5 CCTV Guidance

5.1 Resolution, Identification & Retention

- ☐ Select camera resolution based on identification requirements and field of view. More megapixels provide higher detail but also increase bandwidth and storage requirements.
- ☐ Recommended resolution levels:
 - 1080p (2MP): General indoor and corridor surveillance.
 - 4MP–8MP (4K): Entrances, exits, and high-security areas for facial or number plate recognition.
 - >8MP: Large-area coverage or post-event digital zooming.
- ☐ The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

5.2 Image Quality

- ☐ High-quality imaging is the foundation of effective CCTV. Selecting cameras with the right sensor size, lens aperture, and image processing capabilities ensures accurate visual data capture across lighting conditions.
- ☐ Key considerations:
 - Larger sensors and low f-number lenses capture more light and deliver better contrast.
 - Use Wide Dynamic Range (WDR) cameras for scenes with bright and dark areas.
 - Apply Day/Night and IR-capable cameras for low-light performance.
 - Frame rates between 25–30 fps are recommended for motion clarity.

5.3 Camera Placement and Coverage

- ☐ Camera placement directly affects image usability. Ensure coverage overlap and proper mounting height to minimise blind spots.
- ☐ Placement principles:
 - Mount indoor cameras between 2.5–3 m to prevent tampering while retaining facial detail.
 - Outdoor cameras should be positioned to avoid glare and direct sunlight.
 - Slight overlap of camera fields ensures seamless coverage.
 - Combine wide-angle lenses for area coverage and narrow lenses for detail zones.

5.4 Environmental and Housing Considerations

- ☐ Outdoor and exposed cameras must withstand environmental and mechanical impacts. Select housings rated for weather and vandal resistance.
 - Minimum IP65/66 for outdoor use.
 - IK10 or equivalent vandal-resistant enclosures.
 - Integrated IR or OptimizedIR functions for low-light areas.
 - Avoid steep downward angles; maintain clear facial perspective.

5.5 Network and System Design

- ☐ Design the video system architecture around IP-based network cameras for scalability, reliability, and flexibility. Core design elements to consider:
 - Use Power over Ethernet (PoE) to simplify installation.
 - Calculate bandwidth and storage based on resolution, frame rate, and retention time.
 - Apply compression standards (H.264/H.265) to optimise storage.
 - Ensure strong cybersecurity: password protection, encryption, network segmentation.

5.6 Maintenance and Quality Assurance

- ☐ Routine inspection and maintenance are critical to sustaining image quality and reliability.
 - Perform day/night checks post-installation.
 - Clean lenses regularly and inspect mounting fixtures.
 - Review recorded footage to confirm identification quality.
 - Update firmware and review network security periodically.

6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 A comprehensive security and maintenance regime for the management of the units must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the building. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up to date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures, and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:
 - Opening and closing the units, including staff arrival and departure (including any lone-worker policies).
 - Securing the site when not in use.
 - Management of deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods).
 - Details of staff security training.
 - Location and management of any smoking areas.
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. access control systems, alarm systems, CCTV cameras, lighting etc.
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc.
 - Regular boundary checks
 - Refuse collection arrangements.
- 6.1.2 All high value equipment within communal areas (e.g. computers, televisions, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left in the street for extended periods/overnight. Servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods.

7 Construction

- 7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 7.1.2 Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. Please see [Secured by Design - Secured by Design](#) for more information. To apply for the SBD Award for your development in Greater Manchester, please visit [Apply for Secured by Design – Design For Security](#).

8.2 Park Mark Safer Parking Scheme (PMSPS)

- 8.2.1 The Safer Parking Scheme, run by the British Parking Association (BPA) is designed to create a benchmark standard for all parking areas across the UK, in order to create safer parking areas for the public and their vehicles. Car parks with the award are provided with signage featuring the distinctive 'Park Mark' tick, so that drivers know exactly where to go for safer parking. More information about the scheme and the process of accreditation can be obtained from [ParkMark - Home](#).

8.3 Counter Terrorism Security Advice

- 8.3.1 Given the location/nature of the proposed scheme, the local Counter Terrorism Security Advisor (CTSA) has highlighted that the development may be at an increased risk. Please contact ctpnw.protect@gmp.pnn.police.uk for more information and advice.

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
28/08/2025	Megan Bracha	CIS application received
15/01/2026	Megan Bracha	Meeting
09/02/2026	Ollie Eyre	Plans
13/03/2026	Megan Bracha	Minor amendments

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing title	PREPARED BY
Site Location Plan (7092-SRA-ZZ-	Sheppard Robson
Existing Site Plan (7092-SRA-ZZ-	Sheppard Robson
Proposed Site Plan (7092-SRA-ZZ-	Sheppard Robson
Development Plot Parameter Plan	Sheppard Robson
Illustrative Masterplan (7092-SRA-	Sheppard Robson
Block A1 General Arrangement	Sheppard Robson
Block A1 General Arrangement	Sheppard Robson
Elevations Block A1 (7092-SRA-A1-	Sheppard Robson
Block A2 General Arrangement	Sheppard Robson
Block A2 General Arrangement	Sheppard Robson
Elevations Block A2 (7092-SRA-A2-	Sheppard Robson
Block A5 General Arrangement	Sheppard Robson
Block A5 General Arrangement	Sheppard Robson
Block A5 General Arrangement	Sheppard Robson
Elevations Block A5 (7092-SRA-A5-	Sheppard Robson
Block A7 General Arrangement	Sheppard Robson
Block A7 General Arrangement	Sheppard Robson
Elevations Block A7 (7092-SRA-A7-	Sheppard Robson
Block A7 Typical Strip Section Solid	Sheppard Robson
Typical Strip Sections – Gable End	Sheppard Robson
Typical Strip Section – Through	Sheppard Robson
Typical Strip Section – Through	Sheppard Robson
E1 MSCP Levels 00 and 01 (06125-	5plus
E1 MSCP Levels 02 and 03 (E1	5plus
E1 MSCP Levels 04 and 05 (06125-	5plus
E1 MSCP Levels 10 and 11 (06125-	5plus
E1 MSCP Levels 16 and 17 (06125-	5plus
E1 MSCP Level 18 (06125-5PA-02-	5plus
E1 MSCP Planning Elevations A &	5plus
E1 MSCP Planning Elevations B &	5plus
E1 MSCP - Proposed Gross Internal	5plus
General Arrangement Plan (3223-	Planit
General Arrangement Outline	Planit
General Arrangement Planting Plan	Planit
General Arrangement Planting Plan	Planit

General Arrangement Trees Plan	Planit
General Arrangement Planting Plan	Planit
General Arrangement Furniture &	Planit
General Arrangement Boundaries	Planit

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Date	Revisions
Draft	11 th March 2026	
A	13th March 2026	

D Glossary

Physical Security Standards

PAS 24

Enhanced security performance requirements for doorsets and windows in the UK. Doorsets and windows intended to offer a level of security suitable for dwellings and other buildings exposed to comparable risk. It is designed to mimic an attack by an opportunist burglar, using tools which are easy to conceal.

STS 201

Enhanced security to satisfy the requirements for certification of doorsets, equivalent to test standard to PAS 24.

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors, roller shutters, fences and barriers. Products are rated via the term Burglary Resistance (BR) and range from BR1 (lower security rating) to BR6 (higher security rating).

LPS 1175

Physical security for products manufactured for perimeter, façade, internal spaces and entrapment protection. The higher the security rating, the more formidable the security product.

Developed following extensive consultation with stakeholders, the most recent issue sees the previous single digit performance classifications (i.e. Security Ratings 1 to 8) extended to one formed of two elements that illustrate performance in terms of:

- Threat level (first element) – Letter (A to H) corresponding with the tool kit used to evaluate the product's intruder resistance and number of attackers involved.
- Delay (second element) – Numeric value (1, 3, 5, 10, 15 or 20) corresponding with the minimum delay (in minutes) provided by the product when placed in a locked condition.

BS EN 1627

European standard for the burglary resistance of pedestrian doorsets, windows, curtain walling, grilles and shutters. It defines six resistance classes, from RC1 to RC6, with RC1 being the lowest level of resistance and RC6 the highest. These classes indicate the level of resistance to forced entry, with higher classes requiring more time and specialized tools to breach.

BS EN 356

European standard that specifies the resistance of laminated glazing (i.e. two or more layers of glass bonded together with a plastic interlayer) to manual attacks, such as might occur during forced entry or vandalism. It classifies laminated glass into different resistance levels, ranging from P1A to P8B, with P1A being the lowest and P8B the highest.

Useful Websites

[Design For Security – Designing Out Crime](#)

– apply for Crime Impact Statements or the Secured by Design Award from Greater Manchester Police

[Secured by Design - Secured by Design](#)

– SBD Award Scheme, Design Guides and Member Companies

[ParkMark - Home](#) – Park Mark Safer Parking Award Scheme

[NBS Source](#) – find, select and specify building products (including security-certified products)

[RedBook Live - LPCB Red Book](#) – search for LPS 1175 certified products