



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

68-70 OLDHAM STREET & 61 SPEAR STREET, MANCHESTER
APARTHOTEL (4,664sqm.) & COMMERCIAL SPACE (233sqm.)

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FOR: Jadebricks Manchester Limited

VERSION A: 15/09/2022

REFERENCE: 2017/0286/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security additions/improvements required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Control of access into and around the aparthotel – including to the external entrances, onto bedroom levels, to the guest basement facilities and to all to all back-of-house/staff areas. All stairwells and lifts serving bedroom floors should be fitted with access controls, to ensure that only guests who have already booked in at reception and are staying at the aparthotel can access bedroom floors.
- Treatment of Back Spear Street - a very narrow, partially hidden service route that could leave accessible rear doors and windows potentially vulnerable to attack unseen – including lighting, monitored CCTV coverage and removal of the existing external escape stair if possible.
- Given that the commercial units will front onto Spear Street – also a narrow route that benefits from more limited levels of activity, pedestrian footfall and vehicular movement - consideration should be given to protecting them with shutters out-of-hours.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development. The overall security of the development will be heavily reliant on the continuous effective management of the aparthotel and the commercial premises, rather than just the physical measures recommended in the report.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Sections 4 & 5 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site is bounded by Oldham Street to the west, Warwick Street to the north and Spear Street to the east. It is currently occupied by 2 no. 2/3/4 storey commercial buildings, including a vacant retail unit fronting onto Oldham Street with vacant upper floors above and a former warehouse fronting onto Spear Street that is currently in use as offices.



The site shares a party wall with the adjacent Castle Hotel public house (fronting onto Oldham Street), which is Grade II listed. On the opposite side of Warwick Road are some residential blocks, with ground floor commercial units, currently under construction. The Hive, an office development with ground floor commercial units, lies on the opposite side of Spear Street from the site. It has ground floor units with glazed frontages onto Spear Street, although many of them are partially obscured along the street and front onto the arcade running through the building – meaning they provide little natural surveillance over the street itself.

The site lies within the Northern Quarter district of the city, which houses a concentration of independent retail units, bars, cafés/restaurants and office premises, as well as some residential units and hotels.

Oldham Street is a wide thoroughfare, busy with vehicular traffic and pedestrian movement – as a result, it benefits from good levels of natural surveillance and overlooking.

In contrast, Warwick Street and, in particular, Spear Street are much narrower streets which have more limited levels of activity, pedestrian footfall and vehicular movement. Many of the properties along this stretch of Spear Street back onto the route itself, leaving numerous blank facades or window and door openings that have either been secured (with grilles or shutters) or have been bricked up. There are many similar 'back' streets within the city centre, which can leave adjacent buildings potentially vulnerable to unauthorised access or damage unseen, as well as to nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues, and can leave pedestrians using them somewhat remote/isolated.

Back Spear Street is a very narrow, partially hidden rear access/service route serving the buildings occupying the site, as well as the adjacent buildings fronting onto Oldham Street and Spear Street. There are hidden external access/escape stairs to the rear of the site, which may provide opportunities for offenders to exploit, and many of the adjacent window openings and walls have been secured with grilles/bars and have been graffitied – indicating the presence of crime and disorder issues.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st August 2021 to 31st July 2022.

2.1 Crime Summary



Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
78	182	297	1755	1317	202	52	507	37	107

- 2.1.1 In the local area, the volume of crime is very high, particularly the levels of violence and theft, reflecting the site's location within the city centre. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of city centres – where there is a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of such crime and disorder issues.
- 2.1.2 Reported less serious wounding crimes have taken place throughout the surrounding area, with particularly concentrations around Piccadilly Gardens and the Northern Quarter area. The majority of the violence in the local area has taken place in the evening and during early hours of the morning, with a higher volume of incidents typically experienced between Friday and Sunday – when more people visit the city and attend licensed premises (often for longer periods and consuming more alcohol, leading to conflicts). Thefts in the local area have mostly been taking place within/around the licenced premises, restaurants and retail premises, with offenders primarily targeting mobile phones, wallets/purses and cash belonging to patrons. Offenders have particularly used pick-pocketing and distraction methods to obtain the personal belongings or have targeted insecure bags/coats stored underneath tables or on the back of chairs.
- 2.1.3 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed apart-hotel with ground floor/basement commercial units, the more detailed analysis below will look at use-specific burglary and theft.


2.2 Crime Rate Comparison

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.




- 2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **54% lower** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **41% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **40% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.2 The rate of woundings (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **9% higher** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **48% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **183% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (km), Manchester and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (km), Manchester and Greater Manchester




- 2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **16%** lower than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **10% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **34% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **158%** higher than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **325% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **416% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.


2.3 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.


Domestic Burglary – Day Range



Domestic Burglary – Time Range






Domestic Burglary – Point of Entry



- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of domestic burglary in the local area peaks on Monday and Wednesday.
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of domestic burglary fluctuates, peaking during the early hours of the morning, around midday and late afternoon/early evening. Offenders often target residential properties at night when it is dark, streets are typically quieter than during the day and they perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected. During the day, residents are more likely to be away from home (at work or otherwise), meaning offenders can attempt to gain access without being disturbed.
- 2.3.3 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:
- Offenders have exploited insecure communal entrances or have tailgated into apartment buildings behind genuine visitors/residents to gain access unnoticed.
 - Doors have been targeted (a common M.O. when apartments are burgled) and have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure.
 - Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.

2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Hotels): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against hotels, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018-2019.




- 2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary at Manchester hotels fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Tuesday. During the day, the risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning. It is likely that offenders target hotels at these times when guests are likely to be out of their rooms or when staffing levels are likely to be lower – allowing offender's time to attempt to gain unauthorised access without being detected.
- 2.4.2 **Point of Entry:** In the majority of burglaries at Manchester hotels, the point of entry has not been determined. It is likely that these burglaries have occurred when offenders have entered hotels posing as legitimate guests and have gained access to back-of-house areas or hotel rooms without using force

– possibly when they have been left insecure by guests/cleaners or by using stolen or forged keys/cards. Doors have also been forced open, using bodily pressure and implements/tools to gain entry.

2.5 Theft (Manchester Hotels): Risk Analysis


The data below relates to thefts within/against hotels, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018-2019.




- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of theft at Manchester hotels generally increases over the weekend. It is possible that the risk increases at these times when hotels typically have more guests and the opportunity to carry out such offences is greater. However, offenders do also target hotels between Monday and Friday, when they are typically less busy and they perceive a lower risk of being caught/challenged. The risk of theft is greatest around lunchtime and in the evening/early hours of the morning. This is when hotel restaurants, bars and gyms are likely to be at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Thefts of personal property (such as mobile phones, bags and purses/wallets) are the most routinely stolen items.

2.6 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.



- 2.6.1 **Day Range:** The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester peaks slightly on Wednesday, but remains relatively consistently high across the week.
- 2.6.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary peaks late at night and during in the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target commercial premises at these times when they are closed, it is dark and the areas in which they are typically located are quiet - all of which contribute to offenders perceiving a lower risk of being observed or detected.



2.6.3 **Point of Entry:** In burglaries at Manchester retail premises, the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through shutters, forcing them open by various means including using implements to force them upwards, using vehicles to ram them and using tools to cut through them.
- Offenders have also routinely forced open doors with bodily pressure and tools, as well as smashing glazed panels within them to gain unauthorised access.
- Windows have also been prised open or smashed by offenders.
- A high number of burglaries are recorded as having 'legitimate' or 'unknown' entry points. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers before targeting restricted/back-of-house areas (such as staff rooms, stock rooms etc.) unnoticed.
- Offenders have gained access to premises by gaining access through the roofs of single-storey elements or by penetrating through walls.

2.7 Theft (Manchester Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.




2.7.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester retail premises remains consistently high across the week. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated in the afternoon and early evening. This is when retail premises are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to offend are greater. The majority of thefts are either of staff property or of/from the handbags of shoppers (such as mobile phones, purses etc.). Theft of staff property are more likely to be noticed at

either midday, when lunch breaks are taken, or during the late afternoon when staff are leaving for the day.

2.1 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018-2019.



- 2.1.1 **Day Range:** The risk of burglary at restaurants/cafés in Manchester fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Monday, Thursday and Sunday.
- 2.1.2 **Time Range:** The risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning, when premises are usually closed.
- 2.1.3 **Point of Entry:** In the majority of cases where entry points are known, offenders have entered Manchester restaurants/cafés through external doors. Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools/implements and glazing within doors/windows has been smashed to gain entry. Offenders have also posed as legitimate customers before targeting insecure doors, tailgating, or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas when premises are open to the public.

2.2 Theft (Manchester Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018-2019.



- 2.2.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester restaurants/cafés peaks over the weekend. Many premises experience higher levels of attendance at the weekend than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunities for offenders to commit theft is greater.
- 2.2.2 **Time Range:** The risk of theft peaks in the afternoon and into the evening. This reflects the times when restaurants/cafés are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses/wallets and mobile phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items. Offenders have also targeted I.T equipment within premises, particularly tablets and laptops, as well as alcohol from storage rooms.


2.3 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Offices): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.



- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester is greatest on Tuesday, Thursday and Sunday.
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary at Manchester office premises rises into the evening/late at night. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.

Manchester Office Burglary – Point of Entry




- 2.3.3 **Point of Entry:** The majority of burglaries at offices in Manchester have been committed through doors. Burglaries against office buildings in this area do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing tools with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks. Offenders have also smashed glazed panels in doors and windows to gain entry. A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through 'unknown' and 'legitimate' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.


2.4 Theft (Manchester Offices): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.

Manchester Office Theft – Day Range



Manchester Office Theft – Time Range



- 2.4.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester offices is greatest on Monday and Tuesday and is generally lower over the weekend (when many are shut).
- 2.4.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking around midday. During these times, many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out.

2.5 General Risk Factors

2.5.1 **Residential:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Anti-social behaviour
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Neighbour disputes
- Poor maintenance of access control systems
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.5.2 **Hotels:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary of hotel rooms
- Robbery to business
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Employee theft
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Violence towards staff
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.5.3 **Retail:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery
- Shoplifting
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Employee theft
- Loitering groups
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.5.4 **Restaurants & Cafes:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict
- Miscellaneous theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery/wounding of patrons leaving premises
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.5.5 **Offices:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Employee theft
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.6 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.6.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting local residential properties and Manchester hotels, retail premises, cafés/restaurants and offices are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- **Local Residential:** Offenders have exploited insecure communal entrances or have tailgated into apartment buildings behind genuine visitors/residents to gain access unnoticed.

Possible Solution – A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to apartment blocks before allowing them access (see Sections 4.1/4.2). The main communal entrance to the block should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. Consideration could also be given to ‘airlock’ lobby system, which features a secondary entrance door that only releases when the external door has closed, reducing the opportunities for tailgating unnoticed.

- **Local Residential:** Doors have been targeted (a common M.O. when apartments are burgled) and have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Sections 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.

All individual apartments should also be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (also see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the

attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection. There should be no balconies that would be publicly accessible from street level.

- **Local Residential:** Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

- **Manchester Hotels:** Offenders, posing as guests or legitimate customers, accessing staff-only/restricted areas to steal property

Possible Solution - The main reception should be located to have full view of everyone entering and leaving the premises and all routes to bedrooms and staff areas. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour. Access controls should be used to restrict access to vulnerable areas and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work (see Sections 4.1/4.2).

- **Manchester Hotels:** Offenders entering rooms using forged or stolen electronic key-cards/fobs or by exploiting insecure doors

Possible Solution - Auditable electric locking systems (such as Vingcard, Salto or similar) should be used, which can be easily activated/disabled electronically by reception staff (see Sections 4.1/4.2).

- **Manchester Hotels:** Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tool/implements to gain entry

Possible Solution - All external doors and ideally individual bedroom doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Access controls should also be utilised to prevent non-guest access to bedroom areas/floors (see Sections 4.1/4.2) and CCTV covering access corridors should be monitored at the staffed reception desk to ensure there can be an immediate response to any issues recorded (see Section 4.7).

- **Manchester Hotels:** Theft of personal property from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables

Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with ‘Chelsea Clips’ to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats. The layout of any bars/restaurants/lounges can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment. External seating areas should be enclosed to clearly define them as separate from adjacent pedestrian routes.

- **Manchester Offices, Retail & Restaurants/Cafes:** Doors have been forced open with tools and bodily pressure to gain entry

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting (see Section 5.6) and CCTV (see Section 5.7) can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.

- **Manchester Offices:** Offenders posing as legitimate customers/visitors to gain access and steal items of personal property

Possible Solution – There should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that callers to the office building are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed access into them (see Sections 5.4). All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be secure areas for staff to store their belongings while at work. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour.

- **Manchester Offices & Restaurants/Cafes:** Glazing in doors and windows has been smashed to gain access

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 5.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

- **Manchester Retail:** A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through shutters, forcing them open by various means including using implements to force them upwards, using vehicles to ram them and using tools to cut through them

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 5.2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, ideally the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack.

- **Manchester Retail:** Windows have also been prised open or smashed by offenders

Possible Solution - All external windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 5.2) where possible, which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 5.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Vulnerable shopfronts should be secured with security-certified shutters out-of-hours.

- **Manchester Retail & Restaurants/Cafes:** A high number of burglaries are recorded as having 'legitimate' or 'unknown' entry points. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers before targeting restricted/back-of-house areas (such as staff rooms, stock rooms etc.) unnoticed

Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Section 5.4).

- **Manchester Retail:** Offenders have gained access to premises by gaining access through the roofs of single-storey elements or by penetrating through walls.

Possible Solution - Ideally, single storey building elements should be avoided. If they are absolutely necessary, care should be taken in their design to ensure that roof areas or upper floor windows are not accessible, for example, with the use of high-level/overhanging eaves, high balustrades etc. There should be no features of the building or any nearby hard/soft landscaping features that would facilitate climbing. Any 'accessible' skylights should incorporate at least one pane of laminated glazing and should be secured with internally fixed grilles/bars to prevent unauthorised access. The construction of the roof itself and all external walls should also be robust enough to withstand penetration.

- **Manchester Restaurants/Cafes & Retail:** Theft of personal property from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables

Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats (see Section 6). The layout of any bars/restaurants/lounges can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment. External seating areas should be enclosed to clearly define them as separate from adjacent pedestrian routes.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to partially demolish the existing buildings, convert the existing warehouse building, erect a rooftop extension and a new 10 storey building to create an aparthotel and 2 no. commercial units (Use Class E). The scheme will include:
- 117 no. 2, 3 & 4 person hotel bedrooms;
 - Ancillary ground floor guest lounge space with kitchen facility;
 - Guest luggage store;
 - Guest gym & laundry facilities;
 - Staff changing facilities, break room and offices;
 - 15 no. secure cycle space storage for staff use;
 - Service access off Warwick Street and back-of-house service facilities; and
 - 2 no. ground floor commercial units, one of which extends into the existing basement.
- 3.1.2 The main entrance & reception foyer serving the aparthotel will be located at ground floor level and will be accessed off Warwick Street, with a secondary entrance off Oldham Street. The ground floor will house the reception, a lounge space, a communal kitchen, a guest luggage store, Accessible W/C, staff offices, a staff cycle store, a bin store and plant space. The basement will house plant, linen services space, a guest gym, a guest laundry, guest W/Cs, staff W/Cs and staff changing and break rooms. The hotel bedrooms will be located on the upper floors, from Level 01 to 09, with an external guest terrace at Level 06.
- 3.1.3 The 2 no. self-contained commercial units will front onto the junction of Warwick Street/Spear Street and onto Spear Street respectively. The larger of the two commercial units (fronting onto Spear Street) will also extend into the existing basement of the warehouse building.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

- 3.2.1 *The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.*
- 3.2.2 The proposed development will bring additional activity and surveillance to the area, at all times of the day and night.
- 3.2.3 The footprint of the building will include few recesses that could hide windows or doors and leave them potentially vulnerable to attack unseen.
- 3.2.4 The building will present an active frontages onto Oldham Street, Warwick Street and Spear Street, enlivening the street scene and helping to provide useful natural surveillance over the surrounding public realm.
- 3.2.5 The hotel reception area will be located directly adjacent to the main entrance, providing staff with good views of all people entering/leaving the building and to external circulation areas. Staff should be able to observe and direct members of the public and deter unauthorised access to bedroom floors.
- 3.2.6 The scheme will be staffed and managed on a 24/7 basis, with a CCTV system installed throughout the building to allow staff to monitor movement of guests, visitors and identify potential intruders.
- 3.2.7 The layout of the hotel corridors provide clear views and contain no recessed areas that could conceal criminal activity.
- 3.2.8 The hotel bedrooms will be provided above street level, reducing the potential impacts of any noise, nuisance or anti-social behaviour.
- 3.2.9 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The control of access into and around the aparthotel is paramount to the security of the scheme. The ground floor reception desk within the entrance lobby must be staffed at all times and should have a full, unimpeded views of everyone entering/leaving the building. The main entrance doors to the hotel off Warwick Street (as well as the secondary entrance off Oldham Street) should be capable of being controlled remotely by reception staff if/when required (e.g. into the evening/at night) to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/anti-social behaviour in/around the lobby/lounge space. The stair cores and lifts serving all levels of the building should only be accessible/operable by guest key-card, ensuring that non-guests cannot access the upper floor bedroom levels. Guests should only be able to gain access to their particular bedroom floor and no other and only guests should be able to access the basement facilities (see Sections 4.1/4.2).
- 3.3.2 Back Spear Street is a very narrow, partially hidden service route to the rear of the proposed building and the adjacent buildings fronting onto Oldham Street/Spear Street, which benefits from limited levels of passive surveillance or direct overlooking and could leave accessible rear doors and windows vulnerable to attack unseen. Ideally, the route should be gated to prevent unauthorised access to all but staff/servicing personnel, although it is appreciated that the route is partially outside of the red edge and this could be difficult to achieve given rear access is shared with a number of properties. At the very least, the route must be well-lit (see Section 4.6) and covered by CCTV monitored at reception (Section 4.7), ensuring there can be an immediate response to any issues recorded. If at all possible, it is highly recommended that the existing external escape stair to the rear of the warehouse building is removed, to prevent unauthorised access to the upper floor windows of the building or onto the roof of the structure. All doors and any upper floor windows potentially accessible from external escape stairs must be security-certified (see Sections 4.1/4.3) and contain laminated glazing (see Section 4.4).
- 3.3.3 Given that the commercial units will front onto Spear Street – also a narrow route that benefits from more limited levels of activity, pedestrian footfall and vehicular movement, they could perhaps be more vulnerable to damage or unauthorised access than those fronting onto a wider/busier thoroughfare where surveillance opportunities are maximised. Consideration should therefore be given to protecting any ground floor/potentially accessible glazing with shutters out-of-hours (see Section 5.2).
- 3.3.4 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security (Aparthotel)

In addition to the layout issues highlighted in Section 3, the following checklist (Sections 4 & 5) forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation if required.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ All external doors should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. Any escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ The main entrance to the aparthotel (off Warwick Street) will be formed by glazed sliding doors. These should be tested and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS EN 1627 RC2, incorporating laminated glazing (see below) and multi-point locking (preventing sliding and lifting when secure). Reception staff should be able to remotely secure and control access through the main entrance door if/when required (e.g. into the evening/at night). If, at any point, the reception desk is not staffed, the doors should be secured and operated by staff/guest key-card.
- ☐ The secondary entrance off Oldham Street should be security-certified (see above), self-closing and operated by staff/guest key-card at all times when the reception desk is not staffed.
- ☐ The external service entrance (off Warwick Street) and the external door to the staff cycle store (off Back Spear Street) should be security-certified (see above), self-closing and operated by staff key-card only.
- ☐ The ground floor internal doors into the stair cores serving the upper bedroom floors, as well as doors off the access cores at each level, should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick), self-closing and fitted with 3 hinges and electrically operated locks, operated by staff/guest key-card (which should fail safe in the event of a fire alarm), ensuring that non-guests cannot access bedroom floors (or the basement) and guests can only gain to their particular floor and no other. The lifts should also operate in the same way (i.e. by staff/guest key-card).
- ☐ All individual guest apartment doorsets should ideally be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, SPS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. At the very least, doorsets/frames should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick), self-closing and secured with 3 hinges and an electronically operated lock, controlled by Vingcard, Salto or similar. They should also be fitted with door viewers and chain limiters.
- ☐ Doors to the basement guest gym and laundry facilities should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick) with 3 hinges and an electrically operated lock operated by guest key-card. All other internal doors/frames to staff areas/rooms, offices, back-of-house facilities, the luggage store, the cycle store, plant areas and stores should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick) with 3 hinges and an electrically operated lock operated by staff key-card.
- ☐ Careful consideration should be given to the design of any cash office, which should have solid masonry walls, no false/suspended ceilings, a security-certified doorset (to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2) and a safe providing adequate capacity and overnight cover, certified to LPS 1183. The correct size and category of safe should be determined by an assessment of prospective takings and to meet insurance needs.

4.2 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by staff swipe card/fob or by guest key-card, and not numeric key pads (where codes can be easily observed or shared and are rarely changed). The following doors should operate on access control:
 - The main entrance doors off Warwick Street and the secondary entrance door off Oldham Street out-of-hours or if the reception desk is not staffed at any point – operated remotely by reception staff and via guest/staff key-card.
 - The service entrance door off Warwick Street and the staff cycle store entrance off Back Spear Street - operated via staff key-card.

- The lifts and all doors into stair cores at basement/ground/upper floor levels - operated by guest/staff key-card.
- The entrances into the basement guest gym and laundry facilities – operated by guest key-card.
- All staff-only/back-of-house areas/rooms, the luggage store and any cash office – operated by staff key-card.

- ☐ The electric locking system to be used throughout the building should be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Staff and guest key-cards should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled by staff to ensure that mis-use is prevented. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

4.3 Windows

- ☐ All ground floor, first floor and any potentially accessible upper floor windows (e.g. from roof terraces or retained external escape stairs) should be security-certified to BS PAS 24 where possible. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed.
- ☐ Any ground floor/accessible windows should be non-opening. Any other opening lights (escape requirements permitting) should be lockable, and have fixed opening restrictors limited to 100mm.

4.4 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All ground floor, first floor and any potentially accessible upper floor glazing must incorporate an internal pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining external pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be no features of the building (such as projecting window cills, recessed/projecting brickwork features or exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to upper level windows.
- ☐ Any louvres to plant areas or bin stores should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed, and designed to ensure that they cannot be used as a climbing aid to reach upper floor windows. Security-certified louvred doorsets are also available if required (see https://www.securedbydesign.com/index.php?option=com_sbd&view=catinfoprod&sbdcategory=Doors for accredited products).
- ☐ Any new internal walls between the aparthotel and the ground floor/basement commercial premises should either be of robust masonry construction or should incorporate timber sheathing (minimum 9mm thick) or expanded metal, in order to ensure that the building fabric is not vulnerable to attack/penetration.

4.5 Alarm

- ☐ Any internal/external escape doors should be fitted with alarm contacts, linked to an intruder alarm system, so that any mis-use or alarm activations are relayed to the hotel reception, allowing them to investigate or call the authorities as appropriate.

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to the exterior of the building and the surrounding public realm, in accordance with BS 5489. Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light (which offer superior colour rendition), as opposed to yellow/orange light, and fixtures must not be positioned where they may provide climbing aids up to high level windows. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.7 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an *acceptable standard* that will allow for *identification* of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are *overview* and *recognition*, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: *all external facades of the building (including all external doors), the entrance lobby/communal lounge area and all lift/stair lobbies and circulation corridors on each floor (including the basement).*
- ☐ It is highly recommended that the CCTV is capable of being monitored from the reception desk is monitored at the reception desk, to allow for an immediate response to any issues recorded.

4.8 Other

- ☐ Each guest apartment should have a small wall or floor safe, operated by a personal identification number (PIN) selected by each new guest.
- ☐ The secure cycle store for the use of hotel staff should include either secure lockers or stands that allow staff to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information refer to our cycle storage guidance document: <http://designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/>
- ☐ Lockers should be provided for the use of guests using the gym and within the staff changing rooms. The lockers themselves must be robust/secure and all users must be encouraged to use them and not leave belongs unattended/insecure. Staff should undertake regular inspections of the guest gym.
- ☐ A strategy should be prepared to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

5 Physical Security (Commercial Units)

5.1 Doors

- ☐ All external doorsets should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

5.2 Windows & Shutters

- ☐ All windows should be security-certified to BS PAS 24 where possible and should be non-opening. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed.
- ☐ Any shutters should be certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Shutters should either be provided internally or, if they are to be externally mounted, shutter boxes and guides built into the fabric of the building (where they would be less visually intrusive and less vulnerable to damage).

5.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All glazing must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Any new internal walls between the aparthotel and the ground floor/basement commercial premises should either be of robust masonry construction or should incorporate timber sheathing (minimum 9mm thick) or expanded metal, in order to ensure that the building fabric is not vulnerable to attack/penetration.

5.4 Internal Security/Access Controls

- ☐ All back-of-house/staff areas to any retail units or cafe/restaurant premises should not be publicly accessible. Internal doors to storage rooms, staff rooms or offices should be solid-core (minimum 44mm thick) and self-closing - fitted with auditable access controls (i.e. proximity readers or swipe cards) or secured with keys. Any cash office should have solid masonry walls, no adjacent false/suspended ceilings and a certified doorset to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.
- ☐ Any office premises should have a staffed reception desk adjacent to the main entrance and all visitors should report to the reception for vetting by staff before gaining access. The main entrance doors should be capable of being controlled remotely by reception staff if required (e.g. into the evening/at night) to prevent unauthorised access. Any internal doors/frames to individual offices should be solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and key-lockable so that they can be secured when unoccupied.
- ☐ Any electric locking system to be used throughout the premises should be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Any staff cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled to ensure that mis-use is prevented.

5.5 Alarms

- ☐ A comprehensive intruder alarm system should be installed to cover each of the premises, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (i.e. linked to an Alarm Receiving Centre, who will alert the key holder or a security patrol team).

5.6 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to the exterior of the building and the surrounding public realm, in accordance with BS 5489. Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light (which offer superior colour rendition), as opposed to yellow/orange light, and fixtures must not be positioned where they may provide climbing aids up to high level windows. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

5.7 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an *acceptable standard* that will allow for *identification* of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are *overview* and *recognition*, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: *all commercial unit frontages/facades, the main entrances to each unit, internal circulation areas, all sales counters/till positions and any customer seating areas.*

6 Internal Layout Guidance

The internal layout of any retail units or café/restaurant premises should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. Design for Security understands that the designers and client may not always know who will be occupying their units once complete, and therefore, the end-user requirements. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

6.1 Retail Premises

- 6.1.1 Clear views should also remain from the premises through to the public realm, i.e. large promotional signs should not obstruct views.
- 6.1.2 Careful consideration should be given to the location of paypoints to ensure that staff have full surveillance over the entrance to the unit.
- 6.1.3 Internal aisles and product displays should be aligned to assist surveillance from pay points and avoid blind-spots. There should be no items of high-value displayed close to the entrance of the unit.
- 6.1.4 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any tills, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.
- 6.1.5 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible (see Sections 5.4) and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.


6.2 Cafe/Restaurant Premises

- 6.2.1 Cafes/restaurants/licensed premises can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:
 - **Opportunities** - Large numbers of people congregating in restaurants/licensed premises generates opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons are stationary for long periods of time, making them easier to target.
 - **Lack of attention** - The movement of people, noise, social interaction and other factors mean patrons can be easily distracted.
 - **Cohesion** – Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent restaurants/licensed premises means that such a venue would lack 'community territoriality' (i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them). This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur.
 - **Customer turnover** – High turnover with high levels of customer movement within an establishment, are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
 - **Valuable goods** – Often available and possibly on show, a particular problem in external seating areas. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – such as mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys etc.
 - **Stealth** - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.

In order to minimise these issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:

- 6.2.2 The main entrances to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising.
- 6.2.3 Customers entering/leaving the premises through the main entrances should be easily observed by staff. Staff should also have clear views of any W/Cs to monitor their use.
- 6.2.4 The internal layout of premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.

- 6.2.5 Consideration should be given to high/wide bars/service counters, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of any bars/service counters should be prevented (e.g. with lockable hatches that cannot be easily scaled).
- 6.2.6 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.
- 6.2.7 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible (see Sections 5.1/5.4) and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.
- 6.2.8 It is highly recommended that any customer tables are fitted with Chelsea Clips, to reduce the opportunities for theft (see below).



- 6.2.9 Public toilets can give rise to problems and the following issues should be considered:
- Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work etc. should be used.
 - Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
 - Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening as this will aid gaining access in an emergency. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 200mm from the floor and to reduce the top height.
 - Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
 - Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
 - Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.

7 Management & Maintenance

- 7.1.1 Comprehensive security regimes for the management of the aparthotel and the commercial units must also be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the units. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plans should focus on issues such as:
- Opening and closing of premises, including staff arrival and departure;
 - Cash management within the premises - consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods;
 - Cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices (which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe to meet insurance needs);
 - Management of stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
 - Details of staff security training;
 - Location and management of any smoking areas;
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. access control systems, alarm systems, CCTV cameras, lighting etc;
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
 - Refuse collection arrangements.
- 7.1.2 The opening hours of any retail units or café/restaurant premises should be consistent with other such premises in the locale and should not unduly conflict with other nearby uses. Sufficient levels of service staff should be provided at busy periods to reduce waiting times and the potential for frustration, aggression and conflict.
- 7.1.3 Any high value equipment (e.g. computers/TVs, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 7.1.4 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the site and each of the premises, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff-only/back-of-house areas.
- 7.1.5 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left accessible for extended periods. Servicing activities should also not require any service doors to remain open and unattended for prolonged periods.

8 Construction

- 8.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 8.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

9 Useful References

9.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 9.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
2 nd August 2022	Turley	Receipt of CIS instruction form
3 rd to 4 th August 2022	Turley	Email correspondence re: details of scheme for fee calculation & receipt of revised instruction form
5 th August 2022	Turley	Quote issued & request for additional info
8 th August 2022	Turley	Confirmation of instruction/fee. Receipt of plans
9 th to 15 th August	Turley	Email correspondence re: timescales & letter of comfort
19 th August 2022	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment
1 st September 2022	Turley	Email correspondence re: timescales
9 th September 2022	Turley	Email received re: sending report

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
10338-SHP-A-G200-SK-00-002	Red Line Planning Boundary	02/08/22	01
10338-SHP-RP-B5D8-PA01	Planning Drawings	August 2022	-
10338-SHP-A-B5D8-RPT-DAS-001	Design and Access Statement	August 2022	00

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk