



## CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Corner of Old Mill Street and Upper Kirby  
Street/Lampwick Lane

Full planning application for a residential-led development to provide 40 no. (Use Class C3) and ground floor commercial space (Use Class E) and communal area, together with landscaping, parking, cycle parking, supporting infrastructure and associated works. The Class E GIA is 87 sq. m.

FOR: URBAN SPLASH

VERSION A: 22<sup>nd</sup> November 2023

REFERENCE: 2016/0054/CIS/03

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

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# Corner of Old Mill Street and Upper Kirby Street/Lampwick Lane

2016/0054/CIS/03

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Recommendations made

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - <http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/>), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The following areas have been identified as a concern and should be addressed (see section 3.3 for more details).

- The layout includes two recessed entrances to the building and the undercroft parking areas could potentially generate criminal and antisocial behaviour and should be addressed.
- Access control and physical security of the buildings should be carefully considered.

Additionally, there are a number of recommendations made in section 3.3 of this report which would enhance the security of the development, and it is highly recommended that these are considered. It is also recommended that the development is built to Secured by Design standards.



Patrick Babb

**Consultant**

e: [patrick.babb@designforsecurity.org](mailto:patrick.babb@designforsecurity.org)

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# Contents

|   |                                                |    |
|---|------------------------------------------------|----|
| 1 | Visual Audit.....                              | 4  |
| 2 | Crime Statistics & Analysis.....               | 5  |
|   | 2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi) |    |
|   | 2.3 Risk Factors - Residential                 |    |
|   | 2.4 Risk Factors – Cafes / Restaurants         |    |
|   | 2.5 Crime Rate Comparison                      |    |
|   | 2.6 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis           |    |
|   | 2.7 Burglary Risk Analysis                     |    |
|   | 2.8 Theft Risk Analysis                        |    |
|   | 2.9 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis               |    |
| 3 | Layout Appraisal.....                          | 12 |
|   | 3.1 Proposed development                       |    |
|   | 3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal           |    |
|   | 3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations         |    |
| 4 | Physical Security (Apartments) .....           | 13 |
|   | 4.1 Doors                                      |    |
|   | 4.2 Windows                                    |    |
|   | 4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric                  |    |
|   | 4.4 Alarms                                     |    |
|   | 4.5 Access Control                             |    |
|   | 4.6 Bicycle Parking                            |    |
|   | 4.7 Lighting                                   |    |
| 5 | Physical Security (Commercial Units) .....     | 14 |
|   | 5.1 Doors                                      |    |
|   | 5.2 Windows, Building Fabric & Shutters        |    |
|   | 5.3 Glazing                                    |    |
|   | 5.4 Alarms                                     |    |
|   | 5.5 Access Control                             |    |
| 6 | Management & Maintenance .....                 | 15 |
| 7 | Construction .....                             | 16 |
| 8 | Useful References .....                        | 16 |
|   | 8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)                    |    |

## Appendix


|   |                           |    |
|---|---------------------------|----|
| A | Contact register .....    | 17 |
| B | Associated Documents..... | 17 |
| C | CIS Version History ..... | 17 |

# 1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located on the periphery of Manchester city centre, within the area of Ancoats.

The site is roughly square, and the boundaries are defined by a vehicular access route to a carp parking area to the front of Fanatics to the North-East, to the South-East the site is bound by an unnamed road, to the South-West the site is bound by Upper Kirby Street/Lampwick Lane, and to the North-West the site is bound by Old Mill Street.

The local area is typically residential with both a large number of apartments in the local area, but also a high number of both older housing stock and relatively newly built houses. Old Mill Street is a busy route through the area, connecting areas of East Manchester with Manchester city



## 2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1<sup>st</sup> November 2022 to 31<sup>st</sup> October 2023.

### Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

| Domestic Burglary | Non-Domestic Burglary | Criminal Damage | Less Serious Wounding | Theft | Robbery | Serious Wounding | Theft from Motor Vehicle | Theft of Motor Vehicle | Bicycle Theft |
|-------------------|-----------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|-------|---------|------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|---------------|
| 27                | 27                    | 139             | 339                   | 57    | 14      | 6                | 216                      | 22                     | 13            |

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime is above average for the Manchester division, with less serious wounding, vehicle crime and criminal damage being the highest recorded offence types. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres where there is often a higher concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to an increase of crime and disorder issues.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have occurred throughout the local area, with a hotspot of offences to the southwest of the proposed site at the junction of Pollard Street and Great Ancoats Street. Assaults, harassment, and public order offences have been the most common less serious woundings taking place, with incidents between known associates and domestic disputes most commonly reported.
- 2.1.3 The site's close proximity to the city centre means there is a higher volume of vehicles due to the large amount of commuters that pass through and use parking facilities within the local area. Theft from motor vehicle has been the most common vehicle crime offence, with offenders having smashed the glazing in the windows or used implements to lockpick the doors before removing items from within.
- 2.1.4 Criminal damage to vehicles has accounted for the majority of criminal damage offences taking place in the local area, with offenders having targeted vehicles parked on the streets and in car parks by using bodily pressure or objects to smash the glazing in windows and damage the bodywork of cars, vans, and buses.

## 2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Forcing open secure doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to apartments

*Possible Solution - All apartment entrance doorsets should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (i.e. BS PAS 24).*

- 2.2.2 Entering apartment buildings by means of insecure doors/ tailgating residents and gaining access to communal areas.

*Possible Solution - There should be access controlled secure doorsets restricting access to the circulation core of the building to reduce the possibility of would-be offenders from tailgating residents and visitors into the building.*

- 2.2.3 Posing as a legitimate customer and gaining access to staff only areas by means of tailgating staff and exploitation of insecure doors.

*Possible Solution - Any staff-only areas should operate on an access control system with access restricted to authorised personnel.*

- 2.2.4 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors to gain access into communal areas and apartments.

*Possible Solution - All ground floor communal doors should be fitted with door closers and lock automatically, to prevent these doors from being left open and insecure. Any publicly accessible apartment entrance doors should be fitted with a split-spindle, or fixed external handle, to prevent them from being opened from the outside when unlocked. Any accessible windows should be restricted in opening to prevent them from being fully opened if left insecure.*

- 2.2.5 Theft of parcels left by couriers in communal and insecure areas.

*A secure parcel room should be provided for the delivery of parcels, which can operate on an access control system and be covered by CCTV. Alternatively, a delivery locker system can be used.*

#### 2.2.6 Customers posing as legitimate customers, gaining access to staff only areas

*Possible Solution - There should be a secure area for staff to leave their belongings while at work and access to all staff areas should be restricted with auditable access controls.*

#### 2.2.7 Theft of personal property from tabletops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables

*Possible Solution - A particular issue in drinking establishments within the Manchester city centre area is the theft of personal effects; handbag and mobile phone theft is a particular issue. Consideration should be given to fixing 'Chelsea Clips' (see image), Grippa clips, or simple hooks to the underside of tables to allow customers to secure bags or jackets to the table while keeping it in view; a more secure option than, for example, tabletops or back of chairs, where belongings can be liable to theft.*



*The internal layout of the premises can also help deter theft by promoting surveillance and creating an*

*uncluttered, environment, avoiding pinch points or areas of concealment. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.*

#### 2.2.8 Doors have been forced open with tools and bodily pressure

*Possible Solution – All external doors should be certified to the relevant security standards (see section 4).*

#### 2.2.9 Glazing in windows has been smashed

*Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see section 4 for more details).*

#### 2.2.10 Using implements to force open shutters.

*Possible Solution – Any shutters should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (i.e. LPS 1175 SR 2) which cannot be forced open easily by offenders.*

### 2.3 Risk Factors - Residential

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

### 2.4 Risk Factors – Cafes / Restaurants





The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary

- 
- Robbery to business
  - Criminal damage to property
  - Alcohol-fuelled violence / conflict if licensed
  - Miscellaneous theft to customers
  - Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
  - Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
  - Violence towards staff
  - Safety of staff personal belongings
  - Robbery / wounding of patrons leaving premises
  - Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

## 2.5 Crime Rate Comparison

The rates below relate to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2017.




- 2.5.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **75% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **67% lower** than Greater Manchester and **67% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **70% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **60% lower** than Greater Manchester and **23% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **33% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **12% lower** than Greater Manchester and **7% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **32% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **117% higher** than Greater Manchester and **163% higher** than England & Wales.


## 2.6 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.


Burglary dwelling – Day Range



Burglary dwelling – Time Range



Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry




2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on Monday around midnight (00:00-01:00). Offenders tend to target properties late at night when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.6.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- In cases where the entry point has been recorded as "unknown", it is likely that the offender has exploited insecure windows or doors.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.
- Forcing open secure windows and doors using implements and bodily pressure.

## 2.7 Burglary Risk Analysis



The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.7.1 **Day Range:** The risk of burglary at restaurants/cafes in Manchester fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Monday, Thursday, and Sunday.
- 2.7.2 **Time Range:** The risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning, when premises are usually closed.
- 2.7.3 **Point of Entry:** In the majority of cases where entry points are known, offenders have entered Manchester restaurants/cafes through external doors. Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools/implements and glazing within doors/windows has been smashed to gain entry. Offenders have also posed as legitimate customers before targeting insecure doors, tailgating, or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas when premises are open to the public.

## 2.8 Theft Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.8.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester restaurants/cafes peaks over the weekend. Many premises experience higher levels of attendance at the weekend than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunities for offenders to commit theft is greater.
- 2.8.2 **Time Range:** The risk of theft peaks in the afternoon and into the evening. This reflects the times when restaurants/cafes are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses/wallets, and mobile phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items. Offenders have also targeted I.T equipment within premises, particularly tablets and laptops, as well as alcohol from storage rooms.

## 2.9 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.9.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on Wednesday around midnight (00:00-01:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles late at night when they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

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## 3 Layout Appraisal

### 3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 Full planning application for a residential-led development to provide 40 no. (Use Class C3) and ground floor commercial space (Use Class E) and communal area, together with landscaping, parking, cycle parking, supporting infrastructure and associated works. The Class E GIA is 87 sq. m.

### 3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

*The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.*

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will see the existing vacant plot being bought into active use. The site is currently hoarded to some boundaries and appears to be being used as a surface car park presently.
- 3.2.2 The mix of uses will bring activity to the development during the day and in the evening, which can deter criminals and those antisocially minded.
- 3.2.3 Old Mill Street is a well pedestrian and vehicular route into and out of the city centre area, allowing for passive surveillance opportunities.
- 3.2.4 Apartments are located at first floor and above where they are less susceptible to noise disturbance.
- 3.2.5 There will be a secure cycle store which will allow residents to securely store their bicycles within the building.

### 3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

*The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.*

#### **Apartments**

- 3.3.1 The proposed recessed entrances to the building have the potential to generate crime and antisocial behaviour, particularly given the proximity to the city centre area. These areas offer shelter from the elements and concealment from view. Some of the issues that often affected recessed doorways/areas are loitering, alcohol/drug consumption, vagrancy, and public urination, to the detriment of residents and visitors. Recessed doorways can also allow an offender to conceal themselves from view to attempt to gain entry. It is highly recommended that the recessed entrances are minimised in size, or omitted altogether. If the recessed areas are to remain then they should be illuminated to a high standard and covered by monitored CCTV.
- 3.3.2 The proposed undercroft parking areas will potentially suffer from the issues detailed above, particularly due to the shelter provided. It is highly recommended that these spaces are secured with garage doors or shutters to restrict access to legitimate users.
- 3.3.3 The proposed bicycle stores should be restricted to residents with an access controlled door, certified to a burglary resistant standard (i.e. BS PAS 24). There should be a vision panel in the door to allow those using the facility to view any threats before entering/exiting. Access from the cycle store, into the building, should operate on an access control system.
- 3.3.4 Access into the building should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.
- 3.3.5 To prevent tailgating there should be a second secure, access controlled, door set between the entrance lobby and the circulation areas of the buildings to prevent tailgating.
- 3.3.6 The rear blank façade of the building should be treated with an anti-graffiti coating to a height of 2000mm so that any graffiti can easily be removed.

#### **Commercial Units**

- 3.3.7 The back-of-house areas of the commercial units should be self-contained with no shared access, which could compromise the security of these units.

- 3.3.8 The proposed commercial units should have the infrastructure for the easily installation of an alarm, CCTV system, and access control, to allow a future tenant to install these during the fitout of these units.
- 3.3.9 The opening hours of the units should be in keeping with similar users as the local area and reflect the residential nature of the building on the upper floors.

## 4 Physical Security (Apartments)

*The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.*

### 4.1 Doors

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification. Access into the build should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2. Apartment entrance doors must have a door viewer.
- ☐ External apartment entrance doors should be certified to BS PAS 24 and a split-spindle should be installed to prevent them from being left insecure.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

### 4.2 Windows

- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

### 4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall or material of similar strength (e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind or within any new cladding/insulated panels to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack.

### 4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either:
  - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems

- BS 6799 for wireless systems

☐ If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

## 4.5 Access Control

☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:

- Communal entrances
- Communal areas
- Individual floor levels
- Cycle store

## 4.6 Bicycle Parking

☐ Doors into internal cycle parking area(s) must be certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, with access restricted to registered residents (i.e. genuine bicycle owners).

☐ Cycle stands should either be U-profile or Sheffield style stands. If rack storage is used it should be possible for both wheels and the frame to be secured.

## 4.7 Lighting

☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the development in accordance with BS 5489. Lighting should be taken from a variety of sources and levels (i.e. columns, up lighting) to provide a greater level of coverage and avoid shadows/pooling.

☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.

☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

☐ Doors within the parking area should be illuminated with a dedicated lighting source.

☐ Elevations of the building should be illuminated.

# 5 Physical Security (Commercial Units)

## 5.1 Doors

☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2. Staff should be given flexibility over permitting access into the building at different times of the day and night. The main sliding entrance doors should be capable of being controlled by reception staff if required (e.g. at night) to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/antisocial behaviour in/around the entrance lobby.

☐ Sliding/revolving doors should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2.

☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

☐ All doors/frames to staff areas/stores/offices should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and fitted with auditable access controls. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

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## 5.2 Windows, Building Fabric & Shutters

- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Any shutters must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.

## 5.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

## 5.4 Alarms

- ☐ The commercial units should have intruder alarms installed or the infrastructure for tenants to easily install an alarm.

## 5.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
  - External doors
  - Staff areas

# 6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
  - Litter removal
  - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
  - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 6.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.
- 6.1.3 A comprehensive security regime for the individual commercial units must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable, and up to date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures, and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:
  - Opening and closing the building, including staff arrival and departure.
  - Management of deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods).
  - Details of staff security training.
  - Location and management of any smoking areas.

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## 7 Construction

- 7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

## 8 Useful References

### 8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

## A Contact register

| Date       | Contact With           | Summary of Contact       |
|------------|------------------------|--------------------------|
| 30/10/2023 | Amy Brontë Littlejohns | CIS application received |
| 20/11/2023 | Amy Brontë Littlejohns | Progres update           |
|            |                        |                          |
|            |                        |                          |
|            |                        |                          |
|            |                        |                          |
|            |                        |                          |

## B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

| Drawing No.                  | Drawing Title                       | Date | Rev |
|------------------------------|-------------------------------------|------|-----|
| 2450-A-R-231026-OMS          | Design and Access Statement         |      |     |
| 2450-GHA-ZZ-00-A-(05)100-GA  | Plan - Ground Floor                 |      |     |
| 2450-GHA-ZZ-01-A-(05)101-GA  | Plan - L01                          |      |     |
| 2450-GHA-ZZ-02-A-(05)102-GA  | Plan - L02                          |      |     |
| 2450-GHA-ZZ-03-A-(05)103-GA  | Plan - L03                          |      |     |
| 2450-GHA-ZZ-04-A-(05)104-GA  | Plan - L04                          |      |     |
| 2450-GHA-ZZ-05-A-(05)105-GA  | Plan - L05                          |      |     |
| 2450-GHA-ZZ-06-A-(05)106-GA  | Plan - Roof                         |      |     |
| 2450-GHA-ZZ-XX-A-(05)201-GA  | Elevations - Northwest & Southwest  |      |     |
| 2450-GHA-ZZ-XX-A-(05)202-GA  | Elevations - Northeast & South East |      |     |
| 2450-GHA-ZZ-XX-A-(05)301-GA  | Sections - A1 & A2                  |      |     |
| 2450-GHA-ZZ-XX-A-(05)302-GA  | Sections - B1 & B2                  |      |     |
| 2450-GHA-ZZ-ZZ-A-(05)001     | Site Location Plan                  |      |     |
| 2450-GHA-ZZ-ZZ-A-(05)011     | Site Block Plan - Existing          |      |     |
| 2450-GHA-ZZ-ZZ-A-(05)012     | Site Block Plan - Proposed          |      |     |
| 2450-GHA-ZZ-ZZ-A-(05)501-Bay | Study 01 - Ground Floor             |      |     |
| 2450-GHA-ZZ-ZZ-A-(05)502-Bay | Study 02 - Typical Level            |      |     |
|                              |                                     |      |     |
|                              |                                     |      |     |
|                              |                                     |      |     |
|                              |                                     |      |     |

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

## C CIS Version History

| Version | Revisions Made | Date |
|---------|----------------|------|
| A       |                |      |
|         |                |      |