



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Yew Tree Lane

Care Home

For: **Liberty Property**

Version A: **30/06/22**

Ref: **2022/0268/CIS/01**

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Design changes / security additions advised

This development has been assessed using the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to expose any opportunities for crime and the fear of crime within the proposal.

The information provided for assessment by the applicant is minimal, but the following issues have been identified as potential generators of insecurity, and must be addressed as described within the report (see Section 3.3 for more details):

- Boundary treatment & landscaping
- Access control

Our support for this scheme is subject to the above issues being satisfactorily addressed, as described within the report.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.

David Maher *Dip Arch*
Consultant

e: david.maher@gmp.police.uk

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site is situated just on the outskirts of, Northenden centre, approx. 0.5km west of the high street.

This section of Northenden is predominately residential.

The site is currently used by Yewtree Manor Nursing home with pedestrian and vehicle access off Yewtree Lane.



The site has good vehicle & public transport links to nearby popular destinations such as Sale, Wythenshaw, Didsbury & Manchester. The M60 & M56 motorways provide excellent links to M/cr Airport and the wider Greater M/cr district.

The proposed site can be accessed via a newly formed access point off Yewtree Lane.

The eastern boundary is adjacent to Willenhall Road which provides access to Kenworthy Woods & Wythenshaw Sports grounds.

There are a small number of mature trees adjacent to the junction of Yewtree Lane & Willenhall Road. Generally the site is well maintained.

Existing boundaries vary in their materiality around the site, ranging from timber fencing to metal railings & brick structures.



7 – Existing service entrance off Willenhall Rd



6 – View along Willenhall Rd



5 – New residential development on Yewtree Lane.



1 – Existing site from Yewtree Lane.



2 – Neighbouring residential properties.



3 – View east towards public footbridge over M56



4 – Existing entrance on Yewtree Lane

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st June 2021 to 30th May 2022.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
8	<5	30	102	7	<5	<5	8	<5	<5

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the local area is 25% below the average rate of crime for the Manchester district, with less serious wounding, criminal damage and vehicle crime being the highest recorded offence types taking place in the local area. The majority of crime has taken place along Yew Tree Lane and the surrounding residential streets. Offences have often occurred within dwellings and residential streets, with the majority of violence being carried out by known offenders during a domestic dispute or incidents between friendship groups.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 Doors and windows have been targeted when left unlocked

To minimise the risk of 'walk-in' burglaries:

- front doors should be fitted with a fixed handle or a 'split spindle', so that the only way in is with a key;
- windows should be fitted with opening restrictors;
- defensible space should be provided between dwellings and the 'street', i.e. a small front garden perhaps enclosed with a 1000mm high fence. A degree of separation between public and private space can act as a psychological barrier to some offenders, who are then less willing to cross from public to clearly defined private space. Such boundary definition can also reduce the risk of criminal damage to property; and
- dusk-to-dawn lighting should be fitted to all external doors. Light suggests a dwelling is occupied; it also aids residents in locating keys and locks and highlights the actions of intruders.

2.2.2 Glazing was smashed in windows and patio doors to gain entry.

To minimise the risk of offenders smashing glass:

- all windows, and glazed panels within doors, should be fitted with laminate glass;
- windows should be fitted with key operated locks; and,
- in particularly high crime areas, glazing to secluded side and rear doors should be avoided.

2.2.3 Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all external doors should be certified to PAS 24 security standard - PAS 24 rated doors are very difficult to force open;
- front doors should be visible to neighbouring properties and from the 'street' rather than set within recesses or on more secluded elevations. Offenders will be less inclined to target properties where their actions may be witnessed;
- side or rear gardens should be enclosed with appropriately high fencing and locking gates so that rear doors are only accessible to residents; and

secluded passageways to the sides and rear of properties should be avoided wherever possible as such routes can facilitate offender access to rear gardens, as well as attract anti-social behaviours such as graffiti, fly-tipping or damage to fencing.





2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester and Greater Manchester




The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.



- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **43% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **27% lower** than Greater Manchester and **25% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **8% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **25% higher** than Greater Manchester and **138% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **9% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **43% higher** than Greater Manchester and **74% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **58% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **31% lower** than Greater Manchester and **16% lower** than England & Wales.

2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Monday, Tuesday and Friday during the early hours of the morning (12am – 3am). Offenders often target properties in the early hours of the morning when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the building.
- In domestic burglaries in which the entry point has been recorded as “unknown” offenders are likely to have exploited insecure windows and doors.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on a Wednesday and Friday, during the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target vehicles during the early hours of the morning as vehicles are often left unattended and out of sight of the owner for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to demolish an existing residential care home property and associated out buildings. Following demolition the proposal will consist of a two storey building providing a 64 bed nursing and dementia care home.
- 3.1.2 The existing access off Yewtree Lane will be closed off with a new access formed along the road on Yewtree Lane. The site entrance will provide access for all pedestrians, cyclists and vehicles (visiting/staff/servicing). There will be 20 no. car parking spaces in front of the building (including a drop-off/ ambulance bay). Landscaping to the car park and entrance route will combine a mix of hard & soft features providing fully accessible routes to the staffed entrance building.
- 3.1.3 The proposed development incorporates enclosed landscaped garden spaces around the building. The new building will have a secure entrance, with a reception desk and administration office directly adjacent to the entrance foyer. The development will also include communal facilities, including communal living rooms, verandas, nurse rooms, assisted bathrooms and dining rooms. Additional services, such as a commercial kitchen to serve the dining rooms which are on each level, a plant/maintenance room, staff facilities and laundry located in the basement.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will provide further activity, improved surveillance and overlooking to the area at all times of the day and night.
- 3.2.2 The private garden spaces to the sides/rear of the building will be enclosed, preventing unauthorised access to where criminals could attack the building/exploit opportunities unseen.
- 3.2.3 The proposed building will be staffed 24/7 and will have a clearly identifiable main entrance, which is capable of being robustly managed to control access. People arriving or leaving via the main entrance should be easily viewed by reception staff.
- 3.2.4 The change of surface materials to the footpath & road will create a symbolic barrier at the entrance to the site (e.g. brick pillars, change of road surface texture/colour etc.), encouraging a feeling of territoriality among the residents and staff, psychologically giving the impression that the area beyond is private and discouraging anyone without a legitimate reason from entering.
- 3.2.5 The internal layout of the building is generally uncluttered with few obstacles to surveillance.
- 3.2.6 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building, avoiding the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the developments are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Evaluation of boundaries. The integrity of the site boundary with the adjacent residential plots should be evaluated to ensure that it forms a reliably-secure perimeter to the site. Any weakness could be exploited by potential intruders, and additional fencing should be incorporated - particular attention should be given to detailing the junctions of the different styles and heights of boundary treatment to avoid inadvertently creating a step or ladder feature.
- 3.3.2 Vegetation Management. The proximity of bushes and trees to the fence line can undermine the security of the boundary by creating cover for an intruder, or providing potential climbing aids. Overhanging branches and dense vegetation should be removed where it could be exploited in this way. Care must be taken to ensure the landscaping to the perimeter of the site is maintained at an appropriate height (see Section 4.8), in order to prevent it impeding views to and from the site, and avoid the creation of hiding places that could be exploited by offenders.

- 3.3.3 Access into/around the building must be robustly controlled to prevent unauthorised access. The reception desk adjacent to the main entrance should ideally be staffed at all times (at least during the day and into the evening), ensuring visitors are greeted and vetted before being allowed further access into the building. A high and wide reception desk will allow staff to have full surveillance of everyone entering and exiting the building and across publicly accessible external areas. The external entrance door/s should be capable of being secured and controlled remotely by staff if/when required (e.g. at night when the reception may not be staffed at all times), to prevent unauthorised access (see Section 4.1). All back-of-house/staff facilities should only be accessible to staff.
- 3.3.4 The site entrance to the development off Yewtree Lane should be defined using obvious entry statements such as gate posts and changes in road / paving surface treatments in order to identify the area as private.
- 3.3.5 Garden spaces must be separated with 1.8m high fencing and gates which will help to prevent unauthorised entry to the rear of the development.
- 3.3.6 Definition of boundaries should be well defined to indicate ownership, using low walls, railings, planting and / or surface materials, and discourage intruders from approaching the dwellings or taking short cuts (particularly on corner plots).
- 3.3.7 Doors into medicine/drug stores, or rooms where personal records are stored, should be certified to BS PAS 24. The door should be alarmed when the building is closed. Controlled drugs should be secured in a BS 2881 storage cabinet. Doors into drug or record stores should operate on auditable access controls.
- 3.3.8 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed in section 4 are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ All external doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any escape-only doors is permitted for use under the security certification of the product. Any escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ The main communal entrance to the building should be security-certified to one of the above standards, including a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. If the main entrance to the building is to be formed by sliding doors, the inner and outer sliding doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+) and incorporate laminated glazing (see below). The entrance lobby should work as an 'airlock', with the secondary doors controlled remotely from the reception/admin office, once legitimate visitors have been greeted and vetted. There should also be an external audio access control system linked to the reception/admin office, to allow staff to remotely secure the external doors, vet callers and control access into the building if/when required (e.g. at night).
- ☐ The lift to the back-of-house areas at basement level should only be operable by staff. The internal doors/frames providing access to any offices, kitchens, laundries, staff rooms (as well as general stores, plant areas etc.) should be solid-core and capable of being deadlocked to secure them when unoccupied. Any drug stores should be fitted with a security-certified doorset (to BS PAS 24) and auditable access controls. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys and passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarm

- ☐ All ground floor external doors to communal areas should be fitted with alarm contacts, linked to the building intruder alarm system, to alert staff if anyone attempts to gain unauthorised access. Escape only doors should be alarmed 24/7 and should be signed as such to deter casual use.

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ The rear of the building should be enclosed and defined as private space by 2100mm high weld mesh fencing, railings or close-boarded timber fencing (with a masonry/solid base). Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of walls and railings should have panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid. Care should also be taken to ensure that panels are fixed securely to any posts and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates. Any pedestrian gates to private space should be self-closing and 'slam to lock' (i.e. an automatic deadlocking mortice latch, key/fob operated from both sides), which cannot be left unlocked when shut. If a panic mechanism is required on the internal face of the gate for emergency egress purposes, it should be fitted so that it cannot be reached / operated from the external face of the gate. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates to avoid the creation of footholds.
- ☐ The frontage of the site should be enclosed/demarcated by low-level railings to an approximate height of 1200mm. Any existing/proposed vegetation along Bankhall Lane must not impede views off/from the site (see Section 4.8).
- ☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to all parking areas within the site, in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external communal doors.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.7 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an **acceptable standard** that will allow for **identification** of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: **the main entrance lobby, internal/external circulation areas and all parking areas.**

4.8 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as around entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to. New planting between the resident units and the parking bays can increase in height to 1.4m to reduce the effect of car headlights shining into residents rooms.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.9 Other

- ☐ A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.
- ☐ The cycle parking area should be well-overlooked from the buildings and should include 'Sheffield' stands, which both wheels and the crossbar can be locked to rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: <http://designforsecurity.org/downloads>.
- ☐ There should be no features of the building (such as projecting window cills, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby boundaries, trees, lighting columns, handrails etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to upper level windows.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

-
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
23/05/22	Avisiyoung	CIS application submitted
27/05/22	Avisiyoung	Client confirmation
05/07/22	DfS	Site visit
07/07/22	DfS	CIS Issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
L0206-103	Existing Site Plan	13/05/22	P1
L0206-105	Proposed Site Plan	13/05/22	P1
L0206-106	Boundary Treatment Plan	13/05/22	P1
L0206-107	Coloured Site Plan	13/05/22	P1
L0206-110	Proposed Basement Floor Plan	12/05/22	P1
L0206-111	Proposed Ground Floor Plan	12/05/22	P1
L0206-112	Proposed First Floor Plan	12/05/22	P1
L0206-113	Proposed Second Floor Plan	12/05/22	P1

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB / PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk