



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Land To The West Of Rodney Street

10 Houses & 118 Apartments

For: **Wates Construction**

Greater Manchester Police

Version B: **09/06/22**

design**for**security

Ref: **2022/0141/CIS/01**

Land To The West Of Rodney Street

2022/0141/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported - Minor security additions required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Robust control of access in/and around the buildings.
- Secure cycle store provision
- Ground floor external material protection against graffiti

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police will support the application subject to the design team suitably addressing the recommendations contained in the report (Sections 3.3, 4 & 5), and will seek the inclusion of a planning condition requiring the development to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site is situated on Rodney St and Jersey St, in the Ancoats district on the outskirts of M/cr city centre, located near the busy arterial Oldham Road. The site is currently un-used and has been for a number of years with self-seeded landscaping taking over.

The perimeter of the site has an existing low boundary brick wall with metal railings to a height of approx. 1m high.


The site is separated from the public park; Ancoats Green by Wadeford Close to the western side of the site.

This area of Ancoats contains a mix of single storey industrial units and residential developments. Further West the area contains a number of single storey commercial units facing onto George Leigh St. There is a low knee high metal rail boundary treatment between the park and the pavements.

Parking is in high demand within the area, partly due to the proximity to the city centre and the high density of dwellings in the area, together with limited on-street parking.

There was visual evidence of graffiti around the site.

Development of this site will form one a the final building phases to provide additional housing within the wider Ancoats and Miles Platting development masterplan which is welcomed.



1 – View of site from Jersey St.



2 – View along Jersey Northeast.




3 – View across the proposed site.



7 – View across the proposed site South east.



6 – View along Jersey Northeast.



5 – View of site from Jersey St./Rodney St junction.



4 – Existing public footpath towards Ancoats Green.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st March 2021 to 28th February 2022.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
51	21	152	323	83	18	7	142	22	22

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is 15% below the average rate of crime for the Manchester District, with less serious wounding, theft and vehicle crime being the highest recorded offences, however, the location of the proposed site should be taken into consideration. The proposed site is located within the Miles Platting area which is just on the edge of the city centre. This area largely consists of residential property and car parking facilities, which is reflected in the large number of vehicle crimes taking place around the proposed site, with vehicle crime accounting for 22% of all crime within the local area. Theft from a motor vehicle and criminal damage to a motor vehicle account for 90% of all vehicle crime taking place. Offenders have targeted vehicles using private car parks, parking within apartment buildings and on street parking, targeting glazing, vehicle registration plates and tyres.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 **Entering apartment buildings by means of tailgating residents/ exploiting insecure doors and accessing communal areas (mostly corridors/ post and bike storage areas).**

Residential: Possible Solution - All individual apartments should be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.), cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection. A staffed 24/7 concierge desk will support the management and security of the entrance lobby.

- 2.2.2 **Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.**

General: Possible Solution - Front doors should include a split spindle mechanism which locks on closure and can only be opened from outside with a key.

- 2.2.3 **Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain entry to the property.**

General: Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 5.4), with key operated locks and opening restrictors. All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 5.4). Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points.

- 2.2.4 **Forcing open shutters using implements and tools in order to gain access to the doors and windows located beneath.**

General: Possible Solution – (If proposed within the development), Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 5.2) has an independently proven level of resistance and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc) have been scrutinised by professionals. Avoid locating shutters in concealed areas where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed. Ensure that parked vehicles and stored materials do not obscure sight lines.

- 2.2.5 **Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.**

General: Possible Solution – All ground floor / accessible glazing should include a laminated pane which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Ensure that rubbish and loose material is removed from the areas around the site. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within or directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

2.2.6 Theft of motor vehicles.

Possible Solution – To minimise the risk of theft of vehicles:

- *include vehicle barriers, which can only be activated with a code, token or key card;*
- *prevent offenders casually entering the car park by installing high, visually permeable, perimeter fencing;*
- *limit the number of entry points to the car park and try to ensure entrances are in a location where there is an element of passive supervision;*
- *employ an attendant to supervise the car park and assist customers as required;*
- *install a CCTV system; and, install appropriate lighting.*

2.2.7 Theft from motor vehicles.

Possible Solution - To minimise the risk of theft from vehicles:

- *prevent offenders casually entering the car park by installing high, visually permeable, perimeter fencing;*
- *limit the number of entry points to the car park and try to ensure entrances are in a location where there is an element of passive supervision;*
- *employ an attendant to supervise the car park and assist customers as required;*
- *signs should be erected to remind customers not to leave valuable visible items with their vehicle;*
- *CCTV cameras should monitor the car park; and, the site should be illuminated in accordance with the British Standards for car parking lighting.*





2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester and Greater Manchester

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2020.




- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **52% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **17% lower** than Greater Manchester and **19% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **9% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **43% higher** than Greater Manchester and **53% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **2% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **48% higher** than Greater Manchester and **121% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **1% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **79% higher** than Greater Manchester and **212% higher** than England & Wales.


2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.


Burglary Dwelling – Day Range



Burglary Dwelling – Time Range



Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry





2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Monday and Sunday during the early hours of the morning (12am – 4am). Offenders often target properties during the early hours of the morning as it is dark and there is less foot fall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.
- In cases where entry point is "unknown" it is likely that offenders have exploited insecure windows and doors.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Posing as legitimate resident/ visitor in apartment buildings and gaining access to communal areas (mostly bike sheds/post rooms/ corridors).

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on a Wednesday and Thursday during the morning and into the late evening. Offender often target vehicles parked within close proximity of the city centre as they are often left unattended and not overlooked for long periods of time, creating a low risk opportunity for offenders.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposal seeks to develop land which has been vacant for a number of years.
- 3.1.2 The Planning Application is for a residential development of 10 houses and 118 apartments with associated landscaping, car and cycle parking and public realm improvements and associated works.
- 3.1.3 Amenity spaces for residents will provide secure cycle parking, residents lobby space and a private courtyard garden.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposal will generate additional legitimate activity into a neighbourhood which has been subject to criminal damage and other abuse. Redevelopment with housing and repopulation of the site should help to create a sense of ownership and responsibility and improve informal policing of the area (see also 3.3.1).
- 3.2.2 The building footprints at ground floor level is relatively free of recesses or projections that could provide cover for criminal or antisocial activity.
- 3.2.3 The apartments will have routinely occupied rooms overlooking the adjacent public areas, which will help to increase natural surveillance of accessible areas around the block.
- 3.2.4 The buildings provide ground floor activity in the form of residential entrances, cycle store and reception space and in-turn these uses offer good levels of activity and natural surveillance of the adjacent public realm.
- 3.2.5 The proposed buildings clearly defines the different uses of the building and all entrances can be easily located and navigated.
- 3.2.6 The foyer/reception zones provide the opportunity for good levels of security at a central control point for the development.
- 3.2.7 The internal layout of the buildings appears capable of being divided into identifiable zones, allowing separation of accessible and restricted areas. The access-control strategy adopted for the development should be capable of confining movement into and through the buildings, thus allowing staff and visitors to only enter parts of the site to which they have legitimate reason to be present. Access permissions should be fully auditable and regularly reviewed.
- 3.2.8 Current drawings show secure cycle parking rooms for residents and staff are contained in dedicated rooms off the ground floor via the public garden courtyard and off Rodney St. Entry into these spaces should be strictly limited via the access-controlled system under the building management system ensuring only genuine cyclists can gain access. Racks within the cycle stores should allow bikes to be locked by the frame and both wheels and should be obtained from a Secured by Design approved supplier (see www.securedbydesign.com).
- 3.2.9 The small provision of car parking has been well laid out, avoiding potential hiding spaces for intruders.
- 3.2.10 Security measures carefully incorporated into the building design can ensure the buildings are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime. The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Residents private garden courtyard gate. Boundary treatment must not provide climbing holds or ease of access over the fence, thus allowing an opportunist access into the private garden space.

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- 3.3.2 Mailbox location. Arrangements for delivery of post should not need postal delivery staff to have access to internal corridors and stairwells of the residential blocks. Mailboxes for residents should be located either within a secure lobby area or use a “through-the-wall” arrangement allowing external delivery / internal collection.
 - 3.3.3 Residential post/parcel/grocery room. Arrangements for the delivery of post should not allow postal or grocery delivery staff to have access to internal areas of the residential blocks beyond the GF reception space. Postal workers should not be given unfettered access to the entire buildings as this could potentially leave apartments and residents vulnerable. (see Section 4.1 for more information).
 - 3.3.4 External elevations generally. The cladding / facing materials should not provide external aids to climbing that could allow an intruder to gain access to the upper floor windows. The detailing of the façades and the relationship between the buildings and any other external landscape features / street furniture will need to be carefully planned to avoid introducing this kind of vulnerability.
 - 3.3.5 Graffiti on surfaces. This kind of abuse is particularly prevalent in the vicinity of the site. It is important that external cladding materials at ground floor are sealed, protected and supports the removal of graffiti, a resistant coating should be applied to enable easy removal of any unauthorised markings. The external space should not contain climbing aids that could allow an intruder to gain access to the upper floor Juliet balconies. The detailing of the façade and any proposed external landscape features will need to be considered to avoid introducing an access vulnerability point into the building.
 - 3.3.6 Communal facility maintenance. The robust management of such features is essential as poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour.
 - 3.3.7 Effective lighting should be included to allow users to feel secure in the hours of darkness. Location of lamp columns should take account of obstructions to vision such as any proposed or existing vegetation and parking arrangements for vehicles.
 - 3.3.8 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to STS202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system linked to the concierge desk, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
- ☐ Arrangements for residents to admit visitors. Communal entrance and inner lobby / zone doors should be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on a phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can confirm the identity of visitors before allowing them access themselves.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to STS202 BR2, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS01, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead.
- ☐ Doors to storage / meter rooms should have 44mm solid core doors, 3 hinges, with a mortised sash lock to BS3621/8621 to allow the rooms to be secured when not in use.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
Ground floor and easily-accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- ☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
 - Main Entrance doors
 - Secondary entrance doors off internal lobbies

- Bin stores
- Cycle stores
- Staff-only areas

4.6 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [Main entrances](#), [foyer](#), [stairs](#), [lift lobbies](#), [landings](#), [cycle stores](#), [bin store entrances](#).

4.7 Other

- ☐ Meter cupboards to apartments should be located to the fronts of properties only or within a secure cupboard / room inside the block but not inside individual apartments. Smart meters are acceptable.
- ☐ Any externally-mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- ☐ Partition walls between flats and corridors should be of masonry construction or include reinforcement such as a layer of expanded metal mesh.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction, and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the buildings. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter removal

-
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
18/03/22	AvisonYoung	CIS application submitted
23/03/22	AvisonYoung	Client confirmation
05/04/22	AvisonYoung	Design Team presentation
28/04/22	DfS	Site visit
29/04/22	DfS	CIS completed
20/05/22	DfS	CIS issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
220308	MCC Pre App		
	RODSTA-BUT-ZZ-00-DP-A-00002 - Site Location Plan -	09/06/22	
	253-LYR-XX-ZZ-DWG-L-1001-Landscape Masterplan	09/06/22	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Minor revisions made to report & red line site plan amended.	09/06/22

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door-sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door-set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door-sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk