



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Jessiefield, Spath Road
26 No. Retirement Apartments

FOR: McCarthy and Stone

VERSION A: 12th September

REFERENCE: 2009/0291/CIS/02

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Jessiefield, Spath Road

2009/0291/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recommendations made

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - <http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/>), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed residential development is acceptable in general; however there are a number of points that should be considered.

- The site boundaries should be carefully considered to prevent those criminally, or antisocially minded, from entering the site and accessing resident's amenity space.
- The ground floor apartment on the front elevation of the building should be afforded defensible space with a low boundary or similar.
- Physical security and access control of the building should be carefully considered.

More details can be found in section 3.3 where there are a number of recommendations made which would enhance the security of the development and it is highly recommended that these are considered. It is also recommended that the development is built to Secured by Design standards.



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1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located in the Didsbury area, within the city of Manchester.

The site is located on the junction of Spath Road and Lancaster Road. The development site is presently a residential dwelling and associated private garden/grounds. The site is roughly rectangular with the publicly accessible boundaries of the site being defined by Spath Road and Lancaster Road. The main entrance to the site is presently taken from Spath Road.

The local area is generally residential with a number of large, detached houses in the local area, some of which have been converted to apartment buildings.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st September 2021 to 31st August 2022.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
30	12	12	45	17	<5	<5	22	7	<5

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is 61% below the average rate of crime for the Manchester division. Less serious wounding, domestic burglary and vehicle crime have been the highest recorded offences taking place within the local area. Offences have mostly occurred along Barlow Moor Road and Palatine Road which are the main arterial routes running through the local area.
- 2.1.2 Less serious wounding offences have mostly consisted of assaults, harassment, and public order offences. Offences have mostly taken place to the west of the proposed site, along Palatine Road and the surrounding residential streets. Offences have mostly occurred during a domestic dispute within the dwelling or between known associates.
- 2.1.3 Domestic burglaries have taken place throughout the local area, with a number of offences taking place to the east of the proposed site, around Claremont Grove and to the west around Mersey Road. The majority of the streets targeted are within close proximity to Barlow Moor Road and Palatine Road, which is a main road running through Didsbury, making it an easy escape route for offenders to leave the area without being noticed. Offenders have mostly targeted the rear of properties, forcing entry.
- 2.1.4 Theft from a motor vehicle has been the highest recorded vehicle crime taking place within the local area. Offenders have targeted securely parked vehicles, outside dwellings and using residential car parks. Glazing in windows and doors has been smashed, creating entry points for offenders, as well as offenders using devices in order to override the locking mechanism and tools to remove vehicle registration plates.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Forcing open secure windows and doors (mostly to the rear of the property) using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain entry to the property.

Possible Solution - All external door sets should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (see section 4.1). Rear doors should be positioned within the secure rear boundary to restrict access to residents. Ground floor and easily accessible windows should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (i.e. BS PAS 24).

- 2.2.2 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.

Possible Solution - Front doors should have split spindles or a fixed external handle so then cannot be opened from outside without a key. Rear doors should be positioned in secure rear gardens with appropriate boundary treatments. Ground floor windows should have restrictors installed so that they cannot be opened from the outside if left insecure.

- 2.2.3 Breaking glazing in windows and doors using implements.

Possible Solution - All ground floor and easily accessible glazing should be laminated to prevent it from being easily damaged by offenders to gain entry (see section 4.3. for more details).

2.3 Risk Factors





The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary

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- Theft from gardens, sheds, or garages
 - Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
 - Theft of, or from, vehicles
 - Bogus callers and distraction burglary
 - Anti-social behaviour
 - Neighbour disputes
 - Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
 - Unauthorised access to private spaces
 - Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Crime Rate Comparison

The rates below relate to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.




- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **17% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **7% higher** than Greater Manchester and **10% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **86% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **81% lower** than Greater Manchester and **64% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **83% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **77% lower** than Greater Manchester and **73% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **57% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **29% lower** than Greater Manchester and **13% lower** than England & Wales.


2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.


Burglary Dwelling – Day Range



Burglary Dwelling – Time Range



Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry





2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary in the local area peaks on a Thursday and Saturday during the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target dwellings in the early hours of the morning when it is dark and there is less foot fall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.
- Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.
- Entering the garden of the property and using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the garage/ shed.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on a Thursday, during the afternoon and into the late evening. Offenders often target vehicles during the afternoon and evening as vehicles are likely to be left unattended for long periods of time, often out of sight of the owner, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development is of a 26 no. apartment retirement home.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The site is located on the junction of Spath Road and Lancaster Road, both of which are well used by those on foot and in vehicles, allowing for passive surveillance opportunities.
- 3.2.2 The main car parking area will be located to the front of the building, where it can be easily seen from the street, as well as being well-overlooked from resident and staff spaces within the building.
- 3.2.3 The proposed building will be staffed with a reception positioned in close proximity to the main entrance - allowing staff to view and vet those arriving or leaving via the main entrance.
- 3.2.4 The main site boundary will be defined with 2100mm close boarded timber fence.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Access from the front of the building to the rear amenity space should be restricted to residents and staff, to prevent misuse of this space where someone criminally, or antisocially minded, to gain access. It is highly recommended that a secure 1800mm boundary, with access-controlled pedestrian gates, restricting access to legitimate users.
- 3.3.2 The ground floor apartment on the front elevation should have a defensible space buffer, i.e. a low boundary, so that the external windows/doors cannot be easily accessed.
- 3.3.3 The main entrance into the building should be capable of being operated on an access control system so that access can be restricted when the reception area is not staffed or out of typical visiting hours, such as late in the evening and during the night. The access control system should be a video intercom, allowing residents and staff to properly vet visitors.

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- 3.3.4 Access from main lobby area into residential areas of the building should be restricted with an access control system, restricting access to residents, staff, and legitimate visitors.
- 3.3.5 Ground floor apartment windows should be fitted with window restrictors to prevent them being opened externally if not secured.
- 3.3.6 Landscaping of grounds should be carefully considered, to avoid creating any areas which could be exploited by offenders. It is recommended that in close proximity to the building, parking areas, and access roads/paths that planting is maintained to a level where it does not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should be a minimum of 2400mm from the ground; this is to ensure that good sightlines can be maintained.
- 3.3.7 The car parking area, any pedestrian routes, and the main entrance should be illuminated to a high standard to deter misuse and to allow residents/staff to be alerted to any misuse.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system - these features should be permitted under the scope of the security certification. The main entrance door and doors off the lobby area should be controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set), so that residents can vet callers to the building before allowing them access.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Communal doors located within the corridors should include glazed elements to assist sight lines.
- ☐ Ground floor external French/double doors or sliding patio doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Any external escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ The internal doors/frames providing access to any offices, plant, and stores, should be solid-core and capable of being deadlocked to secure them when unoccupied.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems

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- ☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors and, PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

4.5 Access Controls

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following doors should operate on access control:
- Communal entrance doors
 - Internal lobby doors
 - Bin stores
 - Staff only areas/stores

4.6 Boundaries

- ☐ Secure boundaries should be formed of 2100mm high walls / railings (with no mid-rails that could aid climbing). Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of walls and railings should have railing panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid.
- ☐ Access from the front of the building to the rear amenity space should be restricted with a 1800mm high boundary.
- ☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.

4.7 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.8 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to the front and rear of dwellings, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended for these locations and should not be employed unless advised.
- ☐ Lighting to the access road and in parking areas should be in accordance with BS 5489 and display an average lux level of 20 lux with a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- ☐ Lighting to public / communal areas (including footpaths and roads) should be evenly distributed and not create areas of shadowing or pooling. Any low-level lighting should be positioned to avoid creating glare.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.

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- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.9 Other

- ☐ Meter cupboards to apartments should be located to the fronts of properties only or within a secure cupboard / room inside the block but not inside individual apartments. Smart meters are acceptable.
- ☐ Any externally mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the buildings. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.
- ☐ Bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire-resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.
- ☐ Mailboxes should be obtained from a supplier approved by Secured by Design and installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions (see www.securedbydesign.com).

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The designer must ensure that this report is included within the BIM management model so that all parties are aware of the requirements for construction and management.
- 5.1.2 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable, and up to date. All staff and residents should understand and accept the need for security measures, and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 5.1.3 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter and graffiti removal to ensure that the site remains in good repair.
 - Regular inspection, service, and repair to communal security features (lighting, signage, access controls, alarms, fencing & gates)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees to ensure that sight lines are maintained, and coverage of lighting is not impaired.
- 5.1.4 Ensure that the site management is for which the site was designed remains in place, such as 24-hour concierge / security patrols.
- 5.1.5 Information regarding security features (such as specifications of windows / doors and systems performance) should be conveyed to the ultimate owners or managers of the site to ensure that any future replacements continue to provide the same level of security and maintain any security accreditation for the development.

6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

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- 6.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

7 Construction

- 7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible, and accountable.
- 7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
05/09/2022	Martin Aston	CIS instruction received
12/09/2022	Martin Aston	Progress update

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
NO-2697-3-AC – 0001	Location Plan	07/07/22	
NO-2697-3-AC – 0002	Proposed Site Plan	15/06/22	
NO-2697-3-AC – 1000	Proposed Floor Plan	12/08/22	
NO-2697-3-AC – 2001	Proposed Elevations 1 of 2	12/08/22	
NO-2697-3-AC – 2002	Proposed Elevations 2 of 2	12/08/22	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		