



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Expansion of existing restaurant bar unit incorporating enclosed car parking area and part of colonnade (Use Class E), expansion of office use into mezzanine space (Use Class E); associated external alterations, creation of external seating area, and creation of ground level plant enclosure to rear

1.1.3

AT Union Building, Albert Square

FOR: Bruntwood Management Services Limited

Greater Manchester Police

VERSION A: 12.01.21

designforsecurity

2014/0439/CIS/03

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported

The proposed development is welcomed. The proposals are likely to result in an increase footfall to the area in the evening and passive surveillance of the surrounding public realm of Brazennose Street and Mulberry Square. The appearance of Union will be improved by the remodelling of the façades, and the extension of the Veenio premises into the colonnaded area will result in the purposeful use of otherwise problematic space.

From a crime and anti-social behaviour perspective, the only significant issues to address are:

- the installation of appropriately secure doors and glazing to the Veenio unit
- restricting access to staff-only areas
- securing management and staff rooms
- preparing a management plan for the premises that includes the proper management of the external seating area
- upgrading the CCTV and intruder alarm systems.

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police will support the proposals and recommend that, should the application be approved, a condition be included requiring the approved works to be constructed in accordance with the recommendations set out in section 3.3 and the specification set out in section 4 of this report.



Adrian Murphy MRTPI

Consultant

e: adrian.murphy@designforsecurity.org

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
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1 Visual Audit


The development site and its surroundings are shown on the plan and photographs below. The site, specific areas of Union, an office building that is located in Manchester city centre, opposite the Town Hall, within the Albert Square Conservation Area. Heron House, a similarly styled office building is situated directly opposite Union. Heron house includes a range of ground floor, commercial uses - including several food and beverage premises - that face either Albert Square, on the eastern facade, and Brazennose Street, on the northern elevation. Brazennose Street is pedestrianised and connects Albert Square with Cross Street and Spinningfields. West of the development site, on the north side of Brazennose Street, a seven-storey office building is under construction; when complete, later in 2021, it will add 102,000ft², grade 'A' office space in the heart of the city centre. St Mary's RC Church and associated parochial house is situated on Mulberry Street, adjacent to the north-western corner of Union. Tasle Alley, a narrow cul-de-sac, connects Albert Square with Mulberry Passage, a narrow, secluded, covered walkway that connects John Dalton Street to Mulberry Street and Mulberry Square. Albert Square and Manchester Town Hall are situated to the east of the Union building. Both the Town Hall and the Square are undergoing a major refurbishment with estimated completion date of 2014.





Approaching Union from the south-west corner of Albert Square



Looking west along Mulberry Street with the site on the left, St Mary's church on the right and the emerging replacement for Brazennose House development on the centre-left



Veeno occupies a commercial unit at the corner of Brazennose Street and Mulberry Square



Undercroft area of the car park secured with railings on the Mulberry Square elevation of Union



The service entrance at the rear of Union on Mulberry Street



A view of the Union building's service yard

The proposed development involves works to several areas of the Union building, which highlighted in red on the plan above. Union is a refurbished, six-storey, office building, with commercial space at street level. It is an 'L-shaped' building with its principal elevations facing east towards Albert Square and south on Brazennose Street. Accessed via Mulberry Street, there is a small, secure, service yard and car park at the rear of the building, part of which is located within an undercroft area at the south-western corner of the building. The service yard is enclosed with walls, railings and automated vehicle gates. The entrance to the office space is prominently located at the corner of Albert Square and Brazennose Street. Dutton's, a pub restaurant, occupies a large unit and associated colonnaded forecourt that faces Albert Square. Veeno, an Italian themed wine cafe, occupies a small unit at the south-western corner of Union with frontage to both Brazennose Street and Mulberry Square and an outdoor seating area within the colonnaded forecourt of the building. Breakout, a themed leisure facility with its 'shopfront' on Brazennose Street, adjoins Veeno.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 and 30th June 2019.



2.1 Crime summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
12	263	257	1197	1064	257	45	403	37	170


- 2.1.1 Over the period analysed, there were 4,330 crimes recorded in the neighbourhood in which the proposed development is centred. This is a very high number of crimes but the site is located within the city centre with its high number of crime attractors and crime generators, including: retail outlets, licenced premises, car parks and transports hubs.
- 2.1.2 The 'stand-out' crimes in this neighbourhood are those involving the use or threat of violence, theft, burglary, robbery and vehicle-related crimes - particularly theft from a vehicle. The principal hotspots for crime are in areas with high concentration of shops and/or bars. So, Market Street and the Arndale, in the retail core are hotspots for theft, whilst Peter Street, with its concentration of licensed venues is a hotspot for theft and crime involving violence.
- 2.1.3 Just fewer than 42% of all recorded crimes in this neighbourhood involve the use or threat of violence. Theft accounts for a further 25% of the crimes recorded.
- 2.1.4 Burglary of commercial property is widespread throughout the city centre but there are particular hotspots around King Street, Cross Street and Deansgate.

2.2 Burglary at offices: risk analysis

The data below relates to burglary at offices in Manchester.




- 2.2.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester peaks on Tuesday and Sunday. The risk rises at night/into the early hours of the morning. Premises are usually targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied; offenders can attempt to gain access without fear of being disturbed or apprehended.



- 2.2.2 **Point of Entry:** The greatest number of burglaries involved gaining entry by entrance, or fire, doors. Offenders have also smashed glazed panels in doors and windows to gain entry. A number of burglaries have occurred during the day, when offices are open for business; in these cases offenders may have posed as legitimate visitors before stealing property.

2.3 Theft at offices: risk analysis


The data below relates to incidents of theft at offices in Manchester.




- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** The risk is greatest from Monday to Friday. Office premises are more vulnerable during the working week, with most office premises closed over the weekend.
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** The risk of theft is concentrated from 09.00-17.00, peaking around mid-day. Electrical items, mobile phones and cash/wallets were most frequently stolen.

2.4 Burglary at restaurants & cafés: risk analysis

The data below relates to burglary at restaurants and cafe premises in Manchester.





- 2.4.1 **Day/ Time Range:** The risk of burglary fluctuates throughout the week, with an increased risk on Monday, Thursday and Sunday. Risk also increases during the early hours of the morning, when premises are usually closed.



- 2.4.1 **Point of Entry:** The greatest number of burglaries involved gaining entry by entrance doors, usually front doors but also rear doors and fire doors. Offenders have also forced shutters open prior to targeting doors and windows, and smashed glazed panels in doors and windows to gain entry. On several occasion offenders forced their way into premises by targeting walls or the roof.

2.5 Theft at restaurants and cafés: risk analysis



The data below relates to theft occurring at restaurants and cafes in Manchester.



- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of theft is high throughout the week, but highest on Wednesday and Saturdays. The risk rises through the afternoon into the early evening before falling away. Handbags, purses/wallets and mobile phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items. Offenders have also targeted I.T equipment within premises, particularly tablets and laptops, as well as alcohol from storage rooms.

2.6 Vehicle crime: risk analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in this neighbourhood is very high, particularly so at the weekend. The risk rises through the day and is greatest in the mid-late evening.

2.7 Modus operandi used in committing burglary and theft in offices and restaurants and cafes in Manchester & recommendations to reduce risk

2.7.1 Doors of offices, including escape doors, have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all communal entry doors, office suite entry doors, service doors and escape doors should be certified to BS PAS 24 security standard;
- communal entry doors, service doors and escape doors should be visible from the 'street' rather than set within deep recesses or on especially secluded elevations. Offenders will be less inclined to target properties where their actions may be witnessed;
- defensible space within the building, in the form of a secure, ground floor, lobby and lobby/reception area to the office suites should be provided.

2.7.2 Glazing in windows and doors has been smashed

To minimise the risk of breaking and entering via glazed areas:

- laminate glass should be used throughout the development. Laminate glass is extremely difficult to break and penetrate sufficiently to reach in and open locks and, because of its structural properties; and,
- consideration should be given to installing security grilles to any particularly vulnerable windows and glazed doors or omitting glazing the most vulnerable.

2.7.3 Offenders posing as legitimate customers or staff to gain entry to offices or access staff-only areas and then stealing property

To minimise the risk of offenders posing as customers or staff to gain access:

- install access controls to prevent entry into the building to the doors connecting the entrance lobby to the stair and lift core, and to any 'back of house' areas where staff belongings may be stored;
- install access controls at each office suite entrance door;
- locate a reception desk in the ground floor lobby such that staff can easily supervise the entrance doors and the lobby generally, as well as intercept and register visitors;
- include a staffed desk in the reception area of each office suite;
- install CCTV cameras to monitor movements in, out, and around the building;
- all staff should wear a lanyard with identification badge;
- overt signage should be used to assist in deterring casual entry; and,
- include space for employees to store personal/valuable items securely e.g. lockers.

2.8 Risk factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Criminal damage to property
- Robbery
- Theft of stock by an employee
- Alcohol-fuelled conflict and violence directed at staff
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Theft of staff personal belongings

2.9 Environmental features that can influence crime patterns

2.9.1 Features of the physical environment can influence criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether or not to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?
- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

2.9.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder on and around the site are as follows:

- the site is located in a neighbourhood where significant developments have been completed (including the refurbishment of Heron House and Union), or are under construction, the result of which will be greater levels of activity and footfall on the streets around the site with an increase in passive surveillance by staff of these developments as well as by passers-by. The public realm will improve and street lighting, and light spilling from buildings that are likely to be occupied well into the evening, will make the neighbourhood feel safer for pedestrians;
- the area will gain a significant uplift by the refurbishment of the Town Hall and the remodelling of Albert Square - a building and public space of a very high quality. Neighbourhoods where the environment is of a high quality tend to be respected by the public and better maintained by public bodies; and,

-
- there are an increasingly diverse range of land uses in the neighbourhood, broadening the appeal of the area and attracting custom throughout the day and into the evening;
- 2.9.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder, and these include:
- the site is located within an area where there is a high volume of recorded crime. Criminals are already attracted to this area and may exploit other criminal opportunities; and,
 - the absence of regular street activity or passive surveillance for much of the day and night on side streets of Tasle Alley, secluded parts of Lincoln Square and Mulberry Passage leaves them vulnerable to criminal and anti-social activity.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development involves the following elements:
- the expansion of Veenoo into the undercroft area of the car park at the western side of the Union building and into the adjacent unit;
 - replacing the railings that secure the undercroft openings facing Mulberry Square with glazing and a door to service the external seating,;
 - expansion of Veenoo into part of the colonnade on Brazennose Street elevation;
 - installation of new shopfront to Brazennose Street with entrance door at the corner of the building;
 - expansion of office use into the mezzanine space;
 - setting out an external seating area to Veenoo in Mulberry Square; and,
 - creation of ground-level, plant enclosure to the side and rear of the Veenoo unit.

3.2 Positive aspects of the proposal

- 3.2.1 There are no issues with the expansion of office use into the mezzanine space.
- 3.2.2 The plant enclosures will be securely located within the courtyard at the rear of the building.
- 3.2.3 The proposed investment in Veenoo is welcomed.
- 3.2.4 The Veenoo premises are not in an area that is dominated by licensed premises.
- 3.2.5 The expansion of food and beverage use will not result in an overly large venue; it will remain a business with a modest capacity.
- 3.2.6 The nature of the proposal is such that it is very unlikely to attract customers who may engage in aggressive or criminal behaviour. Licensed premises that have a food offer tend to have less crime and disorder problems.
- 3.2.7 The majority of customers will be seated. Venues with large capacities and with low ratio of seating to customers tend to be more difficult to manage and more susceptible to violence.
- 3.2.8 In the past, given the appearance of the facades of the adjacent buildings to the east and west, Mulberry Square has been a rather dull space. The proposed external seating area, if appropriately managed, and staff and customers are cognisant of the nature of services held at St Mary's Church, will add to the activity, interest and surveillance of Mulberry Square and adjoining streets.
- 3.2.9 Extending the Veenoo premises into the colonnaded area will result in the re-use of recessed space within the colonnade, which is sometimes used for anti-social purposes. The result of which will give the building a more consistent appearance on the street, and enhance activity and supervision of Brazennose Street by both staff and customers.
- 3.2.10 Union is managed by Bruntwood, who have an excellent record in property management. The company are also based in the building.
- 3.2.11 Public transport and taxi ranks are located close-by.

3.3 Recommendations to improve security at the Veen0 premises

- 3.3.1 All new, external doors within the shopfront of Veen0 should be certified to a recognised security standard, e.g. PAS 24, STS202 or LPS 1175.
- 3.3.2 Retained, external doors at the rear of the Veen0 unit should be replaced with security rated doors or supplemented with additional BS 3621 locks – two per door leaf (at third points on the active leaf and top and bottom on the slave leaf).
- 3.3.3 New shopfront glazing should be laminated.
- 3.3.4 The external seating area, and all entrance, escape and service doors, should be appropriately illuminated.
- 3.3.5 The CCTV system should be up-dated to include cameras capable of monitoring all areas of the premises, all external doors, and the proposed external seating area.
- 3.3.6 The intruder alarm system should be upgraded to reflect the expanded premises.
- 3.3.7 A panic alarm for use by staff should be considered.
- 3.3.8 A secure staff/management office and a secure stock room should be provided. CCTV recording equipment, staff personal belongings and a safe to hold cash should be stored in the staff/management office. A PAS 24 rated door, or a 44mm, solid-core door with at least one key-operated BS 3621 or BS 8621 lock, (preferably two locking points), are most suitable. The door should include a viewer to allow staff to vet others prior to opening the door. Access to the management office/staff room (and stock room) should be restricted to staff only. The management office door and stock room door should be self-closing and self-locking.
- 3.3.9 Signage should indicate the areas of the premises that are restricted to staff only.
- 3.3.10 'Chelsea Clips', GrippeTM clips, or simple hooks should be fitted to the underside of tables to allow customers to secure bags or jackets while keeping it in view/close to their person.
- 3.3.11 The external seating area should be enclosed with suitable barriers with a single, clearly defined, appropriately located, supervised, entry point.
- 3.3.12 Tables, chairs, parasols and barriers should be removed into the premises or securely stored externally when the seating area is closed. Given the proximity of St Mary's and the parochial house, the external seating area should be vacated at a reasonable hour, I would suggest 22.00.
- 3.3.13 A management and operating policy should be produced, which includes reference to:
- Staff presence at the premises, and the need for multiple numbers of staff to be always present during business hours.
 - Management of customers entering the premises
 - Management of the external seating area
 - A procedure for opening and making the premises secure after customers have left so that counting and securing the takings can be carried out in a secure environment
 - Details of the alarm and CCTV systems - including CCTV camera positions and monitoring/recording facilities - and a maintenance schedule.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ All new external, hinged doors should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Internal doors to the management office and store rooms, should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24 or be FD30, solid-core doors, with 3 hinges and at least one 5-lever, mortice, deadlock.

4.2 Glazing

- ☐ All external glazing must incorporate an internal pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining external pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Curtain walling panels should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.

4.3 Access control

- ☐ Doors to the staff room, management office and stock rooms should be fitted with electronic locks operated by swipe card or fob, or numeric key pads. These doors should be self-closing and lock securely upon closure.

4.4 CCTV

- ☐ The Veeno CCTV system should be reviewed and upgraded. Cameras should be capable of monitoring all entrance doors, the internal and external seating areas and
- ☐ Images should be recorded and stored on site or off-site by a suitable monitoring/management company.

4.5 Alarm

- ☐ The intruder alarm should be adapted to ensure full coverage of the Veen premises. Alarm contacts should be fitted to all external doors with PIR detectors at suitable positions within the premises. It should be actively monitored.

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
11.11.20	Don Murphy, Paul Butler Associates	Crime Impact Statement commissioned
16.12.20		Site visited
12.01.21	Don Murphy, Paul Butler Associates	Report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings:

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
AXI 100	Proposed ground floor building plan	29/01/20	04
AXI 176	External elevations proposed Lincoln Square	29/01/20	01

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any changes to the scheme, it may be necessary for Design for Security to review the recommendations made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		12.01.21

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing
- b) Performance of hardware
- c) Resistance to static loading
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS02 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk