



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

ALBERTON HOUSE, 30 ST. MARY'S PARSONAGE, MANCHESTER
OFFICES (23,090sqm.) WITH ANCILLARY AMENITY/RETAIL/RESTAURANT
SPACE (880sqm.) & WELLNESS SUITE (672sqm.)

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FOR: Bruntwood RB Limited

VERSION B: 04/03/2022

REFERENCE: 2021/0626/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security additions/improvements required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- The control of access into/around the building is paramount to the security of the scheme, including prevention of unauthorised/public access to upper floor offices and mezzanine co-working spaces from the publicly accessible ground floor amenity/retail/restaurant space, as well as the control of access to individual office levels or suites, back-of-house plant/service/storage areas, basement staff locker/changing areas, and the cycle store.
- The proposed wellness suite at rooftop level should ideally be for the use of tenants of the building, who have passed through access-controlled turnstiles at ground floor level. Should the rooftop wellness centre be intended for the use of members of the public, it should be served by a dedicated lift accessible from the ground floor public area, preventing unauthorised access to all other levels.
- Secure design/treatment of public realm/pedestrian route to the west of the building, prevention of unauthorised access onto the external balcony area to the rear of the building and treatment of the sheltered area underneath the projecting balcony to deter loitering/gathering and anti-social behaviour.
- Prevention of unauthorised internal access between the proposed building and Cardinal House (via any shared escape stair) and surveillance opportunities maximised over emergency egress door/cycle entrance doors adjacent to existing sub-station structure to be retained.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site lies on the north-east side of St Mary's Parsonage, within Manchester city centre (just outside of the Parsonage Gardens Conservation Area). The site also abuts the River Irwell to the north, on the border with Salford.

It is currently occupied by Alberton House, a part four, part twelve storey largely vacant office building constructed in the 1970s.


The main entrance to the existing building is set back off the street, with a small area of hard/soft landscaping in front of the building. The eastern portion of the building includes an undercroft vehicular access/parking area, leading to a small number of parking spaces along the river front. To the west of the building (separated from the existing public realm route by a low wall) is a ramped surface parking area and access route leading down to a shuttered entrance to basement parking facilities.

To the immediate west of the building is a pedestrian-only public realm route off St Mary's Parsonage, leading to a footbridge over the River Irwell (Trinity Bridge). The public realm route is flanked by Alberton House to the east and Albert Bridge House to the west and has mature trees along it. To the rear of the buildings is a steep bank to the riverside, accessible over railings along the edges of the route and to the bridge. There is evidence that unauthorised access is being gained to the partially hidden bank areas on either side of the bridge, including littering and graffiti (particularly to the adjacent façades of Albert Bridge House).

To the rear of Alberton House is an external parking terrace, elevated above the riverside bank - making unauthorised access from the bank/bridge very difficult. The ventilation gaps to the basement parking level have also been fitted with full-height railings to prevent unauthorised access and the sheltered area underneath the terrace is formed by steeply sloping paving - deterring it from fostering loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour.

To the west is Albert Bridge House and car park. To the immediate east is Cardinal House - an office building of similar design and construction to that of Alberton House. On the opposite side of St Mary's Parsonage from the site are Grade II listed buildings, primarily in commercial use. On the opposite side of the River Irwell/Trinity Bridge from the site is the Lowry Hotel and office/commercial buildings.

Given the primarily commercial uses in the immediate local of the site, the area is likely to benefit from lower levels of footfall, passive surveillance and direct overlooking late at night than it does during the day (particularly during the working week).



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st December 2020 to 30th November 2021. It is accurate to a margin of +/- 8%, due to recent updates to GMP IT systems.

2.1 Crime Summary



Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
24	110	144	815	594	81	24	167	23	93

- 2.1.1 In the local area, the volume of crime is very high, particularly the levels of violence and theft, reflecting the site's location within the city centre. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of city centres – where there is a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of such crime and disorder issues.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have taken place throughout the local area, particularly to the east and south of the proposed site, around/off Deansgate/Bridge Street/Peter Street, where there is a concentration of licensed premises. The majority of the violence in the local area has taken place in the evening and during early hours of the morning, with a higher volume of incidents typically experienced between Friday and Sunday – when more people visit the city and attend licensed premises, often for longer periods and consuming more alcohol, leading to conflicts.
- 2.1.3 Thefts have taken place throughout the area, with hotspots occurring to the south of the proposed site, around/off Deansgate and Quay Street/Peter Street. These areas have a high volume of footfall due a concentration of public transport links, licenced premises, restaurants and retail premises. Offenders have primarily used pick-pocketing techniques and distraction methods to obtain personal belongings, mostly mobile phones, bags and purses/wallets. Offenders have also targeted insecure items (particularly mobile phones) left on or under tables in bars and restaurants.
- 2.1.4 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed office scheme (with ancillary uses), the more detailed analysis below will look at use-specific burglary and theft.


2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Offices): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.



- 2.2.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester is greatest on Tuesday, Thursday and Sunday.
- 2.2.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary at Manchester office premises rises into the evening/late at night. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.

Manchester Office Burglary – Point of Entry




- 2.2.3 **Point of Entry:** The majority of burglaries at offices in Manchester have been committed through doors. Burglaries against office buildings in this area do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing tools with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks. Offenders have also smashed glazed panels in doors and windows to gain entry. A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through 'unknown' and 'legitimate' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.


2.3 Theft (Manchester Offices): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.

Manchester Office Theft – Day Range




Manchester Office Theft – Time Range



- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester offices is greatest on Monday and Tuesday and is generally lower over the weekend (when many are shut).
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking around midday. During these times, many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out.

2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.



2.4.1 **Day Range:** The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester peaks slightly on Wednesday, but remains relatively consistently high across the week.


2.4.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary peaks late at night and during in the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target commercial premises at these times when they are closed, it is dark and the areas in which they are typically located are quiet - all of which contribute to offenders perceiving a lower risk of being observed or detected.

2.4.3 **Point of Entry:** In burglaries at Manchester retail premises, the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through shutters, forcing them open by various means including using implements to force them upwards, using vehicles to ram them and using tools to cut through them.
- Offenders have also routinely forced open doors with bodily pressure and tools, as well as smashing glazed panels within them to gain unauthorised access.
- Windows have also been prised open or smashed by offenders.
- A high number of burglaries are recorded as having 'legitimate' or 'unknown' entry points. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers before targeting restricted/back-of-house areas (such as staff rooms, stock rooms etc.) unnoticed.
- Offenders have gained access to premises by gaining access through the roofs of single-storey elements or by penetrating through walls.

2.5 Theft (Manchester Retail): Risk Analysis


The data below relates to thefts within/against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.



- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester retail premises remains consistently high across the week. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated in the afternoon and early evening. This is when retail premises are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to offend are greater. The majority of thefts are either of staff property or of/from the handbags of shoppers (such as mobile phones, purses etc.). Theft of staff property are more likely to be noticed at either midday, when lunch breaks are taken, or during the late afternoon when staff are leaving for the day.


2.6 Non-Domestic Burglary (GM Leisure Facilities): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area 2018-2019.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at leisure facilities in the Greater Manchester area peaks on Thursday/Friday and is slightly lower on Saturday. During the day, the risk of burglary peaks during the late afternoon/early evening and during the early hours of the morning. During the late afternoon/early evening, leisure facilities are often at their busiest, meaning offenders can take advantage of busy staff and anonymity among higher numbers of legitimate customers. Offenders often target commercial properties at night, when they are often closed (or operate with a reduced number of on-site staff), it is dark and the streets/areas in which they are typically located are quieter than during the day – meaning offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.

Leisure Facilities Burglary – Point of Entry




2.6.2 **Point of Entry:** The following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently by offenders targeting leisure facilities:

- Doors and windows have been forced open by offenders using bodily pressure and implements.
- The glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.
- Where the point of entry is 'legitimate' or 'unknown', this is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers to gain access to premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors, tailgating or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas without being noticed.


2.7 Theft (Leisure Facilities): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area 2018-2019.

Leisure Facilities Theft – Day Range



Leisure Facilities Theft – Time Range



2.7.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at leisure facilities within the Greater Manchester area peaks on Tuesday, but remains consistently high throughout the week. During the day, the risk of theft rises in the afternoon and peaks in the evening. This is when leisure facilities are typically at their busiest and the opportunities to offend are greater. Personal property belonging to staff and customers, such as mobile phones and cash, are the most routinely targeted items – taking place most often in changing/locker rooms and staff-only areas.

2.8 General Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

2.8.1 **Offices:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Employee theft
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.8.2 **Retail:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery
- Shoplifting
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Employee theft
- Loitering groups
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.8.3 **Leisure:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Unauthorised access to non-public areas
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Violence towards staff and other users
- Cycle security
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Controlled access (staff/user only)
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Employee theft
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space

2.9 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.9.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting Manchester office/retail premises and Greater Manchester leisure facilities are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- **Manchester Office, Manchester Retail & GM Leisure Facilities:** Doors have been forced open with tools and bodily pressure to gain entry

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting (see Section 4.6) and CCTV (see Section 4.8) can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.

- **Manchester Offices:** Offenders posing as legitimate customers/visitors to gain access and steal items of personal property

Possible Solution – There should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that callers to the office building are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed access into them (see Sections 4.1/4.2). All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be secure areas for staff to store their belongings while at work. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour.

- **Manchester Offices & GM Leisure Facilities:** Glazing in doors and windows has been smashed to gain access

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.4), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

- **Manchester Retail:** A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through shutters, forcing them open by various means including using implements to force them upwards, using vehicles to ram them and using tools to cut through them

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (to LPS 1175 SR 1/2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, ideally the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack.

- **Manchester Retail:** Windows have also been prised open or smashed by offenders

Possible Solution - All external windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.3) where possible, which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.4), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Vulnerable shopfronts should be secured with security-certified shutters out-of-hours.

- **Manchester Retail:** A high number of burglaries are recorded as having 'legitimate' or 'unknown' entry points. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers before targeting restricted/back-of-house areas (such as staff rooms, stock rooms etc.) unnoticed

Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access.

-
- **Manchester Retail:** Offenders have gained access to premises by gaining access through the roofs of single-storey elements or by penetrating through walls.

Possible Solution - Ideally, single storey building elements should be avoided. If they are absolutely necessary, care should be taken in their design to ensure that roof areas or upper floor windows are not accessible, for example, with the use of high-level/overhanging eaves, high balustrades etc. There should be no features of the building or any nearby hard/soft landscaping features that would facilitate climbing. Any 'accessible' skylights should incorporate at least one pane of laminated glazing and should be secured with internally fixed grilles/bars to prevent unauthorised access. The construction of the roof itself and all external walls should also be robust enough to withstand penetration.

- **GM Leisure Facilities:** Windows have been forced open by offenders using bodily pressure and implements

Possible Solution - All windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.3), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. It may be necessary for more windows to be fitted with security-certified shutters, bars, grilles or perforated metal/polycarbonate panels, in order to provide some additional protection.

- **GM Leisure Facilities:** Where the point of entry is 'legitimate' or 'unknown', this is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers to gain access to premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors, tailgating or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas without being noticed

Possible Solution – The main entrance/s to the centre and all internal areas/rooms restricted to staff and officials should operate on an access control system, to restrict unauthorised entry. All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be a secure area for staff/officials to store their belongings while at the premises (see Sections 4.1/4.2).

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to demolish the existing building and erect a new 18 storey office led development, with ground floor retail/food uses and a rooftop wellness suite.
- 3.1.2 The main entrance to the building will be off St Mary's Parsonage, at the junction with the existing pedestrian route leading to Trinity Bridge, and the building will have active frontages along both routes. The basement level of the building will house a large cycle store, changing rooms (with lockers) and plant areas. The ground floor will have a double-height foyer and feature staircase to the mezzanine level, an amenity/retail/restaurant space with access onto a double height external balcony overlooking the river at the rear of the building, along with access-controlled turnstiles leading to the main lift and stair cores, a post room, a kitchen, a bin store, W/Cs and plant areas. The mezzanine level will comprise of a lounge/co-working space and a number of flexible workspace rooms (for those with memberships at other facilities or on a pay-as-you-go programme), along with a screening room, a prayer room and W/Cs. Between the first and sixteenth floor, there will be a variety of workspaces and offices to accommodate freelancers to corporates. At seventeenth and eighteenth floor level there will be a wellness suite featuring a wellness studio (with external terrace), a pool, changing rooms, a lounge and plant areas.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The replacement of an existing office building with a new office led scheme, in an area of the city occupied primarily by similar premises, is unlikely to have any detrimental effect on the existing community.
- 3.2.2 The proposed development will provide additional activity, natural surveillance and overlooking to the area, at all times of the day and into the evening night
- 3.2.3 The building will present active frontages along St Mary's Parsonage and the pedestrian route leading to Trinity Bridge, to the west of the building - enlivening the street scene and helping to provide useful natural surveillance over the surrounding public realm.
- 3.2.4 The glazed façades of the building offer both surveillance opportunities and a greater level of artificial light onto the street/public realm.
- 3.2.5 The building will include no deep/narrow recesses at ground level that would hide windows/doors, leaving them potentially vulnerable to attack.
- 3.2.6 The external double height balcony area to the rear of the building should not be accessible from Trinity Bridge, the public realm route leading to it or the steeply sloping bankside area along the river edge.
- 3.2.7 The office reception area will clearly visible from the exterior of the building and all staff/visitors should pass through access-controlled turnstiles to access the upper floors of the building. Each floor plate will be capable of being individually secured, ensuring tenants cannot gain unauthorised access onto other floors/areas within the building.
- 3.2.8 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the buildings and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 As proposed, the ground floor amenity/retail/restaurant space will be publicly accessible and the mezzanine level will incorporate workspaces for the use of for those with memberships at other facilities or on a pay-as-you-go programme. This could provide opportunities for offenders to gain unauthorised access to the upper floor levels of the building (or the basement) without being noticed/challenged. The

control and management of access will therefore be paramount to the security of the scheme (see Sections 4.1 & 4.2 for more information). There should be a reception desk within the entrance lobby of the building that should be staffed at all times when the building is operational, allowing staff to have full surveillance of everyone entering/leaving the building as well as over the surrounding public realm. All visitors should report to the reception desk for vetting by staff before gaining access to the mezzanine co-working space and the upper office floors of the building. It should not be possible for members of the public to by-pass the ground floor reception desk/access-controlled turnstiles to gain access to the co-working space at mezzanine level and tailgate into the lift/stair core serving the upper floors of the building. A high, wide reception desk increases the distance between reception staff and any potential aggressive visitors and aids surveillance of all parts of the entrance lobby. Staff should be given flexibility over permitting access into the building out-of-hours. The main entrance doors to the building should be capable of being controlled remotely by reception staff if/when required to prevent unauthorised access. Given the building will be occupied by multiple tenants (as well as for those with memberships at other facilities or on a pay-as-you-go programme), it should not be possible for the staff/visitors of one office suite to access another. All individual office levels or suites should be fitted with self-closing access-controlled doors, operated by staff swipe cards/fobs or by intercoms linked to individual receptions and any rooms within flexible working spaces or office suites should be capable of being deadlocked when unoccupied. Access to all back-of-house plant/service/storage areas should also be fitted with auditable access controls (authorised personnel only), as should any basement staff locker/changing areas, cycle stores or refuse stores.

- 3.3.2 The proposed wellness suite at rooftop level should ideally be for the use of tenants of the building, who have passed through access-controlled turnstiles at ground floor level. Should the rooftop wellness suite be intended for the use of members of the public, this could also provide opportunities for offenders to exploit (i.e. to gain unauthorised access to office floors). If the wellness centre is to be for public use, it should be served by a dedicated lift accessible from the public area at ground floor level, which stops at no other floor than the wellness reception area at eighteenth floor level (where staff can control and manage access to all areas).
- 3.3.3 The public realm/pedestrian route to the west of the building should be well-lit and well-maintained/managed, in order to encourage legitimate use and discourage mistreatment (see Sections 4.6/4.7). Formal surveillance over the route will help with this, be it directly from the staffed reception desk (where possible) or remotely via CCTV monitored from the reception desk (see Section 4.8). Any landscape features (hard or soft) along it should not impede natural surveillance of/from the building or reduce the effectiveness of lighting or CCTV systems. The glazed facade of the proposed building should also allow clear views over the route from the ground floor amenity/retail/restaurant space and provide a degree of activity along it. Care must be taken to ensure that the external balcony area to the rear of the building cannot be accessed from Trinity Bridge, the public realm route or the bankside area along the river edge. The sheltered area underneath the projecting balcony should also be inaccessible or treated in such a way (e.g. with steeply sloping, textured paving) to reduce comfort and discourage mis-use (such as rough-sleeping) or criminal/anti-social behaviour.
- 3.3.4 It would appear that the proposed building and the adjacent Cardinal House building will share a common fire escape stair. This feature may provide opportunities for criminals to exploit to gain unauthorised internal access between the buildings. Any interconnecting doors into a shared emergency egress stair from either building should be security-certified (see Section 4.1) and alarmed, with signage to deter mis-use. Once the emergency escape stair is accessed, the only means of egress should be externally at ground floor level. Care should be taken to ensure the existing sub-station structure does not impede views over the emergency egress door/cycle entrance doors from the street, meaning they could be attacked unseen.
- 3.3.5 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in staff and customers.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ All external doorsets should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2+. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery. Security-certified louvred doorsets are also available if required to plant rooms or refuse stores (see <https://www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search> for SBD approved suppliers).
- ☐ Any revolving or sliding doorset to the main entrance of the building should be tested and certified BS PAS 24 or BS EN 1627 RC2. Outside of normal working hours or if the building is to be open at any time without a concierge staffing the lobby area, any revolving/sliding doors should be secured and a single-leaf entrance door (which should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2+) should be controlled by staff key-card and by means of a video access control system linked to a security office or to each individual office suite, allowing staff to vet visitors before allowing them access. See Section 4.2 for more information.
- ☐ The staff cycle entrance to the west of the building should be security-certified (see above), self-closing and operated by staff key-card only.
- ☐ Given that the office building is to be occupied by multiple tenants, all individual office levels or suites should be fitted with self-closing, access-controlled, solid-core doors (minimum 44mm thick), operated by staff swipe cards/fobs or by intercoms linked to individual receptions. All individual rooms within office suites and the flexible workspace rooms at mezzanine level should be capable of being secured when unoccupied.
- ☐ Any interconnecting doors into any shared emergency egress stair core should be security-certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2 (with any door ironmongery permitted under the security certification of the product) and alarmed, with signage to deter mis-use. Once any dedicated emergency escape core is accessed, the only means of egress should be externally at ground floor level.
- ☐ The doors leading to back-of-house areas from the access core at basement level should be solid-core doors (minimum 44mm thick), operated by office staff key-card only, preventing unauthorised access. The basement staff changing facilities and cycle store should be secured with security-certified doorsets to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2, operated by staff key-card only. All other internal doors/frames to back-of-house plant areas, storage rooms or refuse stores should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and an electrically operated lock controlled by staff key-card. Similarly, the doorsets leading to the rooftop pool, lounge and wellness studio should be capable of being secured when unoccupied, with all access controlled/monitored from the wellness centre reception desk during operational hours.

4.2 Access Controls

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads (where codes can be easily observed or shared and are rarely changed). The following doors should operate on access control:
 - The main entrance revolving/sliding doors and any adjacent single-leaf out-of-hours access door - operated remotely by reception staff or by staff key-card outside of normal working hours/when required (e.g. late at night).
 - The external cycle entrance – operable by staff key-card.
 - Internal doors to cycle stores, changing facilities and all other back-of-house rooms, plant areas, stores and refuse areas - operated by staff key-card.

- The turnstiles/security barriers controlling access to the lift/stair cores from the ground floor reception and amenity/retail/restaurant area - operated remotely by reception staff (for visitor access) or by staff key-card.
- Internal doors to each individually let office suites/floors – operated by staff key-card or remotely by individual office suite reception staff.
- Internal doors into the wellness studio, changing rooms and pool/lounge - operated by staff key-card or remotely by wellness suite reception staff.

- ☐ The electric locking system to be used throughout the building should be fully auditable (i.e. allowing the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Staff cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled to ensure that mis-use is prevented. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work or they are authorised to use and keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

4.3 Windows

- ☐ All windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than just to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Any ground floor or first floor opening lights (escape requirements permitting) should be lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.4 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All ground and first floor glazing must incorporate an internal pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. All upper floor glazing should incorporate an internal pane rated as at least P1A under EN 356. The remaining external pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall (or material of similar strength e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind any cladding to the proposed building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack. Any louvres at ground floor level to plant areas should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed, and designed to ensure that they cannot be used as a climbing aid.
- ☐ There should be no features of the building (such as projecting window cills/brickwork features, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby boundaries, trees, lighting columns, handrails etc.) that may provide climbing aids to scale the building facades or gain unauthorised access to any external terraces/balconies.

4.5 Alarms

- ☐ A comprehensive intruder alarm system should be installed to cover the entire building (including any individually let office floors/suites), linked to contacts on all doors and PIR detectors. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (i.e. linked to an Alarm Receiving Centre or security office).

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to all surrounding public realm/pedestrian routes, in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ External lighting must also be provided to all external doors, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor.

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- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED or metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
 - ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments or to upper floor windows/terraces. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.7 Public Realm/Landscaping

- ☐ The pedestrianised route to the west of the building, off St Marys Parsonage and leading to Trinity Bridge, should be secured with bollards (or similar hard/soft landscaping features - such as mature trees or raised planters) to prevent unauthorised vehicular access.
- ☐ The pedestrian route should have no barriers to surveillance along or over it and should be well-lit to an adequate and uniform level (i.e. adoptable standards), with no areas of pooling or shadowing (see Section 4.6 above).
- ☐ The adjacent entrance lobby and amenity/retail/restaurant space will have a glazed facade along the route, which should be free from obstacles to surveillance, that provides some mutually beneficial activity and surveillance opportunities of and from the area. The route should also be overlooked from the main reception desk where possible or via a CCTV system monitored at the reception desk where this is not possible, allowing there to be an immediate response to any incidents recorded (see Section 4.8).
- ☐ The design of any proposed hard landscaping features or street furniture, such as benches and raised planters, should be designed to withstand and discourage the potential for mistreatment and damage (e.g. from vandalism, skateboarding etc.). Any such features should be reduced in number to the minimum practicable and should be located where surveillance and overlooking opportunities are maximised.
- ☐ It must not be possible to climb/reach the external balcony area to the rear of the building from Trinity Bridge, the public realm route or the bankside area along the river edge. The sheltered area underneath the projecting balcony should also be inaccessible or treated in such a way (e.g. with steeply sloping, textured paving) to reduce comfort and discourage mis-use or criminal/anti-social behaviour.
- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as around entrances, building frontages and along pedestrian routes, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to. Loose surface materials in publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ The robust management of the public realm is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance' can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour. If signs of disorder (such as criminal damage, graffiti, littering etc.) are not repaired/removed immediately, they can often attract further abuse.

4.8 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

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- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an *acceptable standard* that will allow for *identification* of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are *overview* and *recognition*, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: *all building facades and external entrances, the main entrance lobby and amenity/retail/restaurant space (including any pay points), the public realm/pedestrian route to the west of the building (including the riverside bank/balcony to the rear of the building), the cycle store, the ground floor turnstiles and all lift lobbies/stairwells on each level.*

It is highly recommended that CCTV coverage over any vulnerable areas is monitored at the reception desk, to ensure there can be an immediate response to any issues recorded.

4.9 Other

- ☐ The secure cycle store should include either secure lockers or stands that allow staff to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information refer to our cycle storage guidance document: <http://designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/>
- ☐ Lockers should ideally be provided within the office and wellness suite changing rooms. The lockers themselves must be robust/secure and all users must be encouraged to use them and not leave belongs unattended/insecure. Wellness suite staff should undertake regular inspections of all areas of the facility, including changing facilities and the locker areas.
- ☐ A strategy should be prepared to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

5 Internal Layout Guidance for Ground Floor Retail/Restaurant/Café Space

The internal layout of any ground floor retail/restaurant/café area within the office building should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

5.1 Retail

- 5.1.1 Clear views should remain across the ground floor space and from the premises through to the public realm, i.e. large promotional signs should not obstruct views.
- 5.1.2 Careful consideration should be given to the location of paypoints to ensure that staff have full surveillance over all areas.
- 5.1.3 Any aisles or product displays should be aligned to assist surveillance from pay points and avoid blind-spots. There should be no items of high-value displayed close to the entrance of the building.
- 5.1.4 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any tills, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods. Non-cash methods of payment are preferred.
- 5.1.5 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.
- 5.1.6 Consideration should be given to how items for sale and any cash can be stored securely if the retail unit closes and the office building remains open.

5.2 Restaurant/Café

- 5.2.1 Such premises can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:
 - **Opportunities** - Large numbers of people congregating generates opportunities for crime. Patrons are likely to be stationary for long periods of time, making them easier to target.
 - **Lack of attention** - The movement of people, noise, social interaction and other factors mean patrons can be easily distracted.
 - **Customer turnover** – High turnover with high levels of customer movement within an establishment, are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
 - **Valuable goods** – Often available and possibly on show – small, valuable, concealable goods are particularly vulnerable, such as laptops/tablets, mobile phones, purses/wallets, keys or swipe cards etc.
 - **Stealth** - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.

In order to minimise these issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:

- 5.2.2 Customers entering/leaving the premises should be easily observed by staff. Staff should also have clear views of any W/Cs to monitor their use.
- 5.2.3 The internal layout of premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.
- 5.2.4 Consideration should be given to high/wide service counters, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of any service counters should be prevented (e.g. with lockable hatches that cannot be easily scaled).

- 5.2.5 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods. Non-cash methods of payment are preferred.
- 5.2.6 All back-of-house/staff-only areas should not be publicly accessible and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.
- 5.2.7 It is highly recommended that any customer tables are fitted with Chelsea Clips, to reduce the opportunities for theft (see below).



- 5.2.8 Consideration should be given to how items for sale and any cash can be stored securely if the retail unit closes and the office building remains open.

6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the building must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the development. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:
- Opening and closing the office building, as well as the retail/restaurant/wellness suite within it, including staff arrival and departure;
 - Management of deliveries;
 - Details of staff security training;
 - Location and management of any smoking areas;
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. access control systems, alarm systems, CCTV cameras, lighting etc;
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
 - Refuse collection arrangements.
- 6.1.2 All high value equipment within communal areas (e.g. computers, televisions, tools etc.) should be properly marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 6.1.3 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left in the street for extended periods/overnight. Servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods.
- 6.1.4 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the building, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff-only/back-of-house areas.

7 Construction

- 7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
25 th November 2021	Deloitte	Receipt of CIS instruction form
26 th November 2021	Deloitte	Quote issued & request for additional info
1 st December 2021	Deloitte	Confirmation of instruction & fee. Plans to follow
6 th December 2021	Deloitte	Receipt of plans & elevations
12 th January 2022	Deloitte	Email correspondence re: progress
18 th January 2022	Deloitte	Email sent re: report completion & payment
20 th January 2022	GMP Finance Dept & Deloitte	Confirmation of payment & issue of CIS Version A
3 rd March 2022	Hilson Moran	Email received re: Security Needs Assessment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
ALBH-EPR-00-00-DR-A-00-0003	Existing Site Location Plan	06/12/21	P01
ALBH-EPR-00-RF-DR-A-01-0101	Proposed Site Plan	06/12/21	P01
ALBH-EPR-00-GF-DR-A-02-1500	Proposed Ground Floor Plan	01/12/21	P11
ALBH-EPR-00-GF-DR-A-02-1501	Proposed Mezzanine Floor Plan	01/12/21	P10
ALBH-EPR-00-GF-DR-A-02-1502	Proposed First Floor Plan	01/12/21	P09
ALBH-EPR-00-GF-DR-A-02-1503	Proposed Second Floor Plan	01/12/21	P08
ALBH-EPR-00-GF-DR-A-02-1518	Proposed Seventeenth Floor Plan	01/12/21	P09
ALBH-EPR-00-GF-DR-A-02-1519	Proposed Eighteenth Floor Plan	01/12/21	P07
ALBH-EPR-00-GF-DR-A-02-1530	Proposed Basement Level Plan	01/12/21	P07
ALBH-EPR-00-GF-DR-A-04-0001	Proposed East Elevation	06/12/21	P06
ALBH-EPR-00-GF-DR-A-04-0002	Proposed North Elevation	06/12/21	P05
ALBH-EPR-00-GF-DR-A-04-0005	Proposed South East Elevation	06/12/21	P04
ALBH-EPR-00-GF-DR-A-04-0003	Proposed South Elevation	06/12/21	P05
ALBH-EPR-00-GF-DR-A-04-0004	Proposed West Elevation	06/12/21	P05

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Info added for SNA	04/03/22

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstdcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk