



## CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

**Bennett Street**

**100 Apartments, 172 Houses and Community Centre (80qm)**

For: **Kellen Homes**

Version A: **19/07/22**

Ref: **2020/0183/CIS/02**

Greater Manchester Police

**designforsecurity**

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# Bennett Street

2020/0183/CIS/02

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Development Supported - Minor design changes/security additions required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, however to improve the scheme from a crime prevention perspective please review in more detail the points outlined within Section 3.3 of this report namely:

- *Secure cycle store provision*
- *Access control for entrance lobbies*
- *Post & delivery arrangements for the apartment blocks*
- *Ground floor external material protection against graffiti*
- *Defensible space around ground floor windows*
- *The development should be built to Secured by Design standards*

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

**Please note:** Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.

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
# 1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.


The site lies in West Gorton, bounded by a railway line to the north, the Piccadilly line viaduct to the west/south-west, Bennett Street to the south-east and existing housing stock to the east (fronting onto Antony Close/Hayfield Close).

The site is currently occupied by a freight forwarding company, including some brick commercial warehouses (largely to the south of the site along Bennett Street) and large areas of freight container storage. To the north of the site, along the railway line, is a narrow overspill parking area serving the commercial premises to the west (accessed through an archway in the existing viaduct). The eastern portion of the site is occupied by a former demolition yard, including a brick office building adjacent to the Palisade entrance gates off Bennett Street and a large metal-clad warehouse to the north, along with large external area currently housing mounds of earth. The small hard surface area off Bennett Street in front of the entrance gates has been secured with large concrete blocks to prevent unauthorised vehicular access.


The freight park is accessed off Bennett Street, with the street frontage defined by the brick façade of the warehouse building, high walls, palisade fencing and barbed wire, as well as scrub vegetation. There are high walls to the rear of the dwellings to the east, previously erected to block out noise and dust as much as possible, and there is mesh fencing along the northern boundary of the park and the adjacent car parking area.



7 – View towards site from Bennett St. opposite side of Piccadilly line.




6 – National Rail land opposite the site with evidence of fly-tipping.




5 – View south west along Bennett St.



1 – The site & existing building on Bennett Street.



2 – View south east along Rostron Avenue.



3 – Trafford Bar metrolink tram stop on Elsinore Road.



4 – Evidence of fly-tipping at previous entrance off Bennett St.

## 2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1<sup>st</sup> July 2021 to 30<sup>th</sup> June 2022.

### Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

| Domestic Burglary | Non-Domestic Burglary | Criminal Damage | Less Serious Wounding | Theft | Robbery | Serious Wounding | Theft from Motor Vehicle | Theft of Motor Vehicle | Bicycle Theft |
|-------------------|-----------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|-------|---------|------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|---------------|
| 10                | 10                    | 24              | 94                    | 27    | <5      | <5               | 10                       | 12                     | <5            |

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is 11% below the average rate of crime for the Manchester district, with less serious wounding, theft and vehicle crime most commonly reported. The majority of crime has taken place to the east and south of the proposed site, around Cloverdale Crescent and Bennett Street where residential estates are located. Offences occurring to the west are concentrated around the industrial estate just off Hyde Road.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have taken place throughout the local area, with a hotspot of offences occurring to the south of the proposed site, around Cloverdale Road located within Longsight and to the east around Bennett Street located within West Gorton. Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the highest recorded offences taking place with domestic incidents and incidents between known associates being the most commonly reported.
- 2.1.3 Theft offences have mostly taken place around the industrial unit located to the west of the site on Hyde Road, with offenders removing personal property of employees, as well as equipment/ items belonging to the businesses. Offences occurring in the residential areas have mostly involved the theft of personal property from lockers at the local leisure centre, items from classrooms as well as wheel clamps belonging to Manchester City Council.
- 2.1.4 Vehicle crime has taken place throughout the area, with criminal damage to vehicles, theft from and theft of vehicles taking place. Offenders have smashed glazing, causing damage and removing items from vehicles. Offenders have also targeted registration plates and vehicle parts, using tools to remove them. Offenders have targeted motor vehicles, using flatbed trucks in order to remove the vehicle. Securely parked vehicles have mostly been targeted.

## 2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access.

*Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see section 4.1 & 5.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors into apartment blocks before allowing them access to the building (also see section 4.1). The main communal entrances should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access.*

*The locks to the front entrance doors of houses should be fitted with split-spindles (see Section 4.1), essentially meaning they are key only entry and are secure from the exterior of the dwelling when shut. This will ensure that they cannot be left open and accessible.*

*All private spaces to the sides/rear of the building should be robustly enclosed, particularly where adjacent to publicly accessible space, to deter unauthorised access. Open pedestrian routes/accessible land to the rear of the properties should be avoided. Lighting to the front and rear of dwellings can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime.*

- 2.2.2 Gaining access to secure apartment complexes by means of tailgating residents and insecure doors, gaining access to resident only areas (mail rooms, bicycle storage and apartment doors).

*Possible Solution - All individual apartments should be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.), cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an*

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offender could operate without fear of detection. A staffed 24/7 concierge desk will support the management and security of the entrance lobby.

A robust audio-visual access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to the apartment blocks before allowing them access. The main communal entrance/s to the blocks should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. Consideration could also be given to 'airlock' lobby system, which features a secondary entrance door that only releases when the external door has closed, reducing the opportunities for tailgating unnoticed. All individual internal apartment entrance doors should be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (see above), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection.

#### 2.2.3 Breaking of glazing in windows and doors using implements.

*Possible Solution - An appropriate glazing specification should be used to adequately secure the building. All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. In vulnerable locations, shutters or perforated protective panels may be necessary to provide extra protection. However, the layout of the building and position of windows should be designed to avoid vulnerabilities as much as possible. Any damage arising from vandalism should be repaired quickly in order to maintain a culture of care and respect, as a lack of maintenance can often attract further abuse.*

#### 2.2.4 Forcing open secure shutters using implements and tools (mostly metal bars) in order to gain access to the windows and doors located below.

*Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 5.2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, ideally the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack.*

#### 2.2.5 Prising open of windows, including windows on balconies and on the ground floor, using implements most likely screwdrivers, crowbars or similar at residential properties.

*Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 5.4), with key operated locks and opening restrictors. All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 5.4). Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points.*

## 2.3 Risk Factors - Residential

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces

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- Poor maintenance of access control systems





## 2.4 General Risk Factors – Community Centres

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Theft of user/staff belongings
- Other theft from premises
- Theft of/from parked cars
- Uncontrolled access
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Arson
- Violence towards staff and other users
- Cycle security
- Cash robbery/attacks on vending machines
- Anti-social behaviour
- Loitering groups
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

## 2.5 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester and Greater Manchester




The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.



- 2.5.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **19% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **4% higher** than Greater Manchester and **7% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **20% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **9% higher** than Greater Manchester and **109% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwelling is **1% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **32% higher** than Greater Manchester and **60% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **4% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **58% higher** than Greater Manchester and **92% higher** than England & Wales.

## 2.6 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Thursday during the evening (6pm – 7:30pm & 9pm – 11:59pm) and the early hours of the morning (6am – 8am). Offenders often target properties during the evening and early hours of the morning when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified. The peak in offences during the evening – 6pm – 7:30pm is likely when residents are returning home from work and finding the property has been burglarised.

2.6.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors (mostly to the rear of the property) using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements/tools.
- Posing as a legitimate tradesperson and gaining access to the property, removing items from within.
- Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.

## 2.7 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis




*The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.*



- 2.7.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on a Wednesday, Thursday and Saturday during the evening (6pm -9pm). Offenders often target vehicles in an evening when they are likely to be left unattended for long periods of time, out of sight of the owner, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

## 2.1 Non-Domestic Burglary (Greater Manchester Community Centres): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against community centres, recorded in the Greater Manchester area 2018-2019.





**2.1.1 Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at Greater Manchester community centres remains relatively consistent, with the exception of Tuesday – when it is slightly lower. During the day, the risk of burglary peaks in the early hours of the morning and during the early evening. At night, when it is dark and streets are quiet, offenders often perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected. During the early evening, community centres are likely to be at their busiest, meaning offenders posing as legitimate patrons can attempt to gain unauthorised access to restricted areas without being noticed.

**2.1.2 Point of Entry:** The following entry points and M.O.s have been the occurred most frequently:

- The majority of incidents have occurred through 'unknown' entry points, which is likely to have been where offenders posing as legitimate service users have gained entry to internal restricted areas by forcing doors, by tailgating or by targeting insecure doors unnoticed.
- Doors (particularly fire doors) have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements/tools or have been targeted when left insecure to gain access.
- Windows have also been prised open and targeted when insecure.
- The glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.
- Shutters have been forced upwards/penetrated to gain access to the doors and windows behind them.

## 2.2 Theft (Greater Manchester Community Centres): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against community centres, recorded in the Greater Manchester area 2018-2019.



- 2.2.1 **Day/Time Range:** Incidents of theft at Greater Manchester community centres peak on Monday and are lowest on Tuesday. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated in the afternoon/early evening. This aligns with the standard opening and closing times for many community centres, when more people attend them and, therefore, the opportunities for theft are greater. The most routinely targeted items are items of personal property belong to patrons and staff members, particularly laptops, mobile phones and handbags.

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## 3 Layout Appraisal

### 3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposal seeks to redevelop the former Olympic Freight Terminal site on the outskirts of Manchester City Centre within West Gorton/Ardwick. The proposal will also incorporate the demolition of an existing buildings fronting onto Bennett Street. The site is a large expanse of derelict concrete waste ground.
- 3.1.2 Residential-led development including demolition of an existing building, new public realm spaces including hard and soft landscaping, 100 apartments, 172 houses and a Community centre (80sqm).
- 3.1.3 The houses will have front and rear gardens and will be served by in-curtilage off-road parking driveways to their front, side and rear. The proposed apartment blocks will occupy the southwestern portion of the site, fronting onto the new access road off Bennett Street, with secure communal parking areas to their side and rear and a small number of visitor parking spaces to their front.

### 3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

*The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.*

- 3.2.1 The mix and size of properties will offer a broader range of individuals and families the opportunity to live within the district of West Gorton/Ardwick. A diverse resident population brings with it a likelihood of a level of activity around the development throughout the day, and a greater prospect of a more stable population as residents may be more likely to remain. Residents who remain for the long term are more likely to develop social ties with the area and with other long-term residents who then have more of a vested interest in the maintenance and security of the development. Developments with greater social cohesion, and active management, tend to be less prone to the effects of crime and disorder.
- 3.2.2 The proposed development will positively add to the regeneration of West Gorton/Ardwick.
- 3.2.3 The proposed masterplan will see the development of a long-standing empty plot. The redevelopment of the site will remove a site which provides no street level activity.
- 3.2.4 The proposed building plots provide further ground floor activity in the form of residential uses and new public realm leading to dedicated resident entrance reception spaces. In-turn these uses offer good levels of activity and natural surveillance of the adjacent streets. Resident cycle storage areas are located in prominent locations.
- 3.2.5 Resident amenity spaces provide opportunities for residents to meet and foster community relations within the development. Schemes which have good social communities are less likely to tolerate inappropriate behaviour and are more willing to challenge unfamiliar faces in the development.
- 3.2.6 Where ground floor amenity spaces have been located, consideration appears to have been taken through the use of external facing materials; glazing, providing good levels of activity.
- 3.2.7 The urban design will provide a new road layout with each property having off-street parking in front of the house.
- 3.2.8 Each house will have garden space to the front and rear of the property.
- 3.2.9 Extensive landscaping of the public realm to the streetscape and green spaces will complement the proposed masterplan. A series of pedestrian routes will be implemented to encourage less reliance on vehicles.
- 3.2.10 The residential proposals incorporate a mix of dwelling house and apartment typologies.
- 3.2.11 The apartment entrance lobbies provide a good view of people entering the apartment blocks. Entry to the stairs and lifts from the lobby should require access-controlled-operation. All visitors to the residents of the apartments will be required to enter via the reception area. Mailboxes for residents should be located within the lobby area so that regular delivery personnel do not need to be given access to the residential parts of the building.
- 3.2.12 There are clearly-defined, entirely separate entrances into each of the different uses proposed, which reduces the opportunities for confusion and conflict and reduces the opportunities to criminals. The

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residential blocks and amenity spaces each have single access/egress points in prominent locations off the public realm, which are capable of being robustly managed to control access.

- 3.2.13 The public realm central landscaped play park will be well-overlooked by the proposed buildings and should benefit from legitimate activity and passive surveillance at all times of the day and night, promoting a greater sense of safety in the public realm.
- 3.2.14 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

### 3.3 Public Realm influences over crime patterns

- 3.3.1 Features of the physical environment can influence patterns criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:
- How easy will it be to enter the area?
  - How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
  - What are the chances of being seen?
  - If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
  - Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?
- 3.3.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder at the site are as follows:
- being located on well-trafficked streets and overlooked by routinely occupied buildings. the site is subject to surveillance by local residents as well as passers-by on foot and in cars. The casual observations by residents and passers-by may deter some offenders.
  - the site is well connected to the core of the city centre. Pedestrian routes are generally busy during the daytime, particularly that they pass along Bennett Street to Hyde Road (a main road connecting to the city centre), and include residential properties, with largely 'active' frontages and regular pedestrian flows, especially during the working day; and,
- 3.3.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder and the fear of crime, these include:
- Although the volume of crime in the neighbourhood is low. A development in this location, is very likely to attract the interest of criminals should they become aware of it whilst going about their everyday activities. Burglary, criminal damage to buildings, theft and vehicle crime are all likely to affect a development on this site. Anti-social behaviour resulting in disturbance to residents, particularly on those on the ground floor is also likely to occur.
  - vacant buildings and plots of vacant land in the vicinity of the site sometimes attract those intent on criminal damage (e.g. smashing glazing and graffiti), burglary and theft (particularly metals or slate).
  - Introducing residential uses to this area may lead to an increase in demand for evening and overnight parking on poorly supervised streets by residents or visitors, which may lead to an increase vehicle-related crime in the neighbourhood.
- 3.3.4 The design and layout of the public realm surrounding the blocks should be carefully considered. It should not include any hard/soft landscaping features that may impede surveillance opportunities or foster loitering/gathering, nuisance, anti-social behaviour or misuse. The following issues should be addressed with the public realm/landscaping strategy (also see Section 4.8):
- The proposed public realm features and any changes in ground levels, with step/ramp features to accommodate them. Such features can sometimes impede surveillance opportunities and provide features that can be mis-used. These features, as well as benches and any other hard

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landscaping features, should be designed to deter and withstand any such treatment and to maximise surveillance opportunities of/from them.

- Public realm furniture items should be robust to sustain constant daily use and form part of the management and maintenance regime. Damaged features which are not tended to over a period of time can lead to further decline and respect for the area.
- In particular, the potential to foster nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues at night. The central public realm area will benefit from levels of footfall, activity and will rely on passive surveillance from the residential properties overlooking this area. The area must be well-lit and designed to maximise surveillance opportunities and eliminate hiding places. Any windows or doors adjacent to these areas may also need additional protection.
- Any cycle parking areas located throughout the public realm area should be located where they can be overlooked from routinely occupied areas.

### 3.4 Changes Needed and Recommendations

*The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.*

- 3.4.1 Any proposed landscaping features (hard or soft) within the public realm, in front of dwellings/buildings or around parking areas should not impede natural surveillance of/from the buildings/spaces or create climbing aids over any boundaries. Future soft landscaping growth and maintenance must be taken into account at the design stage.
- 3.4.2 The main entrances to each apartment block should be self-closing and fitted with secure access controls to operate (see Section 4.1). The external entrance doors should be capable of being secured and controlled remotely by residents if required (e.g. into the evening/at night), to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/anti-social behaviour in and around the entrance lobbies.
- 3.4.3 It should not be possible for an intruder to progress beyond the entrance lobby and enter the residential area of the building. Visitors should require passage through further access-controlled doors to stairs and lifts.
- 3.4.4 The entrance doors and windows at ground floor to the houses and apartments must be protected by some clearly defined defensible space - creating areas entirely separate from the street, in ownership/control of the residents themselves that protect the accessible doors/windows from nuisance, anti-social behaviour and unauthorised access (see Section 4.6). These units should also not include any ground floor or otherwise accessible balconies, which will be vulnerable unauthorised access - both forced and when door/windows are left insecure (a common MO in this area).
- 3.4.5 The exposed gable ends of houses should be protected by a dense band of landscaping. Such gable walls are often used as targets in ball games, and whilst there may be no intent on disturbing the residents within the house it is not unknown for issues to arise as a result of ill-considered designs.
- 3.4.6 Bin storage – space should be identified within the enclosed front or rear gardens to accommodate waste bins, avoiding the need for free-standing bin stores in front of the houses where they could provide potential hiding places and targets for criminal damage.
- 3.4.7 Any communal rear access alleyways should also be gated at their outermost point, in order to prevent access to where dwellings can be vulnerable to unauthorised access unseen and ensure that any offenders attempting to gain access can be clearly seen from the street.
- 3.4.8 Definition of front gardens. Definition of frontage. Front and side garden boundaries should be well-defined to indicate ownership, using low walls, railings, planting and / or surface materials, and discourage intruders from approaching the dwellings and parked vehicles, or taking short cuts.
- 3.4.9 Street furniture and landscape features should be used to prevent unwanted parking or access onto pedestrian only surfaces. It should be very clear in which spaces, or on which streets, vehicle parking is authorised.
- 3.4.10 Any play areas within the amenity spaces should be located at an appropriate distance from residential property (see “Planning and Design for Outdoor Sport and Play” published by Fields in Trust [www.fieldsintrust.org](http://www.fieldsintrust.org) ).
- 3.4.11 Communal facilities and amenity space. The robust management of such areas is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur. Poor management and

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maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour.

- 3.4.12 It is important to formalise the proposed road and pedestrian links across the new development.
- 3.4.13 As the proposed public spaces and plots are developed consideration needs to be given towards external lighting. The proposals are to incorporate a lighting scheme that will distribute illumination evenly around the space without areas of shadowing or pooling and work coherently with the wider security requirements of the site such as any CCTV for apartment entrances, car parking courts and the Hub building.
- 3.4.14 Consideration for safe bicycle storage should be embedded within the landscape design. Short-stay cycle parking stands should be located where they can be readily observed. The location of cycle stores within proposed buildings should consider the position, inherent physical security and safety of cyclists using the facility.
- 3.4.15 The residential cycle stores should be enclosed within a secure area, with a single entrance door to prevent illegitimate access. All cycle stores will need to be provided with access control measures for resident only use. Entry to the stores must be restricted to genuine cyclists only, on application to the managers of the building. Racks within the enclosures should allow cyclists to lock the frame and both wheels.
- 3.4.16 Poor design, management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour. Any landscape features (hard or soft) should not impede natural surveillance of/from the buildings or reduce the effectiveness of lighting or any CCTV system. The design of any hard landscaping features or street furniture, in particular any steps, ramps or benches, should be designed to withstand and discourage the potential for mistreatment and damage (e.g. from vandalism, skateboarding, rough sleeping etc.). Bollards or similar hard/soft landscaping features should also be incorporated to prevent unauthorised vehicles from accessing the courtyard.

## 3.5 Points for Further Consideration

- 3.5.1 Graffiti on surfaces. Expanses of blank wall exposed to public areas should be formed of a graffiti-resistant surface or have a resistant coating applied to enable easy removal of any unauthorised markings.
- 3.5.2 Vegetation Management. The proximity of bushes and trees to the fence line can undermine the security of the boundary by creating cover for an intruder or providing potential climbing aids. Overhanging branches and dense vegetation should be removed where it could be exploited in this way. Care must be taken to ensure the proposed landscaping to the perimeter of the site is maintained at an appropriate height (see Section 4.6), in order to prevent it impeding views to and from the site, and avoid the creation of hiding places that could be exploited by offenders.
- 3.5.3 Residential post/parcel/grocery room. Arrangements for the delivery of post should not allow postal or grocery delivery staff to have access to internal areas of the residential block beyond the GF reception space. Postal workers should not be given unfettered access to the entire building as this could potentially leave apartments and residents vulnerable. (see Section 4.1 for more information)
- 3.5.4 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors

## 4 Physical Security (Residential)

*In addition to the layout issues highlighted in section 3, the following checklist (sections 4-7) forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation if required.*

### 4.1 Doors (Houses)

- ☐ Front and rear doors to dwellings must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ French/double doors or sliding patio doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.

- ☐ Front doors to properties should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key.
- ☐ Front doors should have either fixed sidelights or door viewers.
- ☐ Chain limiters are recommended but not generally essential.
- ☐ Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

## 4.2 Doors (Apartments)

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to STS202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system - these features should be permitted under the scope of the security certification.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to STS202 BR2, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24:2012, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead.
- ☐ Communal doors located within the corridors should include glazed elements to assist sight lines.
- ☐ Ground floor external French/double doors or sliding patio doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24:2012.
- ☐ Chain limiters to apartment entrance doors are recommended but not generally essential.
- ☐ Any external escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24:2012, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ The main entrance door and doors off the lobby area should be controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set), so that residents can vet callers to the building before allowing them access.

## 4.3 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily-accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

## 4.4 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

## 4.5 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:
  - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
  - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- ☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

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## 4.6 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:
  - All external doors where regular staff access is required.
  - Doors separating internal zones / lobbies
  - Any internal doors to obvious high risk or controlled areas (e.g. storage / server / locker rooms)
  - Cycle stores

## 4.7 Boundaries

- ☐ Inward opening automatic gates to provide access to the sports courtyard area must be certified to one of the following standards:
  - LPS 1175: Issue 7, SR2
  - STS 202: Issue 3, BR2
  - Sold Secure Gold
  - PAS 68: 2013
- ☐ Any ground floor townhouse/apartment windows to the Street/courtyard elevations of the podium that will not front onto the front garden spaces described above must be protected by defensive planting beds. The windows themselves should preferably have as high cills as possible and be non-opening. If not, they should have only small opening lights fitted with opening restrictors to avoid providing opportunities to criminals.
- ☐ Boundary treatments to front gardens should be designed to discourage comfortably sitting on or leaning against them, which could potentially cause nuisance and intimidation to residents.
- ☐ The ground floor townhouses and apartments which front onto the public realm and the landscaped courtyard, must be protected by some defensible space, defined by dense low-level planting, creating front gardens areas in ownership/control of the residents themselves.

## 4.8 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by

## 4.9 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors (manual override is also permissible).
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

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## 4.10 Other

- ☐ Meter cupboards should be located to the fronts of properties only, not in the private areas. Smart meters are acceptable.
- ☐ Any externally-mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- ☐ Any garden sheds must be securely fixed to a concrete foundation and the shed door fitted with a certificated 'Sold Secure' Silver Standard padlock, hasp and staple (coach bolted through the shed structure). The shed door should be at least 44mm thick so that the door can be locked into the doorframe using either a mortise deadlock or mortise sash lock certificated to BS 3621: 2007.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction, and metal pipework and wiring should not be visible.

# 5 Physical Security (Non-residential)

## 5.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24:2012, STS02, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Any sliding doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ All internal doors / frames to offices and stores should be solid core (minimum 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and a 5 lever mortise deadlock (to BS 3621 / EN 12209), so that the rooms can be secured when unoccupied.

## 5.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Any shutters to protect ground floor openings must integrally-mounted and be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required), and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.

## 5.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

## 5.4 Roof construction

- ☐ Lightweight roofing systems must be certified to a minimum of:
  - LPS 1175: issue 5 or above, SR1
  - STS 202: Issue 1 or above, BR1

## 5.5 Curtain Walling

- ☐ Secured by Design recognises four distinct types of glazed wall systems. These are:

- Large glazed units connected by 'spider clamp' system.
- Glazed units directly retained within a framing system (usually aluminium)
- Framed windows installed within a separate framing system.
- Framed windows connected to other framed windows to create a window wall.

☐ Glazed curtain walling must be installed using a secure glazing retention system. The method of retaining glass must include one or more of the following:

- Security glazing tape
- Dedicated security sealant or gasket
- A secure mechanical fixing system (Evidence will be required to prove the system is secure. This may be achieved by utilising the specific glazing retention test within PAS 24:2012 or by indicative test on the retention system to LPS 1175: Issue 7, SR1 or STS 202: Issue 3, BR1)

☐ Framed windows (3 and 4 above) used within the construction of a window wall must be certified to one of the following requirements:

- BS PAS 24:2016
- STS 204 Issue 3: 2012
- LPS 1175 Issue 7:2010 Security Rating 1

## 5.6 Access Control

☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:

- Main entrance doors
- Internal doors off entrance lobby
- Doors separating internal zones within the buildings

## 5.7 Alarms

☐ The intruder alarm should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

☐ It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (be that an alert to the key holder, or to a security patrol team).

## 5.8 Boundaries

☐ New secure boundary treatments should generally be 2400mm high and of welded wire mesh construction.

☐ There should be minimal ground clearance beneath the fence, to reduce the potential for crawling in to secure areas.

☐ The site boundary treatment should be positioned on hard standing ground. Where this is not possible, the ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary. Care should be taken to ensure that fence panels are fixed securely to the posts and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates.


☐ Secondary / internal fence lines may be lower, e.g. 1800 to 2100mm.

☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.

☐ Gates should be in keeping with the height of adjacent boundary treatments and incorporate either:

- A pad lockable bolt to the midpoint of the internal face, or
- A key operable deadlock

- ☐ All vehicular and pedestrian gates should also be 2400mm high. There should be no centrally-located horizontal bars to aid climbing and the gates should be positioned away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, street lights, trees etc. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of All boundary fencing should be reviewed to ensure that it provides a consistent level of security around the site.
- ☐ Fencing separating the site frontage from secure areas should be a minimum of 2.1m high.



## 5.9 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

## 5.10 Lighting

- ☐ Lighting to vehicle circulation areas, service yards and car parks should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout/lux plan.
- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

## 5.11 CCTV

- ☐ CCTV Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [Main entrances & lobbies](#), [building perimeter](#), [cycle parking](#).

## 5.12 Other

- ☐ Any externally-mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- ☐ Any bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.
- ☐ All high value equipment (e.g. computers, projectors, flat screen monitors / televisions, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage / theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction, and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the building. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.
- ☐ Signage and orientation. Routes leading to and from various facilities in and around the site should be obvious to site users and visitors. Disorientation can provide legitimacy for an offender to be present in a restricted area. Clear signage should be provided throughout the site which will help to direct people to where they need to go, and discourage entry to restricted areas.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to a protective coating applied to any areas that may be vulnerable to graffiti (such as large expanses of blank walls and inside toilets) - applied at the outset in order to facilitate rapid removal (e.g. 'easy on' – see [www.urbanhygiene.com](http://www.urbanhygiene.com) for details).
- ☐ Car parking - Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated, with pedestrian routes/directions clearly signed.

## 6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 The designer must ensure that this report is included within the BIM management model so that all parties are aware of the requirements for construction and management.
- 6.1.2 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff and residents should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 6.1.3 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
  - Litter and graffiti removal to ensure that the site remains in good repair.
  - Regular inspection, service and repair to security features (lighting, signage, access controls, CCTV, alarms, fencing & gates)

- 
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees to ensure that sight lines are maintained and coverage of lighting and CCTV is not impaired.
  - Ensure that the site management is for which the building / site was designed able to cope with the remains in place, such as 24 hour concierge / security patrols.

6.1.4 Information regarding security features (such as specifications of windows / doors and systems performance) should be conveyed to the ultimate owners or managers of the site to ensure that any future replacements continue to provide the same level of security and maintain any security accreditation for the development.

## 7 Construction

7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

## 8 Useful References

### 8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

## A Contact register

| Date       | Contact With | Summary of Contact                |
|------------|--------------|-----------------------------------|
| 14/07/2022 | Kellen Homes | CIS instruction received          |
| 14/07/2022 | Kellen Homes | Fee agreed / commission confirmed |
| 15/08/2022 | GMP finance  | Invoice issued                    |
| 18/08/2022 | DfS          | Site visit                        |
| 22/08/2022 | DfS          | CIS version A issued              |
|            |              |                                   |
|            |              |                                   |

## B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

| Drawing No.    | Drawing Title                  | Date     | Rev |
|----------------|--------------------------------|----------|-----|
| 22041 (PL) 200 | Proposed Floor Plans - ACACIA  | 21/06/22 |     |
| 22041 (PL) 201 | Proposed Floor Plans – CEDAR   | 30/06/22 |     |
| 22041 (PL) 202 | Proposed Floor Plans – HICKORY | 21/06/22 |     |
| 22041 (PL) 300 | Proposed Elevations – ACACIA   | 22/06/22 | A   |
| 22041 (PL) 301 | Proposed Elevations – CEDAR A  | 01/07/22 |     |
| 22041 (PL) 302 | Proposed Elevations – HICKORY  | 30/06/22 |     |
| 22041 (PL) 303 | Proposed Elevations – LARCH    | 01/07/22 |     |
| 22041 (PL) 304 | Proposed Elevations – OLIVE    | 01/07/22 |     |
| 22041 (PL) 305 | Proposed Elevations – PALM     | 30/06/22 |     |
| 22041 (PL) 306 | Proposed Elevations – CEDAR B  | 01/07/22 |     |
| A-100          | Site Layout                    | 18/02/22 |     |
|                | Block 2 and 3 Elevations       | 02/12/21 |     |
|                |                                |          |     |
|                |                                |          |     |
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|                |                                |          |     |

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

## C CIS Version History

| Version | Revisions Made | Date |
|---------|----------------|------|
| A       |                |      |
|         |                |      |

## D Glossary

### Burglary Resistance Standards

#### BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

*A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.*

#### BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

*An attack test standard for door sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.*

#### ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

*The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:*

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

#### LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

*This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.*

#### STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

#### STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

#### EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

*A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.*

### Commonly Used Acronyms

#### CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

#### CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

#### CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

#### INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

#### PVB / PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

#### LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

#### UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

### Useful Websites

#### Design for Security

[www.designforsecurity.org](http://www.designforsecurity.org)

#### Secured by Design

[www.securedbydesign.com](http://www.securedbydesign.com)

#### RIBA Product Selector

[www.ribaproductselector.com](http://www.ribaproductselector.com)

#### LPCB – Red Book Live

[www.redbooklive.com](http://www.redbooklive.com)

#### Crime Reduction (Home Office)

[www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk](http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk)

#### DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

[www.designagainstcrime.org](http://www.designagainstcrime.org)

#### Building for Life

[www.buildingforlife.org](http://www.buildingforlife.org)

#### CLG (Communities and Local Government)

[www.communities.gov.uk](http://www.communities.gov.uk)