



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Land at Church Lane

28 Apartments

For: **HAD & CO Property Consultants Ltd**

Greater Manchester Police

Version A: **30/05/22**

design**for**security

Ref: **2022/0180/CIS/01**

Land at Church Lane

2022/0180/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported

The proposed apartment building has been well designed from a crime prevention perspective and, with the inclusion of recommendations set out in this report in the design of the completed scheme, I am satisfied that it will provide a safe and secure environment for future residents.

The principal recommendations within the report seek to address the following:

- the robustness of the building and controlling access into to it
- access for cyclists and the security of the cycle store
- creating a high quality space around the apartment building, to emphasise semi-private nature of the site to promote ownership of the space by residents and to deter offenders
- installing appropriate fencing and planting to create a secure boundary, whilst not being oppressively high, and maintaining a reasonable degree of mutual surveillance between residents and passers-by

I am happy to support the proposals, subject to the developer addressing each of the recommendations set out in this report. At planning application stage, Design for Security will request the inclusion of a condition requiring the development to achieve Secured by Design accreditation (see section 4 specification).

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken within and around the site.

The site is located on Church Lane and currently houses a brownfield site which has remained redundant for a number of years.

The site is located within a predominantly residential area of Moston.

The proposed site shares the immediate neighbouring boundaries on the West with residential properties, a nursery building on the East and the Southern boundary is shared with another undeveloped brownfield site.


There is a small retail business facing onto the site.

Parking in the area is in high demand with on-street parking dominant.

Boundary treatments around the site are a combination of historic brick walls and metal railing and/or weld mesh fencing. The boundary facing Church Lane contains timber hoarding.

Approx. 100m east and west of the site on Church Lane is a bus stop. The bus routes provide services within the local area.

A Metrolink tram stop is located approx. 1km south east of the site providing links to Manchester or Rochdale.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st May 2021 to 20th April 2022

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
88	14	149	516	221	24	10	52	22	7

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is 66% above the rate of crime for the Manchester district, with less serious wounding, theft and criminal damage most commonly reported. The proposed site is located within close proximity to Harpurhey shopping centre. There is often an increase of crime and disorder in shopping areas due to the volume of footfall and increased opportunities.
- 2.1.2 Less serious wounding has taken place throughout the local area, with hotspots occurring around Upper Conran Street to the north and along Church Lane and the surrounding residential streets. Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the highest recorded offences taking place, with domestic disputes and offences between known associates being the most common M.O (modus operandi). Offences have largely taken place within dwellings and residential streets, as well around the local shopping centre.
- 2.1.3 Theft in the area is high, with the majority of offences occurring around the shopping complex and gymnasium. Offenders have entered the forecourt of the local fuelling station and made off without payment of fuel. Offenders have also targeted bank cards removed from bags and attempted to withdraw money. The gymnasium has experienced thefts from lockers, both secure and insecure lockers and removing personal items. Pickpocketing and shoplifting offences have also occurred in the area.
- 2.1.4 Criminal damage in the area is high, with businesses targeted around the shopping centre, whereby glazing has been smashed. Offences around the residential estates have mostly occurred around dwellings and vehicles whereby glazing has been smashed using bricks and bodily pressure, as well as doors kicked and damaged and vehicles have been scratched and body work damaged.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 Front doors of apartments have been forced open after offenders have gained access to unsecured communal areas

- communal entry doors should be certified to PAS 24, be self-closing, and lock automatically upon closure;
- individual apartment entry doors should be certified to PAS24 or LPS1175;
- an access control system should also be in place to prevent casual entry to the building or car park, and to allow residents to vet visitors before allowing them access; and,
- entrance doors should be kept to a minimum and be located in highly visible positions in order to deter offenders.

2.2.2 Doors and windows have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all external doors should be certified to PAS 24 security standard;
- apartment and the communal entrance doors should be very visible rather than set within recesses or on secluded elevations;
- secluded passageways to the side or rear of the building should be secured or avoided altogether wherever possible, such routes can facilitate access to vulnerable doors or windows as well as attract anti-social behaviour; and,

- all external doors should be illuminated by dusk-to-dawn lighting. Light suggests a property is occupied, and the light will also highlight the actions of an offender, increasing the chance of a crime being witnessed.

2.2.3 Doors and windows have been targeted when left insecure

To minimise the risk of 'walk-in/climb-in' burglaries:

- entrance doors should be self-closing and self-locking;
- defensible space should be provided to the front and rear of the building;
- windows should be certified to the PAS 24 standard, and fitted locks and with tamper proof, opening restrictors; and,
- dusk-to-dawn lighting should be fitted to all external doors and to the principal elevations of the building.

2.2.4 Glazing in rear doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry

To minimise the risk of offender smashing glazing in doors and windows:

- laminate glass should be fitted to all external doors and windows on the ground floor of each property; and,
- access to gardens should be restricted using high fences and locking gates.

2.2.5 Locks on shed doors were forced.

To minimise the risk of offender breaking and entering sheds or cycle stores:

- storage sheds should be fitted with a Sold Secure™ hasp and staple, fixed with coach bolts through the framed of the shed, and secured fixed with a Sold Secure padlock.
- cycle stores should be very robust, be fitted with a self-closing, self-locking, steel gate, and be positioned out of the view of passers-by.





2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester and Greater Manchester




The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.



- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **49% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **91% higher** than Greater Manchester and **96% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **6% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **28% higher** than Greater Manchester and **145% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **30% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **70% higher** than Greater Manchester and **107% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **33% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **11% higher** than Greater Manchester and **34% higher** than England & Wales.

2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks over the weekend period (Saturday – Sunday) during the early hours of the morning (1am – 5am). Offenders often target properties during the early hours of the morning when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access – it should be noted that locks have often been drilled and snapped.
- Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors using objects/ tools.
- Entering the rear garden of the property and using bodily pressure and implements gain access to the garden shed.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on a Monday during the morning and into the afternoon (8am – 1pm). Offenders often target vehicles during the day, particularly around shopping centres, as they are often left unattended for long periods of time and out of sight of the owner, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 Proposal to build a residential block containing 25no. of 2-bed and 3no. of 1-bed apartments over 3 stories and a smaller roof storey with associated landscaping works and creation of courtyard car park.
- 3.1.2 The proposal is new apartment building of 28 units arranged over three stories, with one roof storey. To increase the green area, the building will be on 34.8% footprint on the total site area and the garden spaces will use 34.5%.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 Bringing forward the proposals will result in the redevelopment of a vacant, unused site, which overtime may attract anti-social behaviour and compromise the security of neighbouring properties and amenity of residents.
- 3.2.2 A residential development seems to be an appropriate use for the site, providing good quality accommodation in a sustainable location with easy access to a range of services.
- 3.2.3 A mixture of apartment sizes is proposed, which is likely to attract a more diverse group of residents.
- 3.2.4 There will be 'defensible space' between the proposed building and Church Lane, which will help preserve an element of privacy for ground floor residents as well as reducing the risk of crime and anti-social behaviour affecting the development.
- 3.2.5 Twenty Eight apartments are proposed, which will provide a good prospect of some residents being present throughout the day, particularly at night and at the weekend, and so casual surveillance over, at least parts of, the development is likely.
- 3.2.6 The orientation and design of the building, with many windows and other large, glazed elements of routinely occupied rooms overlooking Church Lane and the gardens and car parking areas, the pathways either side of the proposed building, and the amenity space, will facilitate natural surveillance. Along with the sight of residents coming and going and, at times, residents being visible within their apartments, the sense of passers-by being under scrutiny will help to deter offenders.
- 3.2.7 The communal entrance door is in a prominent of the Church Lane main entrance.
- 3.2.8 Controls can be easily deployed at the communal entrance doors and any entry gates or shutters to restrict access to residents and authorised visitors.
- 3.2.9 Adequate car parking space and a suitably secure cycle store are included within the site. Residents are easily able to access the car and cycle parking.
- 3.2.10 Refuse storage has been accommodated within the site.
- 3.2.11 Shared amenity space appears to be included within the scheme. Communal spaces can help build relationships between residents and develop 'social capital' within a development. Socially cohesive or developments tend to be less attractive to offenders as residents are more likely to challenge strangers or intervene where inappropriate behaviour is witnessed.
- 3.2.12 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime

3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the scheme

Control entry into the building

- 3.3.1 The 'front' and rear communal entrances must include a security-certified (PAS 24 or LPS 1175sr2), self-closing and lock upon closure door. The doors should be secured with an electrically operated, multi-point lock, activated with a programmable fob.

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- 3.3.2 An audio-visual unit with link to each apartment should be fitted at the front door, so that residents can vet callers prior to allowing access to *bona fide* visitors only.
 - 3.3.3 To minimise the risk of offenders 'tail-gating' legitimate residents/visitors, a secure lobby should be created. The doors into the two apartment corridors and the lift core should also have fob activated, electronic locks fitted. These doors should also be self-closing and lock securely upon closure.
 - 3.3.4 The front entrance should be particularly well lit.
 - 3.3.5 The rear entrance should be for use by residents only.

Apartment security

- 3.3.6 Each apartment should be secured with a security-rated entrance door, fitted with a door viewer and opening limiter. Rear garden access and balcony doors should also carry a security rating.
- 3.3.7 Ground floor windows should be security rated, fitted with key-operable locks and have opening restrictors fitted. Glazing in doors and windows should include laminate glass.

Mail delivery

- 3.3.8 Individual, robust and lockable, postal boxes for each apartment should be located in the entrance lobby.

Cycle store

- 3.3.9 The door to the residents' cycle store should be secured with a 44mm solid core door, fitted with a fob-activated, electronic lock, and be self-closing and self-locking. Access to the store should be restricted to residents holding a suitably programmed fob.
- 3.3.10 Cycle stands within the store should allow the cyclist to secure both wheels and the frame to the stand. The stands should be securely anchored.

Church Lane boundary

- 3.3.11 In order to define the 'defensible space' between the 'street' and the development, the Church Lane boundaries should be defined with a 1200mm high railing supplemented with hedge planting to soften its appearance. A gate of a similar design should be installed to define the approach to the communal entrance door.

Securing the rear of the building

- 3.3.12 The rear gardens of the development should be defined with an 1800mm high fence. A self-closing, steel-railed pedestrian gate should be installed to allow entry to cyclists and maintenance staff. The gate should be secured with a good quality digi-lock or a fob operated electronic lock.

High quality external space

- 3.3.13 In order to define the semi-private nature of the approach to the main entrance door, approach to the car park and the access road to the parking bays, and to encourage resident 'ownership' of these external spaces, high quality surfacing should be used. Materials that are markedly different to the standard tarmac finish can help to promote ownership and deter unwanted visitors. Measures to prevent parking on the access road (and adjoining pathway) to the ground-level parking bays should be introduced.
- 3.3.14 Signs highlighting the name of the development, and the private nature of the parking spaces should be erected.

CCTV

- 3.3.15 The developer should consider the installation of a modest CCTV system to monitor activity at the front and rear entrance doors, the car park and car park ramp, the ground level parking bays and the cycle store. The images should be recorded on site in a secure room or, off-site, at a suitably accredited, monitoring facility.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to STS202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
- ☐ Arrangements for residents to admit visitors. Communal entrance and inner lobby / zone doors should be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on a phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can confirm the identity of visitors before allowing them access themselves.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The post boxes themselves should be of robust construction, with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access-controlled main entrance.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead.
- ☐ Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Doors to storage / meter rooms should have 44mm solid core doors, 3 hinges, with a mortised sash lock to BS3621/8621 to allow the rooms to be secured when not in use.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ Any external french/double doors or sliding doors to easily accessible balconies or terraces should also be certified to BS PAS 24, SPS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2 and should include laminated glazing (see below).
- ☐ The doors to the cycle store should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2, or be steel gates within steel frames. These doors/gates should both be self-closing and lock securely upon closure and be accessible by a programmable fob.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily-accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems

- BS 6799 for wireless systems

☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

4.5 Boundaries

☐ A secure gated entrance boundary should be formed to the car parking undercroft. Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of walls and railings should have railing panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid.

☐ Inward opening automatic gates to provide access to the courtyard area must be certified to one of the following standards:

- LPS 1175: Issue 7, SR2
- STS 202: Issue 3, BR2
- Sold Secure Gold

☐ PAS 68: 2013

4.6 Landscaping

☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.

☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by

4.7 Lighting

☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.

☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors (manual override is also permissible).

☐ Lighting in the car park should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout/lux plan.

☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.8 CCTV

☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [Main entrances](#), [foyer](#), [stairs](#), [lift lobbies](#), [landings](#), [cycle stores](#), [bin store entrances](#).

4.9 Other

- ☐ Meter cupboards to apartments should be located to the fronts of properties only or within a secure cupboard / room inside the block but not inside individual apartments. Smart meters are acceptable.
- ☐ Any externally-mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- ☐ Partition walls between flats and corridors should be of masonry construction or include reinforcement such as a layer of expanded metal mesh.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction, and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the buildings. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

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- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
06/04/22	HADManchester	Application received
05/05/22	HADManchester	Client confirmation
09/05/22	GMP	Invoice issued
09/06/22	DfS	Site visit
13/06/22	DfS	CIS completed

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
HAD3384-01	Location and Site Plan	02/02/22	
HAD3384-02	Proposed Ground Floor Plan	02/02/22	
HAD3384-03	Proposed First Floor Plan	02/02/22	
HAD3384-04	Proposed Second Floor Plan	02/02/22	
HAD3384-05	Proposed Third Floor Plan	02/02/22	
HAD3384-06	Proposed Roof Plan	02/02/22	
HAD3384-07	Proposed Elevations	02/02/22	
HAD3384-08	Proposed Elevations	02/02/22	
HAD3384-09	Proposed Street Elevations	02/02/22	
HAD3384-10	Proposed Site Plans	02/02/22	
HAD3384-11	Crime Impact Statement Plan	01/04/22	
HAD3384-12	Refuse Collection Plan	04/04/22	
HAD3384-13	Outdoor Gates	04/04/22	
HAD3384-14	Outdoor Gates Dimensions	04/04/22	
HAD3384-15	Fence Details	04/04/22	
HAD3384-16	Construction Plan	22/04/22	
	Planning Statement	Mar 22	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for doorsets and windows, which certifies that a particular doorset is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk