



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Francis Road

24 Apartments

For: **Southway Housing Trust**

Version D: **29/07/22**

Ref: **2021/0465/CIS/01**

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

Francis Road

2021/0465/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor design changes / security additions advised

This development has been assessed using the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to expose any opportunities for crime and the fear of crime within the proposal.

The following points have been raised as issues with the proposed scheme and further detailed information can be found in section 3.3 of this report.

- Residential access control into the building, bin & bike store.
- Access control of residential entrance & car park.
- Boundaries with adjacent premises & road

Our support for this scheme is subject to the above issues being satisfactorily addressed, as described within the report.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken within and around the site.

The site is located on Francis Road in the Withington district of Manchester.

The existing building on site appears to be empty. All windows facing onto Francis Rd have metal mesh shutters.

The building is located within a predominantly residential area of Withington.

The proposed site shares its neighbouring boundaries with an NHS residential community building on the south west elevation and a residential dwelling on the north east boundary.



There are a small number of businesses facing onto Cotton Lane, a newsagents and take-away business all in close proximity to the site.

Parking in the area is in high demand with on-street parking dominant, partially due to the nearby location of the Christies hospital.

Boundary treatments around the site are a combination of historic concrete panel fencing and weld mesh fencing.

An access road off Cotton Lane provides vehicle access to a shared rear parking court for the site and the neighbouring NHS building. Existing foliage is overgrown in places.

Withington centre is approx. 1km north west of the site.



7 – Shared parking court.



6 – Access road off Cotton Lane.




5 – Alleyway serving residential properties on Cotton Lane.



1 – Proposed development site facing Francis Rd.



2 – Commercial retail units on Cotton Lane.



3 – View north east along Francis Rd.



4 – Access road off Cotton Lane.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 to 30th June 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
73	<5	38	60	12	17	<5	34	7	<5

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is relatively low for the Manchester district with an exception to domestic burglary, which is high. Less serious wounding, domestic burglary and vehicle crime have been the highest recorded offences taking place in the area.
- 2.1.2 The area consists of student accommodation located to the north of the proposed site, around Cotton Lane and Delaine Road, which has experienced a high volume of domestic burglaries, and long term residential housing located to the south, around Parkville Road. The most common M.O (modus operandi) is approaching the rear of the property and forcing open windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements, as well as insecure doors particularly in multiple occupancy housing.
- 2.1.3 Vehicle crime in the area mostly consists of theft from motor vehicle. Vehicle crime has mostly occurred to the north of the proposed site, around Stephens Road and Delaine Road. The most common M.O has been smashed glazing to gain access to the vehicle and steal personal items.
- 2.1.4 Less serious woundings have taken place throughout the local area, with assaults and public order offences most commonly reported. Hotspots of offences have occurred around the east of the proposed site, around Alveley Avenue. Offences have mostly involved domestic disputes and incidents between known associates.

- 2.1.5 Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain entry.

Possible Solution - All external doors and accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards, which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Entrance doors should be positioned where they can be easily seen from neighbouring properties and passers-by. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.

- 2.1.6 Breaking glazing in windows and doors (mostly ground floor windows) using implements.

Possible Solution - All ground floor / accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within or directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. Side and rear gardens should be enclosed with appropriately high and robust fencing with lockable gates so that rear windows are only accessible to residents. Secluded passageways to the sides and rear of properties should be avoided wherever possible, as such routes can facilitate offender access to rear gardens, as well as attract anti-social behaviours such as graffiti, fly-tipping or damage to fencing.

- 2.1.7 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.

Possible Solution - A robust access control system is required to prevent unauthorised entry to communal areas. Communal entrance doors and all individual apartments should be provided with a security-certified entrance door set (see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Apartment entrance doors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection. Any ground floor doors opening onto private or communal garden space must fall within a secure boundary line.





2.2 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.3 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester and Greater Manchester




The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2020.



- 2.3.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **25% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **118% higher** than Greater Manchester and **213% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.3.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **53% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **27% lower** than Greater Manchester and **22% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.3.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **53% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **32% lower** than Greater Manchester and **1% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.3.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **29% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **29% higher** than Greater Manchester and **124% higher** than England & Wales.

2.4 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary in the local area peaks on Wednesday and Friday during the evening and into the early hours of the morning. Offender often target properties in the late evening and early hours of the morning when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.4.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access.
- Exploitation of insecure windows and doors
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.
- Entering the rear garden of the property and using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the garden shed/ garage.

2.5 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on a Monday and Friday during the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target vehicles in the early hours of the morning when vehicles are less likely to be over looked by the vehicle owner for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development comprises the construction of a new apartment block containing 24 dwellings over 3 floors (Ground + 2 floors). Provision for car and bicycle parking, together with a secured bin store which will be accommodated within the building adjacent to the vehicle entrance.
- 3.1.2 The main resident access to the site will be off Francis Road, with vehicles accessing the parking court from a newly formed road off Cotton Lane.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposal will bring legitimate activity to what appears to be a currently-vacant site that is vulnerable to criminal damage and other abuse. Redevelopment with housing and repopulation of the site should help to create a sense of ownership and responsibility, and improve informal policing of the area.
- 3.2.2 A new access road will be formed off Francis Road to the proposed rear car parking court. This will provide the opportunity to control access to the parking court through the use of a vehicle gate(s). In addition to the gated control it will also allow for an upgrade to the parking road surface, lighting and boundary treatments. These enhancements will provide reassurance to residents and the neighbouring NHS building staff & users.
- 3.2.3 The layout of upper floor corridors is relatively free of projections or recesses that could impede sight lines. Doors within communal corridors should contain a glazed element to improve informal surveillance. Individual apartment entrance doors are positioned flush with the corridor walls removing the potential for concealment.
- 3.2.4 Cycle stores for residents' use are provided at ground floor within the building. Entry to the stores must be restricted to genuine cyclists only, on application to the managers of the building. Racks within the enclosures should allow cyclists to lock the frame and both wheels, and should be obtained from a Secured by Design-approved supplier (see www.securedbydesign.com for details).
- 3.2.5 Many of the apartments will have routinely-occupied rooms overlooking the communal areas and adjacent public realm, which will help to increase natural surveillance in the public realm around the site and communal areas around the new block.
- 3.2.6 The residents' entrances to the building have scope to be laid out with a double door entry system, creating a lobby area and inner access-controlled doors to allow further entry to the inner hall and stair well. This helps to discourage tail-gating into the blocks, which is the most common method of entry for intruders.
- 3.2.7 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can appear hostile and increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Entrances. Overt entry statements should be located at the access points off Francis Road, such as piers, gate posts, and / or an obvious change in surface material, in order to distinguish the circulation areas within the site from the public realm / street, and define the area round the apartment block as private.
- 3.3.2 The communal entrance must be well lit, be fitted with security-certified doors and fitted with an electrically operated, multi-point lock, activated with a programmable fob. There should also be an audio-visual link to each apartment, so that residents can remotely allow *bona fide* visitors.

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- 3.3.3 Access into the building should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set), so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access in to the reception area only prior to providing access further into the building.
 - 3.3.4 Given the high levels of vehicle crime and theft of cycles in the local area, access to the proposed cycle parking areas must be robustly secured, controlled and maintained, in order to prevent unauthorised access. The cycle store and refuse stores should also be enclosed and fitted with security-certified, fob-controlled doors to prevent unauthorised access/theft.
 - 3.3.5 Effective lighting should be included to allow users to feel secure in the hours of darkness. Location of lamp columns for the parking court should take account of obstructions to vision such as any proposed or existing vegetation and parking arrangements for vehicles.
 - 3.3.6 The car parking area and pedestrian routes should be illuminated to a high level and in accordance with BS 5489 which should be considered as the minimum standard. A variety of lighting sources should be used to illuminate the environment rather than reliance on one type of lighting which can lead to pooling/shadowing.
 - 3.3.7 To minimise the risk of offender's tail-gating legitimate residents/visitors, the secondary doors into lobby entrance, residents' parking courtyard should also include access controls. Access controls will need to be used at the communal entrances to restrict entry into the development to residents and their authorised visitors.
 - 3.3.8 Residential post - Arrangements for the delivery of post should not allow postal staff to have access to internal areas of the residential area beyond the reception space. Mail boxes for residents should be located either within a secure lobby area or use a 'through-the-wall' post box arrangement. Further design details of these ancillary spaces are to be developed.
 - 3.3.9 Cycle stores for residents'. Entry to the stores must be restricted to genuine cyclists only, on application to the managers of the building.
 - 3.3.10 The boundary treatments to the proposed rear parking court are vitally important to secure it and to preventing unauthorised access to private spaces. The sides and rear of the site, including the amenity areas, should be defined as private space, and adequately secured to prevent unauthorised access (Refer to 4.5). Care should be taken to ensure ground level changes do not inadvertently facilitate scaling boundaries or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates.
 - 3.3.11 Communal facilities, amenity and parking court. The robust management of such areas is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour.
 - 3.3.12 Security measures carefully incorporated into the building design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime. The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to STS202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
- ☐ Arrangements for residents to admit visitors. Communal entrance and inner lobby / zone doors should be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on a phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can confirm the identity of visitors before allowing them access themselves.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The post boxes themselves should be of robust construction, with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access-controlled main entrance.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead.
- ☐ Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Doors to storage / meter rooms should have 44mm solid core doors, 3 hinges, with a mortised sash lock to BS3621/8621 to allow the rooms to be secured when not in use.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ Any external french/double doors or sliding doors to easily accessible balconies or terraces should also be certified to BS PAS 24, SPS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2 and should include laminated glazing (see below).
- ☐ The doors to the cycle store should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2, or be steel gates within steel frames. These doors/gates should both be self-closing and lock securely upon closure and be accessible by a programmable fob.
- ☐ Any shutters or sectional overhead doors must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2. If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- ☐ The vehicular and pedestrian access and egress points to the car park should be secured with automatic 2100-2400mm high gates. Ideally, the vehicular gates should be sliding. If not, any double gates should overlap when closed and should not be capable of being forced open. They should operate as quickly as is safely possible, in order to reduce the opportunities for tailgating/unauthorised access. The pedestrian gate if required, should be self-closing/locking and any internal release button/mechanism should not be capable of being reached or operated from the public side of the fence line. The gates should be controlled on access by residents key-fob/proximity reader or via an audio access-control system for visitors (linked to individual apartment within the building). Ideally, there should be no automatic egress (i.e. access control 'out' through the vehicular gates via residents key-fob).

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- ☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ Secure boundaries should be formed around the car park and residential boundaries. Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of walls and railings should have railing panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid.
- ☐ Inward opening automatic gates to provide access to the courtyard area must be certified to one of the following standards:
 - LPS 1175: Issue 7, SR2
 - STS 202: Issue 3, BR2
 - Sold Secure Gold
- ☐ PAS 68: 2013

4.6 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors (manual override is also permissible).
- ☐ Lighting in the car park should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout/lux plan.
- ☐ Lighting to undercroft parking areas should display an average lux level of 75-100, with a uniformity level of no less than 50%.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.8 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [Main entrances](#), [foyer](#), [stairs](#), [lift lobbies](#), [landings](#), [cycle stores](#), [bin store entrances](#).

4.9 Other

- ☐ Meter cupboards to apartments should be located to the fronts of properties only or within a secure cupboard / room inside the block but not inside individual apartments. Smart meters are acceptable.
- ☐ Any externally-mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- ☐ Partition walls between flats and corridors should be of masonry construction or include reinforcement such as a layer of expanded metal mesh.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction, and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the buildings. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
16/09/2021	Maddox Planning	CIS instruction received
22/09/2021	Maddox Planning	Fee agreed / commission confirmed
19/10/2021	DfS	Site visit
28/09/2021	GMP finance	Invoice issued
19/10/2021	DfS	CIS version A issued
19/04/2022	DfS	CIS version B issued
09/05/2022	DfS	CIS version C issued
29/07/2022	DfS	CIS version C issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
A20045-20101	Ground Floor Plan	23/04/21	
A20045-20102	First Floor Plan	23/04/21	
A20045-20103	Second Floor Plan	23/04/21	
A20045-20201	Elevations	23/04/21	
A20045-90001	Site Location Plan	10/09/21	
A20045-90100	Proposed Site Plan	10/09/21	
	A20045-SASA-90100 - Proposed Site Plan	22/07/22	
	A20045-SASA-20101 - Ground Floor Plan	22/07/22	
	A20045-SASA-20102 - First Floor Plan	22/07/22	
	A20045-SASA-20103 - Second Floor Plan	22/07/22	
	A20045-SASA-20104 - Roof Plan	22/07/22	
	A20045-SASA-20201 - Elevations	22/07/22	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Unit numbers revised to 24 from 26	19/04/22
C	Client name amended	09/05/22
D	Proposed scheme amended	29/07/22

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door / window assemblies.

A performance standard for door-sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door-set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door-sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a

6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB / PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk