



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

A development of 28 houses
AT **Varley Street, Miles Platting, Manchester**

FOR: **Lovell Partnerships**

VERSION A: **13.06.22**

2022/0166/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police
designforsecurity

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported

We welcome the redevelopment of the site and consider a residential scheme most appropriate.

From a crime prevention perspective, the positive features of the development include: an appropriate balance of types and size of properties; a suitable amount of defensible space around each building; car parking have been included within the curtilage of each house; where feasible, houses have been set out in an 'urban block', with front doors and principal windows facing all aspects of the site.

Advice is included in the report, which we consider will enhance security of the development and this set out in section 3.3. The recommendations are summarised as follows:

- consider upgrading the quality of the streetscape in the cu-de-sac;
- install appropriately secure gates and fencing to define and secure the front and rear gardens and parking bays;
- retain existing and install knee-rails to prevent anti-social parking on grass verges of Bradford Road, Varley Street and Sandal Street;
- ensure the pathway that connects Sabden Close with Bradford Road is safe for users, and that passing pedestrians do not compromise the security of the adjacent houses or the amenity of the residents living in them; and,
- the house should be constructed using Secured by Design approved doors, window frames, glazing and other hardware.

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will make representations to Manchester Planning to require the inclusion of a condition requiring the completed development to achieve Secured by Design, SBD, 'GOLD' accreditation. Should the recommendations included in this report be adopted, I have every confidence that the scheme will achieve the award and the condition met.

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Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The development site and its surroundings are shown on the plan and photographs below. Edged in red on the plan, the site is located in Miles Platting, one and a half miles north-east of Manchester city centre. It falls within the 264-acre, Miles Platting PFI regeneration area, a 10-year development partnership between the City Council and Lovell to provide 1000 new homes and refurbish over 1500 Council properties. Bradford Road, a well-trafficked route that connects the city's inner ring road at Great Ancoats on the fringe of the city centre with Alan Turing way, the city's middle ring road, adjoins the site's south-eastern edge. Industrial premises line the south-eastern side of the road behind which there is a prominent gasholder, which is due to be demolished. Obliquely opposite the site on Bradford Road there is a public house, The Bradford Inn. Largely residential in character, Varley Street, defines the site's south-west boundary; it is a local but well-used route. South-west of Varley Street, at the junction of Bradford Road, there is a small area of greenspace; houses facing Charnley Close overlook this amenity area. Houses facing Stracey Street and Sabden Close overlook the site's north-eastern boundary, whilst newer houses on Sandal Street face the site's north-western boundary. There is a footpath that links Bradford Road to Sabden Close at the site's eastern edge, close to which there is a bus stop on Bradford Road, which allows passengers to board and alight buses travelling from the city centre to the north-eastern suburbs. Signs on Bradford Road and Stracey Street indicate that when matches or other events are held at the nearby Etihad Stadium, parking is restricted to residents displaying the relevant permit.


A north-easterly view across the site from Varley Street



Looking south across the site from the corner of Sandal Street and Stracey Street



Industrial premises and a gasholder and the south-eastern grassed edge of the site on either side of Bradford Road



Sandal Street with modern housing overlooking the north-western fringes of the site



A sub-station housed in a brick shed at the eastern edge of the site next to Stracey Street



Amenity space south-west of the site is overlooked by houses facing Charley Close



The development site itself comprises an almost rectangular shaped area of grassed amenity space supplemented with numerous mature trees in groups and isolated. Once occupied by houses, the site has been long since cleared and the land seeded with grass and managed. The former street pattern is evident in places, particularly at the north-eastern corner of the site where Sabden Close once extended into the site and a footpath linked the head of the defunct cul-de-sac to Varley Street. Grassed mounds have been formed around the fringes of the site to prevent encroachment by vehicles, whilst in other places sections of knee-rail fencing have the same purpose. There is a vehicle access, secured with a steel gate, on Sandal Street. Marketing boards and flags have been erected on the site at the prominent Bradford Road/Varley Street junction promoting the Lovell Homes, in particular a development of new houses nearby. An electricity sub-station, housed in a brick-built, shed-like structure is located on the site at the north-eastern edge of the site adjacent to Stracey Street. The structure has been daubed with graffiti, but attempts have been made to disguise this by overpainting.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood

Crime committed within a 500m radius of the site, recorded between 1st May 2021 & 30th April 2022. Data is accurate to +/- 8%, due to updates with our I.T systems

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Violent crime	Theft including shoplifting	Robbery	Drugs	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
32	<5	81	269	28	8	11	41	13	5

2.1.1 There were 504 recorded crimes in the neighbourhood around the development site during the period analysed. With the exception of neighbourhoods within the city centre, this volume of crime is twice as high as the average rate across the Manchester Division. The neighbourhood is close to the city centre and contains a mixture of residential and industrial property. Part of the neighbourhood falls within the domain of the control zone for parking on Etihad Stadium event days. The proximity to the city centre, blend of residential and commercial property and the proximity of the Etihad all significantly affects the number, type and distribution of crimes.

2.1.2 The most common crimes recorded were:

- crimes involving the use, or threat, of violence - 54%
- theft - 21%
- criminal damage - 16%.
- vehicle crime - 11%
- domestic and commercial burglaries - 7%



2.1.3 The streets experiencing the greatest volume of crime (20 offences or more) were:

- Bradford Road – 59 offences
- Lower Vickers Street - 31 offences
- Manstead Walk - 25 offences
- Barbeck Close - 25 offences
- Varley Street – 22 offences

2.1.4 There were 13 offences on Sandal Street and none on Stracey Street or Sabden Close. Criminal damage and crimes involving the use or threat of violence were most reported on Bradford Road, the Bradford Inn being something of a focus for these incidents. There was a greater spread of crimes committed on Varley Street with no one type of crime dominant. Of the 13 offences recorded on Sandal Street three were vehicle related whilst the remainder involved the use of threat of violence.


Domestic burglary committed within a 500m radius of the site

2.1.5 There were 32 reports of burglary within the neighbourhood during the period analysed.



- 2.1.6 With the exception of Tuesdays, where there was around twice as many burglaries as on other days, the incidence of burglary is spread evenly through the week. Offences tend to take place at night, in the late afternoon or in the evening.


Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry




- 2.1.7 Offenders have most commonly targeted the front and rear doors of properties as a means to gain entry, using force to kick a door open or damaging the lock with a hand tool. In about a quarter of incidents, entry was gained via a window. There were several burglaries where offenders entered a property via an unlocked door. There were several incidents where the offender was disturbed prior to gaining entry and made good their escape.

Vehicle crime committed within a 500m radius of the site

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



The risk of vehicle crime is greatest on a Saturday, and in the afternoon and evening. This suggests that the availability of tariff-free, on-street parking, in close-proximity to the Etihad Stadium is a factor in the occurrence of such crimes, with match or event goers parking within the neighbourhood and continuing their journey to the stadium on foot. That said, the car park associated with Victoria Mill on Lower Vickers Street was the focal point for vehicle-related offences.

2.2 Crime rate comparison


Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester, Greater Manchester, and England & Wales

England & Wales data relates to the period January – December 2021.



Domestic Burglary



Wounding



- 2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **65% higher** than the rate for Manchester, **112% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **117% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.2 The rate of wounding per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **2% higher** than the rate for Manchester, **39% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **165% higher** than the rate across England & Wales.



- 2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **115% higher** than the Manchester rate, **182% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **242% higher** than the rate across England & Wales.
- 2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **50% higher** than the Manchester rate, **146% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **199% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.3 Typical modus operandi used in committing burglary, criminal damage, vehicle-related crime & theft at residential property in Manchester, & measures to reduce vulnerabilities

2.3.1 Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- external doors should be certified to PAS 24 security standard;
- front doors should be visible to neighbouring properties and from the 'street' rather than set within recesses or on more secluded elevations;
- side and rear gardens should be enclosed with appropriately high fencing and locking gates, so that rear doors and windows are only accessible to residents;
- secluded passageways to the sides and rear of properties should be avoided wherever possible as such routes can facilitate offender access to rear gardens, as well as attract anti-social behaviours such as graffiti, fly-tipping, or damage to fencing.
- defensible space should be provided between dwellings and the street, i.e., a small front garden, ideally enclosed with a 1000-1200mm fence or hedge; and,
- all external doors should be illuminated by dusk-to-dawn lighting. Light suggests a property is occupied, and the light will also highlight the actions of an offender, increasing the chance of a crime being witnessed.

2.3.2 Doors and windows have been targeted when left insecure

To minimise the risk of 'walk-in/climb-in' burglaries:

- front doors to houses should be fitted with a fixed handle or a 'split spindle', so that the only way in is with a key;
- windows should be certified to the PAS 24 standard, and be fitted with key operated locks and tamper proof, opening restrictors; and,

- dusk-to-dawn lighting should be fitted to all external doors.

2.3.3 Glazing in rear doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry

To minimise the risk of offender smashing glazing in doors and windows:

- laminate glass should be fitted to all external doors and windows on the ground floor of the houses and garages; and,
- access to rear gardens should be restricted using high fences and locking gates.

2.3.4 Breaking into garden sheds and garages using force to gain entry.

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing entry into garages and garden sheds:

- garage doors should be security certified to LPS 1175 or fitted with a ground anchored T-bar fitted with a Sold Secure padlock;
- double doors should be fitted with two Sold Secure hasp and staples, which are coach-bolted through the door and secured with a Sold Secure™ padlocks, and top and bottom bolts should be fitted to the 'slave' door; and,
- shed doors should be fitted with a Sold Secure hasp and staple, which is coach-bolted through the frame, and secured with a Sold Secure padlock.

2.3.5 Offenders have stolen bicycles

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting bicycles:

- secure cycle parking should be provided at each property,

2.3.6 Vehicles were targeted when parked in unsecured car parks or on the 'street'

To minimise the risk of vehicle-related crime:

- car parking should be located on a gated driveway within the boundaries of the property where it can be supervised by its owner or monitored by an effective CCTV system. Consideration should be given to installing automatic vehicle gates and fencing around any communal car parks.

2.3.7 Offenders have damaged boundary fencing

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting fencing:

- fence panels should be especially robust when they are exposed to the public realm.

2.3.8 Theft of plant and machinery, and criminal damage during the construction period.

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting the construction site:

- a secure boundary should be erected around the site;
- access should be restricted to contractors and authorised visitors;
- security staff should patrol or visit during non-working hours;
- lighting and CCTV should be installed to illuminate and record activity;
- at the end of the working day, plant and machinery should be suitably arranged to prevent forced access onto the site and theft; and,
- plant and machinery should be fitted with tracking devices.

2.4 Environmental features the site that can influence crime patterns

2.4.1 Features of the physical environment can influence patterns criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?

- What are the chances of being seen?
- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder at the site are as follows:

- the south-eastern and south-western edges of the site are very visible on well-trafficked roads, i.e., Bradford Road and Varley Street. Pedestrians and drivers whom, should they witness inappropriate activity, may be inclined to report it and their presence may deter offenders;
- houses on Sandal Street, Stracey Street and Sabden Close, include windows that overlook the site, the prospect of being witnessed by neighbours can help to deter offenders;
- the earth mounds at the edges of the site appear to have prevented any vehicles encroaching on the site, which will preserve the appearance of the greenspace and deter fly-tipping;
- trip rails installed on the edge Bradford Road grass verge prevent cars from parking off the street and damaging the kerb and verge; and,
- the local environment is well-maintained, with little or no sign signs of physical deterioration of buildings, wear and tear of street furniture or the street itself, or accumulations of graffiti and litter.

2.4.2 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder, and these include:

- the site is located in a neighbourhood with crime rate twice the average for Manchester;
- the site lies adjacent to Bradford Road, a well-used route to and from the city centres. Routes such as this can act as a conduit for crime, with criminals using the route to access the city centre seeking out crime opportunities as they do so;
- there are no significant boundaries around the edge of the site, all four edges are open to public access;
- the walls of the sub-station have attracted graffiti, which suggests that people may have congregated here. The presence of graffiti and of people carrying out criminal damage or antisocial behaviour can impact on feelings of safety and security;
- there are numerous street connections around the site, including the pathway that connects Sabden Close to Bradford Road, which facilitate movement through the neighbourhood. Overly permeable neighbourhoods can sometimes be exploited by offenders, whilst the fencing along 'pinch-point' pathways may be regularly damaged and security of gardens compromised;
- the proximity to the Etihad Stadium is likely to result in drivers using the streets in and around the site for parking. Whilst some streets are subject to parking regulations restricting parking to resident permit holders only on event days, there are streets where the restrictions do not apply. There is the prospect, supported by crime figures, that event-goers' cars may be targeted whilst attending the stadium;
- industrial fencing and barbed wire securing the industrial premises on the opposite side of Bradford Road
- the site is very close to the Bradford Inn, which is something of a crime attractor. Disturbances at the pub may have affect the quality of life of residents living closest to it;

3 Development Appraisal

3.1 The proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development involves the clearance of the peripheral, grass mounds and knee-rail fencing, followed by the construction of 28 houses.
- 3.1.2 There will be 5 house types used on the development, a mix of two- and three-storey properties. There will be 8 pairs of detached houses and 4 terraces with three houses in each. Apart from one of the terraces, the houses will be outward facing relative to the site boundary. Seven will face Bradford Road,

nine will face Varley Street, four will face Sandal Street and there will be three facing Stracey Street. The remaining five houses will face Sabden Close, including three which will be located centrally on the site facing an extended section of Sabden Close.

- 3.1.3 All houses will have a modest front garden as well as a more generous rear garden. In all properties car parking will be in curtilage, some houses will have one space whilst others will have two or three spaces. The spaces tend to be at the front or side of the house. The houses that face Bradford Road will have a single parking bay within the rear garden with access from the extended section of Sabden Close.
- 3.1.4 There are no details of the means of enclosing front and rear gardens but other houses on the estate have been defined with 1800mm high walls or timber fences, whilst front gardens are enclosed with a dwarf wall and railing to a height of around 1100mm.
- 3.1.5 The existing sub-station located at the north-eastern end of the site will be retained.
- 3.1.6 Most of the trees on the site will be retained and incorporated into the rear gardens of houses. All of the grassed verge on Bradford Road will be retained. A new grassed verge will be included at the northern end of Sandal Street, whilst the existing grass verge on Varley Street will be retained, except where new driveways will cut across it.

3.2 Positive aspects of the proposals

- 3.2.1 A residential development seems to be an appropriate use for the site given the surrounding land uses.
- 3.2.2 The development includes family housing. Family housing is more likely to retain a presence on the street throughout the day, particularly families with younger children.
- 3.2.3 There are sufficient numbers of houses within the development such that it is likely that some residents may be at home through the day. The presence of residents or even just visible signs of people present, for example, cars on driveways, lights on in houses, external lighting on at entrance doors will help to deter offenders.
- 3.2.4 Houses are, in part, arranged in a perimeter block, with defensible to the front and rear of each dwelling.
- 3.2.5 The houses are orientated in such a way that promotes activity in appropriate places and passive supervision across the 'streets' to neighbouring houses and business premises, and across the Sabden Close cul-de-sac.
- 3.2.6 Rear gardens will be secured with gates.
- 3.2.7 The provision of driveway parking spaces will reduce the risk of vehicles being targeted by offenders.
- 3.2.8 Some of the parking bays will be set out behind gates.
- 3.2.9 Front doors and principal room windows face the 'street', which helps to promote street activity and natural surveillance. Bay windows are especially welcomed.
- 3.2.10 The retention of trees and grassed verge will preserve the add greenery to the streetscape.

3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the scheme

Streetscape

- 3.3.1 In order to emphasise ownership, and encourage maintenance of, and play/socialising in, the street, the application of a high-quality surfacing of the extended section of Sabden Close is recommended. The creation of a shared surface/'Home-zone' design for the 'street', rather than a standard engineering solution will emphasise 'territoriality', promote 'ownership' of the 'street' amongst residents, and encourage play/socialising – all of which adds to the overall supervision of the public space and deters crime. We encourage the inclusion of such measures as: a rumble strip or raised plateaux; use of ornate blockwork or a non-standard, coloured/textured tarmac, non-standard lighting columns and signage. Such measures suggest that a threshold has been crossed into a space that is more private, where one's actions may be under greater scrutiny.
- 3.3.2 Retain existing knee -rails and install additional knee-rails to prevent anti-social parking on grass verges of Bradford Road, Varley Street and Sandal Street;

House security

- 3.3.3 Secured by Design standard, doors, window frames and glazing should be installed within each house. We recommend fitting an intruder alarm to each house.

Front garden boundaries

- 3.3.4 Where it adjoins the footpath linking Bradford Road to Sabden Close, the front/side garden boundary to plot 15 should be a wall and railing with a combined height of around 1500mm. The rear garden may be enclosed with an 1800mm high timber fence.
- 3.3.5 Elsewhere, front gardens should be defined with 1100mm railings, or dwarf walls with railing infill. Vehicle gates at the front of the houses should be of the same height and style as the adjacent fencing.
- 3.3.6 Where necessary, ownership/management responsibility between plots should be clearly defined with a low railing or hedge.
- 3.3.7 In order to differentiate parking bays where they adjoin those of the neighbouring house, railings or stone setts should be used to define ownership.

Rear garden fencing and gates

- 3.3.8 Rear garden fencing should be secured with 2000mm high walls or close-boarded fences finished with trellis.
- 3.3.9 Fencing between neighbouring houses should include an 1800mm high, close-boarded fencing panel (acting as a privacy screen, generally erected perpendicular to the back of the house before it may be lowered to 1200mm or 1500mm of close-boarded fencing with 600mm or 300mm sections of trellis to create a secure boundary whilst also allowing neighbours to interact.
- 3.3.10 To allow cyclists and drivers to come and go, garden entry gates should be fitted with a lock that allows entry and exit with the use of a key.
- 3.3.11 Garden entry gates should be 2000mm high, a combination of timber and trellis. Where they also assist in the securing the rear garden, vehicle gates should be of the same design as pedestrian gates and fitted with a lock that allows entry and exit with the use of a key.
- 3.3.12 A gate securing the rear garden access pathway to the house on plot 02 should be installed at the outer edge of the pathway (similar to plot 18).
- 3.3.13 An additional gate should be installed to secure the pathway to the rear gardens of plots 26 and 27 (similar to plots 11 & 12 and 14 & 15).
- 3.3.14 Communal garden pathway entry gates should be fitted with a lock that allows entry and exit with the use of a key, self-closing and lock upon closure. They should also be 2000mm high and comprise steel rail or timber and trellis.

Cycle parking

- 3.3.15 Include a ground or wall anchor to which bicycles may be secured or provide an appropriately, secure, cycle shelter (ideally a Secured by Design accredited store) within the rear garden of each property.

Sub-station

- 3.3.16 Consider screening and enclosing the sub-station with a 1800mm high, welded-wire, mesh fence and access gates, and/or appropriate climbing shrubs or hedge planting.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ Front doors and back doors, including hinged, sliding, or multi-folding doors, must all be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS 202 BR2, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Front doors should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key when closed.

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- ☐ Front doors should have fixed sidelights or a door viewer, as well as an opening limiter fitted, so that residents can identify visitors prior to opening the door fully.
 - ☐ Chain or similar opening limiters should be fitted to the front doors.
 - ☐ Letter plates should meet the Door Hardware Federation's Technical Standard 008 (TS 008), be fitted with deflector plate, and be located a minimum of 400mm away from the internal handle and locking hardware.
 - ☐ Each house should be clearly numbered with the number visible from the 'street'.

4.2 Window frames

- ☐ Ground floor windows must be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, be fitted with key-operated locks, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limiting opening to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing within, and surrounding, all external doors and all ground floor windows of the houses must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356.

4.4 Intruder alarm

- ☐ It is good practice to fit an alarm to each house. Alarms should be linked to contacts on all external doors, with PIR detectors covering all ground floor rooms that have windows. In the absence of an alarm a 13amp fuse spur should be provided to allow future residents to fit their own alarm.

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ The front boundaries of the houses should be demarcated by low boundaries such hedges, walls, or railings to height of around 1100mm.
- ☐ Sub-divisional boundaries to the front of houses should be defined with railings, fencing or hedges.
- ☐ 2000mm high, timber gates should be installed to secure the access to rear gardens.
- ☐ To allow cyclists to come and go, garden entry gates should be fitted with a lock that allows entry and exit with the use of a key. Security will be enhanced if the gates are self-closing and lock upon closure.
- ☐ The street facing elements of rear garden boundary fencing should be secured with 1800mm high walls or fences, finished with an additional 200mm of trellis.
- ☐ Fencing between rear gardens of neighbouring houses should include an 1800mm high, privacy panel and 1200mm or 1500mm of close-boarded fencing with 600mm or 300mm sections of trellis.

4.6 Landscaping

- ☐ With the exception of around the sub-station, in order to facilitate natural surveillance across the development, any shrub planting within front gardens, should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ External, dusk-to-dawn lighting should be installed at all front and rear doors.
- ☐ Lights should be operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light rather than yellow/orange light.

4.8 Meter cupboards

- ☐ Unless smart meters are installed, meters should be located in ground level boxes to the front of each property, not with the secure area at the side or rear of the house.

4.9 Downpipes

- ☐ Wherever possible, downpipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the brickwork to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.

5 Construction

- ☐ The developer should take appropriate measures to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in and out.
- ☐ The contractor on this scheme should be a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme'.
- ☐ Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved.

6 Secured by Design (SBD)

- ☐ Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout, and construction stages of homes and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact	Summary of Contact
29/03/22	Leigh Ellis, PRP	Statement requested
21/05/22		Site visited
13/06/22	Leigh Ellis, PRP	Statement issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following document and drawings:

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	Design and Access Statement		
BA9882-PRP-A-2000	Site Location Plan	18/03/22	
BA9882-PRP-A-2001	Existing Site Plan	18/03/22	
BA9882-PRP-A-2005	Proposed Type Plan – Option B	01/04/22	04
BA9882-PRP-A-2031	Heartford-Leaford Terraces – Plans and Elevations	22/03/22	01
BA9882-PRP-A-2032	Oakley-Lexington Terrace	22/03/22	01
BA9882-PRP-A-2034	Stateley Semi	23/03/22	01
BA9882-PRP-A-2035	Stateley-Oakley Semi	23/03/22	01
BA9882-PRP-A-2036	Heartford Semi	24/03/22	01
BA9882-PRP-A-2037	Leaford Semi	25/05/22	
BA9882-PRP-A-2038	Leaford-Heartford-Leaford Terrace	25/05/22	

In the event of any changes to the scheme, it may be necessary to review the recommendations made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions	Date
A		13/06/22

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing
- b) Performance of hardware
- c) Resistance to static loading
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS02 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk