



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

2 LITTLE LEVER STREET, MANCHESTER
EXTENSION TO GARDENS HOTEL (TOTALLING 3,820sqm.)

Greater Manchester Police
designforsecurity

FOR: Cairn Hotel Group
VERSION A: 08/04/2022
REFERENCE: 2016/0595/CIS/05

2 Little Lever Street, Manchester

URN: 2016/0595/CIS/05

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security improvements required


This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- The external entrance and outside seating area to the extension should only be utilised when meetings/conferences are being hosted, so that staff can greet guests and delegates and overlook all areas. All hotel guests should access the main hotel building and the proposed extension building via the entrances to the main hotel and then use the proposed bridge link at Level 05.
- The control of access into and around the hotel is essential to the security of the scheme – including onto bedroom levels and to all back-of-house/staff-only areas.
- The proposed outside seating area forms a sheltered space that benefits from limited levels of activity, natural surveillance and overlooking and could foster rough sleeping, nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues if not adequately protected. It will be enclosed with a high glazed balustrade/gates to deter unauthorised access. Staff-monitored CCTV should also be installed (to ensure there can be an immediate response to any issues recorded) and all furniture should be removed when not in use.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development. The overall security of the development will be heavily reliant on the continuous effective management of the hotel and its extension, rather than just the physical measures recommended in the report.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

Contents

1	Visual Audit.....	4
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	5
	2.1 Crime Summary	
	2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Hotels): Risk Analysis	
	2.3 Theft (Manchester Hotels): Risk Analysis	
	2.4 General Risk Factors	
	2.5 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)	
3	Layout Appraisal.....	8
	3.1 Proposed Development	
	3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal	
	3.3 Points for Further Consideration	
4	Physical Security	10
	4.1 Doors	
	4.2 Access Control	
	4.3 Windows	
	4.4 Glazing & Building Fabric	
	4.5 Alarm	
	4.6 External Seating Area	
	4.7 Lighting	
	4.8 CCTV	
	4.9 Other	
5	Management & Maintenance	13
6	Construction	13
7	Useful References	13
	7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)	

Appendix

A	Contact Register.....	14
B	Associated Documents.....	14
C	CIS Version History	15
D	Glossary	16

1 Visual Audit

The site is bounded by Cavell Street to the north, Little Lever Street to the west and Back Piccadilly to the south, on the edge of the Northern Quarter area of Manchester city centre. The site is currently vacant and is enclosed with timber hoardings that have been heavily graffitied.




Cavell Street, Little Lever Street and Back Piccadilly are all relatively narrow routes that benefit from limited levels of activity, surveillance and overlooking, backed onto by buildings fronting onto Dale Street/Newton Street/Piccadilly Gardens/Lever Street.

There is also a large amount of litter and graffiti to the buildings/boundaries along these routes. Such evidence of disorder can attract further abuse if not cleared/rectified immediately, as it can give the impression that buildings are not cared for and that crime and disorder are tolerated. There are numerous blank facades along these routes and the buildings have been heavily fortified with shutters, bars/grilles and barbed wire. There are many similar streets within the Northern Quarter area and the wider city centre which have limited levels of pedestrian footfall and vehicular movement, particularly at night, and this can leave buildings potentially vulnerable to unauthorised access or damage unseen, as well as to nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues.

To the south-west of the site is the Garden Hotel, which fronts onto and is accessed from Piccadilly, between the existing retail/commercial units. The hotel has a rear entrance off Back Piccadilly (as well as service doors/fire doors). In addition to the general lack of surveillance/overlooking along the route, the rear entrance itself is deeply recessed – leaving it even more hidden and vulnerable to attack unseen, as well as providing a sheltered space that could foster loitering/gathering, nuisance/anti-social behaviour and rough sleeping. The space has been gated/secured within a welded-wire mesh fence enclosure to prevent unauthorised access - indicating such issues have been experienced.

There is a small public house to the west of the site, at the junction of Little Lever Street and Back Piccadilly.

In terms of the wider area, Piccadilly Gardens is a very busy area of public realm containing a public transport interchange and surrounded by retail units, bars, cafés/restaurants, office premises and hotels. The Northern Quarter lies to the north.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st March 2021 to 28th February 2022.

2.1 Crime Summary



Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
71	145	317	1987	1268	212	52	415	38	121

- 2.1.1 The most frequently occurring offences in the local area over the last 12 months have been less serious wounding and theft. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues. Reported crimes have taken place throughout the surrounding area, with particularly concentrations around Piccadilly Gardens and the Northern Quarter area. The majority of the violence in the local area has taken place in the evening and during early hours of the morning, with a higher volume of incidents typically experienced between Friday and Sunday – when more people visit the city and attend licensed premises (often for longer periods and consuming more alcohol, leading to conflicts). Thefts in the local area have mostly been taking place within/around the licenced premises, restaurants and retail premises, with offenders primarily targeting mobile phones, wallets/purses and cash belonging to patrons. Offenders have particularly used pick-pocketing and distraction methods to obtain the personal belongings.
- 2.1.2 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed hotel extension, the more detailed analysis below will look at use-specific burglary and theft.


2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Hotels): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against hotels, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.2.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary at Manchester hotels fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Tuesday. During the day, the risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning. It is likely that offenders target hotels at these times when guests are likely to be out of their rooms or when staffing levels are likely to be lower – allowing offender's time to attempt to gain unauthorised access without being detected.

Manchester Hotel Burglary – Point of Entry




- 2.2.2 **Point of Entry:** In the majority of burglaries at Manchester hotels, the point of entry has not been determined. It is likely that these burglaries have occurred when offenders have entered hotels posing as legitimate guests and have gained access to back-of-house areas or hotel rooms without using force – possibly when they have been left insecure by guests/cleaners or by using stolen or forged keys/cards. Doors have also been forced open, using bodily pressure and implements/tools to gain entry.


2.3 Theft (Manchester Hotels): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against hotels, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.

Manchester Hotel Theft – Day Range



Manchester Hotel Theft – Time Range



- 2.3.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of theft at Manchester hotels generally increases over the weekend. It is possible that the risk increases at these times when hotels typically have more guests and the opportunity to carry out such offences is greater. However, offenders do also target hotels between Monday and Friday, when they are typically less busy and they perceive a lower risk of being caught/challenged. The risk of theft is greatest around lunchtime and in the evening/early hours of the morning. This is when hotel restaurants, bars and gyms are likely to be at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Thefts of personal property (such as mobile phones, bags and purses/wallets) are the most routinely stolen items.

2.4 General Risk Factors

- 2.4.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary of hotel rooms
- Robbery to business
- Theft of personal belongings at work

- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Employee theft
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Violence towards staff
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.5 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.5.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting hotels in Manchester are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- **Manchester Hotels:** Offenders, posing as guests or legitimate customers, accessing staff-only/restricted areas to steal property
Possible Solution - The main reception should be located to have full view of everyone entering and leaving the premises and all routes to bedrooms and staff areas. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour. Access controls should be used to restrict access to vulnerable areas and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work (see Sections 4.1/4.2).
- **Manchester Hotels:** Offenders entering rooms using forged or stolen electronic key-cards/fobs or by exploiting insecure doors
Possible Solution - Auditable electric locking systems (such as Vingcard, Salto or similar) should be used, which can be easily activated/disabled electronically by reception staff (see Sections 4.1/4.2).
- **Manchester Hotels:** Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tool/implements to gain entry
Possible Solution - All external doors and ideally individual bedroom doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Access controls should also be utilised to prevent non-guest access to bedroom areas/floors (see Sections 4.1/4.2) and CCTV covering access corridors should be monitored at the staffed reception desk to ensure there can be an immediate response to any issues recorded (see Section 4.8).
- **Manchester Hotels:** Theft of personal property from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables
Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with ‘Chelsea Clips’ to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats. The layout of any bars/restaurants/lounges can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment. External seating areas should be enclosed to clearly define them as separate from adjacent pedestrian routes.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to erect a 9 storey building that will form an extension to the existing Garden Hotel, which is also to be refurbished and extended (subject to a separate Crime Impact Statement).
- 3.1.2 The basement of the proposed building will house storage areas. The ground floor of the building will house a small lounge (with a small outside area), business desks/a flexible meeting space, 2 no. meeting rooms, a fitness room, W/Cs, stores, sub-station/plant rooms and a refuse store. The upper floors of the building will house 94 no. guest bedrooms and a bridge link at Level 05, crossing Back Piccadilly to join with the existing Garden Hotel fronting onto Piccadilly.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will bring a derelict site back into use, resulting in additional activity and surveillance to the area at all times of the day and night.
- 3.2.2 The building is a regular shape, with no deep recesses that would hide windows or doors - leaving them potentially vulnerable to attack.
- 3.2.3 The glazed façades of the new rear Garden Hotel entrance opposite and the ground floor of the building itself offer both surveillance opportunities and a greater level of artificial light onto the street/public realm.
- 3.2.4 The hotel reception desk within the Garden Hotel is located to allow clear views over the new main entrance (off Piccadilly) and the new rear entrance (off Back Piccadilly), allowing staff to have clear views of all people entering/leaving the building and internal circulation areas. Staff will be able to observe and direct customers and deter unauthorised access to bedroom floors.
- 3.2.5 The layout of the hotel corridors provides clear views and contains few recessed areas, which may conceal criminal activity.
- 3.2.6 The hotel bedrooms will be provided well above street level, reducing the potential impacts of noise, nuisance and anti-social behaviour (particularly at night).
- 3.2.7 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The control of access into and around the hotel is paramount to the security of the development. It is essential that all guests access the hotel (and the proposed extension) via the new main entrance off Piccadilly and the new rear entrance off Back Piccadilly, where surveillance opportunities are maximised and where reception staff have a full, unimpeded view of everyone entering/leaving the building. The external entrance to the extension building (onto Back Piccadilly) should only be utilised when meetings/conferences are being hosted and it can be staffed to ensure delegates are greeted and vetted before being allowed to enter. At all other times, it should only be operable by staff fob on access and egress and should be clearly signed to indicate it is alarmed and is not to be mis-used by guests or conference delegates. If left insecure and unobserved at any time, it could be exploited by criminals to bypass the staffed reception, gain unauthorised access up to bedroom floors and escape unseen.

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- 3.3.2 The reception desk within the main entrance lobby of the hotel (off Piccadilly) must be staffed at all times to meet and direct guests. The lifts/stairwells serving all levels of the proposed extension building (as well as the doors to the bridge link between them) should only be accessible/operable by guest key-card, ensuring that non-guests cannot access bedroom floors and guests can only gain to their particular building/floor and no other (see Sections 4.1/4.5). The basement storage areas should only be accessible to staff.
- 3.3.3 The small outside seating area at the junction of Back Piccadilly and Little Lever Street forms a sheltered area that benefits from limited levels of activity, natural surveillance and overlooking, particularly at night or when meetings/conferences are not being hosted in the ground floor facilities. As such, it will be vulnerable to unauthorised access and could foster rough sleeping, nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues out-of-hours – which is likely why the existing recessed rear entrance to the Garden Hotel has been secured with high fencing and a gate. It is noted that the area is to be enclosed with a 1800mm high laminated glass balustrade, in order to deter unauthorised access and withstand damage (see Section 4.6 for more information). It is also highly recommended that the area is covered by a CCTV camera monitored by reception staff within the main hotel, to ensure there can be an immediate response to any incidents recorded.
- 3.3.4 Given that many of the existing recessed doorways along Cavell Street/Little Lever Street/Back Piccadilly have been fitted with external shutters to prevent access to the recesses and the doors themselves, it is highly recommended that any new emergency egress/service doors are brought forward to the building line where at all possible, to remove any potentially vulnerable recesses (or at least reduce the amount of shelter/comfort they provide) - preventing them from fostering nuisance, anti-social behaviour and criminal activity. The doors themselves must be security-certified and be of steel construction to ensure they are robust enough to withstand damage/attack (see Section 4.1).
- 3.3.5 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security

4.1 Doors

- ☐ All external doors should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should ideally be of steel construction, alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery. Security-certified louvred doorsets are available if required to refuse stores/substations (please see SBD licensed products at www.securedbydesign.com/index.php?option=com_sbd&view=catinfoprod&sbdcategory=Doors).
- ☐ The lift to the proposed extension building should only be accessible/operable by guest key-card, ensuring that non-guests cannot access bedroom floors and guests can only gain to their particular building/floor and no other. The lift should only operate to the ground floor of the building when meetings/conferences are being hosted (to prevent unauthorised access when the ground floor is not staffed) and should only operate to the basement via staff fob/swipe card. The doors into the stair cores at each level should be security-certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2 and fitted with electromagnetic locks (permitted as part of the certification) connected to the fire alarm, so that guests at one level cannot access other levels. These doors should be alarmed and clearly signed to deter casual use. Once an emergency escape core is accessed by a member of the public, the only means of egress should be at ground floor level onto the street. Staff access/egress into or from the access stair core should be controlled via fob/swipe card. The doors off to the bridge link at Level 05 should also be security-certified (to one of the above standards) and access controlled (see Section 4.2).
- ☐ All individual hotel bedroom doorsets/frames should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick), self-closing and secured with 3 hinges and an electronically operated lock, controlled by Vingcard or similar. They should also be fitted with door viewers and chain limiters.
- ☐ The internal entrance door/frame to ground floor Fitness Rom should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and an electrically operated lock operated by staff/guest key-card. Internal doors/frames to stores (on all levels) and the ground floor refuse store should also be solid-core (min. 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and an electrically operated lock controlled by staff key-card. The ground floor meeting rooms should also be capable of being locked when unoccupied. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

4.2 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by staff swipe card/fob or by guest key-card, and not numeric key pads (which can be easily observed/shared and are rarely changed). The following doors should operate on access control:
 - The external entrance doors to the proposed extension building (off Back Piccadilly) – operated by staff swipe card/fob only.
 - The doors to the bridge link – operated on access and egress by staff swipe card/fob or by guest key-card.
 - The lifts serving all bedroom floors, the ground floor meeting spaces and the basement back-of-house areas – operated by staff swipe card/fob (at all times) or by guest key-card (to all bedroom levels and the ground floor when meetings/conferences are being hosted).
 - All doors to the stair cores – operated on access and egress by staff swipe card/fob only.
 - The entrance door to the ground floor fitness room – operated by guest key-card.
 - All doors to stores (on all levels) and the ground floor refuse store – operated by staff swipe card/fob only.
- ☐ The electric locking system to be used throughout the building should be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Staff and guest key-cards should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled by staff to ensure that mis-use is prevented. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

4.3 Windows

- ☐ All ground and first floor windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than just to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Any ground and first floor opening lights (escape requirements permitting) should be lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.4 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All ground and first floor glazing must incorporate an internal pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining external pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall (or material of similar strength e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind any cladding to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack.
- ☐ Any louvres to the building should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed, and designed to ensure that they cannot be used as a climbing aid to reach upper floor windows or balconies.

4.5 Alarm

- ☐ All external escape doors should be fitted with alarm contacts, linked to a 24/7 intruder alarm system. Alarm activations should be relayed to the hotel reception, so staff can investigate or call the authorities as appropriate.

4.6 External Seating Area

- ☐ It is highly recommended that the laminated glazed balustrade enclosing the outside seating area is to a height of 1800-2100mm, in order to deter unauthorised access to this sheltered space along a route with limited levels of activity, natural surveillance and overlooking. The glazing itself should be robust enough to withstand damage from kicking etc. and the fixings should not provide footholds over the enclosure. The gates to the area should also be 1800-2100mm, with no centrally located horizontal elements, exposed hinges or large sliding bolt apertures/locking points that would form climbing aids. The gap at the bottom of the gates and the balustrade should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.
- ☐ Removable tables and seating should be capable of being stacked and stored within the building out-of-hours, in order to prevent damage, mis-use and theft.
- ☐ The external seating area should only be utilised when staff should closely monitor customer use/behaviour (i.e. when the ground floor meeting/conference facilities are in use). At all other times, the external entrance doors and the gates to the area should be secured. The external area should also be covered by a CCTV system, monitored at the main hotel reception desk, ensuring there can be an immediate response to any issues recorded out-of-hours (see Section 4.8).

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors and the outside seating area.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light, and fixtures must not be positioned where they may provide climbing aids up to high level windows/balconies. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.8 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an *acceptable standard* that will allow for *identification* of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are *overview* and *recognition*, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: *all external doors/gates, the outside seating area, all lift/stair lobbies on each floor and the bridge link at Level 05*. It is highly recommended that CCTV coverage over any vulnerable areas is monitored at the reception desk, to ensure there can be an immediate response to any issues recorded.

4.9 Other

- ☐ Each guest bedroom/suite should have a small wall or floor safe, operated by a personal identification number (PIN) selected by each new guest.
- ☐ Lockers should be provided for the use of guests using the Fitness Room. The lockers themselves must be robust/secure and all users must be encouraged to use them and not leave belongs unattended/insecure. Staff should undertake regular inspections of the facility.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping or features of the building that could inadvertently create sheltered/hiding places, ledges, seating or loitering spots. These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime. Any rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- ☐ It is noted that the existing rear elevation of the Garden Hotel (and the hoardings around the proposed site) has been heavily graffitied. If signs of disorder (such as criminal damage, graffiti, littering etc.) are not repaired/removed immediately, they can often attract further abuse and lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality - encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour (see Section 6 for more information).

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the hotel must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the premises. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:
- Opening and closing of conference/meeting facilities, the external entrance and the external seating area;
 - Management of stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
 - Details of staff security training;
 - Location and management of any smoking areas;
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras etc;
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
 - Refuse collection arrangements.
- 5.1.2 All high value equipment (e.g. computers, projectors, flat screen monitors/televisions, tools, portable gym equipment etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 5.1.3 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left in the street for extended periods/overnight. Servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods.
- 5.1.4 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the building, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff-only/back-of-house areas and guest-only floors.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
8 th February 2022	Street Design Partnership	Receipt of CIS instruction form
9 th February 2022	Street Design Partnership	Quote issued & request for additional info
8 th March 2022	Street Design Partnership	Confirmation of instruction/fee
9 th March 2022	Street Design Partnership	Receipt of plans
5 th April 2022	Street Design Partnership	Receipt of updated plans
8 th April 2022	Street Design Partnership	Email sent re: report completion & payment
27 th April 2022	Street Design Partnership	Email correspondence re: invoice & payment
10 th to 16 th May 2022	Street Design Partnership	Email correspondence re: payment
25 th May 2022	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
7433 PS.00	Location Plan (SUPERSEDED)	08/02/22	-
7433 PS.02	Proposed Ground Floor (SUPERSEDED)	08/02/22	-
7433 PS.01	Proposed Basement Level (SUPERSEDED)	04/03/22	B
7433 PS.02	Proposed Ground Floor (SUPERSEDED)	04/03/22	B
7433 PS.03	Proposed Level 01 (SUPERSEDED)	28.02.22	A
7433 PS.04	Proposed Level 02 (SUPERSEDED)	21.02.22	A
7433 PS.05	Proposed Level 03 (SUPERSEDED)	21.02.22	A
7433 PS.06	Proposed Level 04 (SUPERSEDED)	21.02.22	A
7433 PS.07	Proposed Level 05 (SUPERSEDED)	21.02.22	A
7433 PS.08	Proposed Level 06 (SUPERSEDED)	21.02.22	A
7433 PS.09	Proposed Level 07 (SUPERSEDED)	21.02.22	A
7433 PS.10	Proposed Level 08 (SUPERSEDED)	21.02.22	A
7433 PS.11	Proposed Roof Level (SUPERSEDED)	21.02.22	A
7433 PS.12	Back Piccadilly Elevation (SUPERSEDED)	28.02.22	B
7433 PS.13	Cavell Street Elevation (SUPERSEDED)	04.03.22	C
7433 PS.14	Little Lever Street Elevation (SUPERSEDED)	28.02.22	B
7433 PS.00	Location Plan	04.04.22	A
7433 PS.01	Proposed Basement Level	04.04.22	C
7433 PS.02	Proposed Ground Floor	31.03.22	D
7433 PS.03	Proposed Level 01	04.04.22	C
7433 PS.04	Proposed Level 02	08.02.22	A
7433 PS.05	Proposed Level 03	21.02.22	A
7433 PS.06	Proposed Level 04	21.02.22	A
7433 PS.07	Proposed Level 05	21.02.22	A
7433 PS.08	Proposed Level 06	21.02.22	A
7433 PS.09	Proposed Level 07	21.02.22	A
7433 PS.10	Proposed Level 08	21.02.22	A
7433 PS.11	Proposed Roof Level	04.04.22	B
7433 PS.12	Back Piccadilly Elevation	31.03.22	C
7433 PS.13	Cavell Street Elevation	31.03.22	D

7433 PS.14	Little Lever Street Elevation	31.03.22	C
7433 PS.15	Section A-A	04.04.22	A
7433 PS.16	Link Bridge Plan Detail	02.03.22	-
7433 PS.17	Balustrade and Sidewalk Details	03.03.22	-
7433 PS.50	Context Photos	08.02.22	-
7433 PS.51	Historic Context	09.02.22	-
7433 PS.52	Design Strategy	08.02.22	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk