



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Macdonald Manchester Hotel, 91 London Road, Manchester

**Proposed extended reception, terrace & porte-cochere,
& internal layout remodelling**

FOR: Macdonald Hotels and Resorts

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

VERSION A: **06.10.17**

2017/0695/CIS/01

Macdonald Manchester Hotel, 91 London Road, Manchester

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported

The scheme is well considered from a crime prevention perspective, with few interventions required to enhance the security of the development. Recommendations are largely centred on the need to install robust doors, glazing and access controls in order to withstand any attempts at criminal damage, and to prevent unwanted visitors gaining access, whilst allowing legitimate customers and guests entry.

Positive aspects of the scheme include:

- large expanse of glazing within ground floor lobby will strengthen natural surveillance of the public realm;
- the proposed porte-cochere will be a striking feature which clearly indicates the location of the principal entrance to the hotel;
- the proposed, secondary, entrance is appropriately located; and,
- the proposed external terrace will facilitate a welcome increase in natural surveillance over this section of London Road.

To improve the scheme from a crime prevention perspective:

- include provision to secure the guest entrances at night-time;
- the surrounding street environment (lighting & street surfacing) must be improved to provide an appropriate setting to the development, to minimise the occurrence of anti-social behaviour, and to prevent inappropriate parking; and,
- the development adopt Secured by Design standards.

I am happy to support the proposed development.



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

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1 Visual Audit

The photographs and plan below show the development site and its surroundings. The site, edged red on the plan, comprises the central part of the MacDonald Manchester Hotel. It is located to the south of the city centre close to Piccadilly Station. Though a single, nine-storey, sinuous building form, the hotel is divided into three parts at ground level by a service road and by Travis Street, both of which pass directly under the building at grade. The main entrance to the hotel is located in the central part of the building facing, but slightly elevated above, London Road. Pedestrian and vehicles can access the main entrance via the service road, a series of five steps connects the entrance to the service road. The service road links Travis Street to Berry Street to the rear of the hotel. The hotel reception area and entrance are somewhat cramped, and the juxtaposition of Travis Street, the service road to the main entrance is not ideal from visual/legibility perspective. To the north of the main entrance there is a large void space beneath the building where several of the buildings supporting columns are situated, to the side of Travis Street. The pedestrian pathway that connects this space to the main entrance is partially hidden by the very large columns. To the front of the hotel there is a ramped pathway between the building's curving façade and the service road. Within the vicinity of the hotel, London Road is a heavily trafficked street but has little pedestrian activity by comparison. There is a steady flow of students coming and going from the residential accommodation to the east of the hotel, and more concentrated flows of customers, primarily in the evening, to and from of the Apollo concert venue further south at Ardwick Green.



There have been 879 reported crimes reported in the neighbourhood around the site in the past 12 months. This volume of crime is very high but not untypical of areas around the fringe of the city centre. Vehicle related crime is the most common in this neighbourhood at around 38% of the crime recorded. Given the presence of several large, commuter, car parks and abundance of on-street parking provision in the area to the east of the hotel, where there is little street activity, partly due to the largely industrial/warehousing land uses in that area, and where other forms of criminality tends to be recorded, it is unusual to see such a high level of vehicle crime. Violent crime is the next most commonly recorded offence in this area, at around 27% of the total. There is a significant area within the city centre within the area analysed where there are numerous licensed premises, which tend to be a focus for violent crimes especially on weekends nights. There have been over 750 crimes at hotels within Manchester in the period analysed. The most common crimes are those involving the use of threat of violence (40% of the total), theft (20%) and burglary (18%). Fourteen crimes were recorded in the same period at this hotel. No one type of crime was dominant. There appears to be a correlation between the star rating of the hotel and its propensity to attract criminal activity – the lower the rating the more likely it is to attract crime. Considering the local environment and the principal crime groups that affect hotel developments, the principal risk areas associated with this development are likely to be: the location of secluded service and escape doors; preventing unwanted visitors into the building or beyond the entrance foyer; ensuring the quality of escape and entrance doors are robust enough to withstand attempts to damage them or force open; and, the being cognisant of criminal and anti-social and criminal behaviour that takes place in the surrounding streets, particularly on weekend nights.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st August 2016 and 31st July 2017.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
15	49	124	245	94	46	7	200	30	39

2.1.1 Overall crime in this neighbourhood has been very high in the past 12 months. The most prevalent offences have been violence, vehicle crime (including theft of/from and criminal damage to) and theft. These crimes are typical of those experienced within the city centre, where there is a concentration of retail and licensed premises, people (including a high number of offenders) and vehicles, all of which tends to result in to increased levels of crime and disorder.

2.1.2 A large proportion of crimes within the area analysed have occurred in car parks or at hotels (20%), and the majority of theft has taken place in licensed premises.

2.2 Modus operandi used by offenders committing burglary and theft at hotels in Manchester & measures to reduce vulnerabilities

2.2.1 **Offenders posing as hotel staff or guests, accessing staff only/restricted areas to steal property**
To minimise the risk of offenders gaining access to staff only areas and the hotel generally:

- access control systems should be used to secure sensitive areas of the hotel, e.g. the staff rest rooms, bar/cellar, kitchens, offices and store rooms;
- all staff should wear an appropriate form of clearly visible ID and/or a company uniform;
- all doors separating public areas from staff only areas should be monitored by CCTV; and,
- personal lockers should be provided for staff to secure their belongings within a secure staff room and a small safe provided to each guest bedroom.

2.2.2 **Doors in hotels have been targeted when left insecure**

To minimise the risk of 'walk-in' burglaries:

- internal and external doors into staff only areas within the hotel should include robust access controls and doors should be self-closing and self-locking when and where appropriate;
- hotel bedrooms should include self-closing doors which, upon closure, and activate the locking mechanism fully;
- all external doors should all be monitored by CCTV; and,
- an alarm should sound to alert hotel staff that service doors or escape doors are open.

2.3 Risk Factors


The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery
- Theft of personal belongings whilst at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to private space
- Vehicle and cycle theft


- Theft by employees
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Violence towards staff
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.4 Burglary at Hotels: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary at hotels recorded in Manchester.




- 2.4.1 **Day and Time Range:** The risk of burglary at hotels in Manchester fluctuates throughout the week, but is greatest from Friday to Monday. The risk of burglary rises in the early afternoon and again in the late evening when guests are likely to have left their rooms to do business or to socialise.



- 2.4.2 **Point of Entry:** In the majority of burglaries (69%) at city centre hotels, the point of entry has not been determined. It is likely that these burglaries have occurred when offenders have entered hotels posing as legitimate guests and gained access to hotel rooms without using force- possibly when they have been left insecure by guests, or by using stolen or forged keys/cards.
- 2.4.3 Open access to the premises has occasionally allowed offenders to enter freely before targeting unmanned staff only (bar or kitchens) areas.

2.5 Theft at hotels: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to theft at hotels recorded in Manchester.



- 2.5.1 **Day Range:** The risk of theft is noticeably higher over the weekend. This is likely due to an increased offender activity in the centre over the weekend.
- 2.5.2 **Time Range:** The risk of theft varies throughout the day with particular increases in risk around mid-day, late afternoon and in the evening. Hotels tend to be particularly busy at these times, especially in the bar and dining areas, with a constant exchange of people entering and exiting, providing 'cover,' for offenders to mingle with guests and other customers. Handbags, mobile phones and purses are the most routinely stolen items.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development involves the following:
- erection of a porte-cochere at the main entrance on the London road elevation;
 - creation of an 75m² external seating area to the bar and lounge located in front of the London road façade and adjacent to the main entrance;
 - an infill extension of around 250m² in the void between the main entrance and Travis Street to enlarge the reception area and provide an alternative entrance at the corner of Travis Street and London Road; and,
 - internal other alterations, some of which have the extant consent.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features will make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed extension, with its curved glazed facade will enhance the level of activity and casual supervision of the section of London Road in front of the hotel and of the junction of Travis Street and London Road throughout the day.
- 3.2.2 The proposed new entrance on Travis Street is suitably located in a very visible location convenient to guests coming and going to the city centre and Piccadilly Station.
- 3.2.3 The redesigned reception area facilitates the supervision of guests as they enter the hotel as well as maintaining casual surveillance of the public realm around the entrances.
- 3.2.4 The proposed porte-cochere will serve to clearly indicate the principal entrance to the hotel.

3.3 Recommendations to Enhance the Security of the Development

The following points have been identified for further consideration.

- 3.3.1 The new entrance door on the Travis Street corner of the building should be automated and capable of being secured remotely by staff manning the receptions desk, for instance at night-time when there may be a desire to control entry into the hotel at a single entrance.
- 3.3.2 The glazed façade to the extension should include laminate glazing which meets the P4A specification under the EN 356 standard.
- 3.3.3 The proposed new doors, including the escape doors, should meet a recognised security standard and glazed elements should also include P4A rated laminate glazing.
- 3.3.4 The external terrace should be enclosed with a suitable temporary or permanent barrier system to prevent direct access from the street.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ The proposed new entrance doors should be:
 - compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2;
 - include a multi-point electronic lock, (which is an integral part of the certification), capable of being operated via an electronic access control system; and,
 - be self-closing and capable of locking automatically on closure, although it is accepted that with the main entrance doors, the locking system may only operate at night-time.
- ☐ The doors onto the external terrace should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ If sliding or revolving doors are installed, they should be tested, and certified to, ENV 1627-30 (WK2+).
- ☐ The escape door onto Berry Street should be certified to LPS 1175 sr 2, be self-closing and lock securely upon closure. The door should be free of any ironmongery on the public side of the door. An alarm should alert staff that the door is open.

4.2 Glazing

- ☐ All new glazing must incorporate an internal pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under the EN 356 standard.

4.3 Access Control

- ☐ Access controls on doors should be operable by swipe card, room key card or fob, and not numeric key pads.
- ☐ An audio-visual unit should be located at the two principal entrance doors to allow staff to communicate with visitors at night when the hotel may be secure. Staff should be able to operate the entrance door locking mechanisms remotely to allow *bona fide* visitors entry.

4.4 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk-to-dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors. Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.5 CCTV

- ☐ The CCTV system should be adapted to enable new entrance and escape doors to be monitored.
- ☐ Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
 - With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
 - Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
 - **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
 - **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras, and lighting, that are vulnerable to damage should be protected, either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required, or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ Well placed cameras will help to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations for cameras would be: all building elevations, with particular focus on entrance and escape doors; the external terrace; the bar; the reception desk; and the entrance lobby.

4.6 Other

- ☐ Signage should be used in all areas to direct people throughout the hotel, and also to deter unauthorised access to staff only areas.

5 Management & Maintenance

- ☐ A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address repairs to the building. It should include reference to lighting, signage, and access controls.

6 Construction

- ☐ The developer should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction. The contractor should be a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme'.
- ☐ Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved, (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
15.08.17	Flavia Invernizzi, SDP	Request for Crime Impact Statement
18.09.17		Site visited
06.10.17	Flavia Invernizzi, SDP	Report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
P.01	Location Plan	23.05.17	
P.02	Block Plan	23.05.17	
P.03.B	Site Survey	24.05.17	
P.04	Existing Plans	24.05.17	
P.08	Proposed Lower GF Plan	31.05.17	A
P.09	Proposed Upper GF Plan	31.05.17	
P.12	Proposed West and East Elevations	24.05.17	
P.14	Proposed Visualisation 03 & 04	07.06.17	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing
- b) Performance of hardware
- c) Resistance to static loading
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS202 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk